

**БРАКИ ПРАВОСЛАВНЫХ СО СТАРООБРЯДЦАМИ
В БЕССАРАБИИ В 1813-1837 ГГ.**

**MARRIAGES OF ORTHODOX WITH OLD BELIEVERS
IN BESSARABIA BETWEEN 1813-1837**

Алина Феля

Институт истории АИМ (Кишинев)

afelea44@yahoo.com

Rezumat: *Căsătorile ortodocșilor cu credincioșii de rit vechi în Basarabia între 1813-1837*

În Evul Mediu și epoca modernă, inclusiv la începutul secolului al XIX-lea, căsătoria a fost instituția care s-a ghidat după dreptul canonic. O condiție preliminară pentru recunoașterea legitimității căsătoriei a fost unitatea religioasă, deosebirea de credință constituind un impediment important pentru încheierea acesteia.

La începutul secolului al XIX-lea, în teritoriul dintre Prut și Nistru, reglementarea problemelor familiale intra în competențele autorităților clericale, întemeindu-se pe tradiția și normele juridice locale. În articol, pe baza unor exemple concrete din Basarabia, autorul a prezentat problema căsătoriilor mixte din punct de vedere confesional: între ortodocși și lipoveni (ortodocși ruși de rit vechi). Ca surse de cercetare s-au folosit documente din fondurile Arhivei de Stat a Republicii Moldova.

Abstract: *In the Middle Age and the Modern era, even in the early 19th century, marriage was the institution guided by the canon law. A prerequisite for the recognition of the marriage legitimacy was the religious unity, the difference of believes being an imperious obstacle.*

In the early nineteenth century in the territory between the Prut and Dniester the family problems were resolved by ecclesiastic authorities and based on local rules of law and tradition. In the article, based on concrete examples of Bessarabia, we will present the reality of the problem of mixed marriages, between Orthodox and Old believers/Starovery. As sources of research were used documents from the funds of the State Archives of Republic of Moldova.

Résumé: *Les mariages des Orthodoxes avec les fidèles de rite ancien en Bessarabie entre 1813-1837*

Au Moyen Age et à l'époque moderne, même au début du XIX^e siècle, le mariage était l'institution qui est guidée par le droit canonique. Une condition préalable à la

reconnaissance de la légitimité du mariage était l'unité religieuse, la différence être un obstacle impérieux.

Au début du XIXe siècle sur le territoire entre le Prut et le Dniestr la réglementation des problèmes familiaux ont été en compétence des autorités ecclésiastiques et sont basées sur des normes locales du droit et sur la coutume. L'article ci-joint, basé sur des exemples concrets de la Bessarabie, fait référence aux mixtes mariages: entre Orthodoxes et Starover. La recherche se base sur les matériaux des Archives de l'Etat de la République Moldova.

Keywords: mixed marriages, Bessarabia, family, orthodox, Lipovan.

Вступление

В современном обществе смешанные браки и семьи являются реальностью и не вызывают никаких вопросов. Другой была ситуация до середины XIX века. В средние века и в новое время (до середины XIX века) институт брака в румынском пространстве руководствовался каноническим правом. Брак был действительным, если он был правильным с точки зрения законов государства, но особенно с точки зрения церкви¹. Священное писание гласит: «Что Бог сочетал, человек да не разлучает» (Мф. 19, 4-6). Христианская церковь считает брак действительным, если были соблюдены несколько условий:

- 1) Принятие женихами Святого Крещения.
- 2) Принятие женихами Таинства брака.
- 3) Соблюдение установленного возраста для брака.
- 4) Отсутствие запрещенных степеней родства, включая и духовное родство.
- 5) Лица, желающие вступить в брак, должны быть свободны от брачных уз.
- 6) Разрешение вступать в брак три раза, четвертый брак был запрещен.
- 7) Согласие родителей и брачующихся.
- 8) **Единая православная вера женихов.**

Смешанный брак в религиозных терминах был вызовом не только для Православной Церкви, но и для общества и женихов, которым приходилось сталкиваться с осуждением со стороны общины, родственников, соседей.

После аннексии Бессарабии Российской Империей в 1812 году, некоторое время при решении вопросов, связанных с браком, семейными спорами,

¹N. Fuștei, *Creștinismul pe înțelesul tuturor* [Christianity Explained], Chișinău, 2008, p. 284.

разводом учитывались традиции и молдавское законодательство. В румынских сводах законов, как в Молдавском княжестве, так и в Валахии, «Карте ромыняскэ де ынвэцэтурэ» и «Ындрептаря лежий» смешанные браки, с точки зрения религии, не имели юридическую основу и относились к категории «браков, не соответствующих законам», «непозволительные», то есть запрещенными. «Карте ромыняскэ де ынвэцэтурэ» включала в эту категорию и браки, заключенные с еретиками².

В России, согласно Кормчей книге, были запрещены браки между представителями разных религий: «Недостойт мужу православному с женою еретическою браком совокуплятися, ни православной жене с мужем еретиком сочетаватися». Такие браки необходимо было расторгнуть: «Ибо не подобает смешивати несмешаемое...»³. С 1721 г. в России были разрешены браки христиан с католиками, протестантами и армянами. Согласно статьи 27-й Статуса Духовной консистории, женихи иноверцы, которые вступают в брак с православными, обязуются крестить и воспитывать детей в православной вере⁴.

Краткий обзор историографии

Происхождение и эволюция раскольнической церкви были предметом многочисленных исследований российской историографии⁵. В румынской

² *Carte românească de învățătură (1646)* [Romanian Book of Teaching], București, 1961, p. 145–146

³ М. К. Цатурова, *Русское семейное право XVI-XVIII вв.* [Russian family law of the 16th-18th centuries], Москва, 1991.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ Байдин В. И., *Уральское старообрядчество конца XVIII — середины XIX в. в дореволюционной и советской историографии* [The Old Believers of Urals at the end of the XVIIIth century and the mid-nineteenth century, in pre-revolutionary and Soviet historiography], in *Историография общественной мысли дореволюционного Урала*, Свердловск, 1988, с. 43-50; *Очерки истории старообрядчества Урала и сопредельных территорий* [Essays on the History of the Old Believers of Urals and adjacent territories], УрГУ, Лаб. археогр. исслед. Моск. патриархат, Екатеринбург. правосл. епархия, Екатеринбург. духов. уч.-ще. Екатеринбург: Изд-во Урал. гос. ун-та, 2000; *Традиционная духовная и материальная культура русских старообрядческих поселений в странах Европы, Азии и Америки* [Traditional spiritual and material culture of the Russian Old Believers settlements in Europe, Asia and America], Новосибирск, 1992; *Духовная литература староверов востока России XVIII-XX вв.* [Spiritual literature of the Old Believers of Eastern Russia in the 18th to 20th Centuries], Новосибирск, 1999; Кутузов Б. П., «Церковная» реформа XVIII в. как идеологическая диверсия и национальная катастрофа [The "Church's" Reform of the 18th Century as ideological subversion and national disaster], 4-е изд., перераб. И доп. Барнаул: Фонд

поддержки стр-ва храма Покрова Пресвятые Богородицы Рус. Правосл. Старообряд. Церкви, 2008; Мальцев А. И., *Староверы-странники в XVIII — первой половине XIX в.* [The Old Believers-wanderers from the 18th - the first half of the 20th centuries], Новосибирск, 1996; Мальцев А. Н., *Старообрядческие беспоповские согласия в XVIII — начале XIX в.: проблемы взаимоотношений* [Bezpopovtsy Old Believers consent of the 18th - the early of 19th century: Relationship problems], Новосибирск: Изд. Дом «Сова», 2006; Мельников Ф. Е., *Собрание сочинений. Т. 1. Краткая история древлеправославной (старообрядческой) церкви* [Works. T. 1. A Brief History of Ancient Orthodox (Old Believers) Church], 2006; Семибратов В. К., *Староверы федосеевцы Вятского края* [Fedoseevtsy Old Believers of Region Veatka], Москва, 2006; *Старообрядчество: история и культура* [Old Believers: History and Culture], Сб. науч. ст. Барнаул, Вып. 1. 1999.; Вып. 2. Барнаул, 2002; Байдин В. И., *Новые источники по организации и идеологии урало-сибирского старообрядчества конца XVIII — первой половины XIX вв.* [New sources for the organization and ideology of the Ural-Siberian Old Believers of the XVIII and the first half of the nineteenth century], in „Сибирское источниковедение и археография”, Новосибирск, 1980, с. 93-109; Байдин В. И., Гриненко А. А., «Родословие поморского согласия» — сочинение по истории старообрядчества на севере Оренбургского края в XVIII— XIX вв. [“Genealogy Pomeranian consent” - an Essay on the History of the Old Believers from the North of the Orenburg Region in the 18th -19th centuries), in *Исследование и исследователи Оренбургского края XVIII — начала XX вв.: материалы регион. науч. конф.* Свердловск, 1983, с. 141-142; Беляева О. К., *Описание тюменских старообрядческих сборников из рукописных собраний ИИФиФ СО АН СССР и УрГУ* [Description of Tyumen Old Believers collections of manuscript in collections of IIFIF of Academy of Sciences of USSR and USU], in *Источники по истории общественной мысли и культуры эпохи позднего феодализма* [Sources on the history of social thought and culture of the late feudalism], Новосибирск, 1988, с. 156-268; Голикова С. В., *Горожане-старообрядцы* [Townspeople - Old Believers], in Миненко Н. А. и др., *Повседневная жизнь уральского города в XVIII — начале XX века* [Daily life in the Urals' cities of the 18th and the early 19th century], in Н. А. Миненко, Е. Ю. Апкаримова, С. В. Голикова, *Конфессиональная жизнь горожан* [Confessional life of townspeople], Москва, 2006, Гл. 2, р. 265-294; Мангилев П. П., *Из истории складывания обряда бессвященнословных браков у старообрядцев Урала* [History of ceremony of marriages without priests of Old Believers of Urals], in *История церкви: изучение и преподавание: материалы науч. конф., посвящ. 2000-летию христианства*, 22-25 нояб. 1999, с. 198-204; Мангилев П. И., *Памятники канонического права в старообрядческих библиотеках (каноническое право и правовая культура русского крестьянства)* [Monuments of canon law in the Old Believers libraries (canon law and legal culture of the Russian peasantry)], in *Книжные собрания российской провинции: проблемы реконструкции*, Екатеринбург, 1994, с. 150-157; Чагин Г. Н., *Этносы и культуры на стыке Европы и Азии: избранные труды* [Ethnic groups and cultures at the crossroads of Europe and Asia: selected works], Пермь, 2002; *Старообрядческий мир верховьев Колвы и Печоры в XIX-XX вв.* [Old Believers world headwaters Colva and Pechora in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries], с. 296-312; *Традиционные связи духовной культуры семьи и общины русского старообрядческого населения Верхотамья* [Traditional ties of spiritual culture of family and community of Russian Old Believers population Verhokamy], с. 313-319; Шкерин

исторической науке, которая называет староверов «липованами», были написаны статьи, в которых авторы обсуждали проблемы поселения липован в румынских землях, развитие раскольниковства, волны прибытия, попытка создания епархии, обычаи и традиции⁶. Довольно широко были изучены проблемы появления липован на территории между Прутом и Днестром, эволюция числа верующих в первые десятилетия XIX века и т.д.⁷. По мнению исследователей, староверы появились в румынских княжествах во второй половине XVII⁸ - первой половине XVIII-го веков, после их изгнания

В. А., *Исследователь старообрядчества и сектанства С. Д. Нечаев и его агенты* [Researcher of the Old Believers and sectarianism S.D. Nechayev and his agents], in „Уральский исторический вестник”, 2007, № 17, с. 22-27; Смирнов П.С., *История русского раскола старообрядства* [History of split of Russian Old Believers], 2-е изд., испр. и доп. СПб.: Тип. Гл. упр. уделов, 1895; Щапов А., *Русский раскол старообрядства* [The Split of the Russian Old Believers], Казань, 1859.

⁶ Melchisedek, *Lipovenismul, adică schismaticii seu rascolnicii și ereticii rusești. Dupre autori ruși și izvore naționali române* [Lipovenism, that schismatics or Old Believers and Russian heretics. After Russian authors and Romanian national sources], București, 1871; Victor Vascenco, *Lipovenii. Studii lingvistice* [Lipovans. Linguistic studies], Ed. Academiei Române, București, 2003; Idem, *Melchidesec și lipovenii* [Melchidesec and Lipovans], in “Romanoslavica” XLII, București, 2007, p. 133; Filip Ipatiov, *Rușii-Lipoveni din România: studiu de geografie umană* [Russians Lipovan in Romania: the study of human geography], Presa Universitară Clujeana, 2001; Toader Nicoară, *Istoria și tradițiile minorităților din România* [History and traditions of minorities in Romania], 2005, http://hiphi.ubbcluj.ro/Public/File/sup_curs/istorie16.pdf; Alexandra Fenoghen, *Staroverii-istorie, mitologie, literatură* [Starovers/old believers - history, mythology, literature], 2013.

⁷ Ion Gumenăi, *Unele consideratii privind aparitia miscarii schismatice a lipovenilor si incercarea de formare a unei Episcopii lipovenesti pe teritoriul romanesc* [Some considerations on the occurrence of Lipovans schismatic movement and the attempt to form a Lipovan Bishop on the Romanian territory], in L. Zabolotnaia (ed.), *In Honorem Demir Dragnev. Studii, Supliment la Revista de Istorie a Moldovei*, Chișinău, 2006, p. 337-341; Idem, *Dinamica numărului populației lipovenești din Basarabia în perioada 1812-1835* [Dynamics of Lipovan population in Bessarabia during 1812-1835], in “Tyragetia”, vol. 1, Nr. 2, 2007, p. 153-158; Idem, *Raporturile între populația autohtona a Basarabiei și minoritățile confesionale în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea* [Relations between the local population of Bessarabia and religious minorities in the first half of the nineteenth century], in *La frontierele Civilizațiilor. Basarabia în contextul geopolitic, economic, cultural și religios* [At the borders of Civilisations. Bessarabia in the geopolitical, economic, cultural and religious context], Galați, 2011; Idem, *Aspecte privind politica confesionala a Imperiului Rus la hotarele sale vestice* [Aspects of religious policy of the Russian Empire at its western borders], in “Buletinul științific, Revista de Etnologie, Științele naturii și Muzeografie”, serie nouă, 7(20), 2008.

⁸ Toader Nicoară, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

российской официальной Церковью⁹. Число староверов увеличилось к середине XVIII-го века, когда липоване «попытались создать епархию»¹⁰. О числе липован в Днестровско-Прутском междуречье в XVIII- XIX веках писал исследователь Анцупов¹¹. Однако его выводы были поставлены под сомнением исследователем Ионом Гуменным, который, основываясь на архивных документах, утверждает, что население липован в Бессарабии «зависело от конфессиональной политики царской империи», и подчеркивает, что в первые десятилетия XIX-го века нельзя говорить об устойчивой тенденции роста¹². В 1828 году в Бессарабии было около 5504 липован¹³.

Смешанные браки с точки зрения христианской церкви (православной)

«...если какой брат имеет женщину неверующую, и она согласна жить с ним, то он не должен оставлять ее; и жена, которая имеет мужа неверующего, и он согласен жить с нею, не должна оставлять его».

Апостол Павел (I Кор. 7, 12-13).

Согласно христианству, единство семьи создано по милости Святого Духа и дается через Святое Таинство Брака¹⁴. Условие принадлежности к одной религии происходит от римского семейного права. Слова апостола Павла: «Не преклоняйтесь под чужое ярмо с неверными. Ибо какое общение праведности с беззаконием? Что общего у света со тьмою?» (2 Кор. 6:14), были отнесены христианскими писателями и Святыми Отцами (Тертуллиан, Киприан, Блаженный Августин) к бракам между христианами и язычниками¹⁵. Тертуллиан называл отношения христиан с язычниками — блудом и считал правильным отлучать от церкви христиан, заключивших брак с язычниками.

⁹ Ion Gumenâi, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ И.А. Анцупов, *Русское население Бессарабии и левобережного Поднепровья в конце XVIII-XIX в.* [Russian population of Bessarabia and the left bank of the Dniester in the late 18th-19th centuries], Кишинев, 1996.

¹² Ion Gumenâi, *op. cit.*, p. 154

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Pr. Prof. Dr. Nicolae Necula, "Glasul Bisericii", nr. 9-12/2001, p. 119, 120.

¹⁵ В.А. Цыпин, *Церковное право* [Canon law], Holy Trinity Orthodox School, p. 6;`
<http://lib.eparhia-saratov.ru/books/22c/cipin/eccllaw/eccllaw.pdf>

Христианская церковь запрещала также браки христиан с еретиками¹⁶.

Проблема смешанных браков рассматривалась священными канонами и была отражена в богословских и исторических работах¹⁷. Исследователи подчеркивают, что для канонического регулирования проблемы смешанных конфессиональных браков фундаментальными признаны тексты: 10-й канон Лаодикийского Собора (343 г.), 31-й Канон Лаодикийского Собора (343 г.), 21-й канон Карфагенского Собора (419 г.), 14-й канон IV-го Вселенского Собора (451 г.), 72-й канон Трулльского Собора (691-692 гг.), а также 23-й канон Святого Иоанна (619 г.)¹⁸.

10-й канон Лаодикийского Собора говорил: «Не должно церковным, без разбора, совокупляти детей своих брачным союзом с еретиками». Эта норма повторена и в 72-м каноне Трулльского Собора: «Недостойно мужу православному с женою еретическою браком совокуплятися, ни православной жене с мужем еретиком сочетаватися. Аще же усмотрено будет нечто таковое, соделанное кем-либо: брак почитати не твердым, и незаконное сожитие расторгати. Ибо не подобает смешивати несмешаемое, ниже совокупляти с овцею волка, и с частию Христовою жребий грешников. Аще же кто постановленное нами преступит, да будет отлучен». Однако когда один из супругов принимает правильную веру, то такой брак можно сохранить: «Но аще некоторые, будучи еще в неверии, и не быв причтены к стаду православных, сочетались между собою законным браком, потом один из них, избрав благое, прибегнул ко свету истины, а другой остался во узах заблуждения, не желая возврати на Божественные лучи, и аще притом неверной жене угодно

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ Demetrios J. Constantelos, *Mixed Marriage in Historical Perspective*, in „Greek Orthodox Theological Review”, 40/3-4, 1995 p. 279; Vlassios I. Phidas, *Drept canonic – O perspectivă ortodoxă* [Canon law - An Orthodox perspective], Iași, 2008, p. 40; Constantinos G. Pitsakis, *Les mariages mixtes dans la tradition juridique de l'Église grecque: de l'intransigeance canonique aux pratiques modernes*, in *Études balkaniques*, 10, 2003, <http://etudesbalkaniques.revues.org/index341.html>; Patrick Viscuso, *Marriage Between Orthodox and Non-Orthodox: A Canonical Study*, in „Greek Orthodox Theological Review”, 40, nr 1-2, 1995; Maximilian Pal, *Căsătoriiile mixte în legislația Bisericii Catolice, aspecte istorico-juridice* [Mixed Marriages in the Catholic Church law, legal history matters], in „Studia Theologica”, IV, 4/2006, p. 465-483; Idem, *Mixed Marriages in the Canonical Legislation: a Brief Survey*, in *IURA ORIENTALIA* III, 2007, 119-139, http://www.iuraorientalia.net/IO/IO_03_2007/III_06_2007_Pal.pdf

¹⁸ Pr. Dr. Patriciu Vlaicu, *Biserica Ortodoxă în fața problematicei căsătoriilor mixte* [The Orthodox church and the issue of mixed marriages], <http://comptepv.typepad.fr/canonice/2012/03/biserica-ortodoxC483C3AEEn-faC89Ba-problematicei-cC483sC483toriilor-mixt.html>

сожительствовать с мужем верным, или напротив мужу неверному с женой верною, то да не разлучаются, по Божественному Апостолу: «святится бо муж неверен о жене, и святится жена неверна о муже» (I Кор., 7, 14).

31-й канон Лаодикийского Собора утверждает: «Не подобает со всяким еретиком заключать брачный союз или отдавать таковым сынов или дочерей, но допустимо брать от них, если обещаются христианами быть» (Ап 26, 45, 65; IV Собор, 14; Трулл. Соб. 6, 72; Лаодикийский 10; Карфагенский 21)¹⁹. Комментируя данное правило, епископ Далмации Никодим (Милош) утверждал, что оно является дополнением к канону 10-му того же Собора о смешанных браках, и запрещает брак между еретиком и православным. Но канон указывает, что брак может быть разрешен только тогда, когда человек обещает принять православие²⁰.

Отец Патрициу Влайку утверждает, что самый ясный текст насчет смешанных браков это 72-й канон Трулльского Собора²¹. Комментируя гражданские эффекты упомянутых выше постановлений Соборов, Константинос Г. Питсакис со ссылкой на социальные практики считает, что иноверец не в состоянии интегрироваться в общество и подымает вопросы сосуществования в брачном союзе и в семье, о религиозной принадлежности детей, рожденных в смешанных семьях. Однако исследователь приходит к выводу, что брак христианина с «еретиком» или нехристианином, если он обещает принять христианство, рассматривался положительно²². Хотя Церковь указывает, что брак христианина с неверным в принципе осужден из-за пастырских и социальных причин, все таки институционально он не считался невозможным.

После Великого раскола (1054) запрещались браки между латинянами и православными. Матей Властарес в *Синтагме*, Главе Р. 12, указывает: «не

¹⁹ *Правила поместных Соборов Святой Православной Церкви с толкованиями Епископа Никодима (Милоша)* [The laws of the Holy Orthodox Church with the interpretations], Часть 3, Издание исправленное и дополненное, 2004 год. http://www.lib.eparhia-saratov.ru/books/13n/nikodim_milosh/rules2/rules2.pdf; vezi și G.-V. Gârdan, M. Eppel, *Familia în gândirea teologică și în dreptul matrimonial ortodox* [The family in theological thought and Orthodox matrimonial law], in Ioan Bolovan, Diana Covaci, Daniela Deteșan, Marius Eppel, Elena Crinela Holom (eds.), *În căutarea fericirii. Viața familială în spațiul românesc în sec. XVIII-XX* [Looking for happiness. Family life in the Romanian space of the 18th-20th centuries], Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2010, p. 70.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Трулльский собор (691-692) создан императором Юстинианом II. Каноны Собора важны в плане позиции христиан относительно язычников или еретиков.

²² Constantinos G. Pitsakis, *op. cit.*

разрешаются браки с латинянами». Константинос Г. Питсакис и Патрихиу Влайку отметили, что смешанные браки допускались Церковью. В то время были известны случаи, когда византийские принцессы были отданы замуж за татар, монголов, персов и турков²³. С точки зрения Православной Церкви это были не браки, а сожителства.

В историографии утверждается, что перелом происходит одновременно с деятельностью патриарха Григория V-го (1797-1798, 1806-1808, 1818-1821 гг.)²⁴, по требованию которого монахи Афона, Агапие и Никодим, разработали Пидалион — коллекцию канонов, которые четко осуждают браки с еретиками²⁵. Согласно Синодальному томосу 1806 года исключалась возможность брака православного с иноверцем или еретиком²⁶.

Брак с точки зрения старообрядцев

Старообрядцы²⁷ делятся на поповцев и беспоповцев. Относительно брака и свадебного торжества ветвь поповцев имела ту же концепцию, что и православные. Беспоповцы имели совсем другое отношение. Согласно их мнению, брак можно было заключать без присутствия священника, ибо «это тайна, оставленная Богом и подтвержденная Иисусом Христом». Таинство брака — от Бога, а венчание — «изобретение гражданской власти». Беспоповцы утверждали, что истинный брак заключается не в венчании и молитвах, а в согласии жениха и невесты: «взаимного понимания жениха и невесты». Их представители придавали большое значение родительскому благословению и утверждали, что если отец и мать благословили своих детей на брак, то данный брак является законным.

²³ По мнению исследователей, такие браки были обычным явлением и продолжались до последней византийской династии, Палеологов.

²⁴ Св. Григорий был 234-й Патриархом Константинополя, занимая патриарший престол три различных периода времени: 1797-1798, 1806-1808, 1818-1821. Был замучен во время греческой войны за независимость в 1821 году, по приказу султана Махмуда II, был повешен на главных воротах Патриархата, в ночь Воскресения Господня. В 1921 году он был канонизирован Православной Церковью Греции (Εθνομάρτυρας), его празднуют 10 апреля. См. Radu Alexandru, *Sfantul Grigorie V, Patriarhul Constantinopolului* [St. Gregory V, Patriarch of Constantinople], <http://www.crestinortodox.ro/sfinti/sfantul-grigorie-v-patriarhul-constantinopolului-128294.html>

²⁵ Каноническая часть была взята из номоканона Святейшего Патриарха Фотия.

²⁶ Demetrios J. Constantelos, *op. cit.*; Constantin G. Pitsakis, *op. cit.*

²⁷ С точки зрения официальной церкви старообрядчество было скизмой.

Другое направление этого вероисповедания — «безбрачники» — тип холостяков, которые не признают брачный союз и христианский тип семьи (который они называют византийским типом семьи). Для безбрачников, семья является одним из видов свободных отношений, которые могут быть расторгнуты по обоюдному согласию партнеров. «Женитьба» является результатом предварительной договоренности с женщиной или девушкой, которая приходит в определенное место и время, заранее согласованные. Чтобы доказать, что они являются «семьей», пара появляется в общественных местах, например на рынке, держа за руки или держа за косынку.

Казуистика

В архивных фондах Республики Молдова выявили только два документа, отражающие брак представителей старообрядцев.

а) *браки с представителями поповцев*. О женитьбе православной с старовером сообщает документ датированный октябрём 1818 года, который является жалобой Евдокии Морозовой на мужа Максима Морозова, представленной в Духовную Дикастерию Кишинева²⁸. Евдокия утверждала, что уловкой был принуждена выйти замуж за липована по их обрядам. После брачного обряда муж, применяя физическое насилие, заставлял ее посещать раскольническую церковь в Кишиневе. Максим Морозов дает показания по данному делу и сообщает что он старовер, ему 37 лет, родился за пределами Российской империи, в селении Дунаевец. Он сын липован Максима и Марии Морозовых из названной деревни, которые к моменту дачи показаний были мертвыми. Максим был крещен и помазан елеем священником липован Василием, крестным отцом был Ермолай Динеевич, житель той же местности, также старовер. В 1814, вместе с другими жителями, он покинул родные места, перешел в Российскую империю и поселился жить в Кишиневе, где получил российское гражданство. В Кишиневе женился на Евдокии. Также обвиняемый утверждает, что он не знал, что Евдокия была православной, потому что она посещала богослужения липован. Евдокия приняла предложение руки и сердца по обычаю старообрядцев. Свидетелями добровольного брака были все представители великороссиян и малороссиян Кишинева. Максим указал, что семейные недоразумения появились, потому что жена уходила от него три раза,

²⁸ Национальный Архив Республики Молдова [National Archives of the Republic of Moldova], Ф. 205, д. 2181, л. 6-8.

убегая с неженатыми мужчинами, и даже пыталась его отравить. Непристойное поведение Евдокии может подтвердить православный житель Кишинева Макарий Васильев, староверы и родственники его жены (Никита Орлов, Мефодий Токарев, Иван Семенов, Михей Ткачев и Филакт Шароваров)²⁹. Хотя представленный документ отражает аморальное поведение жены, он одновременно свидетельствует о смешанном браке.

б) браки с представителями «Часовенного согласия»³⁰.

Староверы-часовенные (софонтиевцы), называющие себя и кержаками, были распространены особенно в восточной части России, на Урале и в Сибири и, строго говоря, эта ветвь не может быть отнесена к определенной ветви старообрядцев³¹. Своим родоначальником часовенные считают беглого иерея Софонтия (1637-1710). Разгром Керженского центра властями петровской империи привел к бегству десятков тысяч староверов на Урал и в Западную Сибирь. Здесь они смешались с местными *беспоповцами* и частично с *поповцами*. В 1840 году эти две линии достигли условного соглашения и единства, а Объединенный совет на Тюменском соборе решил не принимать «беглых попов».

В архиве я нашла только одно дело, которое относится к этой ветви староверов. В 1817 г. Ион Балан обращается в Дикастерию с просьбой разрешить развод с женой Ириной. Ион рассказывает, что происходит из семьи, принадлежащей к секте «Часовенная», вырос и воспитывался в традициях этой

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ Покровский Н. Н., *Соборные уложения часовенных XVIII–XX вв.: система запретов* [The Council decrees of chapels in 18th-19th centuries: System of prohibitions], in *Источники по русской истории и литературе: Средневековье и Новое время. Вып. XIX*, Новосибирск: СО РАН, 2000, с. 123–138. Idem, *Соборные постановления старообрядцев-часовенных востока России XVIII–XX вв. как исторический источник* [The Council decrees of Old Believers-chapels of East Russia in XVIII-XX centuries, as a historical source], in *История: научные поиски и проблемы (Памяти д. и. н. проф. А. П. Проништейна)*, Ростов-на-Дону, 2000, с. 115–152; Idem, *Пути изучения истории старообрядчества российскими исследователями* [Way of studying the history of the Old Believers by Russian researchers], in „Археографический ежегодник за 1998 год”, М. Наука, 1999, с.3-20; Idem, *Споры об исповеди и причастии у староверов-часовенных Востока России в XVIII в.* [Disputes about confession and communion among the Old Believers-chapels of Eastern Russia in the XVIII century], in *Культура славян и Русь*. М.: Наука, 1998, с. 518-528.

³¹ Покровский Н. Н., *Соборные постановления старообрядцев-часовенных востока России XVIII-XX вв. как исторический источник* [The Council decrees of Old Believers-chapels of East Russia in XVIII-XX centuries, as a historical source], <http://krotov.info/history/18/general/pokr2000.html>

секты³². Однако взрослея, он понял смысл православия и принял православное крещение. Родители и наставники пытались убедить его жениться на девушке из «секты», названной «раскольницей», но Ион отказался. Тогда староверы опоили молодого человека и женили на девушке Ирине, в возрасте 14 лет, у которой по его словам, было непристойное поведение. Ион рассказывает, что до сих пор у него с женой не было супружеских отношений, а Ирина отказывается присоединиться к Православной Церкви. Поэтому он умоляет дать ему развод. Дикастерия начала расследование, но вскоре после этого Ион и Ирина наладили отношения и попросили прервать расследование. Супруги дали расписку, что будут жить в мире и не будут вмешиваться в исповедуемую религию другого.

Выводы

Браки между православными и липованами входят в число смешанных браков с точки зрения конфессий. Молдавское законодательство XVII – начала XIX веков запрещало браки между православными и иноверцами (другими христианами или нехристианами). В Российской Империи XVIII-го века разрешались условные православные браки с католиками, протестантами и армянами. Браки православных с липованами были разрешены только при обращении в православие. Однако, как доказывают документы, случаи смешанных браков зарегистрированы, хотя не всегда они были счастливы.

³² *Ibidem.*

GEORGIAN NATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF GEORGIAN NATION

Mariam Chkhartishvili

Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University Tbilisi, Georgia
mary.chkhartishvili@gmail.com

Rezumat: Naționalismul georgian și ideea de națiune georgiană

Scopul articolului este de a furniza un discurs actual asupra istoriei naționalismului georgian și a ideii de națiune georgiană. Autorul propune o viziune alternativă a nașterii și emergenței naționalismului georgian și identifică principalele surse și subiecte ale discursului narativ național. Este sugerat faptul că originile naționalismului georgian trebuie datate la începutul secolului al XIX-lea și nu spre finalul celui secol, cum a fost general acceptat până acum. Rezultatul acestei cercetări dovedește că conceptul de națiune georgiană, în ciuda modelului său vest european, nu este identic cu acesta. Moștenirea etnică a „naționalizării” comunității georgiene și impactul acestui fapt provin de la Imperiul Rus (din care a făcut Georgia parte în secolul XIX), dând cazului georgian o coloratură aparte.

Résumé: Le nationalisme géorgien et l'idée de nation géorgienne

Le but de l'article ci-joint est celui de fournir un discours actuel sur l'histoire du nationalisme géorgien et sur l'idée de nation géorgienne. L'auteur y propose une vision alternative de la naissance et de l'émergence du nationalisme géorgien et identifie les principaux sources et sujets du discours naratif national. On y suggère qu'on doit dater les origines du nationalisme géorgien au début du XIX-ème siècle et pas vers sa fin, comme on accepta de manière générale jusqu'à nos jours. Le résultat de cette démarche scientifique prouve que le concept de nation géorgienne, malgré son modèle ouest européen, n'est pas identique avec celui-ci. L'héritage ethnique de la "nationalisation" de la communauté géorgienne et l'impacte que celui-ci eut proviennent de l'Empire russe (dont la Géorgie fit partie le XIX-ème siècle) et donnèrent au cas géorgien un caractère et une colorature tout à fait spéciale.

Abstract: *The goal of the article is to provide up-to-date discourse on the history of Georgian nationalism and the idea of Georgian nation. The author discuss an alternative view on the time of Georgian nationalism's emergence and identifies the main sources and topics of Georgian national narrative. The early nineteenth century is suggested to be the date of Georgian nationalism origin, instead of the generally accepted late nineteenth century. The*

results of the present investigation also reveal that the concept of Georgian nation, despite its west-European model, did not completely match the original sample. The ethnic legacy of nationalizing the Georgian community and the impacts come from the Russian empire (part of which Georgia was in the nineteenth century) gave the Georgian case the special colours.

Keywords: *Georgia, Nation-Formation, Nationalism*

Introduction

The specialized literature on nations distinguishes between two main types of this phenomenon: nations as direct products of modernization and nations emerged as a result of nationalism. The most of the modern nations are products of nationalisms¹ and only few (according to L. Greenfeld, solely one – England²) have emerged as direct products of modernization. Certainly, the process of nation-building was not identical in different environments. If in the first case objective factors (like economic developments) were crucial, in the second one, the subjective factors (like shared memories, values, and symbols) were central.

The role of intellectuals was decisive in making nations of the second type. However, I do not understand this role as the elite's voluntarist social engineering, but rather see it through the eye of ethno-symbolism and, therefore, regard it as an activity within the culture of a potential nation. Here again, I agree with A. D. Smith (and also with many others) who considers the transition from the ethnic community to the national one as a conscious process led by intellectuals. Just intellectuals of nationalizing communities reinterpret ethnic heritage in terms of available cultural assets: *"In contrast to modern, perennial and primordial paradigms of ethnicity and nationalism, historical ethno-symbolism focuses particularly on the subjective elements in the persistence of ethnoeses, the formation of nations and the impact of nationalism. This does not mean that it takes "objective" factors for granted or excludes them from the purview of its analysis; but only that it gives more weight to the subjective elements of memory, value, sentiment, myth and symbol, and that it thereby seeks to enter and understand the "inner worlds" of ethnicity and nationalism...ethno-symbolists stress the relationship between various elites and*

¹ Anthony D. Smith, *The origins of nation. Becoming national. A reader*. Edited by Geof Eley and Ronald Gregor Suny, New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1996 (first published in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12, 3, July, 1989, pp. 340-367), p. 122.

² Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London England, 1992. I use the paperback edition 1993, p. 23.

lower strata (“the people”) they aim to represent. But this is not a one-way relationship. The non-elites, partly through the cultural traditions and partly as a consequence of their vernacular mobilization, influence the intelligentsia, the political leaders and the bourgeoisie, by constraining their innovations within certain cultural parameters and by providing motifs for their cultural projects and political goals”.³

One can trace the process of shaping of Georgian ethnic identity⁴ back to the 15th century BC. We may argue on the existence of the pre-modern Georgian nation⁵ in the 11th-12th centuries. As for the modern Georgian nation, it emerged on a ground of a pre-existing ethnic community in the second half of the 19th century.⁶ It belonged to

³ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism. Theory, ideology, history*. First was published by polity press in 2001. I use the reprint of 2003, p. 57.

⁴ Colchi// Kolkhi, Karti were designations of ancient Georgian ethnic community. For more details see მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი, *ქართული ეთნიკური რელიგიური მოქცევის ეპოქები*, თბილისი, კავკასიური სახლი, 2009. [Mariam Chkhartishvili, *Georgian ethnics in the epoch of religious conversion*, Tbilisi, Caucasian House, 2009]; Idem. Forging Georgian identity. Ideology of ethnic election. *Caucasiologic Papers* I. Tbilisi: Tbilisi University Press, 2009, p. 386-391; Idem, *ქართლის მოქცევის ისტორია ეთნიკურობის კვლევის პრობლემატიკის თვალთახედვით. ეთნიკურობა და ნაციონალიზმი I* (საქართველოს მეცნიერებათა აკადემიასთან არსებული ინსტიტუტთაშორის სემინარის მასალები). თბილისი: ინტელექტი, 2002, 32-47 [The History of Conversion of Georgia in Light of Ethnic Studies. *Proceeding of Inter-Institute Seminar at the Georgian Academy of Sciences*, Publishing House Intelecti, 2002], pp. 32-47.

⁵ According to ethno-symbolism some of the pre-modern communities might be considered as nations. For example, A.D. Smith thinks that many organizing principles of these communities might be interpreted as counterparts of recent national institutions: “...horizontal fraternity of citizenship would find its counterparts in popular participation in large-scale cults and rituals, in the performance of ethical and religious obligations which bind the community of presumed ancestry in into a community of faith and worship, in the sense of community evoked by symbols and myths of ethnic origins and elections, and shared memory of ancestors and heroic deeds. When such a fusion has occurred we may begin to speak on nationhood... In this way we can speak on distinct way of ancient nations”. See Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism. Theory, ideology, history*, p. 111. As a historian with experience in studying of pre-modern period, I think that concept of pre-modern nation is very useful for adequate representation of nation-formation processes. For example, I have argued that Georgian pre-modern nation existed.

⁶ There is no consensus among Georgian historians concerning the date of emergence of the Georgian nation. Part of the scholars find it possible to speak about it even in 4th century BC, entirely ignoring essential unlikelyness between ancient and modern Georgian communities and also modern theories of nation. Others, who see the historical processes through the eye of modern understandings, think that the Georgian nation has emerged in 19th century. On some aspects of Georgian historiography concerning Georgian nation-

the second type of nations, i.e. it was a “nation of design”. This means that the decisive role in the making of the Georgian nation had been played by nationalism (an ideology and a political movement “*for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity of a population of whose members deem to constitute an actual or potential nation*”⁷), namely, an idea of a Georgian nation which was nothing more than a comprehensive nationalist story on the essence and perspectives of the would-be Georgian nation.

We must say a few words on the nature of the *idea of the nation*: it is a narrative of a specific kind. As any nationalist discourse, it may lack inner coherence. Sometimes it may accommodate diametrically opposite assertions; however, this fact does not create any problem for the whole story. Actualization of separate themes has a situational character. Some of the nationalist appeals are topical in one time, some others – at another time. The targets of national narratives are the heart of humans and not the minds. Because of this fact these narratives reveal great social power when they penetrate masses. They are able to support large-scale social solidarities like national identities.

Many Georgian intellectuals took part in the making of the Georgian nationalist narrative and tried to clarify the essence of *Georgianness*. The main designer and contributor to the Georgian nationalist project was the eminent Georgian writer and public worker Ilia Chachavadze (1837-1907). He outlined the idea of Georgian nation and gave the answer on the question: “Who are We”?

The Georgian historiography of the Soviet period labelled nationalism as the “false bourgeois ideology”. As subject of academic inquiries it was ignored. In result of this practice there had emerged a palpable gap in the study of Georgian nationalism. That is why the nationalist narrative proposed by Chavchavadze was not a topical problem of the Georgian studies.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, some of the Georgian scholars (including me) devoted their scientific works to this problem; however, the gap still exists and in the representation of the history of the Georgian nation many crucial events and details are missing. This article attempts to fill this gap.⁸

formation see: Mariam Chkhartishvili, *The shaping of Georgian national identity: Iveria and its Readers. The Balkans and Caucasus: Parallel Processes on the Opposite Sides of the Black Sea*. Edited by Ivan Biliarsky, Ovidiu Kristea, Anca Oroveanu, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012, p. 192-199.

⁷ Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism. Theory, ideology, history*, p. 9.

⁸ Some of my views concerning this topic were already published elsewhere. See Mariam Chkhartishvili, Sophio Kadagishvili, *Georgian nationalism in the nineteenth century: values, ideals symbols. Proceedings*, vol. IV, Ivane Javackishvili Tbilisi State University,

The articles and literary fictions (poems, novels) by Chavchavadze serve as sources to this investigation. Many of these works were published in the *Iveria* periodical. *Iveria* was issued between 1877 and 1906. Chavchavadze was *Iveria*'s founder and editor. During three decades, *Iveria* cultivated the nationalist ideals in the Georgian community. As a result, the readers of *Iveria* were transformed into the members of the Georgian nation.⁹ Chavchavadze elaborated almost all the necessary topics to construct the "building blocks"¹⁰ of a Georgian national identity: the Georgian community's attitude towards its ethnic past, its social composition, the interrelations with *significant others*, the cultural uniqueness, the national character, common destiny and so on.¹¹

Historical Preconditions

Before discussing on the national narrative of Chavchavadze, I would like to highlight its preconditions. In the nineteenth century the Georgian national idea represented a combination of political and cultural forms of nationalism. It had arisen as a part of a political movement, as a response to the Russian oppression. The abolishment of the Georgian royal dynasty of the Bagratians by the Russian emperor's decree of 1801 represented the causing factors. This was an extraordinary event for the Georgians. The Bagratians were in power for at least ten centuries. In

Faculty of Humanities. The Institute of Georgian History, 2011, pp.426-435; მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი, ქეთევან მანია, სოფიო კადაგიშვილი, ქართული ნაციონალიზმის წარმოშობა, *შრომები*. ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის ჰუმანიტარულ მეცნიერებათა ფაკულტეტი, საქართველოს ისტორიის ინსტიტუტი, 2011 [Mariam Chkhartishvili, Ketevan Mania, Sophio Kadagishvili, *The arising of Georgian nationalism.-Proceedings*, vol. III, Ivane Javackishvili Tbilisi State University, Faculty of Humanities. The Institute of Georgian History, 2011], pp. 259-277.

⁹ მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი, ქეთევან მანია, ქართველთა ნაციონალური კონსოლიდაციის პროცესის ასახვა ბეჭდურ მედიაში. ივერია და მისი მკითხველი საქართველო, თბილისი, უნივერსალი, 2011 [Mariam Chkhartishvili, Ketevan Mania, *Coverage of the process of the Georgian national consolidation in print media. Georgians as a readers of Iveria*, Tbilisi, Universali, 2011].

¹⁰ Ghia Nodia, *Components of Georgian national idea: an outline*, Identity Studies, I, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, 2009, p. 89.

¹¹ მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი, ქეთევან მანია, ქართველთა ნაციონალური კონსოლიდაციის პროცესის ასახვა ბეჭდურ მედიაში. ივერია და მისი მკითხველი საქართველო, დასახ. გამოცემა [Mariam Chkhartishvili, Ketevan Mania, *op. cit.*], pp. 477-535.

the pre-modern era, Georgian identity was built, in many regards, on loyalty to the kings of this dynasty. Some scholars even assert that *“The abolition of the Georgian monarchy in 1801 assumed in the collective memory the character of a kind of traumatic fixation, to a significant extent; this became a determinant of those processes which occurred in Georgian political consciousness during the subsequent two centuries and which also happen today”*.¹²

The respond to this challenge was immediate. It was expressed in the popular uprisings of 1802, 1804, 1812-1813 against the tsarist Russia. The goals of these uprisings were political: restoration of Georgian monarchy. It was for the first time that people acted independently; however, the revolted population was yet unaware of the idea of *sovereign people* and people's dominant role in the social life. The insurgents longed for nothing but the restoration of the authority of the Bagratons' dynasty. The Georgian princes were invited to lead these movements. One of them was even considered as king of Georgia.

These uprisings were not successful. However, they are interesting as events announcing the birth of the Georgian nationalism. Despite the fact that, mainly the monarchy, as a form of political order is incomparable with the Enlightenment project and, accordingly, with the initial idea of nationalism, the mass character of these movements makes me consider them nationalist.

The failure of the above mentioned revolts made the Georgian elite think that the spontaneous rebellions might not be successful; it was necessary to conduct some preliminary work among the Georgian nobility and define the goals and tactic of the liberation movement.

The result of the relevant activities was the conspiracy of 1832. Almost all representatives of the Georgian high nobility were involved in it. The conspiracy also had political goals: it aimed to regain political autonomy of Georgia. Despite the facts that among the participants of this conspiracy there were Georgian princes, the conspirators perceived the constitutional monarchy or the republic as a political form for the future Georgian state. The participants to the conspiracy were acquainted with the ideas of the Enlightenment and longed to transform the native country into a republic, “to make Georgia as France”.

To ensure the mass character of their movement, the conspirators intended to involve the people in it. However, they did not plan to inspire the people with liberation ideas, but attempted to involve the people in the movement by false alarm

¹² Zaal Andronikashvili, George Maisuradze, *Secularization and its vicissitudes in Georgia*, in “Identity Studies”, Tbilisi, Ilia State University, 2010, no. 2, p. 7.

concerning danger coming from the Russian officials. Thus, the conspiracy was an essentially elite movement, though it recognized the importance of popular participation and popular governance as a form of political order.

The conspiracy was betrayed some time before its first action. Thus, this conspiracy, as well as the above mentioned popular uprisings, has failed. However, the importance of the 1832 conspiracy for the history of the Georgian nationalism was great. It made evident that the preliminary cultural self-determination is necessary before attempting to promote political goals.

The birth of the Georgian nationalism at the first years of the nineteenth century shows palpable discrepancy from the paradigmatic models. In England and France the kings were executed and only after these symbolic sacrificing the *sovereign people* occupied the place of the monarch. In Georgia, the people did not kill the king (the Bagratians' dynasty, as it was mentioned, was abolished by Russia), on the contrary: the people achieved social visibility in the struggle for the restoration of monarchy.

In 1860-1880ss the premature Georgian political nationalism was replaced by fully developed Georgian cultural nationalism. As it was already mentioned, its main author was Ilia Chavchavadze who, with his co-workers, was an active part of the societal life of the 1860s. For this reason the group of young Georgians was named as the "sixties generation". They were referred to as *Tergdaleulni* as well. The literary meaning of this word is as follows: "those who drank water of Terek (in Georgian *Tergi*) River". Terek was perceived as the borderline between Georgia and Russia. *Tergdaleulni* were Georgian intellectuals who had received education in Russia.

The sixties generation was called as the "sons", as well. The "fathers" were the generation of the 1830s, i.e. those who had taken part in the conspiracy of 1832. However, after the conspiracy failure, these political radicals were transformed into the loyal subjects of the Russian *Gosudarstwo* and the devoted servants of the Russian emperor. Because of this they were severely criticized by the "sons"; however, the "sons", in particular, Chavchavadze, considered the conspiracy as a very important stage in the development of the Georgian national idea, and he always showed his deep appreciation for the contribution of the "fathers".

According to some theorists of nationalism, the process of national consolidation begins with cultural mobilization and results in cultural self-identification. M. Hroch, for instance, who had studied European nationalisms, was able to found out the common paradigm for the development of nationalists movements: according to him, national movements begin from small circles of intellectuals (scholars, writers, artists etc.) who try to elaborate the idea of nation. It is

phase A, which is followed by dissemination of the idea through patriotic circles of agitators, educators and journalists (phase B). Only after this the ideas begin to infect the wider masses of the middle and lower classes (phase C).¹³

This pattern shows a straightforward linear link between elites' politics and mass movements. However, Smith and Hutchinson have found out that the real interrelation between cultural and political forms of nationalism is even more complicated and "*in practice, cultural and political forms of nationalism often succeed each other, and nationalists may oscillate between them*".¹⁴

As reader, I was able to guess that the Georgian case better fits the Smith-Hutchinson pattern, according to which political and cultural forms of nationalism may follow each other and cultural form should not necessarily antecede the political one, as argued by Hroch.

Georgian National Narrative by Chavchavadze: Main Themes

Main Ideal

The nationalist ideal of autonomy (which first and foremost means nothing but political independence), is universal. Thus, it is not an accident that the ideal of political independence of Georgia occupied an important place in Chavchavadze's narrative.

The peace obtained as a result of Georgia's incorporation into the Russian empire, in Chavchavadze's opinion was to enough to compensate the damage caused by the loss of independence. The main character of Chavchavadze's story *The Letters of the Traveler* (1861), Lelt Ghunia, an inhabitant of the Georgian highlands (and, accordingly, preserver of the nation's authentic self, as it was believed by the Georgian nationalists) expressed this idea with due clarity. Lelt Ghunia met the author travelling from Russia to Georgia in the borderland region of these countries. By this representative of the common people Chavchavadze expressed his regret about the Georgians not being independent: Lelt Ghunia, during the conversation with the traveler (i.e. the author), underlined that the country's independence was decisive for preserving national authenticity.

However, later Chavchavadze avoided to made public statements concerning this issue and devoted his life to ethno-cultural re-conceptualization of the native ethnic community. His attitude towards Russia was a result of his (and of many other

¹³ Miroslav Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe*, Cambridge, 1985, p. 22-24.

¹⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 76-77.

Georgian nationalists') pragmatic calculations: the sad memory of unsuccessful uprisings and conspiracy against the Russian rule in the first decades of the nineteenth century was still fresh; apart from this, Georgia actually was in international isolation: Christian Europe showed no interest in Georgia, whereas Georgia's immediate neighbours – the Ottomans and Persians – were non-Christian and expansionist countries. Accordingly, Russia, as political partner, had no alternative in the eyes of the Georgian nationalists in the nineteenth century. They considered Russia as the guarantor of peace and favourable factor for modernization and promotion of the ideas of the Enlightenment.

Georgian Nation as Sacral Communion

The nations have sacral foundations¹⁵ despite the fact that the nation-building process implies a process of secularization, and at the same time with the spread of nationalism the religion gave up its positions in the public sphere.

Chavchavadze also considered nations as ethical communities; according to him, nations represent in-groups bound by common moral obligations. Without morality, the existence of the nation was impossible. The nation should follow moral principles if it aimed to survive. Very interesting in this regard is Chavchavadze's paper (published in *Iveria*, no 74, in 1887) on nation as a community with God's grace. In this paper for his point of view Chavchavadze referred to E. Renan's essay *What is a Nation?*

At the first glance the impression is that, actually, the source of Chavchavadze's inspiration was the above-mentioned essay. However, it is obvious that Chavchavadze came to believe in the idea of nation as a sacral community independently. He already wrote about the Georgian nation as sacral communion in 1850s, while E. Renan's above-mentioned work was published in 1882. In the poems of 1858, 1860 Chavchavadze introduced the image of poet-prophet being in direct communication with God and leading the Georgian community in accordance with God's Commandments.

Chavchavadze, with the great intuition of a nationalist leader, guessed the social power of the ethic community and developed this theme in the Georgian national narrative. For critics of Chavchavadze the importance of the "idealistic"

¹⁵ On the sacral foundations of nations see Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen peoples*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

approach cultivated by the “humanitarian party” (i.e. Chavchavadze and his followers) was unintelligible.

Re-conceptualization of the Ethnic Legacy

In the 1860 concluding remarks of his critical review on Revaz Eristavi’s translation of *Madwoman* by Kazlov, Chavchavadze wrote: “*From our ancestors, we inherited the three sacred treasures: fatherland, language, and faith. If we do not even take good care of them, what kind of men are we, what will we be able to say to our heirs?*”

Chavchavadze began the conceptualization of the Georgian nation with reinterpretation of the main ethnic markers of Georgian identity. These were: (1) territory, which Chavchavadze conceptualized as *mamuli* (i.e. legacy left from fathers), (2) language, which, according to him, was the expression of the national spirit, and (3) Christian faith to which, he believed, Georgians’ devotion was unprecedented.

Each element of the triad was a building block of the Georgian national identity.¹⁶

To the fatherland, as national identity marker, Chavchavadze ascribed a special importance. He idealized Georgian peasantry¹⁷ as he (alike many nationalist leader worldwide) considered this social stratum as repository of “true virtue and authenticity” just because of peasantry’s firm attachment to the native land.

On the second place of the triad was language. The “sons” started debates with the “fathers”¹⁸ on the issues of language. They tried to bring closer the language of literature to the Georgian of everyday communication. Some scholars consider these debates between the two generations of Georgian nationalists in the context of the secularization process as the struggle for the secular Georgian.¹⁹

I think that this polemic was connected not only with the process of secularization, but also with Chavchavadze’s purpose to conceptualize the Georgian

¹⁶ Ghia Nodia, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁷ Idealization of peasantry is a common feature of nationalist worldview. As E. Hobsbaum puts it ‘...since the later eighteenth century... Europe had been swept by the romantic passion for the pure, simple and uncorrupted peasantry...’ E. Hobsbaum, *Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press. 1990, reprint 2008. p. 103.

¹⁸ The cultural “war” between the “fathers” and the “sons” represents universal feature of nationalist ideology. See Anthony D. Smith, *The origins of nation...*, p. 123.

¹⁹ Zaal Andronikashvili, George Maisuradze, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

people as the source of legitimacy. Chavchavadze underlined that the arbiter of language was the people and not the “theory of alphabet”. The “theory of alphabet” was a title of the work by the eighteenth century Georgian Catholicos and erudite Anton (Bagrationi), who tried to reform the Georgians. Catholicos Anton distinguished different styles of Georgian: one for literature, another for common people and everyday communications. Chavchavadze and his followers insisted on one national language. For Chavchavadze it was not enough to create the standardized national language; simultaneously with the elaboration of a language, he intended to cultivate the idea of people as the source of legitimacy.

Within the triad, religion occupies the last place; despite this, it was a very strong marker of *Georgianness*. Chavchavadze presented Georgian community as a martyr for Christianity. He wrote: “*Christ our Lord has sacrificed for our sake, and we have sacrificed for Him*”²⁰ However, Chavchavadze’s attitude towards religion was ambivalent. The reasons for such an attitude were the historical conditions: on one hand, throughout many centuries the Georgian culture and the collective memory of Georgians were forged in frames of Orthodox Christianity, on the another hand, Orthodoxy was also the religion of the Georgians’ main oppressor, i.e. the Russian empire. Thus, it is not an accident that in the above triad of the sacred treasures religion occupies the last place; and one more observation in this regard: to the Christianity Chavchavadze attached great importance, however, his nationalism was secular; he was against the clergy's participation in the state affairs.

Thus, Chavchavadze re-conceptualized the main Georgian ethnic markers and transformed them into the markers of Georgian national identity.

Georgian Nation as a Mnemonic Collectivity

As it was already mentioned in specialized literature, an additional factor against putting emphasis on religion, in particular, on Christianity was the existence of the Islamized Georgians. They lived in the south-western Georgian province of Ajara.

In 1877 during the war with the Ottoman Empire, Russia (with support from the Georgians) occupied Ajara. Thus, through the inclusion of Ajara into the Russian empire, it was actually regained by Georgia. The new political circumstances created a relevant practical task for Georgian intellectuals: to conduct the cultural merging of the Georgian population of Ajara with the Georgians that lived in other provinces of the country. It is why Chavchavadze proposed a modified concept of the Georgian

²⁰ Ghia Nodia, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

nation, based on the assertion of common historical experience as the most decisive factor for national in-group forming. In particular, in the paper published in *Iveria* (*The Ottoman Georgia, Iveria*1877,#9) he wrote: “Every nation lives by its history. Only history represents the treasury in which a nation finds its spiritual power, its heart, its superiority in morality or reason, its identity, its selfhood. We think that neither common language, nor faith or kinship is able to merge the humans so firmly in one whole, as history does. ... We are not afraid that our brothers who lived in the Ottoman Georgia are Muslims. Georgians can demonstrate that they do not touch human’s conscience and their brothers being distanced from them during many times will be welcomed again as brothers”.

After getting acquainted with this citation the first impression is that Chavchavadze attempted to redefine his assertions concerning the three main markers of Georgian identity proposed in the 1860s and tried to establish the new order of the “treasuries”.

Why?

First and foremost we should underline that historical memory, as the specific “item” in the package of national identity markers proposed by Chavchavadze, existed before the above-mentioned date; however, it was not accentuated. It was implied from the very beginning. By the second half of the 1870s it was only bolded and moved to the foreground of the national discourse.

Hence, the question arises: what were those newly emerged facts which made necessary to stress the specific importance of historical memory for Georgian nation’s existence?

As it was noted the above mentioned triad of “sacred treasuries” represented the main Georgian ethnic identity marker. In this definition, the Georgian identity was represented as not fully exclusive, and however, not sufficiently inclusive as well. By ascribing to historical memory the decisive importance, Chavchavadze made Georgian identity more open, more inclusive and prepared the ground for the concept of the Georgian nation according to the civic matrix of nationalism.

Ambivalence of Georgian National Narrative: Ethnic or Civic?

Was Georgian *eri* (Georgian word for nation²¹) conceived by Chavchavadze as ethnic or was it conceived as civic nation?

²¹ On essence of this notion see მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი. ენტონი დ. სმიტი. ნაციონალიზმი: თეორია, იდეოლოგია, ისტორია .თარგმანი ინგლისურიდან,

As it is well known, the problem of ethnic/civic dichotomy was firstly identified by Kohn, who thought that Western forms of nationalism were based on the idea of nation as a national association of citizens who were tied by common laws and a shared territory. As for Eastern varieties of nationalism: they were based on a belief in common culture and common ancestry and regard a nation as an organically whole and exclusive group transcending its members who, from the moment of their birth (and during all lifetime), were marked by national features and inherited the national character. The causes of these differences should be found in non-similar social composition of these formations. If in the West, strong bourgeoisies could build civic nations, the East was the realm of imperial autocrats and feudal landowners creating soil for the emergence of organic conception of nation and mystical forms of nationalisms.²²

Since Kohn, many researches addressed this problem and clarified the main discrepancies between these two models. A. D. Smith, for example, underlined that in the “voluntarist” conception of the nation, individuals must necessarily belong to a nation in a “world of nations” and national states, but they can, basically, choose the nation they want to belong to. In the case of the “organic” conception, such a choice is not possible. Individuals, wherever they may migrate, remain an intrinsic part of their birth nation. A. D. Smith stresses that the provided features are characteristics of the normative types. He approaches different attempts aiming to provide more historically-recognizable schemes of distinctions, like the following: the old continuous nations of (mainly) Western Europe and the new deliberately created nations (nations of Eastern Europe and Asia), also, the distinction based on territory and those based on ethnicity.²³

The conceptualization of the Georgian *eri* by Chavchavadze was ambiguous. On one hand, Chavchavadze was elaborating the Georgian ethno-national identity: he perceived the native nation in terms of organicism. As any living creature, Georgian *eri*, according to Chavchavadze, had blood and flesh, soul and common will, legs and arms. It might be sorrowful, joyful, could cry, die, be tired, be exhausted etc. *Eri* was unity by ascription, emotional attachments²⁴ were decisive in forging of its identity;

ქართული ტექსტის რედაქტორი რ. ამირეჯიბი-მალენი. თბილისი: ქესც, 2004, გვ. 8-9 [Mariam Chkhartishvili Translator's introduction. *Nationalism. Theory, ideology, history* by A. D. Smith. Translated into Georgian by Mariam Chkhartishvili, edited by R. Amirejibi-Mullen, Center for Georgia Language, 2004, p. 8-9].

²² Hans Kohn, *The idea of nationalism: A Study of its origins and background*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944.

²³ Anthony D. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 39-40.

²⁴ Emotions played a great role in all forms of nationalism: “the cultural and psychological

common roots (/common blood) and inheritance was the organizing principle of *erovnobა* (nationhood). *Eri* in Chavchavadze's perceptions was a large-scale fraternity exercising ethnic majority rules. The addressees of Chavchavadze's nationalist appeals were exclusively ethnic Georgians.

On the other hand, Chavchavadze viewed in-groups based on kin identity less powerful than the entities bound by political ties. He tried to cultivate the ideals of civic nationality. He also underlined that law, liberty, and individuality are organizing principles of the nationhood. He longed to make the Georgian identity inclusive and overcome the closeness of ethno-cultural conceptualization of Georgian community.²⁵

Thus, the matrix chosen by Chavchavadze for conceptualization of the Georgian *eri* was not strictly ethnic; some principal features of it were indisputably civic.

To reveal the civic nature of the Georgian nation, the changes in the meanings of the terms are very characteristic. The case of the word *eru* is especially eloquent.

In the previous period word *natesavi* (the main segment of this word is *tesli*, "seed": in Georgian; so, *natesavi* means a group of humans of a common origin) was used to designate the Georgian in-group. It was replaced by *eri* in the times of Chavchavadze. In the Middle Ages *eri* referred to the socially-based identities. Only from nineteenth century it began to operate as a term designating in-groups based on ethno-cultural markets. *Natesavi* meant that the in-group consisted of members who were sure that they had one ancestry; in the case of *eri*, the basis for the group membership was not specified. Thus, *eri*, as well as *natesavi*, was used to designate human groups, though *eri* did not accentuate the common origin of the group members. In the second half of 19th century Chavchavadze entwined the term *eri* with the term *nation*. For instance, E. Ronan's famous work's title *What is a nation?* he translated as *What is eri?*

importance of the nation, and hence of nationalism, is even more profound. The ubiquity of nationalism, the hold it exerts over millions of people in every continent today, attests to its ability to inspire and resonate among 'the people' in ways that only religions had previously been able to encompass" (Anthony D. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 2; in case of ethnic ones, the emotions are especially strong and potent).

²⁵ მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი, ქეთევან მანია, ქართველთა ნაციონალური კონსოლიდაციის პროცესის ასახვა ბეჭდურ მედიაში. ივერია და მისი მკითხველი საქართველო, დასახ. გამოცემა, [Mariam Chkhartishvili, Ketevan Mania, *Coverage of the process of the Georgian national consolidation in print media. Georgians as readers of Iveria.*] Despite the huge number of examples analyzed in the above book, other relevant documents (yet unpublished) are available in abundance. The special investigation allows me to say that some of them are even more far reaching than those presented in the mentioned book.

Thus, despite the fact that Chavchavadze (as many nationalist leaders) looked at the native nation through the organicist and determinist lenses, he promoted the liberal (territorial) ideal of nationality as well.

The ambiguous nature of Georgian nationalism does not represent any paradox. Experts in the field argue that in some cases the “ethnic-civic” dichotomy is *“historically inaccurate and sociologically misleading. ... Most nations exemplify both principles of social organization, even if they choose to emphasize one of them over the other at any given time”*.²⁶

A. D. Smith even thinks that distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of nations is simply fissionable. Very often in reality it is impossible to ascribe real communities to one or another type. Yet, for all apparent differences, the similarities are much more striking. They confirm that, despite the evident contrasts between “organic” and “voluntarist” types of nationalist ideologies, and the ethnic and civic conception of nations, there is greater affinity between the policies they inspire than one might be led to expect”.²⁷

The specific political and cultural conditions as well as the historical developments and inherent nature of the Georgian ethnic community predetermined the Georgian *eri*’s conceptualization according to ethnic as well as civic matrixes.

Chavchavadze was sure that his (as it was already mentioned, ambiguous) understanding of nation was identical with the E. Renan’s definition. This view is very puzzling: after all (according to the widespread opinion), E. Renan had provided a voluntaristic, etatist ideal of nationality. Many scholars even assert that his essay on nation should be considered as “classical texts for civic nationalism”. The question is: how this liberal understanding of nation might be fitted with deterministic elements of Chavchavadze’s nationalism?

For Chavchavadze it was very important to underline that his opinion concerning this key notion of modernity coincided with the views of the eminent French scholar. Just by this fact one might explain the *Iveria*’s permanent interest in E. Renan’s works, his ideas and events of public and private life. The first remark on E. Renan in *Iveria* appeared in 1882, when the Georgian translation of Renan’s essay *What is a Nation?* was published, while the last information is from 1903. During this period *Iveria* had published two different Georgian translations of *What is a nation?*

Why did Chavchavadze thought that his understanding of nation was identical to the definition proposed by E. Renan?

²⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 101-102.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

According to Renan, the organizing principles of the nationhood were not race, language or religion, but sentiment. Nation was nothing but continued consent. Thus, according to E. Renan, subjective factors create nationhood: *“A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage that we have jointly received. Messieurs, man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate: our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past with great men and glory (I mean true glory) is the social capital upon which the national idea rests. These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to make them again. One loves in proportion to the sacrifices that one has committed and the troubles that one has suffered... A nation is therefore a great solidarity constituted by the feeling of sacrifices made and those that one is still disposed to make. It presupposes a past but is reiterated in the present by a tangible fact: consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation’s existence is (please excuse the metaphor) a daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life”*.²⁸

In regard to this quotation we should return to Chavchavadze’s views and analyze them once again. It is undisputable that, despite the elaboration of some civic components of the idea of Georgian nation, Chavchavadze created narrative of Georgian ethno-cultural community. The nation in his perception did not coincide with the state; national identity might only be inherited and its acquiring was not dependant on human’s will. Thus, Georgian national narrative proposed by Chavchavadze was more fitted with the ethnic pattern of the nation, than the civic one, while Renan’s concept belongs (at least as it is generally believed) to the civic one.

How to harmonize the above facts: on the one hand, the actual nature of Chavchavadze’s nationalism and, on the another hand, his strong belief in coincidence of his views with E. Renan’s understanding?

A.D. Smith analysis of Renan’s definition helps us solve this dilemma: *“The locus classicus for the debate about the two kinds of nationalist ideology can be found in Ernest Renan’s critique of Heinrich von Treitsckhe in his 1882 lecture entitled*

²⁸ Ernest Renan, *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* Translated by Ethan Rundell, Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992, p. 10 (I use internet publication).

Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Whereas Treitsckhe employed ethno-linguistic criterion to legitimate the German annexation of the disputed territories of Alsace and Lorraine claiming that despite their clearly expressed political will and historical memories, the Alsatians were 'objectively' ethnic Germans, Renan argued for more political, and to a certain extent voluntary, approach. While conceding something to the 'Germanicist' of thesis the origin of France, insofar as the Germanic (Frankish) tribes brought monarchical government and lasting territorial division to Western Europe, nevertheless affirmed the spiritual nature of nations and importance of historical memories and political will. Against ethnic determinism, Renan affirms the primacy of 'human culture' over particular national cultures, and the need for "consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. 'A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as the individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life'. This well-known passage is often taken out of the context to demonstrate a liberal and voluntarist ideal of nationality, in contrast with the organicism and determinism of German Romantic ideology. To be sure Renan eschews both determinism and the organic analogy, but it is not to assert a doctrine of voluntary nationality or the individual's right to choose her or his nation. Rather, he seeks to vindicate a historical and activist political understanding of the nation, one that would give weight to the "cult of ancestors" and to a "heroic past". The analogy of the nation with the individual is not intended to support liberal theory of individual preferences or a situational analysis of group identities. It is used to confirm the role of the past, of history and memory (and forgetting) as well as of continuing political will in forging of nations".²⁹

From the above discourse it is evident that E. Renan's understanding of nation was not strictly voluntaristic and it also was marked by ambiguity. This definition of nation was endowed by the features of both types of nationalism and for this reason it was open to ambiguous interpretations. Hence, Chavchavadze was quite right when he referred to E. Renan for his assertions concerning the essence of nation.

This ambiguous model might be referred to as Renan's model of nation conceptualization, however, it should be stressed that E. Renan's famous essay on nation was not Chavchavadze's direct source. To the identical point of view Chavchavadze came independently and common places in ideas, of Georgian and French thinkers, were supported by the atmosphere of all European discourse on a nation.³⁰

²⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 36-37.

³⁰ მარიამ ჩხარტიშვილი, ქეთევან მანია. ქართველი ერის კონცეპტუალიზაცია და ე.რენანის „რა არის ერი?“ ქართული წყაროთმცოდნეობა, 2011/2012, ტ. 13/14,

Conclusions

Thus, the main themes of Georgian national narrative were displayed. Of course, the idea of a Georgian nation created by Chavchavadze was richer than the author represented in this article. However, the above analyzed facts are sufficient to reveal the universal features, as well as specificity of the Georgian case, the creativity of the Georgian intellectuals while naturalizing general models of nationalism. The Idea of a Georgian nation shaped in the nineteenth century should be considered as a fact of the Georgian cultural history, the history of thoughts.

I would like to close this article quoting again from A. D. Smith: “*Very often nationalism concerns the realm of politics, but the significance of nationalism is not confined to the world of politics. It is also cultural and intellectual, for ‘the world of nations’ structures our global outlooks and symbolic systems*”.³¹

თბილისი, უნივერსალი, 72–89 [Mariam Chkhartishvili, Ketevan Mania, *Conceptualizing Georgian nation and What is a Nation by E. Renan*, in “Georgian Source-Studies”, vol. 13-14, 2013/2014, pp. 72-89].

³¹ Anthony D. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

IDENTITY IN TRANSITION: THE CASE OF POLISH KARAITES IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Dovile Troskovaite

University of Klaipeda (Lithuania)
dovile.troskovaite@gmail.com

Rezumat: *Identitate în tranziție: cazul caraiților polonezi în prima jumătate a secolului 20*

Articolul aduce în discuție eforturile elitei comunității karaite de a forma o identitate colectivă modernă polonezilor caraiți din prima jumătate a secolului XX. Scopul acestui articol este acela de a dezbate motivele apariției nevoii de transformare a identității colective, reconstruind semnificațiile acesteia și modalitățile de realizare. O atenție deosebită este acordată comunicării dintre liderii caraiți și ideilor lor de origine karaită referitoare la religie și limbă, considerate drept elementele de bază ale auto-percepției karaite.

Abstract: *The article discusses the efforts of Karaite community elite to form a modern collective identity of Polish Karaites in the first half of the 20th century. The aim of this paper is to discuss the reasons why the need to transform the collective identity appeared and reconstruct the means and ways it was done. The special attention is paid to the communication among Karaite leaders and their ideas of Karaite origin, religion and language, which were considered to be the core elements of Karaite self-perception.*

Résumé: *Identité en transition: le cas des Karaïtes polonais dans la première moitié du 20-ème siècle*

L'article ci-joint met en discussion les efforts de l'élite de la communauté karaïte de former pour les Polonais karaïtes une identité collective moderne dans la première moitié du XX-ème siècle. Le but de cet article est celui de débattre les motifs de l'apparition du besoin de transformation de l'identité collective, tout en réédifiant ses significations et ses manières de réalisation. On accorde une attention tout à fait particulière à la communication entre les leaders karaïtes et à leurs idées d'origine karaïte concernant la religion et la langue, considérées comme les éléments fondamentaux de l'auto-perception karaïte.

Keywords: *identity, Poland, Karaites, Seraja Szapszal*

INTRODUCTION

Karaite lived in Eastern Europe as a community within community – identified by others as Jews, they named themselves as Jews as well, but they still perceived and felt their difference from Rabbinic Jews. Modernization of the community had strengthened their feelings of ethnical identity, which led to the formation of two different identities – Jewish and Karaite. The formation of the last one was highly influenced by political changes in their home country. Russian imperial policies pursued towards Jews in the 19th c. led Karaites to reconsider their relationship with Jewishness. Gradual but consistent estrangement from Judaic tradition in order to avoid the restrictions applied to Jews formed the background for the formation of modern ethnical identity of Karaites in the 20th c.

Since the 18th c. both social and mental gap between Karaites and Jews increased steadily. Karaite Spiritual Board (Rus. *Karaimskoje Dukhovnoje pravlenie*) was established in Tauria¹ on the 3rd of March, 1837 (by the old calendar). It marked the emergence of the schism between the Rabbinic Jews and Karaites.² There are numerous studies, which reveal Karaites' refusal of elements associated with Hebrew tradition. Roman Freund³ aptly named this process as dejudaization. He discussed such actions as refusal of Hebrew language and orthography, which allow us to talk about rational, thought-out strategy constructing a modern self-image of Karaites. Similar efforts are presented by Philip Miller⁴, who analyzes diplomatic attempts of the Crimean Karaites in order to consolidate their social differences from Jews, and Mikhail Kizilov, who probably made the most comprehensive research on this issue, and dedicated his recent study to the analysis of the Galician Karaites' case.⁵ Despite the growing interest to examine the development of national Karaite self-identity, it is difficult to talk about a single, aggregated field in Karaimic studies both in academic and geographical spheres. This is due to two existing approaches in Karaite studies, which distinction is clearly visible for more than a century.

There is an existing tradition to study the history of Karaites in the context of Jewish studies. It is mostly common between Western and Israel researchers⁶, but this

¹ A similar Spiritual Board was established in Trakai (Troki) in 1863.

² Philip E. Miller, *Karaite Separatism in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Joseph Solomon Lutski's Epistle of Israel's Deliverance*, New York, 1993, p. XV.

³ Roman Freund, *Karaites and dejudaization. A historical Review of an Endogenous and Exogenous Paradigm*, Stockholm, 1991.

⁴ Philip E. Miller, *op. cit.*

⁵ Mikhail Kizilov, *The Karaites of Galicia: An Ethnoreligious Minority Among the Ashkenazim, the Turks, and the Slavs, 1772 – 1945*, Leiden, 2008.

⁶ Dan D. Y. Shapira, *Tendencies and Agendas in Turkic-Karaite and Karaite – related studies in Eastern Europe in 20th Century* in “PINKAS: Annual of the Culture and History of East

kind of generalization is very conditional in the context of globalization. This avenue of approach allows us to look at the Karaites in the broader context of Jewish history and explore the history of this community as an integral part of it from the ancient times until today. The same can be said about the Karaites, who lived in Eastern Europe and were related to Rabbinic Jews not only by religious tradition, but by common jurisdiction of Vaad, legal and fiscal liabilities to State – The Grand Duchy of Lithuania.⁷ In the study of later periods of Karaite history this approach enables researchers to reconstruct the formation and development of modern ethnical identity of Karaites – the works of R. Freund,⁸ M. Kizilov,⁹ Ph. Miller¹⁰ show that the search of Karaite ethnical identity began with the dissociation of any links with Jews, so both the community history before this process, which began in the 19th c., and after it, encourages researchers to locate their works in the context of Jewish studies.

The second avenue of approach, which, due to the specificity of the activities of Karaite community, is mostly supported by researchers in Eastern Europe,¹¹ is related with the transformation of Karaite identity. Researchers tend to accept the

European Jewry”, no. 1, Vilnius, 2006; Nathan Schur, *History of the Karaites*, Frankfurt am Main, 1992; Dan Shapira, *Avraham Firkowicz in Istanbul (1830 – 1832). Paving the Way for Turkic Nationalism*, Ankara, 2003.

⁷ Jacob Mann, “Karaica”, *Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature*, no. 11, Philadelphia, 1935; Jurgita Šiaučiūnaitė – Verbickienė, *Žydai Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės visuomenėje: sambūvio aspektai*, Vilnius, 2009; Idem, *Ką rado Trakuose Žiliberas de Lanua, arba kas yra Trakų žydai*, in “Lietuvos istorijos studijos”, no. 7, 1999.

⁸ R. Freund, *op. cit.*

⁹ Mikhail Kizilov, *Between the Jews and the Khazars: the formation of the ethnic identity and historical views of the East European Karaites in the general context of European history from the late eighteen century until today*, in “Pinkas: Annual of the Culture and History of East European Jewry”, no. 2, Vilnius, 2008; Idem, *Social adaptation and manipulation with self-identity: Karaites in Eastern Europe in Modern times, Karaites in Eastern Europe in the Last Generations, Proceedings of the First International Karaite colloquium*, Jerusalem, 2008; Idem, *The Arrival of the Karaites (Karaims) to Poland and Lithuania: A Survey of Sources and Critical Analysis of Existing Theories*, in “Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi”, no. 12, 2003/2004; Idem, *Faithful Unto Death: Language, Tradition, and the Disappearance of the East European Karaite Communities*, in “East European Jewish Affairs”, Vol. 36, No. 1, London, 2006; Idem, *Karaites in North-Eastern Europe: The Karaite Community of Troki between the Two World Wars, Orient als Grenzbeereich. Proceedings of the Deutscher Orientalistentag*, Wiesbaden, 2007; Idem, *Karaites through the Travelers’ Eyes. Ethnic History, Traditional Culture and Everyday Life of the Crimean Karaites According to Descriptions of the Travelers*, New York, 2003

¹⁰ Philip E. Miller, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Algirdas Baliulis, Stanislovas Mikulionis, Algimantas Miškinis, *Trakų miestas ir pilys*, Vilnius, 1991; Stefan Gąsiorowski, *Karaimi w Koronie I na Litwie w XV – XVIII wieku*, Cracow – Budapest, 2008.

theory of Karaite Khazarian origins, and apply it in their studies.¹² Because of its limitations – the critical application of this approach to the Karaites history before the 20th c. is logically almost impossible – the Karaite studies are not sufficiently developed in this region. And in the last decades this approach attracts even less adherents – with an exception of more of descriptive nature, journalistic initiatives¹³, which are supported by Lithuanian Karaite community. While the Khazarian approach is rather critically assessed by the academic community.

In this article, the efforts of the leaders of Karaite community to form a modern ethnical identity of Karaites in the first half of the 20th c. will be discussed. The aim of this article is to reveal the motives, which influenced the direction of identity formation, and the means by which it was constructed, as well as the particular symbols, on which the modern ethnical identity of Karaites was based. The array of the sources, which enables the reconstruction of this process, consists of the correspondence of S. Szapszal, stored in his archive, the manuscripts of his articles,¹⁴ documents of Karaite community presented to the Polish Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education¹⁵ and Karaite periodicals *Myśl karaimska*¹⁶ (Vilnius, Poland) and *Onarmach*¹⁷ (Panevėžys, Lithuania). While discussing the formation of Karaite identity we need to distinguish three significant segments, which understanding changed the most – language, religion and origin.

¹² The articles written by S. Szapszal himself are the most notable. Their manuscripts are stored in the library of Lithuanian history institute, F. 4. Also worth mentioning – the works of Tadeusz Kowalski, for instance, *Turecka monografia o karaimach krymskich*, in “*Myśl Karaimska*”, t. 2, Vilnius, 1929, note. 2. See more: Dan D. Y. Shapira, *Tendencies and Agendas in Turkic – Karaite and Karaite – related Studies in Eastern Europe on 20th Century*, in “Pinkas: Annual of the Culture and History of East European Jewry”, Vol. I, Vilnius, 2006, p. 210-241.

¹³ Halina Kobeckaitė, *Lietuvos karaimai*, Vilnius, 1997.

¹⁴ Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka [The Wrublewski library of Lithuanian Academy of Science] (further LMAB), *Rankračių skyrius* [Manuscript collection] (further – RS) F. 143: A letter from Emanuel Kobecki to Seraj Szapszal, b. 364; A. Mardkowicz to S. Szapszal b. 466, 467, 127; S. Bobowicz to S. Szapszal, b. 182, 511; Zarach Zarachowicz to S. Szapszal, b. 511, 723, 724; In the Manuscript department fund (F.7) of Lithuanian Institute of History Library (further - LIIB).

¹⁵ *A provision of the Karaite legal status bill in Poland (1921-1922)*, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 364; *A provision of the Karaite legal status bill in Poland (1928)*, Lithuanian Central State Archive (further – LCVA) F. 51, Ap. 4, b. 117, b. 400.

¹⁶ “*Myśl Karaimska*” [The Karaite Thought], was published in the period of 1924 – 1939 in Polish, Vilnius, ed. Ananjasz Rojecki (1924 – 1929), Ananjasz Zajączkowski (1929 – 1939) (published – twelve issues).

¹⁷ “*Onarmach*” [Progress] was published in the period of 1934 – 1939 in the Karaite language, Panevėžys, ed. Mykolas Tinfovičius (Tinfavičius) (published – three issues).

I. DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES: *WE* KARAITES AND *THEY* JEWS

Despite the pre-existing economical disagreements between Jews and Karaites, neither one nor the other called themselves otherwise as Jews until the 7th decade of the 19th c. Moreover, both groups claimed that they are the believers of true Judaism.¹⁸ With the establishment of the spiritual board of Karaites, two communities, which belonged to the tradition of Judaism, were separated, and the Karaism was recognized as a separate, unique religion. However, it would not be entirely accurate to agree with Ph. Miller, which claims, that “from the moment when the Crimea was subordinated by Russia in 1783, a part of the Karaite community wanted to distance a not only from the Rabbinic Jews, but from the Jewry in general.”¹⁹ The Karaite aspiration to distance themselves from Rabbinic Jews is testified by both Simcha ben Salomon Bobowicz, who became the first Karaite hakham after the establishment of the Karaite spiritual board and instantly in 1827 made an effort to obtain the withdrawal of military obligations for Karaite community²⁰, and his father, Salomon, who travelled to Saint Petersburg in 1795 in order to obtain an exemption from the restrictions imposed on Jews and Karaites. However, both in the end of the 18th c. and in the 19th c. all Karaite attempts to establish their independence from Jews were mainly directed outwards, i.e. above all the community aimed to reveal their differences from Rabbinic Jews to the authorities in order to dispose discriminatory restrictions applicable to Jews. These efforts had a little impact on the community life, in a sense that it did not aim to change the Karaite self-perception, only to present it in a way, which would please the authorities and help Karaite to achieve their objectives. This is evidenced by the extant historical sources, in which the majority of Karaites still associated themselves with the nation of Israel and traditions of Judaism – *Epistle of Israel's Deliverance* by Joseph Solomon Lucki was originally written in Hebrew around 1840. In addition, the work had been written in biblical style.²¹

The turning-point of the Karaite self-perception was the beginning of the 20th c., which correlated with the leadership of S. Szapszal.²² His personal features and

¹⁸ Jacob Mann, *op. cit.*; Philip E. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. XV.

¹⁹ Philip E. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. XVI.

²⁰ Since 1791 Jews were permitted to reside only in the zone of settlement; a double taxation system introduced in 1794; an introduction of conscription of recruits in 1827 – while emphasizing their differences from Rabbinic Jews, Karaites expected the abolition of these restrictions.

²¹ Philip E. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. XVI.

²² Seraj Szapszal was born in Bakhchsarai in 1873. He moved to study in Saint Petersburg in 1894 and got married to Vera Issakowicz Ogiz in 1909. S. Szapszal was a professor of Oriental languages in the University of Saint Petersburg, also was a member of various academic associations. In 1915 S. Szapszal was elected as a hakham of Russian Karaites and took community activities – collected documents, established a library, brought back

abilities directed his communal activities toward the formation of Karaite ethnical identity, which was based not only on religious tradition, but on their origins as well. A qualitatively different process, which was directed not only outwards, but to the community itself, had started. It transformed the self-perception of Karaites and on its basis it formed the attitude of dominant society towards this ethnical group. Probably, there were two main stimuli of this turning-point: the first one had remained the same as in previous centuries – to secure favourable living conditions for community, and the second one – growing sense of ethnic identity, which encouraged defining their uniqueness and draw the boundaries between *themselves* and *others*. In this case, *the other* was the Rabbinic Jews, with whom Karaites had a strong connection based on religious tradition. So it is not surprising, that the formation process of the modern ethnical identity of Karaites began with a coherent refusal of Hebrew elements in religious tradition, language and the perception of their origins.

The historiographical discussion about the influence of Haskalah on the formation of Karaite self-consciousness did not provide unanimous conclusion so far. R. Freund tends to think, that the process of acculturation, which was encouraged by the Jewish enlightenment movement, had an influence on the changes of Karaite community self-perception, directing them towards dominant society, for instance, the “westernization” of personal names etc.²³ As for the Karaites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it is very hard to identify the dissemination (or lack of it) of Haskalah ideas, because of the low density of communities and their estrangement in social and political matters. Although, it cannot be ruled out that ideas expressed by intellectuals in Vilnius, which was already known as one of the Haskalah centres in Eastern Europe in the end of 18th c. – the beginning of 19th c.²⁴, were known to local elite of Karaite communities. However, this assumption requires further detail studies.

I.2. Language and its reforms: Hebrew versus Karaite

J. Fishman, who analyzed the important link between the language and

many manuscripts to Saint Petersburg. It is assumed that exactly this time was the turning-point of Karaite self-perception. The activities of S. Szapszal were terminated by the First World War, and he started working again only in 1927, when he became the chief religious leader of Polish Karaites and settled in Vilnius. He held this position until 1940. In 1929 he became a member of Polish Academy of Sciences, and after ten years he was awarded a honorific of professor of Vilnius University. Until the end of the 5th decade of the 20th c. he formed and established the ideology of modern ethnical identity of Karaites. In 1961 S. Szapszal died in Vilnius, and here he was buried in the joint cemetery of Karaites and Tatars. LMAB RS F. 143, b. 404; LCVA F.51, Ap.4, b. 117, l. 1-2.

²³ Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁴ For more detailed information about the Haskalah movement in the region see: Marcin Wodzinski, *Haskalah and Hasidism in the Kingdom of Poland: A History of Conflict*, Oxford, 2005.

ethnicity, stated, that “language is not only a conscious factor but may become a primary cause, a rallying cry, a prime concern and a perceived first line of defence.”²⁵ In the beginning of the 20th c., when S. Szapszal became the leader of Russian Karaite community (and later on – of Polish Karaite community), the transformation process of Karaite identity started with the changes of language use in the community. The Hebrew language was the higher language used for literature and liturgy in the Karaite community and the orthography was the alphabet of Karaite language. So it was not only a sign of belonging to the Jewry, but also a way to express the Jewishness. While speaking about the connection between the religion and language, Fishman argues, that “the link between language and religion (what would be religion without language?) not only sanctifies ‘our language’ but helps to raise language into the pale of sanctity even in a secular culture.”²⁶ The process of the formation of modern ethnical identity of Karaites shows, that Karaism was inseparable from the Hebrew language, so the rejection of this language significantly weakened religious traditions within the community. At the same time the weakening of religious faith strengthened the importance of Karaite language to the identity of community. S. Szapszal used the language as the main argument in the development of his theory about Karaite Khazarian origins. It also helped to establish the image of the Crimea as the historical homeland in the Karaite self-consciousness. In one of his first articles²⁷ after becoming the chief religious leader of Polish Karaites, S. Szapszal emphasized both directly and indirectly the importance of Karaite language to self-perception of the community – “Karaites are almost from the same origins as Tatars, and they preserved their own Turkic language, which they are still using both in daily life and religious prayers.”²⁸ As it is shown in the previous quotation, the chief Karaite leader, while presenting his community to the Polish government, clearly identifies Karaite language as the only one used between Karaites, in addition of course to the Polish language, which usage is implied by the language of this document itself. S. Szapszal took the same position not only in his letter to the Polish Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education²⁹, but in his other texts as well – both public and academic ones.³⁰

The leaders of Karaite community also understood the link between liturgy and language, so they began to consider how to strengthen the religious feelings in the

²⁵ Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and ethnicity in minority sociolinguistic perspective*, Clevedon and Philadelphia, 1991, p. 7.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ S. Szapszal, *Memorial*, 1927 - 1928, Vilnius (it is assumed, that this document was addressed to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education), LCVA, F. 51, Ap. 4, b. 117, l. 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, l. 3 v.

²⁹ A letter from S. Szapszal to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education, The 29th of November, 1928, Vilnius, LCVA, F. 51, Ap.4, b. 400, l. 23 (typewriting)

³⁰ *K voprosu ob istoričeskoj sviazi Litvy s tiurkskimi stranami i narodami*, 1955, Vilnius, LIIB, F. 4, b. 208, p. 1-10 etc. (typewriting)

community and to make a simultaneous change from Hebrew to Karaite language in the liturgical rites. Aleksandr Mardkowicz³¹, one of the leaders of Luck community, on the 23rd of January, 1928 wrote a letter to S. Szapszal, and indicated the need to abandon “the Hebrew language, because everyone prays in it, but just the minority of community members understands it”. (...) Therefore, taking into account the needs of community, it would be appropriate to translate prayer books to Karaite language and, it would be welcomed to provide its text in Polish as well. In addition, prayer books should be printed in Latin alphabet³² (*Underlined by the author - D. T.*). It is obvious, that the author of these words linked the needs of community not with the Hebrew language, but with the Karaite language. He was not the only person, who was worried about this connection between language and religion and its importance to the self-consciousness of Karaite community. After a decade, in 1938 Samuel Bobowicz also contacted S. Szapszal, and called to the attention the question of Hebrew language and its incompatibility with the self-perception of Karaites. S. Bobowicz differed from his predecessor, because of the rigidity and assertiveness of his ideas. Bobowicz stated, that a person “cannot pray to God in incomprehensible language, because then the participation in worship services becomes an obligation, rather than the gratification of spiritual needs. We do not consider ancient Jewish language as our own; this language is dead, inorganic and unpleasant to our generation (*underlined by the author – D.T.*).”³³ It is obvious, that Karaites have identified themselves with Hebrew language in liturgy and other areas of life less and less. Although Szapszal himself did not leave any direct speeches regarding the use of Hebrew language in liturgy, but his opinion about the relationship between Karaite and Hebrew languages is clearly reflected in the Karaite language reform initiated by S. Szapszal himself. His academic interests contributed to this process as well – S. Szapszal was a well-known orientalist and actively participated in the scientific discussions with turkologists, who found the interest in Karaites in the 19th c., because their language belonged to the Turkic language group.³⁴ Due to the specifics of

³¹ Aleksandr Mardkowicz (1875-1944) – the leader of Karaite community in Luck, poet, publicist, active member of community. He was writing in Russia, in a journal published in Moscow – “The life of Karaites” [“Karaimskaja Žizn”], and later, on the 3rd decade of the 20th c., he became a pioneer of Karaite press – he was the editor of newspaper [The voice of Karaites] “Karay Awazy” and published his articles in another newspaper – “The thought of Karaites” (“Myśl Karaimska”).

³² LMAB RS F. 143, b. 466, l.5-10, 1928.

³³ LMAB RS F. 143 b. 511, l. 2-6. Samuel Bobowicz was about fifty years old in 1938, and it means that he could have been born at the last decade of the 19th c. Although, there are no more data found on his person, it is possible, that he could have been related with Simcha Bobowicz, who carried out a successful mission to Saint Petersburg in 1827.

³⁴ Dan D. Y. Shapira, *A Jewish Pan-Turkist: Seraya Szapszal (Şapşaloğlu) and his Work Qirim Qaray Türkleri (1928)*, in “Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae”,

Karaite language and anthropological features of the Crimean Karaites, the majority of researchers both in Europe and later in Russia, tended to ascribe Karaites to Turkic origins. The Crimean Karaites were acknowledged as a separate religious group in 1837, and they tended to rely on these considerations, which presented them as an extraordinary and unique nation with a deep historical tradition. Therefore it is not surprising, that in this atmosphere S. Szapszal began the Karaite language reform, tried to cleanse it from the interference of Hebrew words and terminology, changing them to Turkic language, thus weakening the Karaite connection with Jewishness. At the first glance these changes might look insignificant – usually just one or two letters differ in the word, but actually it changes word's structure significantly. For instance, a word *hakham* (Hebr. *Wiseman*), which describes the chief religious leader, was changed to *hakhan*, because then it sounds more like the word *Khan*, meaning the chief leader of Tatars. Similar changes were implied to the names of months – regular Hebrew names were changed to Karaite language.³⁵ R. Freund bases his opinion on findings of Tadeusz Kowalski, and states, that Karaites used Hebrew terminology until the year 1927³⁶, however, the archival documents, gathered during research, show, that terminology with many Turkic elements has been widely used in official documents of the Polish Karaite community at that time.³⁷

So in the first half of the 20th c. Karaite community has experienced significant linguistic changes, which influenced their self-perception as well – Karaites had no longer associated themselves with Hebrew language, and this affected the further denial of other Jewish elements in the religious tradition. In the beginning of the 20th c. the interior of Trakai kenesa has changed – the decoration of the ceiling, the Star of David, was removed, and traditional décor elements of synagogues – table entries of Decalogue in Hebrew – were eliminated from the interior as well.³⁸ And in Vilnius kenesa, which was built in 1911, the religious symbols were changed with secular ones – the spire was adorned by the Karaite coat of arms, which spread widely and became a symbol of the community. Like a litmus paper it reflects the essence of Karaite ethnical identity ideology - allegories of Khazarian origins and the Crimean historical homeland.³⁹

Only after the refusal of Hebrew features, which were traditionally associated with Jewish community, it became possible to move on to the next important step in

No. 58 (4), 2005, p. 349-380.

³⁵ About the changing of Hebrew month names to Karaite language, see: Roman Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³⁶ Roman Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³⁷ The project regarding the legal status of Karaites, LCVA F. 51, Ap. 4, b. 400 etc.

³⁸ M. Kizilov, *Karaites in North – Eastern Europe ...*, p. 37.

³⁹ It is unknown when exactly the Karaite coat of arms was introduced, but it had probably happened before the building of Vilnius kenesa. Later it was used in the documents of Karaite community and had a symbolic and representative function.

shaping of identity – the search of new identity features, its conceptualization and consolidation.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN ETHNICAL IDENTITY OF KARAITES

II.1. Transformation of origin: Semites versus Khazars

In discussions about Karaite origins, which started in the end of the 18th c. – the beginning of the 19th c., Karaites were associated with Jews, who supposedly moved to the Crimea after the destruction of the first temple in Jerusalem.⁴⁰ A little later, at about the third decade of the 19th c., in order to convince the government of Russian Empire and Orthodox Church officials, that Karaites did not participate in the murder of Christ, they started looking for the Karaite connections to the Sadducees.⁴¹ While none of these theories were entrenched, because of obvious chronological irrationalities,⁴² the story of Karaite absence in deicide spread widely and established itself in the society.⁴³ However, growing interest in Karaites, their origins, language and ethnography, encouraged the solution of the origins question. Moreover, the officials of Russian Empire, even after the establishment of Karaite Spiritual Board, did not stop to take an interest in this community.⁴⁴ Avraham Firkowicz (1786 – 1874), who was entrusted by the Crimean Karaite community to collect evidence about Karaite past, introduced a new version of Karaite origins. According to him, Jews were the ancestors of Karaites; they have lived in the Black Sea region since Biblical times and had converted pagan Khazars to Karaism. Newly converted

⁴⁰ Philip Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴² Such an interpretation is at odds with the chronology of Karaism genesis – Karaism was formed in the 9th-11th centuries, so there was no way, that Karaites would have been one of that lost tribes of Israel.

⁴³ In the middle of the 19th c. Władysław Sirokomlia, who was wandering in Trakai, talks about Karaites and that “they are not burdened as Talmudic Jews by the death of the Righteous, because they had left Jerusalem before the torture of Christ. They are not defiled by the mistakes of Talmud, since they were not there, when Christ was tied and crucified.” See. Vladislavas Sirokomlė, *Iškylas iš Vilniaus po Lietuvą*, Vilnius, 1989, p. 58.

⁴⁴ Soon after the decree of 1837, Russian Empire started to question the validity of privileges granted to Karaites. In 1839 the General Governor of Taurica, Michail Voroncov (1782-1856), sent a letter to Karaite spiritual board in Taurica. In this letter he asked for information about Karaite origin, traditions, customs and their differences from Jews. The text of this document suggests that without the convincing evidence regarding the authenticity of Karaites, those granted privileges and new status may be rescinded. See. O. Belyi, *Obzor arxivnykh dokumentov po istorii karaimskoj obščiny Kryma v pervoj polovine XIX veka, Krymskij muzej (1995 – 1996)*, c. 114.

Khazars have developed their communities in Jerusalem, Damascus etc. during their migration to South in the 10th-11th centuries.⁴⁵ Despite controversial assessments of Firkowicz, this theory became very popular in the Empire. It should be noted that in spite of Khazarian element presented in the search of Karaite origins, it was generally recognized, that Karaites originated from Semites.

The 19th c. discussions about the origins of Karaites are perfectly described by one of the first Russian orientalists, who were interested in ethnogenesis of Karaites as well, V. V. Grigorjev:

“We will pay attention only to the fact, that Tatar language [and it’s] dialect, which is used by *Russian Karaites*, does not contain even the slightest resemblance to Jewish words or other traces of that language, which would have been used by their ancestors, if they were Jews. Also, facial features and expressions of *our* Karaites do not have that striking national Jewish [feature], which instantly enables us to distinguish the child of Israel from any other human being (...) *Our* Karaites, even if they really are Jews, once blended with Turkic nations and this mixing had to have been permanent since the early ages (...) or, which is more *unbelievable*, (...) they are not Jews at all, but descendants of those Turks – Khazars, who professed the Law of Moses and ruled the Crimea in the 8th-11th c.”⁴⁶ (*Italics by – D. T.*).

The essential turning-point of Karaite self-perception was the 20th c. – S. Szapszal, who at that time implemented reforms of Karaite language, began to form the theory of Karaite origins from Khazars, which he presented in his academic and journalistic articles as “Karaites in Lithuania”⁴⁷, “Khazars and their language”⁴⁸, “On the question of Karaite ethnogenesis”⁴⁹, in letters to the Polish Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education and public speeches. S. Szapszal provided the answers to the questions, which were important to the community – about the origins of Karaites, their history, language and religion – without which the modern self-perception of Karaites could not have been formed.

S. Szapszal summarized his own ideas in the article *On the question of Karaite ethnogenesis (K voprosu ob etnogeneze karaimov (prodolzhenie issledovanie “Chazary i ich jazyk”))*⁵⁰, in which he represented the new conception about the

⁴⁵ Philip Miller, *op. cit.* p. 8. More about these attempts see: Mikhail Kizilov, *Social adaptation and manipulation with self-identity....*

⁴⁶ V. V. Grigorjev (the title is not given), 1846. This article was prepared for the magazine of Internal Affairs. LIIB F. 4, b. 127, l. 6 (quoted by С. Шапшал, *К вопросу об этногенезе караймов...* Free translation from Russian language (D. T.)). It is true, that Szapszal did not tend to agree with this opinion, but he did not doubt the authenticity of these words.

⁴⁷ Серая Шапшал, *Караймы в Литве*, LIIB F. 4, b. 181; LMAB RS F. 143, b. 825.

⁴⁸ Серая Шапшал, *Хазары и их язык*, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 828.

⁴⁹ Серая Шапшал, *К вопросу об этногенезе караймов*, LIIB F. 4, b. 127; LMAB RS F. 143, b. 831.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

origins of Karaites. Its starting point was the kinship of Karaite language with the Turkic languages and their centuries-long history in the Crimea, as well as the theory developed by A. Firkowicz about the connection between Karaites and Khazars. Khazars – mystified, now extinct but once very powerful tribe – was regarded in the considerations of S. Szapszal as “a suitable candidate for the ancestry”, which presented an opportunity both to create a magnificent image of Karaite past in the collective consciousness and to break free from Jewishness once and for all. According to Szapszal’s theory, Karaites settled in the Crimea in the 10th c. BC, there they converted local Khazars to pre-Talmudic Judaism.⁵¹ Those Khazars, who accepted Karaism, were named as the ancestors of Karaites. It is important to pay attention to the fact, that the conception of S. Szapszal had a significant difference from the attempt of A. Firkowicz, who tried to introduce Khazarian element to Karaite history and self-perception. A. Firkowicz idea about the origins of Karaites from the ancient Jews was abandoned – Khazars became the ancestors of Karaites.⁵² The essential aspect of this transformation is that it enabled the escape from Karaite Semitic origins and brought them closer to Turkic ancestry idea: “Khazars as the nation have no connection to Jews, only because of religion they were called Jews”.⁵³ During the development of Karaite Khazarian origins theory S. Szapszal relied on the data of anthropological fieldwork⁵⁴. His relationship with the available information was rather specific – although mentioned researchers did not have common opinion regarding the origins of Karaites (there were found similarities with Jews, Tatars, Bashkirs and others). A. Bashmakov presented very controversial findings⁵⁵, which S. Szapszal interpreted as an unambiguous proof of Karaite Khazarian origins.⁵⁶

However, after the spread of S. Szapszal conception, which stated that Karaites have originated from Khazars, it has not immediately established itself in the collective consciousness of Karaites. This was the result both of the incompleteness of this conception (it was finally formulated only in the 5th decade of the 20th c.) and

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, l. 11. However, the new academic studies prove, that Khazars actually adopted Talmudic Judaism and until their mysterious extinction they had not have any contacts with Karaites.

⁵² *Ibid.*, c. 50.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, c. 15

⁵⁴ In his article S. Szapszal discusses 9 anthropological expeditions in both the Crimea and Poland, during which it was attempted to figure out the origins of Karaites and their relationship with Jewishness.

⁵⁵ Bashmakov argues, that Crimean Karaites, as well as Tatars, are kind of indigenous people of Crimean peninsula. As in *Серая Шапшал, К вопросу об этногенезе караимов...*, c. 10. The author quotes a book written by Bashmakov, *Cinquante siecles d'evolution ethnique autour de la Mer Noire*, Paris, 1937.

⁵⁶ “All authors have to unanimously admit, that Karaite type is different from Jewish and vice versa, [and] is undeniably closer to Turkic [type].” But at the same time Szapszal states, that Karaites had been Israelites before resettling in the Crimea.

relatively short period of time, which was not enough for the definitive establishment of modern Karaite identity. So next to the Karaite origins theory, presented by Szapszal, there was another theory, distant from ideas of both Firkowicz and radical Szapszal. It is describe in the mentioned article by A. Mardkowicz, "The sons of law" (*Synowie zakonu*, 1930), which was written in Polish during his time in Luck, and later, in 1934 published in Lithuanian in the journal *Onarmach*, carried by Karaites of Panevėžys.⁵⁷ It can be assumed, that it is no coincidence, that this article was printed in this journal in Lithuanian, especially since it is the only text in this journal (there were only three issues of it), which is printed not in the dialect of Trakai Karaites. As the author of this text states in the original manuscript, "regarding the growing interest in social issues in Polish society, we release this short book about Karaites. We aim to share some knowledge with wider society about that modest and quiet nation, which is reluctant to manifest their existence."⁵⁸ Neither the editor of *Onarmach*, Mykolas Tinfavičius, nor the translator of this text (name and surname are left unknown) did not write the foreword or even a note in Lithuanian, which would explain the reason behind publishing of this article, so it is considered, that it was successful achieving the mentioned aim of the author and was adapted to the Lithuanian public. This text provides both the Karaite attitude towards themselves based on three attributes – language, religion, origin,⁵⁹ and the knowledge, which was considered worthy of sharing with society. The article of A. Mardkowicz, named "The sons of law", is divided to several smaller chapters and subsections, which discuss Karaism, it's relationship with Christianity and Judaism, Karaite language, origins and their communities in Poland and Lithuania. Here are some key insights made by A. Mardkowicz:

Origin. "From the incest of Turks and Semites and long-term merger of various nations arose a new element – the Crimean Karaites."⁶⁰ It is clear, that the author's attitude towards the Karaite origins reflects some aspects of S. Szapszal's conception – Karaites are derived from Crimean territory and identified with the nations of this region, although they still preserve several features of Semitic origins. Notwithstanding the named connection between Karaites and Semites, the author expresses a negative attitude towards Jews. Karaites are presented as a contrast to Jews; author uses anti-Semitic statements, which are "borrowed" from unknown author⁶¹: "Despite many general anthropological similarities between Jews and

⁵⁷ Aleksandr Mardkowicz, *The sons of law*, in "Onarmach", Panevėžys, 1934 (a one-time publication), p. 8-16 (translation from Polish),

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁹ "A different origin of Karaites is proved by their language, character and religious liturgy", *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁶¹ Statements, which negatively describe Jews, are quoted with the quotation marks, but the source is not identified.

Karaites, there are facial features, which distinguish them. These are well-known Jewish facial features, so-called *ghetto face*. We do not find this particular ghetto expression in the faces of Karaites.”⁶²

Religion. “Two factors influenced the Karaism: religion and ethnicity. So the name “karaite” describes not only the faith of these people, but indicates a certain, different from others, ethnicity.”⁶³ Karaism “for a long time was the only mark, which indicated the difference between Karaites and other Israelites.”⁶⁴ “From here came the name “*karaite*” – from the Hebrew word “*karai*”, which means *the one who is reading*”⁶⁵. Karaism developed “in the all lands, where Israelites were found (...) The propaganda of Karaism, going North in the direction of ancient people, between the Black and Caspian seas, found a good soil in Armenia, Dagestan, Georgia, the Crimea and Byzantium.”⁶⁶ The author reflects Karaite dissociation from Judaism and Jewishness, which already happened, and emphasizes the growing link between religion and origins (“ethnicity”), which is common to modern ethnical self-perception of Karaites.

Language. Karaite language “which since ancient times was the language of Karaite ancestors, now displaces the Hebrew language, which was usually used in church liturgy. The ancient Karaite poets used the Hebrew language as the language of literature as well.”⁶⁷

Though differently from previously discussed articles by S. Szapszal, “The sons of law” by A. Mardkowicz does not present unambiguous position, which would support the theory of S. Szapszal. It reflects changes in self-perception that have already occurred and showed an increase in pro-Turkic orientation, mainly in the fields of religion and origins. However, despite the apparent identity shift towards the formation of modern ethnic self-consciousness, attitude of Karaites in Panevėžys, who published the article of Mardkowicz, could be called as obsolete in comparison to the self-concept of Polish Karaites. In the first publication of Karaite community newspaper *Myśl Karaimska* in Poland (1924) there was a review by A. Rojecki for the article “Karaites in Poland” (*Karaici w Polsce*) prepared by Mejer Bałaban. This reviewed article was published in monthly newspaper for Jewish literature, art and science, “New life” (*Nowe Życie*), edited by M. Bałaban himself in Warsaw.⁶⁸ Although the content of this article caused an anger of the reviewer, it is obvious, that

⁶² Aleksandr Mardkowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶⁸ Ananjasz Rojecki, *Karaici w Polsce (o artykule Dr. M. Bałabana)*, in “*Myśl Karaimska*”, t. 1, z. 1, Vilnius, 1924, s. 3-4. A book by the same name, “*Karaici w Polsce*”, was prepared by A. Bałaban as well.

a certain polemic discussion (if only in journalistic and academic circles) existed between Jews and Karaites. According to A. Rojecki, M. Bałaban stated, that “Karaites always had ambitions to claim, that they are the real Jews”.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the author of the review disagrees, arguing that “Karaites are the only believers of the Old Testament [not Torah! – Underlined by the author – D.T.] without its later appendix (...), and they have never claimed to be called Jews and they never will, because [they] are not Jews (Karaites differ from them both with religion and ethnography), so they do not have such right.”⁷⁰

In the process of creation and development of ethnicity, origin became one of the most important of its elements. Origins, blood relations with ancestors can be negative, re-created, can be only assumed, mythical or real, but due to their quality to provide a community with continuity and longevity, it often determines the collective behaviour of the community. The Karaite community is not an exception – the question of origins became the object of their communal discussions and the most significant indication of their modern ethnical identity.

The results of Karaite identity transformations in the first half of the 20th c., especially the link between origins and language, are visible in academic society as well. Symon Szyszman makes references to Tadeusz Kowalski, who stated, that Karaite origin from Khazars is acknowledged by the fact, that Karaite language formed in the territory between Caspian and Black seas, where prospered the culture of Khazars.⁷¹ This enabled S. Szyszman to make an assumption, that Karaites maintained the Khazar culture.⁷² While arguing about the Karaite origins from Khazars and/or Chuvash, S. Szyszman as well as Szapszal finds additional arguments in anthropometric studies of Karaites.⁷³ So it can be stated, that during the 20th c. the historiographical school of Karaimics was formed. It maintained the legitimacy of modern Karaite identity, which was inspired by the ideas of S. Szapszal.

II.2. Transformation of homeland symbol

When Szapszal began to consolidate the theory of Karaites originating from Khazars, historical homeland question became also important to Karaites. In the Karaite religion the land of Israel was considered as a historical homeland, but due to the formation of ethnical identity and the aspiration to distinct themselves from Jews, this image had to be replaced. The first source, where S. Szapszal discusses this issue,

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ T. Kowalski, *Turecka monografia o karaimach krymskich*, in “Myśl Karaimska”, t. 2, sąs. 2, Vilnius, 1929, p. 3-5.

⁷² Simon Szyszman, *Karaizmas*, Vilnius, 2000, p. 76.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

is already mentioned “Memorial”. There, after the short introduction of Karaite history, S. Szapszal states, that Karaites derived from the Crimea⁷⁴. Similar position was taken by A. Mardkowicz, who saw a direct relation between historical Karaite homeland and their origins. The author associated Karaites with the Orient and in order to reason his opinion, he emphasized a clear contrast between the Crimea and the land of Israel, from which originated those, according to the author, who were doomed to wander and live in different places, where they (the Jews) will always remain unwelcomed strangers. Therefore, for Karaites the holy land of Israel – “is not the true ancestral homeland, which they had never seen, but imagined and only known from the Bible”, in other words, an allegory of homeland.⁷⁵ However, this approach has not been the dominant one – during the year 1929 Halich community leader Zachar Zacharowicz created a poem for a communal celebration⁷⁶, in which the land of Israel is glorified and Karaites are called its children.⁷⁷

However, after the establishment of Khazarian origins theory in the Karaite consciousness, the significance of the Crimea grew steadily – historical homeland no longer had been associated with religious tradition, it started to be linked with origins, in other words - its image had become an element of secular ethnical identity. Its positions were strengthened by the fact, that the Crimea itself was the provenance of actually existing Karaite community, so the historical homeland was tangible and visualized. These links between Karaites and the Crimea are also recognized in the reform project presented by S. Bobowicz⁷⁸. In addition to religious reforms it presents the “national issue of Karaites” and links it with the consolidation of the Crimea as a historical homeland.

A symbiosis of two images formed in Lithuania – the Crimean image, which was developed by S. Szapszal, who himself was born and grew up in the Crimea, and the image of Trakai, which was closer to Lithuanian communities. The previous image was expressed in the poems of Karaite poet, Simon Kobecki (1865-1933). His collection of poetry “Irlar” (“Songs”) was published in Cyrillic printed Karaite language, and was the first printed secular book in this language.⁷⁹ It consists of 25 poems, which, according to Ananjasz Zajączkowski, reflect the life of Karaites, their ethnical and cultural feelings.⁸⁰ S. Kobecki describes the surroundings of Trakai and

⁷⁴ *Memorial*, LCVA, F. 51, Ap. 4, b. 117, l. 3-3v.

⁷⁵ Aleksandr Mardkowicz to Seraja Szapszal – F. 143, b. 466, l. 8v, 1929, Luck.

⁷⁶ For the newest publication of the poem, see. M. Kizilov, *The Karaites of Galicia*, Appendix no. 3.3, p. 393.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ A letter from S. Bobowicz to S. Szapszal, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 182, l. 1-8

⁷⁹ Ananjasz Zajączkowski, “*Pieśni*” Kobeckiego, *Osobne odbicie z czasopisma “Myśl Karaimska”*, t. I, z. IV – V, Vilnius, 1928, l. 1.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

its nature in his poems “Dominican Hill” and “Spring”.⁸¹ In his most popular poem “*Jukla, uvlum, jukla*” (“Sleep, son, sleep”) S. Kobecki glorifies two Karaite “holy places” – Zion or the Holy Land and Trakai. The distinction made between these two places is expressed in such words „Let the Zion be the purpose of your hopes/ and Trakai – the object of your thoughts”⁸². These lines aptly describe the separation of religious and secular homelands, and mark the changes in the self-consciousness of the community. It seems, that already in the 4th decade of the 20th c., the Crimean image established itself in Lithuanian Karaite community as well. Albeit indirectly, it is also mentioned in the poem *Batyr bijin tamaša aty* (“The magic horse of the Grand Duke”, 1933)⁸³ by Simonas Firkovičius.

Duke, You are – the only one, like the Lord in heavens!

*We heard in the old country of Solchat*⁸⁴,

*That the flocks of kipchaks*⁸⁵ *in the north dense forest*

*Are laid down by your hand, strong and spirited.*⁸⁶

(...)

The Great Vytautas looked out from the castle window,

And said to the women in Karaite language... (Underlined by the author – D. T.).

This short fragment from the poem expresses the essential characteristics of modern ethnical identity of Karaites – the established theory of the Khazarian origins, the legend of ancestral homeland in the Crimea and Karaite language as an identity mark of the community. The focus on the historical homeland question made by Karaite poets and community activists is not a casual matter. In the consciousness of the community it is associated with the origins and the blood relationship with the

⁸¹ The unique works of Simonas Kobeckis reflect the Karaite worldview in the 19th c. His poems were influenced by various languages – Hebrew, Polish, Turkish, Russian and Arabic. Borrowings from these languages indicate, that the Karaite language was still alive and intensely used in the end of the 19th c. In the 20th c. S. Szapszal started to reform Karaite language and these borrowings from other languages were changed to Turkish words only, so the language of S. Kobeckis poems is very important from the linguistic point of view. We can see a parallel between the change of language and identity – elements of other cultures have been eliminated both from Karaite language and self-consciousness of the community.

⁸² “*Syjon niech będzie celém twej nadziei, a Troki – przedmiotem twej myśli*” (translation to Polish language by Ananjasz Zajączkowski), from: Ananjasz Zajączkowski, “*Pieśni Kobeckiego*”, *Osobne odbicie z czasopisma „Myśl Karaimska”*, t. I, z. IV – V, Vilnius, 1928, l. 1.

⁸³ The poem both in Karaite and Lithuanian languages is published in: Halina Kobeckaitė, *Lietuvos karaimai*, Vilnius, 1997, p. 115-118.

⁸⁴ Solchat – a territory in the Crimea.

⁸⁵ Kipchaks – one of the former nations of the Golden Horde, who lived in the Crimea.

⁸⁶ Simonas Firkovičius, *Batyr bijin tamaša aty* [The magic horse of the Grand Duke], in Halina Kobeckaitė, *Lietuvos karaimai*, Vilnius, 1997, p. 116.

ancestors. In other words, it is an integral part of the origin question, which was very relevant in the construction of the modern ethnical identity of Karaites. Thus, the transferring of the historical homeland to the Crimea strengthened, legitimated and consolidated theory, which emphasized the Karaite origins from Khazars, both in the collective consciousness of the community and the surrounding society.

II.3. Religion: reform attempts in the secularising community

S. Szapszal took seriously the adaptation of language and history to the new identity ideology, but left behind another significant element of Karaite self-perception – religion. Paradoxically, he, formally the chief religious Karaite leader, hesitated to start religious reforms.⁸⁷ The issues of religious reforms in the Karaite community are not consistently discussed in historiography – both M. Kizilov⁸⁸ and R. Freund⁸⁹, who did a research on this issue, mostly concentrated on the refusal of Hebrew symbols and terminology in the Karaite liturgy and paid less attention to the development of the ideas regarding religious reforms. It is important to notice, that the need for religious reforms, realized by the intellectuals of the community, was influenced by both ideological and practical reasons. The first ones were determined by the established need to differentiate themselves from Jews, while the second ones were determined by the evaporating religious faith of Karaites and growing secularization, which was a threat for Karaite self-perception and survival of the community.

Although, S. Szapszal have not initiated or implemented religious reforms himself, he created preconditions for the emergence of such ideas in the Karaite community. Shortly after becoming the chief Karaite religious leader, he represented his own interpretation of Karaite religion – “Karaites confess the Old Testament in its primary purity, alike the Christian Church. Anan (*Anan ben David* – *auth. comment*) accepted Jesus Christ as the [God] sent prophet, and declared Muhammad as the prophet as well.”⁹⁰ Moreover, for the first time he introduces the collation of Karaite religion and Islamic tradition – he compares mufti with hakham, imam with khazan, muezzin with samashti, although these parallelisms would not be adequate in religious practice.⁹¹

⁸⁷A. Mardkowicz and S. Bobowicz introduced their separate religious reform projects to S. Szapszal, but these reforms remained unimplemented (see. further).

⁸⁸ Mikhail Kizilov, *Social adaptation and manipulation with self-identity...*

⁸⁹ Roman Freund, *Karaites and dejudatization....*

⁹⁰ *Memorial*, LCVA, F. 51, Ap. 4, b. 117, l. 3

⁹¹ LCVA F. 51, Ap. 4, b. 117

The need for religious reforms was realized in the third decade of the 20th c. – A. Mardkowicz, the author of “The sons of law”⁹² and one of the leaders of community in Poland, in 1928 wrote a letter to S. Szapszal suggesting the reform project for Karaite religion. However, as it can be seen from the subsequent correspondence of S. Szapszal and a subsequent project of Samuel Bobowicz, the reforms proposed by Mardkowicz were not implemented. In contrast with already mentioned S. Bobowicz, who initiated similar reforms on the 4th decade of 20th c., Mardkowicz mentioned that reasons, which encouraged changes in the religious rituals, are more connected with the need to adapt in Slavic environment than with the distancing themselves from Jews (even though this motive is also important). The author proposed two projects, which should have helped Karaites to adapt to the surrounding environment. The first one - to move the celebration of the seventh day of the week from Saturday to Sunday, arguing, that “in the conditions, in which we live now, not Saturday, but Sunday is the seventh day”, so where worship takes place only once a week, they should be moved from Saturday to Sunday.⁹³ The second issue, directly linked with the traditional requirements of Judaism, was named by the author as *the hat issue* (“*kwestja czapkowa*”). Stating that, “from some Karaites’ perspective, walking without covering your head [with hat] is pleasant for surrounding environment”, he suggested to discuss this issue, although did not find it of a big importance.⁹⁴ Mardkowicz suggested some exotic ideas as well, for instance, to revive the sacrificial traditions of Biblical times only by replacing a lamb with flowers and burning of incense.⁹⁵

As we can see from his proposals, the ideas of A. Mardkowicz were strongly influenced by the surrounding society and a need to adapt to it. As predicted by the initiator of these ideas, his reform project met a strong resistance in the community – one of the leaders of Halich community, Zachar Zacharowicz, wrote a letter to S. Szapszal on the 4th of August, 1928, stating, that these propositions made by Mardkowicz caused a great dissatisfaction in Halich community - Karaites considered these reforms as non-ethical and immoral, although the author of the letter, defended A. Mardkowicz for his good intentions.⁹⁶

Although the first attempt to reform Karaite religion and adapt it to the modern age failed, the need for changes remained in the community. However, a decade had passed before the second reform project was proposed. It was constructed by Samuel

⁹² Aleksandr Mardkowicz, *The sons of law*, in “Onarmach”, Panevėžys, 1934 (a one-time publication) p. 8-16.

⁹³ A. Mardkowicz to S. Szapszal – F. 143, b. 466, l. 8v

⁹⁴ A. Mardkowicz to S. Szapszal – F. 143, b. 466, l. 6

⁹⁵ A. Mardkowicz to S. Szapszal – F. 143, b. 466, l. 5.

⁹⁶ LMAB RS F. 143, b. 511, A letter from Zarach Zarachowicz to S. Szapszal about the resentment of reforms proposed by A. Mardkowicz in the Karaite community.

Bobowicz⁹⁷, who at that time lived in the emigration in the United States of America. In the November of 1938 he wrote a letter to S. Szapszal, in which he outlined his reform proposals for religious life of the community.⁹⁸ In his letter he indicated the main reasons, why these changes are necessary. Those reasons included the preservation of Karaite self-consciousness, which depended on the answers to important issues of the community, and the possibility to achieve main goals of the community. Those goals are not identified, but the contents of this letter suggest, that author has in mind Karaite adaptation in unpredictable and menacing environment (the First World War and the Russian revolution have recently passed, uneasy nationalistic feelings were in the air) and the necessity to assert their differences from Jews.⁹⁹ Hence, the need to consolidate ethnical self-perception of Karaites was clearly understood and expressed. In addition to his proposal to refuse to worship in Hebrew, he also presented a unique understanding of religious holidays, which was undoubtedly influenced by the Karaite Khazarian origins theory, which was already well-established at that time. So Bobowicz states, that “we do not accept celebrations, which are reminiscent of the expulsion of the Jews from Egypt, because our ancestors were not there, they were not expelled from there, and so we do not consider it as our celebrations.”¹⁰⁰ (*underlined by the author – D. T.*)

Although both S. Bobowicz and A. Mardkowicz considered Hebrew language, used in the liturgy, as the main object of the religious reforms in the Karaite community, other ideas of S. Bobowicz relatedly departed from the ones expressed by his predecessor. Despite the different ideas both authors had similar intentions – A. Mardkowicz sought to adapt Karaite religion to the changed circumstances by introducing new rituals, while S. Bobowicz led by similar purpose wanted to eliminate Jewish elements from Karaite liturgy. The only difference is that the first one was proposing specific actions, and the second one – ideas, which should have led to changes.

It is worth mentioning, that both A. Mardkowicz and S. Bobowicz presented their individual ideas about Karaite religion, traditions and the need to adapt to new, changing living conditions in the modern society, to S. Szapszal hoping for his approval, support and initiatives to implement these projects. As the S. Bobowicz states in his letter, “All these issues make us worry and we rely on your strong will, because as many of us have speculated, this issue is of a very important and urgent

⁹⁷ Samuel Bobowicz was about fifty years old in 1938, and it means that he could have been born at the last decade of the 19th c. Although, there are no more data found on his person, it is possible, that he could have been related with Simcha Bobowicz, who carried out a successful mission to Saint Petersburg in 1827.

⁹⁸ A letter from S. Bobowicz to S. Szapszal, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 182, l. 1-8.

⁹⁹ A letter from S. Bobowicz to S. Szapszal, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 182, l. 2.

¹⁰⁰ A letter from S. Bobowicz to S. Szapszal, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 182, l. 3.

nature.”¹⁰¹ The assumption can be made, that S. Szapszal played an important role in these discussions about reforms, because only he, as the chief religious leader of Karaites, had a possibility to start their implementation. Paradoxically, he remained reticent in the decision making process regarding the religious questions, because academic activities were closer to his heart.¹⁰² His relationship with reforms, proposed by A. Mardkowicz and S. Bobowicz, was rather passive – in the first case the community itself revolted against reforms and in the second case – events were influenced by the Second World War. Therefore, it remains unclear, what was the response of Karaite community to the latest reform proposal, which remained not implemented. However, the crucial mental fractures for the revealing of the process of formation of Karaite self-perception had already occurred. And despite the living in the different countries, the Karaite intellectuals were working together when considering issues important for the survival of Karaites.

Conclusions

Although the Karaites of Eastern Europe were aware of their differences from Rabbinic Jews, until the 19th c. this issue rarely left the field of religious discussions. In the 19th c., in the background of the Jewish question policy carried out by Russian Empire, Karaites declared their dissociation from Jews on religious basis as well, but taking into account the pragmatic aims – to improve their social status in the Empire. Though Karaites asserted their isolation from the Rabbinic Jews, they still associated themselves with religious tradition of Judaism, Jewish origins.

The 20th c. was a turning-point for the self-perception of Karaites. It was influenced by both rational reasons – integration in society, higher social status and integration in it, and mental sensations – a steadily growing gap from Jewishness, secularization and the emergence of the sense of ethnical identity. The activities of the chief Karaite religious leader, S. Szapszal, had the most significant influence on the formation of modern self-perception of Karaites. After becoming the leader of community, S. Szapszal turned his activities towards 1) full delimitation of Karaite self-consciousness from Judaic tradition and 2) the introduction of new elements of identity and its consolidation in the self-consciousness of the community. He reformed Karaite language – changed the Hebrew terms into Turkic, and then on the basis of Karaite language tried to justify the theory, which traced the origins of Karaites from mystical Turkic tribe. In this way S. Szapszal completely abandoned the previously dominant perception about Jewish Karaite origins. Charisma, leadership and diplomatic experience served to S. Szapszal – his theories found a

¹⁰¹ A letter from S. Bobowicz to S. Szapszal, LMAB RS F. 143, b. 182, l. 1-8.

¹⁰² M. Kizilov ambiguously states, that S. Szapszal were completely ignorant of religious affairs. See Mikhail Kizilov, *The Karaites of Galicia...* p. 340.

support among the community leaders, through them the ideology of modern ethnical identity of Karaites was established among other members of the community as well. Until the middle of the 20th c. S. Szapszal formed a clear, complete, logical ideology of ethnical identity, which was based on alleged connection between Karaite language, origin and religion. The dissemination of this ideology through the community leaders, the press and propaganda oriented towards the surrounding society, has managed to establish itself not only in their community and surrounding society, but in an academic environment as well.

**LES DISCUSSIONS INTER-ORTHODOXES SUR LE SUJET
DE LA DIASPORA ET LA DÉCISION DE L'ÉGLISE ORTHODOXE
ROUMAINE DE RÉORGANISER SES STRUCTURES ECCLÉSIALES
EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE APRÈS 1990**

**THE INTER-ORTHODOX DEBATES ON "DIASPORA"
AND THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH'S DECISION
TO REORGANIZE ITS ECCLESIASTICAL STRUCTURES
IN FRANCE AND ITALY AFTER 1990**

Raluca Dima

Université "Babeş-Bolyai" de Cluj-Napoca,
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales
raluca.dima@ubbcluj.ro, ralue_dima@yahoo.fr

Rezumat: Această lucrare își propune să ilustreze, folosind metoda analizei de discurs, modul în care contextul reprezentat de relațiile inter-ortodoxe a avut un anumit rol în decizia Bisericii Ortodoxe Române de a-și (re)organiza structurile ecleziiale din străinătate după 1990. Folosind drept studii de caz contextele din Franța și Italia, ipoteza de la care pornește acest studiu este aceea că, fără a fi singura explicație a deciziei Bisericii Ortodoxe Române de a-și (re)organiza infrastructura instituțională, concurența cu alte Biserici Ortodoxe pentru jurisdicția asupra comunităților de români ortodocși a avut un rol stimulator.

Abstract: Using the method of discourse analysis, this paper intends to illustrate the manner in which the context represented by the inter-orthodox relations had a certain role in the Romanian Orthodox Church's decision to (re)organize its ecclesiastical structures abroad after 1990. Using as case studies the contexts of France and Italy, the hypothesis this study uses is that without being the only explanation for the Romanian Orthodox Church's decision to (re)organize its institutional infrastructure, the concurrence of the other Orthodox Churches over the jurisdiction of the Romanian orthodox communities had a stimulating role.

Résumé: Le travail ci-joint se propose à illustrer, en employant la méthode de l'analyse du discours, la manière dont le contexte représenté par les relations inter-orthodoxes eut un certain rôle dans la décision de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine de (ré)organiser ses structures ecclésiiales à l'étranger après 1990. Utilisant comme études de cas les contextes de France et d'Italie, l'hypothèse que cette étude propose est que, sans être la seule explication pour la décision de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine de (ré)organiser son infrastructure institutionnelle, la concurrence avec les autres Églises Orthodoxes pour la juridiction sur les communautés roumaines orthodoxes a eu un rôle stimulateur.

Keywords: Diaspora, autocephaly, ethnicity, Romanian Orthodox Church

Introduction

L'existence des communautés orthodoxes roumaines à l'étranger, sans être quand même incluses dans un programme ou une stratégie articulée de l'Église, date depuis 1853 à Paris¹, 1906 à Vienne², et 1902 à Regina, Saskatchewan³, pour mentionner seulement les premières initiatives. L'installation du régime communiste en Roumanie et plutôt sa politique envers la religion, ainsi que la réponse de l'Église face à cette politique menèrent à la rupture entre la Patriarchie Roumaine et beaucoup de ses communautés de l'Europe Occidentale et de l'Amérique du Nord qui identifièrent plus ou moins « l'Église Mère » avec le régime. Après 1990 l'infrastructure ecclésiale de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine à l'étranger connut et connaît encore une vraie « explosion » (plus de 300 paroisses dans la Métropole Orthodoxe Roumaine de l'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale) justifiée/expiquée par l'institution religieuse comme réponse aux besoins spirituels des Roumains émigrés. La Métropole Orthodoxe Roumaine de l'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale créée en 2001 sur les bases de l'Archevêché Orthodoxe Roumain de l'Europe Occidentale comprend le territoire de dix pays, parmi lesquels la France et l'Italie. Sans considérer seulement le contexte des relations/des débats inter orthodoxes, les deux pays illustrèrent de manières différentes comment l'institution religieuse organisa son infrastructure à l'étranger après 1990. Les différences les plus significatives regardent la configuration de la structure institutionnelle de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine préexistante dans les deux pays, la morphologie sociale (et pas seulement) distincte des deux contextes spatiales, et la manière dont les communautés de Roumains se sont formées (et se forment encore) le long du temps.

L'ouvrage ci-joint se propose à illustrer la manière dont le contexte représenté par les relations inter orthodoxes eut un certain rôle pour la décision de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine de (ré)organiser et finalement d'adapter ses structures ecclésiales à l'étranger après 1990. L'hypothèse sur laquelle on a construit cette étude est celle qu'il s'agit d'une sorte d'émulation concurrence qui explique, il est vrai, partiellement la détermination de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine de refaire son infrastructure ecclésiale hors des frontières de l'État roumain. On n'a pas l'intention de suggérer que cette émulation concurrence eut une position centrale mais plutôt qu'il s'agit d'un facteur parmi d'autres qui influença les décisions prises par l'institution religieuse. Comme le montre le discours de l'Église, d'autres facteurs,

¹ Veniamin Pocitan Ploesteanu, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română din Paris [L'Église orthodoxe Roumaine de Paris]*, Bucarest, Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, 1941, pp.33-34.

² Emanuel Tăvală, *Românii din Viena, chemați la 'Sfânta înviere' [Les Roumains de Vienne, appelés à 'la Sainte Résurrection']*, en « Ziarul Lumina » [« Le Quotidien la Lumière »], le 24 avril 2011, édition en ligne, <http://www.ziarullumina.ro/articole;1836;0;55861;0;> Romanii-din-Viena-chemati-la-Sfanta-Inviere.html, vérifié le 20.10.2012.

³ Aurel Moisiuc, *Citadele românești în America [Des citadelles roumaines en Amérique]*, en « Ziarul Lumina » [« Le quotidien la lumière »], le 20 Mars 2011, édition en ligne, <http://www.ziarullumina.ro/articole;1836;0;54081;0;Citadele-romanesti-in-America.html>, vérifié le 20.10.2012.

aussi, ont eu, sans doute, une importance considérable pour la décision d'organiser son infrastructure à l'étranger après 1990; on mentionne le besoin accru de refaire une unité affectée de manière assez dramatique par les évolutions de la Guerre Froide, l'apparition des conditions internes et internationales favorables après la chute du mur de Berlin, et, bien sûr l'émigration massive des Roumains en Occident après 1990, ainsi que le devoir de l'Église d'accomplir leurs besoins spirituels. L'intention de cette étude est d'isoler seulement un de ces facteurs: le contexte des débats inter orthodoxes sur le sujet de la diaspora.

Généralement, les disciplines sociales n'ont approché que de manière assez marginale l'orthodoxie⁴. Un nombre limité de travaux se sont engagés dans l'analyse de la présence orthodoxe en Occident, préférant particulièrement le continent Américain ou la situation de l'orthodoxie russe⁵. Les relations inter orthodoxes, à quelques exceptions⁶, restent plutôt la préoccupation des théologiens. La littérature qui approche l'activité de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine à l'étranger, soit qu'on parle du cadre temporel, du contexte géographique ou de la perspective disciplinaire, est assez limitée. Deux articles plaçant l'activité de l'Église dans le contexte de l'émigration après 1989⁷, quelques études qui combinent le genre biographique avec les documents des archives regardant l'activité de l'Église ou de ses représentants à l'étranger avant 1989⁸ et des références marginales dans les analyses approchant des

⁴ Voir par exemple, Pater McMyler, Maria Vorozhishcheva, *Sociology and Eastern Christianity*, in "The Blackwell Companion to eastern Christianity", Ken Parry (sous la direction de), Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp.462-467.

⁵ Thomas Fitzgerald, *Eastern Christianity in the United States*, in "The Blackwell Companion..." Alexei D. Krindatch, *Orthodox (Eastern Christian) Churches in the United States at the Beginning of a New Millennium: Questions of Nature, Identity and Mission*, en "Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion", vol.41, n° 3, 2002. Timothy L. Smith, *Refugee Orthodox Congregations in Western Europe. 1945-1948*, en "Church History", vol.38, n° 3, 1969.

⁶ François Thual, *Le Monde Orthodoxe ou l'anti-Huntington*, en « La Revue administrative », n° 329, 2002, p.518. Nikolaos A. Daldas, *Le Patriarche Œcuménique de Constantinople et le statut canonique de la "diaspora" orthodoxe de langue grecque – la cas de la France*, Éditions Pektasis, 2001. Victor Roudometof, *Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional Disputes*, en "Sociology of Religion", vol.69, n° 1, 2008.

⁷ Lavinia Snezana Stan, *Transnational Migration in Europe. Romanian Emigration to Italy 1989-1999*, en "Transylvanian Review", vol.10, n° 3, 2001, pp.106-118. Nadia Laura Neagu, "La pastorale ortodossa romena in Italia: quo vadis?", in *Caritas Italiana – Romania. Immigrazione e lavoro in Italia. Statistiche, problem e prospettive*, Franco Pittau, Antonio Ricci, Alessandro Sulj (sous la direction de), Centro Studi et Ricerche IDOS, 2008, pp.240-243. See also the unpublished PhD thesis, Suna Gulfer Ihlamur, *The Romanian Orthodox Churches in Italy: The Construction of Romanian-Italian Transnational Orthodox Space*, Università degli Studi di Trento, Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale, Scuola di Dottorato in Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale, <http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/74/1/PhDThesisSGI.pdf>, vérifié le 23.11.2011.

⁸ Dumitru Stavarache, *Mitropolitul Visarion Puiu. Documente din pribegie (1944-1963) [Le Métropolite Visarion Puiu. Des documents d'errance (1944-1963)]*, Pascani, Moldopress,

sujets plus générales⁹ constituent plus ou moins le matériel tout entier sur ce sujet.

La méthode qu'on employa dans cette étude est celle de l'analyse du discours, utilisant comme sources les communiqués des institutions religieuses orthodoxes et les déclarations des représentants de celles-ci. Pour le discours de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine on a utilisé à part les déclarations publiques de ses représentants, une série des rapports synthétisant les discussions du Synode publiés dans la revue officielle de la Patriarchie.

L'analyse comprend deux parties, dont la première se penche sur les discours des Églises Orthodoxes concernant la situation de la 'diaspora' en Occident, comme cadre général pour situer et comprendre le discours de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine qui fait l'objet de la deuxième section de l'étude.

La question de la « diaspora » et les relations inter orthodoxes en Europe Occidentale – quelques repères

Le fait que l'orthodoxie est, sous plusieurs aspects, coupée au moins en « deux pôles rivaux, Moscou et Constantinople »¹⁰ est déjà quelque chose de commun et pris comme point de départ pour toutes les analyses approchant la situation de l'orthodoxie contemporaine. En fait, les divisions à l'intérieur de l'orthodoxie sont plus nombreuses et plus complexes que celles entre les « deux pôles ». La question de la « diaspora orthodoxe » est une des contextes qui montrent le mieux cette situation.

Comme les premières communautés chrétiennes orthodoxes établies en Occident après le Grand Schisme eurent un caractère particulièrement spontané lié à leur composante humaine (des immigrés, des (auto)exilés, des réfugiés etc.), sans être organisées toujours par un centre ecclésial particulier¹¹, mais plutôt comme « réponse

2002. Aurel Sasu, *Cazul Policarp Morușca. O cronologie a faptelor [Le cas Policarp Morușca. Une chronologie des faits]*, Cluj-Napoca, Limes, 2002. Remus Grama, *Policarp Morușca. Primul Episcop al Românilor din America. Scrisori din captivitate. Tragedia despărțirii bisericești a românilor din America [Policarp Morușca. Le premier Évêque des Roumains d'Amérique. Des lettres de la captivité. La tragédie de la séparation ecclésiale des Roumains d'Amérique]*, Cluj-Napoca, Eikon, 2004. Radu Șerban, *Prea Sfințitul Policarp. Însemnări despre Unchiul Pompei [Le Très Sacre Policarp. Des notes sur l'oncle Pompei]*, Bucarest, Dareco, 2007. Alexandru Nemoianu, *Ortodoxia și românii-americani [L'Orthodoxie et les Roumains-Américains]*, Cluj-Napoca, Eikon, 2011. Alexandru Nemoianu, *În America, la "Vatra Românească" [En Amérique, à "Vatra Românească"]*, Bucarest, Minerva, 2001. Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *O contribuție la istoria exilului românesc. Vol.4, Biserica Ortodoxă Română în străinătate, în exil, în diaspora [Une contribution à l'histoire de l'exile Roumain. Tome 4. L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine à l'étrangère, en exile, en diaspora]*, Bucarest, Vremea, 2004.

⁹ Iuliana Conovici, *Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă. Reconstrucția unei identități publice [L'Orthodoxie en Roumanie postcommuniste. La reconstruction d'une identité publique]*, Cluj-Napoca, Eikon, 2009, pp.475-497.

¹⁰ François Thual, art.cit., p.518.

¹¹ Thomas Fitzgerald souligne ce fait pour les premières communautés se trouvant sur le territoire des États-Unis. L'auteur mentionne aussi que pendant les premières années "la

aux besoins spirituels des croyants », un des problèmes apparus concernait et concerne encore l'exercice de la juridiction canonique; les Églises Orthodoxes Autocéphales, malgré l'existence des consultations successives concernant cette question, particulièrement dans le cadre des conférences préconciliaires réunis à Chambésy en 1976¹², 1986¹³ et les Commissions inter orthodoxes préparatoires (du Saint et Grand Concile, Chambésy) de 1990, 1993, 1995 et 2009¹⁴ n'arrivèrent pas à un point commun sur l'interprétation des Canons et la fixation des critères à suivre¹⁵.

Évaluant la situation de l'orthodoxie aux États-Unis, Alexei D. Krindatch observa que le mouvement vers l'unité ecclésiale et administrative fut fortement inhibé par le fait que l'Église Orthodoxe a été utilisée pas seulement comme « un instrument pour la préservation de la foi, mais aussi pour la préservation d'une identité, culture et langue ethniques particulières »¹⁶. Le processus de formation des États nationaux pendant le XIX-ème siècle en l'Europe de l'Est engagea aussi la contribution des acteurs religieux et cela influença l'évolution des relations inter orthodoxes; ces phénomènes font l'objet des nombreuses études. La tentation du nationalisme a eu des conséquences sur la manière dont la diaspora orthodoxe est maintenant organisée en Occident. La révolution bolchevique en Russie et la Guerre Froide ont compliqué d'avantage la configuration de la présence orthodoxe en Europe

vie ecclésiale orthodoxe sur le territoire des États-Unis s'est développée avec très peu de contrôle de la part de la hiérarchie et pas toujours en harmonie avec les pratiques acceptées », Thomas Fitzgerald, art. cit., p.271.

¹² 21-28 Novembre 1976. Ière Conférence panorthodoxe préconciliaire, en <http://www.centreorthodoxe.org/saint-et-grand-concile/1ere-conference-preconciliaire>, vérifié le 10.01.2013.

¹³ 28 Octobre – 6 novembre 1986. IIIe Conférence panorthodoxe préconciliaire, en <http://www.centreorthodoxe.org/saint-et-grand-concile/preconciliaires/3e-preconciliaire>, vérifié le 10.01.2013.

¹⁴ Les Commissions, en <http://www.centreorthodoxe.org/saint-et-grand-concile/les-commissions>, vérifié le 10.01.2013.

¹⁵ Des pas ont été quand même faits, par l'établissement des étapes intermédiaires à suivre, comme la création des « Assemblées Épiscopales composées des évêques canonique, reconnus, qui continuent de relever des juridictions canoniques de leurs Églises d'origine », ayant le rôle de « manifester l'unité de l'Orthodoxie » (1990) et la délimitation des « régions dans la diaspora dans lesquelles les Assemblées Épiscopales devraient être créées » (1993), Métropolitaine Jérémie à l'occasion du quarantième anniversaire du Comité Inter-épiscopal de France (2007), fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=40eme+anniversaire+Comite+inter-episcopal&x=0&y=0>, vérifié 20.03.2013. Voir aussi, *Repères Chronologiques Historiques*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/site/200/reperes-chronologiques.htm>, vérifié le 10.01.2013. Voir aussi Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, p.434 et les textes annexes « Commission inter-orthodoxe préparatoire, Chambésy, 10-17 novembre 1990 », pp.351-353, « Commission inter-orthodoxe préparatoire. Centre orthodoxe du Patriarcat Œcuménique, Chambésy, 7-13 novembre 1993, Communiqué », pp.554-555, « Commission inter-orthodoxe préparatoire du Grand et Saint Concile. La Diaspora orthodoxe. Texte adopté », pp.556-557.

¹⁶ Alexei D. Krindatch, art. cit., p. 558.

et en Amérique du Nord¹⁷. Plusieurs structures ecclésiales des réfugiés provenant de pays où se sont installés des régimes communistes ont décidé de rompre les liens avec leurs Eglises mères en identifiant des solutions juridictionnelles plus ou moins canoniques. Après la chute du mur du Berlin, quelques-unes de ces structures ecclésiales ont commencé à reprendre les relations et finalement à revenir sous la juridiction des Églises Autocéphales d'où celles-ci sont sorties. Ces évolutions post-Guerre Froide n'ont quand même réussi à régler le problème de la diaspora orthodoxe sous tous ses aspects.

Une définition généralement acceptée de ce qu'est la diaspora orthodoxe reste bien difficile à identifier. Quand même mentionnant, d'une part, la définition proposée par le prêtre russe Boris Bobrinskoy pour lequel la diaspora est « l'ensemble des communautés orthodoxes dispersées dans l'Occident, dans le Nouveau Monde, en dehors des limites territoriales canoniques nationales des Églises Orthodoxes historiques »¹⁸, et d'autre part celle du Patriarcat Œcuménique qui considère comme « terres de la 'diaspora' orthodoxe » celles se trouvant « en dehors des limites canoniques des Églises Autocéphales et Autonomes Orthodoxes »¹⁹, Nikolaos A. Daldas souligne la liaison entre ce type de définition et l'idée d'Église autocéphale (nationale). De plus, l'auteur indique la différence entre la manière dont le concept de « diaspora » est compris par les Grecs, d'un côté et par les Russes, de l'autre côté: les premiers lui donnèrent un « sens sociologique et culturel », les autres plutôt une signification « politique » et partiellement « ecclésiologique »²⁰, situation qui naît des confusions plutôt lorsqu'il s'agit de trouver des solutions communes.

Assez utile pour comprendre la raison pour laquelle le concept « diaspora » est en fait considéré évitable (à la mesure du possible) à l'égard des communautés orthodoxes, est la spécification faite par Carol Saba (responsable pour la Commission Média et Informations de l'Assemblée des Évêques Orthodoxes de France, AEOF) dans un entretien : « on [les orthodoxes] n'a pas de diaspora en tant que tel, on a un centre qui est celui de l'Eucharistie et autour de ce centre tout se construit, il n'y a pas d'autre logique de centre »²¹. D'une manière similaire, Radu Preda affirme que la situation de la diaspora est un indicateur pour « le degré de sécularisation des relations inter orthodoxes » à cause du fait que la géopolitique vient à remplacer de

¹⁷ Thomas Fitzgerald parle de l'existence en 1933 de quatre juridictions orthodoxes russes aux États-Unis, Thomas Fitzgerald, *Eastern Christianity in the United States*, en "The Blackwell Companion...", p.271.

¹⁸ Boris Bobrinskoy, *Renouveau de l'Église dans la perspective du prochain Concile panorthodoxe*, en « Cahiers « Lumen Gentium », n° 41, 1978, p.18, apud Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, p.248.

¹⁹ Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, p.438.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.249.

²¹ *Entretien avec Carol Saba*, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=carol+saba+commission+media+et+information&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012. La même idée est soutenue par Grigorios D. Papathomas, *The oppositional relationship between the locally established church and the ecclesiastical 'Diaspora'*, en <http://www.orthodoxa.org/GB/orthodoxy/canonlaw/The%20oppositional%20relation.pdf>, vérifié le 2.06.2013.

plus en plus l'ecclésiologie²².

En France, les premières formes d'organisation des orthodoxes ont été celles des Russes (1727, 1816), des Grecs (1820) et des Roumains (1853) et le premier évêque installé à Paris a été le métropolite Euloge (Exarchat du Patriarcat de Moscou en Europe Occidentale, et puis Exarchat du Patriarcat Œcuménique, pour revenir au Patriarcat de Moscou juste avant sa mort²³²⁴). Les premières vagues significatives d'immigrants orthodoxes en France ont été celles des Grecs et des Russes au début du XX^e-ème siècle²⁵. Il s'agit des évolutions qui suivirent la révolution bolchevique et la fragmentation des communautés russes d'Occident qui ont influencé les relations de concurrence entre le Patriarcat de Moscou et le Patriarcat Œcuménique à l'égard de la juridiction sur la diaspora. L'installation des régimes communistes en pays comme la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, la Yougoslavie, n'a fait qu'amplifier la fragmentation: par exemple, la paroisse roumaine de 9 bis rue Jean de Beauvais, de Paris, « le siège de l'Évêché Orthodoxe Roumain d'Europe Occidentale »²⁶, après plusieurs agitations décide de sortir de la juridiction du Patriarcat de Bucarest²⁷. À cet égard, en France, comme partout en Occident, les choses ont connu des transformations significatives après 1990.

²² Radu Preda, *Ortodoxia și ortodoxiile. Studii social-teologice [L'orthodoxie et les orthodoxies. Des études social-théologiques]*, Cluj-Napoca, Eikon, 2010, pp.11-12. Le concept « diaspora » est regardé de mauvais œil aussi par certains fidèles, particulièrement ceux vivant en Occident depuis longtemps. On peut rappeler ici le cas des Roumains vivant aux États-Unis, membres de l'Évêché Orthodoxe Roumain qui refuse la juridiction du Patriarcat Roumain et qui est partie composante de la structure appelée l'Église Orthodoxe d'Amérique (OCA), ayant une situation canonique ambiguë. Alexandru Nemoianu, mentionne que « les Roumains établis dans le Nouvel Monde (...) ne peuvent pas être un appendice du roumanisme », « c'est tout à fait injurieux qu'on appelle les Roumains-Américains et les Roumains-Canadiens 'diaspora'. (...) Diaspora est partie d'un peuple qui vit pour un temps hors ses frontières historiques. Dans ce sens, les Roumains-Américains sont n'importe quoi, mais pas une diaspora », Alexandru Nemoianu, *Ortodoxia și românii americani... [L'orthodoxie et les Roumains-Américains...]*, p.16.

²³ *Quelques mots sur le Diocèse de Chersonèse*, en http://www.egliserusse.eu/Quelques-mots-sur-le-diocese-de-Chersonese_a15.html, vérifié le 20.03.2013. Voir aussi, Timothy L. Smith, art. cit., p.314.

²⁴ *Quelques repères chronologiques de la présence orthodoxe en France*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/site/225/reperes-chronologiques.htm>, vérifié le 20.03.2013. Voir aussi Olivier Clément, *L'Orthodoxie en France*, présentée à l'occasion de la Première Journée de l'Orthodoxie en France, <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/1ere%20Journee%20Orthodoxie%20en%20France/1ereJourneede-OrthodoxieEnFranceConferenceOlivierClement.PDF>, vérifié le 20.03.2013. Voir, Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, pp.250-253, 334.

²⁵ *Quelques repères chronologiques de la présence orthodoxe en France*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/site/225/reperes-chronologiques.htm>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

²⁶ Dumitru Stavarache, *op. cit.*, p.27.

²⁷ Ovidiu Bozgan, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română din Paris în primii ani postbelici [L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine de Paris pendant les premières années d'après Guerre]*, en "Studii de Istoria Bisericii" ["Des études d'histoire ecclesiale"], <http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/istorie/religie/biserica%20brtodoxa%20romana%20din%20paris.htm>, vérifié le 23.11.2011. Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *op. cit.*, pp.152-169.

A cette époque, l'Assemblée des Évêques Orthodoxes de France, organisme qui réunit les évêques canoniques des diverses juridictions, a comme membres dix évêques appartenant aux sept juridictions²⁸, situation qui illustre en effet les difficultés de l'orthodoxie en diaspora de trouver une forme d'organisation claire. On identifie en Italie trois diocèses orthodoxes (le Patriarcat Œcuménique, à Venise, le Patriarcat Roumain, à Rome, le Patriarcat Serbe, à Trieste), deux doyennés (appartenant au Patriarcat Œcuménique et au Patriarcat de Moscou) et deux communautés paroissiales (bulgare et polonaise)²⁹. Quand même, un autre diocèse ayant une situation pas très claire est celui appartenant à l'Église Orthodoxe Ukrainienne, qui englobe pas seulement des paroisses ukrainiennes mais aussi d'autres ethnies (dont quelques-unes roumaines, ou ayant des prêtres roumains, à Alcamo, Trapani, Marsala, Bagnolo-Grosseto, Latina, Campo di Carne, Genova, Savona³⁰), devenant de cette manière une concurrente pour les autres diocèses nationaux, mais aussi pour le Patriarcat Œcuménique³¹. Une autre structure ayant une canonicité au moins discutable est l'Église Orthodoxe en Italie³². La situation est similaire dans les autres pays d'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale: treize évêques canoniques et sept juridictions différentes pour la Grande Bretagne et l'Irlande³³, huit évêques canoniques et quatre juridictions différentes pour les pays du Benelux³⁴, six évêques canoniques et cinq juridictions

²⁸ Patriarcat Œcuménique, Patriarcat d'Antioche, Patriarcat de Roumanie, Patriarcat de Moscou, Patriarcat de Géorgie, Patriarcat de Serbie, *Évêques et Diocèses*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/files/AnnuaireRegroupe-AEOF.pdf>, vérifié le 20.01.2013. Dans un article publié en novembre 2003 dans *Le Monde*, à l'occasion de la Deuxième Journée de l'Orthodoxie en France, Xavier Ternisien remarquait le fait que « l'orthodoxie en France ne compte pas moins de huit évêques et évêques auxiliaires pour une communauté de croyants d'une peu plus de 300.000 personnes », Xavier Ternisien, *Les orthodoxes français célèbrent leur rapprochement par une journée commune*, en « Le Monde », Dimanche 2 – Lundi 3 Novembre 2003, p.7.

²⁹ *Chiese Ortodosse in Italia*, en <http://www.ortodoxia.it/chieseortodosseinitalia.htm>, vérifié le 10.03.2013.

³⁰ Une autre paroisse orthodoxe roumaine se trouve sous la juridiction de l'Archevêché Orthodoxe d'Italie et Malte, Patriarcat Œcuménique, *The Holy Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy and Malte*, en <http://www.ortodossia.it/TheHolyOrthodoxArchdioceseofItalyedMalta.htm>, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

³¹ *Chiesa Ortodossa Ucraina. Arcidiocesi Ortodossa di Palermo e di Tutta l'Italia*, en <http://www.ortodossiaitalia.info/>, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

³² Basilio, *La necessità di un'Ortodossia italiana*, en "La Voce Ortodossa", vol.3, n 1-4, 2008, disponible également sur http://www.chiesaortodossaitaliana.it/la_necessita_di_unortodossia_italiana.html, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

³³ *Communique of the Pan-Orthodox Assembly of Bishops. Inaugural Meeting of the Pan-Orthodox Assembly for the British Isles*, en http://www.thyateira.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=739&Itemid=1, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

³⁴ *Communiqué de la Conférence Épiscopale Orthodoxe du Benelux (CEOB-OB)*, en http://www.orthodoxia.be/Z-Nouvelles_2012/Reunion_CEOB-OB_2.html, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

différentes pour l'Espagne et le Portugal³⁵.

En gros, on peut identifier trois positions qui séparent les Églises autocéphales : celle soutenue par le Patriarcat d'Antioche, fondé sur le critère pastoral, qui implique l'évolution progressive des communautés orthodoxes de l'Europe Occidentale vers le statut d'Églises autocéphales locales, le point de vue de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine et de l'Église Orthodoxe Russe qui parlent du « droit de chaque Eglise Mère à diriger sa propre 'diaspora' », et la vision du Patriarcat d'Alexandrie et du Patriarcat Œcuménique qui considèrent que « la 'diaspora' orthodoxe du point de vue de l'administration ecclésiale dépend du Patriarcat Œcuménique de Constantinople »³⁶. N'importe la position adoptée, tout le monde s'accorde sur un point : l'existence dans la même cité de deux ou plusieurs évêques appartenant aux juridictions différentes représente une anomalie pour l'organisation et l'unité de l'Église³⁷.

Comme « solution » temporaire de la crise d'unité orthodoxe en Occident, la Commission inter orthodoxe de Chambésy de 1990 recommandait la création des Assemblées Épiscopales « composées d'évêques canoniques, reconnus, qui continuent de relever des juridictions canoniques de leurs Églises d'origine », ayant le rôle de « manifester l'unité de l'Orthodoxie ». La recommandation n'a pas pris des formes concrètes partout, les seuls « réussites » étant la France et les États-Unis, où des formes de coopération inter épiscopales existaient bien avant 1990 (il s'agit pour

³⁵ José Manuel Vidal, *Se presenta en sociedad la Conferencia episcopal ortodoxa de Espana y Portugal*, en <http://www.periodistadigital.com/religion/otras-confesiones/2011/02/01/conferencia-episcopal-ortodoxa-espana-portugal-iglesia-cofesiones-polcarpo.shtml>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

³⁶ Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, pp.401-405. Victor Roudometof parle aussi de l'existence d'une compétition entre le Patriarcat Œcuménique et les Églises autocéphales sur la question des communautés orthodoxes de la diaspora, Victor Roudometof, *art. cit.*, pp.79-80.

³⁷ Grigorios D. Papatomas, « La place et le rôle des principes du système canonique de l'Autocéphalie ecclésiale au sein de l'Église orthodoxe », in *The Place of Canonical Principles in the Organisation and Working of Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. The Canon Law International Symposium, Arad, 10-12 September 2008*, Constantin Rus (sous la direction de), Arad, The Orthodox Theology Faculty's Center of Theological-Historical Studies and Pastoral-Missionary Prognosis, 2008, pp.68. Voir aussi, Irime Marga, « Principiul jurisdicțional în Biserica Ortodoxă » [« Le principe juridictionnel dans l'Église Orthodoxe »], in *The Place of Canonical Principles...*, p.180, 195. Métropolitaine Nicolae de Banat, « Autocefalia și comuniunea frătească cu Bisericele Ortodoxe surori » [« L'Autocéphalie et la communion fraternelle avec les Églises Orthodoxes sœurs »], in *Autocefalie, Patriarhie, Slujire Sfântă. Momente aniversare în Biserica Ortodoxă Română – 1995* [Autocéphalie, Patriarchie, Saint Ministère. Des moments anniversaires dans l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine - 1995], Bucarest, Institutul Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1995, p.120. Métropolitaine Jérémie à l'occasion du quarantième anniversaire du Comité Inter-épiscopal de France, 2007, fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=40eme+anniversaire+Comite+inter-episcopal&x=0&y=0>, vérifié 20.03.2013. Christos Yannaras, *L'Église orthodoxe en Europe : défis et exigences de l'unité*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/40emeanniversaireduComiteinter-episcopalorthodoxeenFrance/CommemorationTexteYannaras.pdf>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

la France du Comité inter épiscopal, et pour les États-Unis de la Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in America, SCOBA), formes qui inspirèrent la recommandation de la Commission inter orthodoxe de Chambésy.

L'Assemblée des Évêques Orthodoxes de France (AEOF) est une structure réunissant tous les Évêques canoniques en France, créé en 1967, initialement comme « Comité Inter épiscopal », un organisme informel, sans aucune structure juridique, et devenu en 1997 suivant les recommandations de la Commission Inter orthodoxe Préparatoire du Saint et Grand Concile, l'AEOF, « une vraie association, qui a un cadre juridique »³⁸, regardé par l'État français comme l'Église Orthodoxe en France, ayant des rencontres mensuelles, et étant représenté dans les relations avec les autres acteurs laïcs et religieux par son président, actuellement le Métropolite Emmanuel, du Patriarcat Œcuménique³⁹.

L'AEOF se présente officiellement comme « un lieu de rencontre et de coopération des différentes composantes de l'Église orthodoxe en France »⁴⁰. L'objectif central déclaré de l'Assemblée est celui « de manifester l'unité de l'Église Orthodoxe en France et de maintenir, de préserver et de développer les intérêts des communautés relevant des diocèses orthodoxes canoniques de ce pays »⁴¹. On peut remarquer le fort attachement pour la formule « canonique » qui est présente dans tout document relevant de l'AEOF, toujours pour montrer d'une part la filiation de l'AEOF (un organisme ou une étape d'organisation ayant comme origine les rencontres/consultations des vraies Églises Orthodoxes Autocéphales et Autonomes), et d'autre part l'image de l'AEOF comme représentant de la « vraie » orthodoxie mutuellement reconnue en France.

Dans les autres régions de l'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale, des conférences épiscopales inter orthodoxes ont été créées seulement après la décision prise à la IV-ème Conférence Panorthodoxe Préconciliaire de Chambésy en 2009: la Conferenza Episcopale Ortodossa d'Italia e Malta, the Pan-Orthodox Assembly of Bishops with Churches in the British Isles, la Conférence Épiscopale Orthodoxe du Benelux, la Conferencia episcopal ortodoxa de España y Portugal, Die Schweizer Orthodoxe Bischofskonferenz. Si en France existaient déjà les bases d'une certaine collaboration depuis 1967, dans tous les autres cas, il s'agissait d'une nouvelle expérience dans la gestion des relations inter orthodoxes au niveau local. Comme dans le cas de l'AEOF, le président des nouvelles conférences est toujours le représentant du Patriarcat Œcuménique. Le Métropolite Pantéléimon, président de la Conférence Épiscopale Orthodoxe du Benelux, voit dans la création de cette structure une « mesure transitoire », une bonne occasion pour la « coordination » et pour faire

³⁸ *Entretien avec Carol Saba*, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=carol+saba+commission+media+et+information&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

³⁹ *Organisation*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/site/226/organisation.htm>, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

⁴⁰ *Communiqué AEOF du 21 septembre 2007*, en http://www.aeof.fr/articol_51530/communiqua-aeof-du-21-septembre-2007----session-de-rentree-de-lassemblee-des-eveques-orthodoxes-de-france.html, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁴¹ « Statuts et Règlement intérieur de l'Assemblée des Évêques Orthodoxes de France », Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, p.573.

que la voix de l'orthodoxie ne perd plus sa force à cause de la « divergence » entre les juridictions⁴². Le père Dimitrio (Rogelio) Sáez Carbó, secrétaire de la Conferencia episcopal ortodoxa de España y Portugal, considère cette structure « un premier pas vers l'idéal » représenté par « des églises locales territoriales dans la diaspora »⁴³.

Une analyse des discours des divers représentants des juridictions orthodoxes membres de l'AEOF donne l'image de l'ambiguïté qui entoure en effet cette structure (ainsi que celles similaires) et en même temps, plus largement, l'organisation de l'orthodoxie en Occident. En juillet 2004, on a rendu publique une déclaration⁴⁴ signée par un nombre d'orthodoxes de France (prêtres et laïcs appartenant aux diverses juridictions) parlant à l'égard de l'orthodoxie en France comme d'une « unité ecclésiale et communion eucharistique (...) encore fragile » considérant l'AEOF « une avancée importante vers l'organisation synodale » et se prenant comme mission pour l'avenir « de promouvoir tous les actes allant dans ce sens [de l'esprit conciliaire], en refusant les tentations de morcellement et de replis identitaires ». On remarque la tonalité assez positive du texte également dans ses références au présent ainsi qu'à l'avenir, sans apporter en effet rien de nouveau au niveau des engagements ou des perspectives par rapport aux autres textes approchant le sujet. Cette attitude positive mais quand même préoccupée de n'avancer trop sur le terrain des engagements communs est en fait spécifique pour tout texte issu d'un accord entre diverses juridictions.

Parlant des transformations plus larges à l'égard de l'orthodoxie en diaspora et seulement indirectement sur celles connus par l'AEOF, Carol Saba, responsable de la Commission Média et Informations de l'AEOF et membre du diocèse appartenant au Patriarcat d'Antioche, délimite trois étapes de l'évolution de l'orthodoxie en Occident: la première, « de la logique de la diaspora » ou « de la logique du foyer des souvenirs », traduit l'attachement des communautés orthodoxes immigrés « à leur racines, à leur tradition historique, à leur tradition linguistique », une phase qu'il considère déjà dépassée; la deuxième, celle « de l'accentuation de la localité de l'orthodoxie en diaspora » qui comprend des variations est l'étape que l'orthodoxie expérience à ce moment, et la troisième, l'étape « de la synthèse positive des expressions historiques de l'orthodoxie » est en quelque sorte l'image du « devenir »

⁴² *Allocution de son Éminence le Métropolite Pantéléimon de Belgique (Président) lors de l'ouverture de la première Conférence Épiscopale Orthodoxe du Benelux, Bruxelles, 23 juin 2010*, en http://www.orthodoxia.be/Z-Nouvelles_2010/Discours_Ouverture_CEOB.pdf, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

⁴³ José Manuel Vidal, *Se presenta en sociedad la Conferencia episcopal ortodoxa de España y Portugal*, en <http://www.periodistadigital.com/religion/otras-confesiones/2011/02/01/conferencia-episcopal-ortodoxa-espana-portugal-iglesia-cofesiones-polcarpo.shtml>, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

⁴⁴ *L'unité orthodoxe en France et en Occident : notre responsabilité commune*, en <http://www.orthodoxpress.com/index.php?group=display&action=document&numero=291&page=1>, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

de l'orthodoxie en Occident⁴⁵.

La rupture entre les communautés orthodoxes russes en Occident et le Patriarcat Russe a bouleversé la vie de ces communautés de cette façon que même aujourd'hui elles sont séparées en trois branches: les communautés se trouvant sous la juridiction du Patriarcat de Moscou (le Diocèse de Chersonèse), celles qui forment l'Archevêché des Églises Orthodoxes Russes en Europe Occidentale (Patriarcat de Constantinople) et celles qui composent le Diocèse de Genève et d'Europe Occidentale de l'Église Russe Hors Frontières (Patriarcat de Moscou)⁴⁶). Les représentants des diocèses se trouvant sous l'autorité canonique du Patriarcat Œcuménique, comme Mgr. Gabriel, Archevêché des Églises Orthodoxes Russes en Europe Occidentale parlait d'une future orthodoxie en Europe occidentale « qui n'est plus russe, ni grecque, ni bulgare, mais qui est locale et fidèle à la Grande Tradition de l'Église Orthodoxe Universelle »⁴⁷. Séraphin Rehbinder, membre de la paroisse russe rue Daru (Patriarcat Œcuménique) mentionnait en 2009 qu'on ne peut pas parler d'une Église de France, l'AEOF étant « une association réunissant des évêques appartenant à des Églises territoriales différentes », qui n'a « aucune autorité canonique véritable », qui « serve comme lieu de rencontre (...) afin de développer des liens d'amitié et de collaboration »⁴⁸. M. Rehbinder, président en même temps de l'association « Orthodoxie Locale de Tradition Russe en Europe Occidentale », créée en 2004 par des laïcs appartenant aux trois juridictions issues de l'église russe en Europe, au but « de contribuer à la promotion de l'Eglise locale en Europe Occidentale dans le maintien d'une composante de traditions spirituelles et culturelles russes »⁴⁹, considère que l'AEOF « ne peut pas trouver sa place dans l'organisation canonique de l'Eglise orthodoxe » à cause du fait que cette structure ne résout pas le problème central de l'orthodoxie en Occident « celui de la multiplicité des évêques sur le même territoire »⁵⁰. De cette perspective, la proposition de l'OLTR est celle d'un plus d'autonomie pour les diocèses orthodoxes par rapport aux Eglises mères comme condition nécessaire pour leur future unité en diocèses panorthodoxes territoriaux. Pour mieux comprendre la position des communautés russes se trouvant

⁴⁵ Entretien avec Carol Saba, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=carol+saba+commission+media+et+information&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

⁴⁶ *Annuaire Regroupé – Évêques Membres AEOF*, en http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/files/Annuaire_Regroupe-AEOF.pdf, vérifié le 4.06.2013.

⁴⁷ Émission "Orthodoxie", Radio Chrétienne Francophone, n° 27/2007, fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=radio+RCF+2007&x=0&y=0>, vérifié, le 23.10.2012.

⁴⁸ Séraphin Rehbinder, *Quelques réflexions sur l'avenir de l'Église Orthodoxe en France et en Europe avant la réunion de la Commission préconciliaire sur l'organisation de la diaspora*, le 29 mai 2009, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=seraphin+rehbinder+2009&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

⁴⁹ *Mouvement pour une Orthodoxie Locale de Tradition Russe (OLTR)*, en <http://oltr.france-orthodoxe.net/index.html>, vérifié le 20.01.2013.

⁵⁰ Séraphin Rehbinder, *Annexe explicative au communiqué n° 3 de l'OLTR*, en <http://oltr.france-orthodoxe.net/html/annexe3.html>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

sous la juridiction du Patriarcat Œcuménique à l'égard de l'organisation de l'orthodoxie en diaspora par comparaison aux autres acteurs, voir le Graphique n° 1, le troisième groupe de colonnes. Cet exemple montre que l'attachement pour des valeurs culturelles particulières n'est pas nécessairement un obstacle pour la construction des Églises locales autocéphales en Occident.

Le philosophe et théologien grec Christos Yannaras voit quand même la transformation de l'AEOF dans un futur « synode local » comme la solution pour dépasser « la situation anormale » dans laquelle se trouve l'orthodoxie en Occident⁵¹. Nikolaos A. Daldas voit l'AEOF comme « une institution transitoire » vers une future « Église locale Orthodoxe 'en' France » élaborant même un parcours de cette transition dont le rôle du Patriarcat Œcuménique reste un central. Quand même, Daldas semble voir « l'Église Orthodoxe locale 'en' France », dans le sens d'une sorte d'œcuménisme chrétien plutôt qu'orthodoxe⁵². En ce qui concerne la vision des communautés grecques à l'égard de l'organisation de l'orthodoxie en Occident, voir le Graphique n° 1 qui l'illustre dans le quatrième groupe de colonnes. Leur degré d'attachement pour l'idée d'Église locale en Occident plus faible par comparaison aux communautés russes se trouvant sous la même juridiction peut être expliqué par la manière différente des deux groupes de se rapporter au Patriarcat Œcuménique: si les Grecs ont toujours eu une connexion particulière, historique avec la Patriarchie de Constantinople, les communautés russes ont choisi cette juridiction faute d'autre option disponible. La connexion particulière des Grecs avec le Patriarcat Œcuménique fait que leur attitude à l'égard d'une Église orthodoxe locale autocéphale en Occident soit la même avec celle de celui-ci, qui semble être celle qu'une Église locale est envisageable, mais sous sa propre juridiction (la cinquième colonne du Graphique n° 1).

Le théologien français Olivier Clément pense aussi que l'AEOF « évoluera dans un sens quelque peu synodal » et la future organisation de l'orthodoxie en France a bien des chances d'être celle d'une « Église locale », une Église qui ne doit pas représenter « une seule Église autocéphale (...) mais toute l'Orthodoxie (...) compte tenu de la 'sollicitude' de Constantinople pour les communautés de la diaspora »⁵³. Sa position est représentative pour la vision des occidentaux convertis à l'orthodoxie ou provenant des familles orthodoxes occidentales, attachées aux valeurs de la culture française, mais pas d'une manière exclusiviste, ethnique. Pour eux, la solution pour l'organisation de l'orthodoxie en Occident est celle des Églises locales, mais ils considèrent l'AEOF un pas nécessaire vers cet idéal (dans le Graphique n° 1, le sixième groupe de colonnes).

⁵¹ Christos Yannaras, *L'Église orthodoxe en Europe : défis et exigences de l'unité*, en <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/40emeanniversaireduComiteinter-episcopalorthodoxeenFrance/CommemorationTexteYannaras.pdf>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁵² Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, pp.321-325, 447.

⁵³ Olivier Clément, *L'Orthodoxie en France*, présentée à l'occasion de la Première Journée de l'Orthodoxie en France, en <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/1ereJourneeOrthodoxieenFrance/1ereJourneeOrthodoxieEnFranceConferenceOlivierClement.PDF>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

Une forme de langage sur laquelle s'accordent tous les discours est dominée par des expressions comme « concertation », « consultations »⁵⁴, « convergence », « rapprochement »⁵⁵, « coopération », « collaboration coordonnée »⁵⁶, « consensus »⁵⁷, tous des possibles synonymes pour le terme « unité » qui n'est pas employé que dans les références à une situation future ou idéale de l'orthodoxie en Occident, et qui donnent la mesure du type d'unité orthodoxe que l'AEOF représente et promut: une unité toujours soucieuse de respecter les diverses opinions des juridictions qu'elle met en dialogue.

Les Églises autocéphales préfèrent cette forme d'organisation et pas celle d'une Église dans le sens propre; leur attitude à l'égard de l'existence de l'Église Orthodoxe d'Amérique (Orthodox Church of America, OCA) est révélatrice; celle-ci réunit des évêques représentant plusieurs nationalités, mais elle n'est pas encore reconnue comme Église que par un petit nombre d'Églises locales, parmi lesquelles le Patriarcat de Moscou, qui lui a accordé l'autocéphalie de façon unilatérale, sans aucune consultation avec les autres Églises autocéphales. Le refus d'accepter OCA comme modèle de solution pour la crise concernant l'organisation de la diaspora est justifié par le fait qu'elle est « prématurée », nécessitant comme condition préalable l'assimilation des communautés immigrées⁵⁸.

La même réticence des Églises autocéphales se manifeste envers d'autres formes d'organisation de l'orthodoxie locale, comme par exemple l'Église catholique orthodoxe de France et l'Église Orthodoxe en Italie. L'Église catholique orthodoxe de France, créée en 1937, initialement sous la juridiction du Patriarcat de Moscou, puis sous d'autres juridictions, parmi lesquelles celle du Patriarcat Roumain aussi, jusqu'à 1993⁵⁹, se « décomposa peu à peu »⁶⁰. Selon Olivier Clément, la réticence des Églises

⁵⁴ Émission "Orthodoxie", Radio Chrétienne Francophone, n° 27/2007, fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=radio+RCF+2007&x=0&y=0>, vérifié, le 23.10.2012.

⁵⁵ *Entretien avec Carol Saba*, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=carol+saba+commission+media+et+information&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

⁵⁶ Métropolite Jérémie à l'occasion du quarantième anniversaire du Comité Inter-épiscopal en France (2007), fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=40eme+anniversaire+Comite+inter-episcopal&x=0&y=0>, vérifié 20.03.2013.

⁵⁷ Nikolaos A. Daldas, *op. cit.*, p.322.

⁵⁸ Voir par exemple, Alexandru Moraru, « Biserica Autocefală și diaspora ei » [« L'Église Autocéphale et son diaspora »], in *Autocefalie, Patriarhie, Slujire... [Autocéphalie, Patriarchie, Saint Ministère...]*, p.154.

⁵⁹ Une structure ecclésiale, « l'Évêché orthodoxe catholique de France sous la juridiction de la Patriarchie Roumaine », avec laquelle le Patriarcat Roumain a des discussions depuis 1988 est mentionnée en 1990, *Convorbiri între o Comisie Sinodală a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române și o delegație a Episcopiei Ortodoxe Catolice din Franța, Cernica, 18-19 octombrie 1990 [Des discussions entre une Commission Synodale de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine et une délégation de l'Évêché Orthodoxe Catholique de France, à Cernica, le 18-19 Octobre 1990]*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.108, n° 7-10, 1990, p.47. Voir aussi, Marc Antoine Costa de Beauregard, *Rolul Ortodoxiei în Franța astăzi [Le rôle de l'orthodoxie en France aujourd'hui]*, en « Biserica

autocéphales envers cette construction ecclésiale locale avait été justifiée par « le laxisme canonique »⁶¹ et « l'ecclésiologie nationaliste » (préoccupée à 'faire ressurgir la Gaule « orthodoxe » de l'époque mérovingienne')⁶². Assez significatives dans ce contexte sont deux Communiqués de l'AEOF, du 3 avril 1997 et du 1 avril 1999, dans lequel les évêques canoniques de France parlent de l'AEOF comme de « la seule habilitée à représenter l'orthodoxie et à manifester l'unité et la canonicité de l'Eglise orthodoxe en France », exprimant en même temps leur préoccupation pour la « recrudescence en France de communautés, de groupes ou de personnes (clercs ou

Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.109, n° 4-6, 1991, p.49. Entre 1991 et 1993, le Synode de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine discute et décide de retirer la protection canonique pour l'Eparchie Catholique Orthodoxe de France, *Temei nr.3083/1991*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.109, n° 10-12, 1991, p.222 ; *Temei nr.423/1993*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.111, n° 1-3, 1993, p.142. Il n'est pas assez clair pourquoi et comment a été effectivement appliquée cette décision. Les documents publiés dans *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, parlent en fait d'un conflit entre l'Évêque Germain et les membres de son diocèse, c'est pourquoi le Synode en fait retire sa protection canonique seulement pour l'Évêque et laisse aux communautés la liberté de choisir si elles restent ou pas en communion avec l'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine. C'est pour ça qu'en 1993 le Synode discute de nouveau la possibilité d'intégrer dans l'Archevêché Orthodoxe Roumaine d'Europe Occidentale une structure ecclésiale constituée sur les ruines du diocèse de l'Évêque Germain, suivant la demande de la part des fidèles, voir *Temei nr.3695/1993*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.111, n° 7-9, 1993, p.207.

⁶⁰ Olivier Clément, « L'Orthodoxie en France », présentée à l'occasion de la Première Journée de l'Orthodoxie en France, <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/1ereJourneeOrthodoxieenFrance/IereJourneede-OrthodoxieEnFranceConferenceOlivierClement.PDF>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁶¹ Ce fait est évident aussi dans les documents synthétisant les discussions du Patriarcat Roumain avec les structures ecclésiales de l'ECOF se trouvant en communion avec lui, voir *Convorbiri între o Comisie Sinodală... [Des discussions entre une Commission Synodale...]*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.108, n° 7-10, 1990, p.47. Voir aussi, « Temei nr.3083/1991 », *Biserica Ortodoxă Română [L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine]*, vol.109, n° 10-12, 1991, p.222, où le Synode de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine argumente son option pour retirer la protection canonique pour l'évêque Germain de l'ECOF par le fait que « pour bien des années la Patriarchie Roumaine a fait des efforts pour déterminer l'Évêque Germain et la diocèse qu'il dirige de respecter les règles de la foi, du rite, de la vie ecclésiale et les canons orthodoxes, des efforts qui sont restés sans des résultats positifs ».

⁶² Olivier Clément, *L'Orthodoxie en France*, présentée à l'occasion de la Première Journée de l'Orthodoxie en France, en <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/1ereJourneeOrthodoxieenFrance/IereJourneede-OrthodoxieEnFranceConferenceOlivierClement.PDF>, vérifié le 20.03.2013. Père Syméon, *Vécu de la Tradition et de la spiritualité orthodoxe en France*, présentée à l'occasion de la Première Journée de l'Orthodoxie en France, en <http://www.aeof.fr/uploads/file/1ere%20Journee%20Orthodoxie%20en%20France/IereJourneede-OrthodoxieEnFranceConferencePereSymeon-lecture.pdf>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

laïcs), qui se prétendent de l'Eglise orthodoxe »⁶³. Le Communiqué est en effet l'indice qu'à part des concurrences intra canoniques, la cohérence organisationnelle et représentationnelle de l'orthodoxie en France et en Occident est affectée aussi par la concurrence canonique – non canonique. De plus, le Communiqué de l'AEOF de 4 novembre 2005 parle de l'existence d'un « dialogue » entre l'Église Serbe et l'Union des Associations Cultuelles Orthodoxes de Rite Occidental⁶⁴ (c'est-à-dire, l'ancienne Église catholique orthodoxe de France de l'extinction de laquelle parlait Olivier Clément en 2001). L'exemple le plus évident de la manière dont une église non canonique vient à compliquer le paysage assez fragmenté de l'organisation de la diaspora orthodoxe est celui de l'Église Orthodoxe en Italie. Cette structure qui n'est pas en communion avec l'orthodoxie universelle⁶⁵, selon le discours de ses représentants, a des racines anciennes (« du temps apostolique ») sur le territoire de l'Italie, étant pour bien des siècles « supprimée avec tromperie et violence » et « empêchée à fonctionner » par l'Église Catholique⁶⁶.

Ces deux entités (l'Église catholique orthodoxe de France/l'Union des Associations Cultuelles Orthodoxes de Rite Occidental et l'Église Orthodoxe d'Italie) sont représentées dans le Graphique n° 1 par le deuxième groupe de colonnes. Elles ont un fort attachement pour les éléments locaux, comparable mais pas similaire au nationalisme des Églises Russe et Roumaine, visible plutôt dans le cas de l'ECOF, mais qui manifestent en même temps un fort attachement pour la construction où mieux la « reconstruction » d'une Église locale, qui ne soit pas nécessairement nationale ethnique (voir le cas de l'Église Orthodoxe d'Italie). Leur attachement pour une certaine forme de nationalisme est plutôt déterminé par le besoin de justifier/de démontrer l'existence de l'orthodoxie sur le territoire de la France et de l'Italie, et ainsi donner plus de légitimité à leur discours. Elles restent quand même marginales en ce qui concerne le degré de représentativité pour l'orthodoxie en France et en Italie à cause de leur statut non canonique.

D'une Église ou mieux d'une orthodoxie locale, soit-elle française, italienne, anglaise déjà dans une « phase de fermentation » parle aussi Vladimir Zelinskij: il souligne que la seule manière de sortir de la crise créée par la division fondée sur le principe national est « la création d'une Église commune, d'une Église autocéphale italienne »⁶⁷. Cette position est en fait fortement soutenue généralement par les

⁶³ *Communiqué AEOF du 3 avril 1997*, en http://www.aeof.fr/articol_51474/communiquae-aeof-du-3-avril-1997.html, vérifié le 20.03.2013. *Communiqué AEOF du 1 avril 1999*, http://www.aeof.fr/articol_51479/communiquae-aeof-du-1-avril-1999.html, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁶⁴ « Communiqué AEOF du 4 novembre 2005 », http://www.aeof.fr/articol_51515/communiquae-aeof-du-4-novembre-2005.html, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁶⁵ Selon les affirmations de ses représentants, le Patriarcat de Bulgarie ait reconnu cette structure ecclésiale, *Ortodossia Italiana. Breve Storia*, en <http://www.chiesaortodossa.it/>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁶⁶ *Ortodossia Italiana. Breve Storia*, en <http://www.chiesaortodossa.it/>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

⁶⁷ Vladimir Zelinskij, *Quale Ortodossia in Italia?*, en <http://www.dimensionesperanza.it/aree/ecumene/chiese-cristiane/item/6468-quale-ortodossia-in-italia>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

occidentaux convertis à l'orthodoxie, ou provenant des familles occidentales orthodoxes. Ce sont eux, mais pas seulement eux, qui encouragent des formules comme les fraternités orthodoxes.

De cette manière, un autre niveau, au-delà des rapports interinstitutionnels, se situant pas complètement en dehors, où la question de l'organisation de l'orthodoxie en Occident est abordée, est celui des fraternités orthodoxes, soient elles locales (Fraternité Orthodoxe Sainte Anne, Fraternité Orthodoxe du Sud-est) ou continentales (Fraternité Orthodoxe de l'Europe Occidentale). Étant des initiatives des laïcs, par comparaison aux structures comme l'AEOF, ces fraternités semblent toujours quelques pas en avance sur le chemin vers l'unité, c'est pourquoi si non leurs activités au moins leurs conclusions sont parfois difficilement digérées par la hiérarchie réunie au cadre de l'AEOF⁶⁸, qui tient toujours à mentionner à l'égard de ces structures le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas d'« une Église parallèle (...) d'une institution parallèle (...) » c'est tout simplement un espace de rencontre »⁶⁹. Bien qu'il soit un peu forcé de voir une contradiction entre les structures comme l'AEOF et les fraternités, quand même on peut observer la facilité avec laquelle les fraternités approchent de manière pratique l'unité orthodoxe et les difficultés des représentants des institutions religieuses à même « bien choisir les mots »⁷⁰ lorsqu'ils en parlent du sujet (La position des fraternités est illustrée dans le Graphique n° 1, par le sixième groupe de colonnes, celui des occidentaux orthodoxes).

Dans le contexte actuel des discussions inter orthodoxes concernant le sujet de la diaspora, où les seules décisions sont celles prises pendant les dernières années à Chambésy, eux-mêmes considérées transitoires, toutes les opinions et les positions présentées ci-dessus restent également valides.

Autocéphalie, ethnicité, devoir – pourquoi (ré)organiser les structures ecclésiales en France et en Italie ?

L'installation du régime communiste en Roumanie eut des conséquences significatives pour l'organisation des communautés orthodoxes roumaines de l'étranger. L'attitude du Patriarcat de Bucarest à l'égard des politiques pratiquées par les communistes a déterminé certaines structures ecclésiales organisées hors les

⁶⁸ Dans son exposé à l'occasion du quarantième anniversaire du Comité Inter-épiscopal de France (2007), le Métropolite Jérémie parle des réserves que les Évêques membres de l'AEOF ont quelques fois à l'égard des initiatives de la Fraternité Orthodoxe en Europe Occidentale, fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=40eme+anniversaire+Comite+inter-episcopal&x=0&y=0>, vérifié 20.03.2013.

⁶⁹ Émission "Orthodoxie", Radio Chrétienne Francophone, nr.23/2007, fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=radio+RCF+2007&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

⁷⁰ Émission "Orthodoxie", Radio Chrétienne Francophone, nr.23/2007, fichier audio disponible sur le site <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=radio+RCF+2007&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012. Voir aussi, *Entretien avec Carol Saba*, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/?s=carol+saba+commission+media+et+information&x=0&y=0>, vérifié le 23.10.2012.

frontières du pays de refuser l'autorité canonique de « l'Eglise Mère ». Deux des plus connus exemples sont l'Évêché Orthodoxe Roumain d'Amérique du Nord (ayant le siège à « Vatra Românească », Detroit) et la communauté de la paroisse Saints Archanges, de Paris (9 bis rue Jean de Beauvais), qui deviendra depuis 1949 avec la création de l'Association de l'Évêché Orthodoxe Roumain de l'Europe Occidentale⁷¹, par le Métropolite Visarion Puiu le siège de cette structure-là. La structure ecclésiale eut une existence courte, en 1958, après les malentendus entre les orthodoxes Roumains de l'Europe Occidentale et leur Métropolite concernant plusieurs questions canoniques et juridictionnelles sur le fond des troubles politiques⁷², la structure est supprimée par son hiérarque⁷³. Comme mentionne un des prêtres desservant actuellement la communauté de rue Jean de Beauvais, Iulian Nistea, dans un entretien de 2007 avec Cristina Hermeziu, il était assez difficile pour la paroisse de trouver une solution juridictionnelle à cause du fait qu'« aucune des Patriarchies traditionnelles ne voulait pas recevoir cette église parce que (...) [elles] forment ensemble la communion orthodoxe. Elles n'admettent pas de passer des unes aux autres les paroisses »⁷⁴. Après la rupture avec le Patriarcat de Bucarest, la première juridiction que la communauté de rue Jean de Beauvais a identifiée a été celle du Synode de l'Église Russe Hors Frontières, sous la juridiction duquel elle reste jusqu'en décembre 1998. En Italie, avant 1990 existaient des paroisses orthodoxes roumaines en quelques villes comme Torino (1979), Milano (1975), Florence (1984), Bari (1983)⁷⁵ toutes sous la juridiction du Patriarcat Roumain.

⁷¹ Dumitru Stavarache, *op. cit.*, p.27.

⁷² Ovidiu Bozgan, art. cit.. Sur l'existence des divers groupes se disputant le contrôle sur l'Église de rue Jean de Beauvais parle aussi Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-128, 136-148, 152-169, 215-248. Pour les années 1945-1947 voir aussi Dudu Velicu, *Biserica Ortodoxă în perioada sovietizării României. Însemnări zilnice. I. 1945-1947 [L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine pendant la soviétisation de la Roumanie. Des notes journalières. I. 1945-1947]*, Bucarest, 2004, pp.50, 73, 128, 133.

⁷³ Sorin Petru, *Mitropolitul român Visarion Puiu [Le Métropolite Roumain Visarion Puiu]*, en http://www.ortodoxia.de/html/mitropolitul_roman_visarion_puiu.html, vérifié le 23. 03. 2012. Les raisons qui ont déterminé Visarion Puiu prendre la décision de supprimer l'Évêché ne sont pas très claires. Les documents de l'archive personnelle du Métropolite, se trouvant à la Bibliothèque Roumaine de Freiburg, publiés par Dumitru Stavarache donnent l'impression qu'il s'agissait de la manque d'attachement des fidèles pour l'église et pour la religion même, les fréquentes conflits politiques et canoniques dans lesquels la communauté de Paris était impliquée, pp.112-113, 121, 136, 210, 211, 269.

⁷⁴ Cristina Hermeziu, *Preotul Iulian Nistea din Paris care a creat 15 site-uri de ortodoxie română: 'Am trecut prin martorii lui Iehova, baptism, prin toate' [Le prêtre roumain Iulian Nistea de Paris a créé 15 sites d'orthodoxie roumaine : 'J'ai connu les témoins de Iehova, le baptême, tout']*, en « Suplimentul de Cultură » [« Le supplément de Culture »], n° 145, 15.09.2007, édition en ligne disponible sur <http://www.suplimentuldecultura.ro/index/continutArticolNrIdent/Interviu/2306>, vérifié le 3.06.2012.

⁷⁵ *Evenimente și împliniri din viața Episcopiei Române a Italiei [Des événements et des réalisations dans la vie de l'Évêché Roumain d'Italie]*, en « Ziarul Lumina » [« Le quotidien la lumière »], le 2 Octobre 2011, édition en ligne, <http://www.ziarullumina.ro/>

Le principe de l'autocéphalie joue un rôle central dans l'argumentation construite par les représentants de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine à l'égard de la manière dont elle comprend la question de la juridiction canonique sur la 'diaspora' en Occident, et, par conséquent, vient à illustrer la manière dont les relations inter orthodoxes expliquent au moins partiellement la décision de l'institution religieuse de (ré)organiser ses structures ecclésiales à l'étranger après 1990. L'autocéphalie est définie par le Métropolite Nicolae de Banat comme « le principe d'organisation ecclésiastique selon lequel la hiérarchie d'une Église, constituée canoniquement dans un Synode, sur le territoire d'un État souverain, exerce le pouvoir ecclésial complet, indépendamment par rapport à la direction d'une autre Église, organisée de la même façon »⁷⁶. Autrement dit, l'autocéphalie est le principe qui, au moins partiellement, explique et organise les relations inter orthodoxes et l'utilise comme base dans les explications/justifications à l'égard des activités concernant l'organisation de ses unités ecclésiales hors les frontières de la Roumanie, indique le fait que les relations inter orthodoxes ont joué un rôle significatif dans les décisions de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine.

Liant le principe de l'autocéphalie à celui de la subsidiarité, par excellence lui-même associé au maximum de démocratisation à l'intérieur de l'Église⁷⁷, le prêtre Patriciu Vlaicu⁷⁸, spécialiste en droit canonique, souligne le fait que la subsidiarité, comme base de l'autocéphalie, exprime la « capacité d'une Église de choisir son primat et de se conduire selon ses propres normes ecclésiales », mais en même temps le principe indique le fait « qu'on ne peut pas parler de l'indépendance des Églises locales, mais de l'interdépendance » grâce au fait que « l'Église orthodoxe n'est pas une confédération des Églises orthodoxes autocéphales ou autonomes, mais plutôt leur communion »⁷⁹. Tout de même, il faut mentionner, comme souligne le théologien Radu Preda, qu'à l'exception des vieux centres comme Constantinople, Alexandrie, Antioche, Jérusalem, « toutes ou presque toutes les Églises autocéphales et autonomes (...) sont nées par émancipation unilatérale et même violente, rarement par consensus

articol;1840;0;63274;0;Evenimente-si-impliniri-din-viata-Episcopiei-Ortodoxe-Romane-a-Italiei.html, vérifié le 10.12.2011. Voir également, Emanuel Tăvală, *Ortodocșii români se roagă la Torino de peste trei decenii* [Les orthodoxes roumains prient à Torino depuis trois décennies], en « Ziarul Lumina » [« Le quotidien la lumière »], le 10.07.2011, édition en ligne, <http://www.ziarullumina.ro/articole;1836;0;59642;0;Ortodocsii-romani-se-roaga-la-Torino-de-pestre-trei-decenii.html>, vérifié le 10.12.2011.

⁷⁶ Métropolite Nicolae de Banat, *Autocefalia și comuniunea frățească ...* [L'Autocéphalie et la communion fraternelle...], en « Autocefalie, Patriarhie, Slujire Sfântă... » [« Autocéphalie, Patriarchie, Saint Ministère... »], p.114. Voir aussi Alexandru Moraru, loc. cit., p.142.

⁷⁷ Pour la manière dont le principe de la subsidiarité est compris comme l'expression du « constitutionalisme démocratique ecclésial », voir Constantin Rus, *Drept bisericesc* [Droit ecclésial], I, Arad, Mirador, 2000, p.112.

⁷⁸ Paroisses Nice, Bruxelles et le Bureau de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine auprès des institutions européennes.

⁷⁹ Patriciu Vlaicu, *Biserica, realitate eschatologică și prezență instituțională* [L'Église, réalité eschatologique et présence institutionnelle], en « Tabor », n° 2, 2007, pp.48-49.

avec Constantinople ou, selon le cas, avec Moscou »⁸⁰. À cet égard, l'observation de Grigorios D. Papathomas est très intéressante: celui-ci affirme que la raison pour l'application de l'autocéphalie avait été celle « d'affronter la division et l'éloignement ethnique provenant de l'établissement du principe des nationalités et de l'accroissement de l'ethno phylétisme ». L'auteur essaie en fait de démontrer que l'autocéphalie n'est pas opposée à l'unité de l'Église mais plutôt c'est une nécessité pour la conservation de celle-ci⁸¹. De cette façon, la relation entre l'unité et l'autocéphalie reste une idéalement bonne mais pratiquement confuse.

Le critère ethnique dans l'exercice de l'autocéphalie est compris par les représentants de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine comme une manière de conserver l'unité de l'Église orthodoxe universelle en respectant la diversité et les particularités aux niveaux de langue, culture et tradition de chaque communauté locale⁸². L'attachement du Patriarcat de Bucarest pour l'autocéphalie comprise presque exclusivement dans le sens ethnique est explicable si on pense aux motivations qui ont guidé son auto proclamation: l'indépendance politique de l'État roumain comme État national⁸³. Quand même, Grigorios D. Papathomas souligne que le critère ethnique est étroitement lié, même dépendant de celui territorial dans l'exercice de l'autocéphalie, et donc, le premier ne peut pas être appelé pour justifier l'autorité canonique des Églises autocéphales sur « leurs diasporas »⁸⁴. De toute façon, on ne peut pas nier le fait que la manière dont est organisée la diaspora est un exemple pour la façon dont les critères ethnique et celui de la juridiction territoriale entrent en collision à l'intérieur du principe de l'autocéphalie⁸⁵.

Une possible synthèse de la vision de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine sur la manière dont le principe de l'autocéphalie justifie sa position à l'égard de la question juridictionnelle de la diaspora marche sur l'idée qu'il s'agit en fait d' « une obligation

⁸⁰ Radu Preda, *De la autonomie și autocefalie la unitate canonică și etică. Dileme social-teologice ale ortodoxiei actuale [De l'autonomie et l'autocéphalie à l'unité canonique et éthique. Des dilemmes social-théologiques de l'orthodoxie actuelle]*, en "Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai – Theologia Orthodoxa", vol.LV, n° 1, 2010, p.102.

⁸¹ Grigorios D. Papathomas, loc. cit., pp.63, 79.

⁸² Alexandru Moraru, loc. cit., p.147.

⁸³ Radu Preda affirme que « l'indépendance canonique de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine était vue par la hiérarchie et par la classe politique également comme un pendant absolument obligatoire de l'indépendance politique », Radu Preda, art. cit., p.112. Voir des idées similaires chez Constantin Rus, « Unity and Autocephaly. Some canonical remarks », in *The Place of Canonical Principles...*, particulièrement p.168. Pour les justifications concernant l'organisation de l'Église comme Patriarcat, voir Teoctist, Patriarche de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine, « Cuvânt Înainte. Patriarhatul Român – dreapta întocmire a Bisericii naționale românești autocefale » [« Avant-propos. Le Patriarcat Roumain – la juste construction de l'Église nationale roumaine autocéphale »], in *Autocefalie, Patriarhie, Slujire... [Autocéphalie, Patriarchie, Saint Ministère...]*, p.8.

⁸⁴ Grigorios D. Papathomas, loc. cit., pp.68, 75, 80, 85.

⁸⁵ Radu Preda, art. cit., p.100. Voir aussi, Voir aussi, Irime Marga, Principiul jurisdicțional în Biserica Ortodoxă [«Le principe juridictionnel dans l'Église Orthodoxe»], in *The Place of Canonical Principles...*, p.195.

» ou d'un devoir de l'Église autocéphale de prendre soin de l'organisation et de la vie religieuse des communautés se trouvant hors les frontières de l'État où elle a le siège afin d'assurer la continuité et la liaison des communautés avec la spiritualité, la tradition et la culture d'origine⁸⁶. L'accusation d'ethno phylétisme, appelée plutôt par le Patriarcat Œcuménique, est vue par l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine pas seulement sans consistance, mais aussi en tant que partie d'une stratégie de celui-ci de s'imposer la juridiction sur les communautés des autres Églises autocéphales (nationales)⁸⁷. De cette perspective, un texte publié en 1991 dans la revue officielle *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* (L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine) est illustratif: il exprime le point de vue de la Patriarchie Roumaine à l'égard du débat sur la juridiction canonique des communautés orthodoxes de 'diaspora'. En marchant sur l'argumentation de la légitimité du principe national ethnique dans l'organisation des relations inter orthodoxes dans la diaspora, l'Église exclut toute possibilité de laisser ses fidèles sous la juridiction d'une autre Église⁸⁸. Le désaccord avec la vision de la Patriarchie Œcuménique va même jusqu'aux accusations que celle-ci est intéressée à soumettre les fidèles d'autres Églises à cause du fait qu'elle n'a pas ses propres croyants⁸⁹. En ce

⁸⁶ Alexandru Moraru, loc. cit., p.149, «on peut affirmer que par le principe de l'autocéphalie on comprend l'indépendance de la hiérarchie d'une Église nationale (...) en exerçant le pouvoir ecclésial complète, normalement sur le territoire d'un État particulier, mais exceptionnellement aussi sur sa propre diaspora lorsque les fidèles de sa nation (...) se trouvent sur le territoire des autres États », p.159, « L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine, comme Église autocéphale et autonome, prend soin comme une vraie Mère de son diaspora (...) en accord avec l'esprit et la tradition de l'Église première. Voir aussi, Iorgu D. Ivan, « Etnosul – Neamul – Temei divin și principiu fundamental canonic al autocefaliei bisericești » [« L'ethnos – la nation – base divine et principe fondamental canonique de l'autocéphalie ecclésiale »], in *Autocefalie, Patriarhie, Slujire... [Autocéphalie, Patriarchie, Saint Ministère...]*, p.136.

⁸⁷ Voir le texte de Iulian Mihai L. Constantinescu, « The Principle of Ecclesiastical Autocephaly and the Problems of Inter-orthodox jurisdiction. An Actual Ecclesiological and Canonical Contribution », in *The Place of Canonical Principles...*, pp.235, 237-238, 241.

⁸⁸ Virgil Moldovan, *Probleme actuale ale diasporei ortodoxe [Des problèmes actuels de la diaspora orthodoxe]*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.109, n° 4-6, 1991, p.46, « (...) l'Église mère devra réfléchir encore, parce qu'il est hors de toute discussion d'y céder. ». Voir aussi, *Temei nr. 10094/1990*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.109, n° 7-9, 1991, p.161. 'Să folosim libertatea pentru a spori cooperarea panortodoxa', interviu de PFPP Daniel revistei rusesti *Spre unitate*, nr.3, mai-iunie 2009, a Fundatiei international pentru unitatea popoarelor ortodoxe [Que nous utilisons la liberté pour développer la coopération panorthodoxe, entretien du Patriarche Daniel pour la revue russe *Vers l'unité*, n° 3, Mai-Juin 2009, de la Fondation internationale pour l'unité des peuples orthodoxes], en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.127, n° 5-8, 2009, p.9.

⁸⁹ Virgil Moldovan, *Probleme actuale ale diasporei... [Des problèmes actuels de la diaspora...]*, p.46, « (...) Bien sûr, la Patriarchie Œcuménique a besoin de fidèles et on peut considérer celui-ci le raison pour lequel elle manifeste cette tendance d'incorporer la diaspora orthodoxe sous sa juridiction ».

qui concerne une « tendance d'accaparement » manifestée par « d'autres Églises Orthodoxes en Occident et ailleurs » envers laquelle l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine et ses communautés doivent « lutter », elle revient souvent dans le discours des représentants de l'institution religieuse⁹⁰. De plus, en Italie sans être quand même le seul cas, par comparaison avec la France, où la question a été solutionnée après 2009, persiste encore la situation où des paroisses orthodoxes d'origine roumaine préfèrent l'autorité canonique du Patriarcat Œcuménique. À cet égard, l'Église Roumaine qualifie les activités du Constantinople comme « des abus canoniques »⁹¹.

Même pendant les discussions des Commissions inter orthodoxes approchant parmi d'autres sujets la question de la diaspora, le point de vue de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine reste celui que dans les Assemblées Épiscopales tout se fasse dans « le respect du principe ethnique de telle façon que les paroisses roumaines n'appartiennent aux autres juridictions que celle de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »⁹². Pendant la rencontre inter orthodoxe de Chambésy, en 2009, la délégation de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine soutient en accord avec les représentants du Patriarcat de Moscou la proposition devenue le paragraphe 5 du texte final que « les Assemblées Épiscopales ne peuvent pas annuler ou limiter les droits des évêques membres concernant leurs compétences administratives et canoniques »⁹³. De cette perspective on observe en fait la préoccupation de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine (et des autres Patriarcats aussi) pour limiter au minimum les compétences des Assemblées Épiscopales qui tendent à être perçues comme des formes organisationnelles concurrentes pour l'intérêt de l'institution religieuse de maintenir dans sa juridiction les communautés orthodoxes d'origine roumaine. Si ces spécifications sont particulièrement adressées aux autres Églises Orthodoxes, en ce qui concerne les membres du corps ecclésial, en 2002 une décision du Synode qui les visait précisait le

⁹⁰ Sabin Verzan, *Eveniment istoric la Patriarhia Română. Reactivarea Mitropoliei Basarabiei, Autonomă și de stil vechi* [Événement historique à la Patriarchie Roumaine. La réactivation de la Métropole de Bessarabie, Autonome et de style ancien], en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.110, n° 11-12, 1992, p.22, qui cite en ce cas le prêtre Simion Felecan, représentant la paroisse orthodoxe roumaine de Munich, « Une situation similaire vivent les Roumains dans l'Europe Occidentale, qui doivent faire face à une tendance d'accaparement par d'autres Églises Orthodoxes ». *Teamei nr. 441/1996*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.114, n° 1-6, 1996, p.377. *Teamei nr.3292/2000*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.118, n° 4-6, 2000, p.331. *Teamei nr. 594/2002*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.120, n° 1-6, 2002, p.654. *Teamei nr.4158/2009*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.127, n° 5-8, 2009, p.106.

⁹¹ *Teamei nr.4158/2009*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.127, n° 5-8, 2009, p.106. Voir aussi, *Teamei nr.7048/2009*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol. 127, n° 9-12, 2009, pp.90-96.

⁹² *Teamei nr.441/1996*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română [L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine] », vol.114, n° 1-6, 1996, p.377.

⁹³ *Teamei nr.992/2009*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol. 127, n° 5-8, 2009, p.98.

fait « qu'on interdit aux clercs, aux moines et aux licenciés des facultés de théologie orthodoxe de solliciter ou d'accepter la proposition de passer sous la juridiction d'une autre Église Orthodoxe sans l'accord du Patriarche de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »⁹⁴. Les deux spécifications sont en fait complémentaires et regardent les deux directions d'où pourrait venir la déstabilisation de son autorité sur les communautés orthodoxes roumaines de l'étranger.

En février 2010, le Synode de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine adresse aux Roumains de l'étranger « se trouvant sans bénédiction sous la juridiction des autres Églises Orthodoxes sœurs ou sous des autres structures non canoniques » un « Appel à l'unité et à la dignité roumaine », dans lequel on leur demandait « de revenir en communion directe avec l'Eglise Mère »⁹⁵. L'Appel prend comme arguments en faveur de cette demande le Statut d'organisation et de fonctionnement de l'institution religieuse qui définit l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine comme l'Église qui comprend aussi « les chrétiens orthodoxes roumains se trouvant hors les frontières du pays », et les décisions de la dernière rencontre inter orthodoxe de Chambésy (2009) qui « précisent que chaque Église autocéphale a le droit de pastorale sur son propre diaspora »⁹⁶. Dans un esprit d'émulation concurrence avec les autres Patriarcats, le document de l'Église évoque comme exemples les activités en ce sens des Patriarchies Russe et Serbe. La dernière partie du document essaye de souligner le fait que les transformations connues par la société roumaine après 1990 font « ce qu'avait été excusable dans le passé devenir injustifiable et même regrettable aujourd'hui », c'est-à-dire la séparation des certaines communautés de l'Eglise Mère à cause des conditions de la période communiste.

L'Appel du Synode a déclenché des réactions critiques parmi les orthodoxes particulièrement en France. Dans une déclaration commune⁹⁷, 28 personnalités orthodoxes⁹⁸ de l'Europe Occidentale voient dans le texte émis par le Synode de

⁹⁴ *Temei nr.594/2002*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol. 120, n° 1-6, 2002, p.655.

⁹⁵ *Apel la unitate și deminătate românească [Appel à l'unité et à la dignité roumaine]*, en http://www.patriarhia.ro/_upload/documente/12659590116712358431.pdf, vérifié le 20.03.2013. Un appel similaire a été adressé en avril 2003 par le Patriarche Alexis II aux orthodoxes russes, voir Nicolas Senèze, *Les orthodoxes français ont manifesté leur unité*, en « La Croix », novembre 2003.

⁹⁶ La « décision » de Chambésy est en fait une mesure transitoire ou provisoire et la prendre comme argument peut être un indice pour le faible engagement de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine sur le chemin vers la création d'une Église autocéphale locale en diaspora.

⁹⁷ Assez suggestive est le fait que la déclaration des 28 est intitulée « Appel à l'unité et à la dignité de l'Église » comme une forme de correction pour le titre de l'Appel du Synode de Bucarest « Appel à l'unité et à la dignité roumaine », comme si tout attachement à la nation ou à l'ethnie est en contradiction est a des effets négative sur l'unité et la dignité de l'Église comme forme de manifestation de l'orthodoxie universelle. Les deux « dignités » et les deux « unités » ne trouvent pas aucun accord dans leur manifestation absolue.

⁹⁸ Les signataires sont membres ou représentants du Patriarcat Œcuménique (soient-ils des grecs ou des russes qui ont choisi de rester hors de la juridiction du Patriarcat de Moscou) ou des français convertis. Les deux documents illustrent en fait le heurtement entre deux

l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine une possible manifestation d'ethno phylétisme qui implique le risque d'affecter de manière négative l'image de l'institution religieuse à l'intérieur de la communauté inter orthodoxe. Le texte de la déclaration conclut en affirmant « qu'on ne doit pas instrumentaliser l'Église du Christ au service de l'unité et de la dignité d'une nation »⁹⁹. Le père Michael Evdokimov se déclare « affligé et consterné » par l'Appel, se demandant si « l'Église roumaine pense-t-elle l'orthodoxie en termes d'universalité ou de simple roumanité », car le texte « fait preuve d'une absence de sollicitude paternelle envers les orthodoxes qui, dans leur diversité ethnique, sont amenés à un partage de la vie sacramentelle », restant dans la même logique « muet sur l'état du dialogue inter orthodoxe »¹⁰⁰. De ce point de vue, l'Appel et les documents similaires des autres Patriarcats font la preuve du faible degré d'attachement des Églises Autocéphales dans la direction de l'unité de l'orthodoxie en Occident (voir le premier groupe de colonnes du Graphique n° 1).

En mai 2010, la Métropole Orthodoxe Roumaine d'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale a rendu public une réponse aux réactions suscitées en Occident par l'Appel de l'Église Mère. La Métropole essaye de préciser à qui s'adresse « en effet » l'Appel en délimitant entre les communautés qui ont reçu la bénédiction et celles qui ne l'ont pas reçue pour pouvoir joindre une autre juridiction que celle de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine¹⁰¹. De plus, le document se montre soucieux à préciser le fait que « l'appel n'a pas de visée « impériale », mais il est l'expression d'un souci pastoral » et que le but du Patriarcat Roumain n'est pas « à réunir tous les Roumains vivant hors de Roumanie sous la bannière d'un nationalisme »¹⁰².prétendu ».

Malgré toutes ces spécifications et nuances, l'Appel reste profondément attaché aux formules du langage nationaliste ou de la confusion entre « orthodoxe » et « Roumain ». Un simple regard sur les occurrences des collocations devient assez illustratif: en quatorze contextes on identifie des constructions où l'orthodoxie est associée à la roumanité (par exemple : « communion directe avec l'Église Mère », « l'Église de la nation roumaine », « chrétiens/fidèles orthodoxes roumains », « unité et communion orthodoxe roumaine », « résurrection et réconciliation orthodoxe roumaine », « dignité orthodoxe roumaine », « nos frères roumains ») ; trois autres

des visions qui regardent l'organisation de la diaspora orthodoxe, celle ethnique et celle envisageant une Église locale.

⁹⁹ « Apel la unitatea și demnitatea Bisericii Ortodoxe, Paris 11 aprilie 2010 », annexe dans Radu Preda, *op. cit.*, pp.330-334.

¹⁰⁰ Michael Evdokimov, *Réaction à l'Appel à l'unité et à la dignité roumaine de l'Église Orthodoxe de Roumanie*, en http://orthodoxie.typepad.com/Fichiers_2/P_Michel_Evdokimov.pdf, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

¹⁰¹ *Réponse aux attaques injustes visant un appel pastoral*, en <http://www.orthodoxie.com/actualites/europe/la-metropole-roumaine-deurope-occidentale-et-meridionale-vient-de-mettre-en-ligne-un-texte-en-reponse-aux-interrogations-s/>, vérifié le 20.03.2013.

¹⁰² Une analyse des deux documents est faite aussi par Radu Preda, qui considère ce moment une bonne occasion « d'approcher sérieusement au-delà des festivités et autocélébrations le sens de l'autocéphalie ecclésiale dans l'Orthodoxie universelle du début du XXIe siècle », voir Radu Preda, *art. cit.*, p.100.

contextes appellent des antonymes pour la relation orthodoxie-roumanité pour décrire la situation actuelle de certaines communautés orthodoxes roumaines (« des étrangers », « des autres », « aliénation »); deux contextes font référence à l'orthodoxie définie ethniquement (« les Eglises mères », « coresponsabilité et solidarité ethnique orthodoxe »); seulement trois formules sont employées sans aucune association avec l'ethnicité (« Église autocéphale » et « juridiction » deux fois) (Voir le Graphique n° 2).

Le fait que la concurrence avec les autres Église Orthodoxes joua un certain rôle dans les décisions de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine d'organiser et de développer ses structures hors les frontières du pays est visible aussi dans les justifications que l'institution religieuse invoque en 2001 pour expliquer la transformation de l'Archevêché Orthodoxe Roumaine d'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale en Métropole: « prenant en compte le fait qu'en contexte européen, les éparchies du Patriarcat Œcuménique, du Patriarcat Russe, du Patriarcat Bulgare et des Églises Orthodoxes Syriennes sont organisés comme Métropoles »¹⁰³. La situation est un peu différente en Italie, où la Patriarchie Œcuménique a démarré au nom de toute l'Église Orthodoxe un dialogue avec les autorités religieuses et laïques afin d'obtenir plus des droits pour l'orthodoxie dans la péninsule. À cet égard, en 2006 un rapport du Secteur des Communautés Externes de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine rappelait l'opinion de Teodor Baconsky que cette initiative « de la Métropole Orthodoxe Grecque d'Italie, parlant au nom de toutes les communautés orthodoxes peut déterminer l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine d'entrer sous « la protection légale » de l'orthodoxie grecque, ce qui ne serait pas désirable »¹⁰⁴. Bien que l'affirmation n'appartienne pas aux représentants de l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine, l'institution semble y adhérer et par conséquence, considérer assez dangereuse pour le statut juridique des communautés orthodoxes roumaines de l'étranger toute action sous la coordination du Patriarcat Œcuménique, même s'il s'agit de l'amélioration de leur situation légale.

Avant de conclure, on doit mentionner le fait que la question ne concerne seulement les communautés orthodoxes de l'Europe Occidentale, mais dans la même mesure, celles autour des frontières de la Roumanie, particulièrement de la République de Moldavie et de Serbie. Les désaccords que l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine a eu avec le Patriarcat Russe concernant la « réactivation » de la Métropole de Bessarabie en 1992¹⁰⁵ et avec l'Église Orthodoxe Serbe sur le sujet des structures

¹⁰³ *Temei nr.1080/2001*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.119, n° 7-12, 2001, p.515.

¹⁰⁴ *Temei nr.4106/2006*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.124, n° 7-12, 2006, p.97.

¹⁰⁵ Sabin Verzan, *Eveniment istoric la Patriarhia Română...*, pp.12-60. Le cas de la République de Moldavie est plus compliqué, au-delà des deux structures ayant des juridictions séparées (Roumaine et Russe), Radu Preda mentionne aussi l'existence de deux autres structures ayant un statut canonique « pas clair »: l'Évêché de Făleşti et de Moldavie de l'Est (sous l'autorité de la Patriarchie de Kiev, pas reconnue comme canonique) et l'Archevêché de Moldavie et de l'Ukraine du Sud (en communion avec l'Église Russe hors frontières), Radu Preda, *art. cit.*, p.102.

ecclésiales orthodoxes roumaines de Banat serbe et de la Vallée de Timok¹⁰⁶ ont connu quelques fois des épisodes déplaisants en impliquant aussi des acteurs politiques¹⁰⁷ ou juridiques nationaux et internationaux, comme la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme¹⁰⁸. Le discours de l'acteur religieux montra quelques fois qu'il considérerait plus acceptable de reconnaître l'autocéphalie de ces communautés, soient-elles en Occident ou autour les frontières du pays, que de les « céder » à la juridiction des autres Églises Orthodoxes¹⁰⁹.

Par son fort attachement aux valeurs nationales ethniques et l'attachement assez faible à l'idée d'une Église autocéphale locale en Occident¹¹⁰, l'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine ne peut se rapporter que d'une manière concurrentielle aux autres juridictions, soient-elles nationales ou panorthodoxes lorsqu'il s'agit de la situation des communautés orthodoxes roumaines de l'étranger. Quand même, on considère que l'attachement à l'idée nationale n'est pas en soi-même le déterminant de l'attitude concurrentielle, mais plutôt une forme de manifestation, la plus évidente et avec laquelle l'institution religieuse se sent le plus à l'aise. Ce qui se trouve derrière le langage fondé sur la confusion nation confession est l'effort de l'Église de rester une institution pertinente pour ses fidèles. Dans la situation où une bonne partie de ses fidèles sont « sollicités » par d'autres structures ecclésiales nationales ou inter/panorthodoxes l'Église se sent inévitablement concurrencée sur le terrain de la pertinence et de la légitimité. Par rapport à ses « concurrentes » c'est l'appel aux valeurs nationales ethniques que l'Église comprend utiliser pour conserver/refaire sa position. Ce qui reste à voir est si ce type de langage ait les effets envisagés.

¹⁰⁶ *Teamei nr.562/1997*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.115, n° 1-6, 1997, p.319. Diana Nedelcea-Cotescu, *Biserica Românească din Serbia la începutul mileniului III [L'Église Roumaine de Serbie au début du III-ème millénaire]*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.123, n° 4-6, 2005, pp.236-255. *Teamei nr.2609/2005*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.123, n° 7-12, 2005, pp.111-116. *Teamei nr.2621/2006*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.124, n° 4-6, 2006, pp.98-102.

¹⁰⁷ *Teamei nr.2788/1992*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.110, n° 4-6, 1992, p.182.

¹⁰⁸ *Teamei nr.2579/2002*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.120, n° 7-9, 2002, p.539. *Teamei nr.5363/2002*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.120, n° 10-12, 2002, pp.414-417. *Teamei nr.412/2002*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.120, n° 1-6, 2002, p.649. *Teamei nr.3140/2009*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.127, n° 5-8, 2009, p.102.

¹⁰⁹ *Teamei nr.10094/1990*, en « Biserica Ortodoxă Română » [« L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine »], vol.109, n° 10-12, 1991, p.161.


Conclusions

La manière dont les Églises Orthodoxes autocéphales et autonomes se rapportent à l'organisation de l'orthodoxie en Occident connaît des variations dépendantes des conditions historiques et géopolitiques qui font assez difficile l'identification d'une position commune. Dans le cadre actuel de la discussion, la juridiction des églises autocéphales ou les diverses formes d'unité vers l'évolution des églises orthodoxes locales en Occident restent seulement des options également envisageables.


L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine trouve dans le principe de l'autocéphalie définie ethniquement la base de son argumentation à l'égard de la façon dont les communautés orthodoxes de l'Occident doivent être organisées. La détermination de l'institution religieuse de conserver ou de regagner le contrôle juridictionnel sur les communautés orthodoxes roumaines de l'étranger la positionne parfois en désaccord avec les autres Églises autocéphales. « L'Appel à l'unité et à la dignité roumaine », son attitude toujours inquiète à l'égard de la « sollicitude » du Patriarcat Œcuménique envers les communautés orthodoxes se trouvant en Occident et la position soucieuse concernant l'autorité des structures comme l'AEOF ou les conférences inter épiscopales sont assez des indices pour illustrer le fait que l'institution religieuse agit selon des principes concurrentiels.

On essaya à l'intermédiaire de cette étude à souligner la contribution de ce milieu concurrentiel pour la décision de l'Église de (ré)organiser des structures ecclésiales à l'étranger après 1990. Comme on vient de mentionner dans l'introduction, cette concurrence n'est qu'un des facteurs ayant un rôle stimulateur pour l'activité de l'institution religieuse hors les frontières de la Roumanie.

Graphique n° 1:



Graphique n° 2 :



HISTORIANS IN SEARCH OF NEW WAYS AT THE BORDER OF THE CENTURIES

Lorina P. Repina

Institute of World History of the
Russian Academy of Sciences
lorinarepina@yandex.ru

Rezumat: Istorici în căutarea de noi căi la hotarul dintre secole

Lucrarea analizează transformările radicale care au avut loc în privința fundamentelor teoretice, a metodologiei și a modelelor conceptuale ale științei istorice de la limita secolelor XX - XXI. Schimbările în strategiile de cercetare ale istoriografiei recente sunt considerate drept o rezultată a interacțiunii fructuoase a diferitelor discipline din arealul comun al științelor sociale și umaniste. Autorul estimează potențialul cognitiv al noilor modele teoretice cu scopul de a restabili integritatea viziunii istorice a trecutului.

Résumé: Historiens à la recherche de nouveaux chemins à la limite des siècles

L'ouvrage ci-joint analyse les transformations radicales qui se produiraient dans le domaine des fondements théoriques, de la méthodologie et des méthodes conceptuelles de la science historique à la limite des XXème – XXIème siècles. On considère les changements dans les stratégies de recherche de l'historiographie récente comme le résultat de l'interaction fructueuse des disciplines différentes du domaine commun des sciences sociales et humanistes. L'auteur estime le potentiel cognitif des nouveaux modèles théoriques au but de rétablir l'intégrité de la vision historique du passé.

Abstract: *The paper analyses the radical transformations that took place in the theoretical foundations, methodology and conceptual models of historical science at the border of the XX – XXI centuries. The changes in research strategies of recent historiography are considered as an outcome of the fruitful interaction of different disciplines in the common space of social sciences and humanities. The author estimates the cognitive potential of new theoretical models aiming to restore the integrity of historical vision of the past.*

Keywords: *recent historiography, social theories, interdisciplinarity, cultural turn, search for synthesis*

The last decades of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century have been marked by deep changes in the structure and content of social sciences and humanities and in the methodology of these fields of knowledge. In this

rapidly transforming intellectual context a radical reorganization of historiography has taken place. Comparing some aspects of historiographical situation of the mid-twentieth century with that of the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, one can see fundamental differences in the understanding of the subject and methods of historical cognition, the content and nature of historical knowledge, in the definition of its status and narrative style as well as the possibilities of the further interpretations of historical text. It was already at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s that serious theoretical discussions took place in which new conceptions were being shaped, formulations refined and the platform for the future consensus was being built. Numerous monographic studies and collections of essays not only reflected the challenges of the time, encountered by historians at the turn of the two centuries and eras, but demonstrated a whole range of reactions to these challenges.

The main “post-modernist challenge” to history was directed against its perception of historical reality and hence of the object of historical knowledge, which in the new interpretation was presented as something constructed by language and discursive practice. Notably, the definition and supposed specificity of historical narrative itself as a form of an adequate reconstruction of the past were problematized. Creative character of historical narrative, which transforms patchy and often arbitrarily selected historical evidence into an unambiguous linear pattern, was emphasized to the highest extent. The issues of the possible depth of historical understanding, familiar criteria of objectivity and ways of a scholar’s own control over her creative work were raised from a new perspective. A historian was now supposed to look closer into the texts, use new methods to reveal the hidden meanings and decipher the slightest nuances of changes in the language of a source, to analyze the rules and ways of perception of a text by the intended audience and so on and so forth. One of the most distinct signs of changes that took place at the end of the twentieth century was the intensive use of literary sources in historical studies, and consequently, of methods and theories borrowed from contemporary literary studies. Significant changes, related to the development of post-modernist paradigm, occurred in the sphere of professional consciousness of historians; they urged to reconsider the established ideas about the place of history within the system of knowledge, its inner structure and exploratory tasks.

The climax of the confrontation between the two opposing positions, “linguistic” and “objectivist”, or the one of “post-modernist critics” and of “orthodox realists”, occurred at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. However, as the ideas, initially perceived as rather wild, were becoming more and more acceptable, the voices of the “moderates”, who were calling for the understanding of each other, were growing stronger. The natural protest of historians against the extremes of the “linguistic turn” was converted to constructive suggestions and compelling arguments in favour of the so-called “middle ground”. The “moderates” found a foothold in the idea that the

impossibility of *direct* perception of a long-gone reality did not mean that a historian was completely arbitrary in his “construction” of it. Historians sharing the “middle-ground” platform had thoroughly reconsidered their practice in the light of “linguistic turn”. As Aron Gurevich emphasized, “it would be mistaken to deny the fact that the post-modernist critique of historiography had revealed the real weaknesses in the methodology of historians. It re-opened old sores that had been previously largely neglected by historians”¹. Recognition of these weak points and the search for the ways of overcoming them do not necessitate joining those who stand at the extreme positions of post-modernist critique, but, as Gabrielle Spiegel pointed out, “even if we wanted it (and there are few who do), we would never be able to go back to the self-confident assumptions of the nineteenth-century positivist historiography”². The solution was found in the paradigm of “new social and cultural history” that interprets various social processes through the lens of cultural assumptions, symbolic practices and value systems. Along with the adoption of the techniques of literary criticism, the scholars’ attention was drawn to the “social logic of the text” – to the extra-linguistic characteristics of the discourse, linked to biographical, socio-political and mental contexts within which the text was made, and also to the aims, interests and world outlook of its creator.

Looking at the various manifestations of new tendencies in historiography, it would be appropriate once again to acknowledge the continuity of intellectual processes in the sphere of humanities. Indeed, the new tendencies were not imposed from without. As a part of the general cultural shift, the “linguistic turn” embodied everything that has long been neglected and seemed to be lost, but was being gradually crystallized within historiography itself, and that was transformed by it within the interdisciplinary “new history”. The need in the structural reorganization of all historical disciplines also became obvious long before “linguistic turn”. The old division between economic, political, social history and the history of ideas became outdated, although for some time this reorganization was going latently on the constantly expanding exploratory field that was then colonized by new social history with its interconnected and intermingling sub-disciplines.

The powerful influence of post-modernist tendencies affected the development of *new cultural history* that attempts to construct social life by means of cultural practice, the potential of which is, in turn, defined by practice of everyday relationships. The social norms and institutions are analysed in the context of cultural

¹ А. Я. Гуревич, *Историк конца XX века в поисках метода* [A. Ya. Gurevich, *Historian of the end of the XX century in search of a method*], in *Одиссей. Человек в истории* [Odysseus. Man in History], Москва, 1996, с. 7.

² Г. М. Спигел, *К теории среднего плана: историописание в век постмодернизма* [G. M. Spiegel, *For a theory of middle ground: history writing in the age of post-modernism*], in *Одиссей. Человек в истории*, Москва, 1995, с. 219.

practices of historical actors, and the social dynamics is seen as a process which includes not only structural differentiation and reorganization of activities of groups and individuals, but also the “reorganization of minds”, or the changes in values and beliefs, a certain new mind-set, or *new culture*, which literally *sees* the world around it (natural as well as social) from a *different point of view*. The main task of a scholar is to demonstrate the ways personal beliefs, thoughts, abilities, intentions of the individuals operate within the space of possibilities, limited by collective structures that had been created by the previously existed cultural practice. In the view of Roger Chartier, this complex subordination can be described by the notion of representation that articulates “three registers of reality”³. The conception of competing “strategies of representation” opens up new ways of exploring the dynamics of social processes on different levels.

At the same time new cultural history encounters difficult epistemological problems which stem from specific qualities of “non-traditional” sources, such as the traces of everyday practices of “ordinary people” or literary works. However, “it does not invalidate the significance of such sources, we should only bear in mind that even in the cases when the sources do not allow us to comprehend the events, they can give us important information about the authors’ assumptions and beliefs, and hence reveal the range of ideas, i.e., help us to understand the character of the cultural life of the epoch”⁴. The notable place within the “space of possibility”, limited by the norms of historical critique, is taken by the models based on the recognition of the definitive role of social context for all kinds of collective activities (including a linguistic one). In their striving to escape the dichotomy of “literature and life”, “individual and society” they follow the original dialogic conception of Mikhail Bakhtin. Individual experience is understood in the context of interpersonal and intergroup relationships within the examined society and with consideration for the existence of multiple “competing groups” each of which can assign its own “programme of behaviour” to an individual in different circumstances. On the one hand, the reading of each text involves its exposure to the contexts of discursive and social practices that set out its limits, on the other hand, in each text the various aspects of these contexts are being revealed and their inherent contradictions and conflicts are being uncovered⁵. In the history of everyday life the priority is given to the analysis of symbolic systems and, in the first place, of linguistic structures, through which the people of the past

³ R. Chartier, *Le monde comme representation*, in “Annales E.S.C.”, 1989, no. 6, pp. 1505-1520; Idem, *On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language and Practices*, Baltimore, 1997.

⁴ А. Я. Гуревич, “Территория историка” [A. Ya. Gurevich, “A Historian’s Territory”], in *Одиссей. Человек в истории*, 1996, с. 91.

⁵ R. Chartier, *Texts, Printing, Readings*, in L. Hunt (ed.), *The New Cultural History*, Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1989, pp. 154-175.

perceived and interpreted the real world, gave meaning to their experience and visualized the future.

“Cultural”, “pragmatic”, “memorial”, “visual”, “spatial” and other “turns” opened up the new perspectives to history: new objects and methods of historical research emerged, masses of new sources were given wide circulation, a whole range of revolutionary approaches to traditional sources was elaborated, new effective ways of information processing came into being. The extent of these shifts was such as to characterize the situation in history at the turn of the century as “historiographical revolution”. Intensive research has resulted in the creation of new (neoclassical) integrative models, built on the principle of complementarity of micro- and macro-historical approaches and their use in historical studies. It led to the moving away from binary thinking with its juxtaposition of macro- and micro-history, structures and events, rational and irrational, and also to the sweeping expansion of “the territory of a historian”.

Proponents of the “third position” have demonstrated a rather wide range of responses to the post-modernist challenge. “Experience” (which could not be reduced to discourse) and “practice” became the key concepts in the unfolding revision of the linguistic approach. Notably, it is the conception of “practice”, which can be described as a *complex of conscious and unconscious principles organizing human behaviour* that is given preference over the notion of “strategy” with its emphasis on deliberate choice⁶. The search for a new research paradigm resulted in the development of historical concepts, consolidated around various theories of “pragmatic turn”. These “theories of practice” bring to the fore the historical actors in their local situations, in the context of those social structures that create the opportunities for action while at the same time set limits for it, putting “structural pressure”. Thus the question of how historical actors change their ways of living and action has become a central one. Its further exploration requires the development of integrative theoretical model, oriented towards the combination of micro- and macro-analysis and incorporating the mechanisms of individual choice⁷.

In a paradoxical way, the narrowing of the field of observation and detailed study of the models of relationships and types of behaviour opens up the possibilities for a fresh approach to the processes of the historical structures’ formation. It is not a coincidence that in the discussion of micro-history’s intention to go into all possible details and take into account all mechanisms of the construction of reality, the term *neopositivism* is frequently used, and the subject of analysis is shifted: instead of the reconstruction of “what really happened” it is now concerned with “*everything that*

⁶ R. Biernacki, *Language and the Shift from Signs to Practice in Cultural Inquiry*, in “History and Theory”, 2000, Vol. 39, no. 3, p. 289.

⁷ Л. П. Репина, *Комбинаторные возможности микро- и макроанализа* [Combinatory potentialities of micro- and macroanalysis], in “Диалог со временем”, 2001, no. 7, с. 61-88.

has caused something to happen, or everything that could have happened"⁸.

The perspective of socio-cultural approach and micro-history leads to the development of a specific method of comparison as well. The method of "decentring comparison" takes single and unique cases as its referent points, which means that we deal with the case study approach. In her paper "*Decentring history: local stories and cultural crossings in a global world*" Natalie Zemon Davis has raised the question of whether the historian can "hold onto the subjects of "decentred" social and cultural history, often local and full of concrete detail, and still address the perspectives of global history". She demonstrated such an approach, comparing single cases, scattered over different countries, continents and civilizations, and presenting the historical experience, documented in these cases, not in the terms of "backwardness" and "development" but as alternatives. In her opinion, "the decentring historian does not tell the story of the past only from the vantage point of a single part of the world or of powerful elites, but rather widens his or her scope, socially and geographically, and introduces plural voices into the account"⁹.

It is not difficult to see that the advocates of the "third platform" from among professional historians closely monitor (and often follow) the research of the leading social theorists, who are looking for the "third way" in the presentation of a theoretical model of social reality as a synthesis between the objectivism of system-structural approach and the subjectivism of phenomenology. "Pragmatic turn" has indeed led to the establishment of the category of "practices" in the wide range of fields of contemporary social science and humanities (including history, theory of language and literary theory). It demonstrates that a "certain paradigm common to all social sciences is being formed", which generated a new understanding of historical society through the process of formation of the social in the activities of cultural subjects¹⁰. Accepting the idea that "every discipline has its own, characteristic and distinct from any other, way of incorporating these notions into the research tradition, its own way of conceptualization", we should add, however, that today even those research strategies and ways of conceptualization that exist within the same discipline can be significantly different from each other, and that they are not constrained by the "pursuit to demonstrate that the abilities of a person, which seem natural (like rationality or aesthetic ability), the basic forms of experience (sexuality, violence, madness, cognition, death) and self-awareness (personality, individuality), as well as

⁸ P. A. Rosenthal, *Construire le "macro" par le "micro": Frederic Barth et la microstoria*, in *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience*. Textes rassemblés et présentés par J. Revel, Paris, 1996, p. 159.

⁹ Davis N. Zemon, *Decentering History: Local Stories and Cultural Crossings in a Global World*, in "History and Theory", 2011, Vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 188-202.

¹⁰ В. Волков, О. Хархордин, *Теория практик* [Volkov V., Kharhordin O., *Theory of Practice*] СПб., 2008, с. 12.

main cultural practices that became natural (manners, colloquial speech, reading) have long and often non-linear history of development and transformation”¹¹.

The movement towards a new conceptualization of socio-historical reality that took place in historiography draw mainly from the sociological theories that analysed the organization of social life in the complex of interactions of its local and integral components. According to these theories, practices rather than structures become a starting point for the social analysis, enriched by the “subjective perspective” of acting individuals, - the analysis of their mental acts and interpretative schemes, which stresses the divergences between the culturally determined meanings and their individual, historically conditioned use. The suggested perspective also offers a chance to widen the restraints of retrospective vision, so familiar to historians, to overcome the linear historiographical thinking, which reduces the variety of possibilities of the past situations (with their complex dynamics and open, rather than pre-determined, future) to the “real” or, more precisely, constructed from the presentist point of view, historical process.

It is hardly a coincidence that the interest of historians to the theoretical foundations of historiographical practice in its both aspects, research and representation, is increasing. A whole new corpus of work has now appeared concerned with discussion of theoretical problems of history in the new intellectual situation. Their main focus is not on a theory of historical process or the implementation of social sciences’ theories to history, but on the *historical* theory, on the theory of historical knowledge.

In contemporary Russian historiography the opinions on the influence of postmodernism on history are also very diverse. In spite of terminological variety, they still have much in common regarding their concepts and methodologies in the context of development of “new rationality” and the new image of history. Thus, the late Yuri Bessmertnyi’s works of the early 2000s¹² were concentrated on epistemological turn, which the author regarded as the abrupt change of the “logic of

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 16-17.

¹² Ю. Л. Бессмертный, *Это странное, странное прошлое...* [Yu. L. Bessmertnyi, *This strange, strange past...*], in “Диалог со временем”, no. 3, 2000, pp.34-46; Idem, *Многоликая история. Проблема интеграции микро- и макроподходов* [Multifaceted History. Problem of integration of micro- and macro-approaches], in *Казус. Индивидуальное и уникальное в истории – 2000* [Incident. Individual and unique in history – 2000], Москва, 2000, pp.52-61; Idem, *Иная история* [The Other History], in *Казус. Индивидуальное и уникальное в истории – 2000*, pp. 165-177; Idem, *Индивид и понятие частной жизни в Средние века: в поисках нового подхода* [Individual and a notion of private life in the Middle Ages: in search of a new approach], in *Казус. Индивидуальное и уникальное в истории – 2003*, Москва, 2003, pp. 484-491; Idem, *О понятиях «Другой», «Чужой», «Иной» в современной социальной истории* [On the concepts of the Other, the Stranger, the Different in current social history], in *Казус. Индивидуальное и уникальное в истории – 2003*, p. 492-496.

analysis itself”, of the “set of the ways of thinking”. The new developments in current historiography that accompanied this turn, in his view, were the evidence of the “decisive refusal of the evolutionary-successive position that interprets the phenomena of the past within the same semantic framework as their analogues of the later period”¹³. However, one could notice controversies in his ideas, which hint at least to the incompleteness of methodological searches of the author, who clearly saw these controversies himself and even tried to resolve them. In the first place, it pertains to the problem of understanding the Other, which becomes particularly acute in the situation of emphasizing not only substantial differences but fundamental gap between the logic and motivations of medieval people and contemporary historians, which makes any comparison absolutely impossible. On the one hand, the demonstration of “strangeness” of everything that happened in the past implies a move away from the idea of successiveness and requires the use of only those concepts and ways of thinking that actually existed in the past. On the other hand, without a certain “dose” of successiveness any more or less adequate description of the “uniqueness of medieval phenomenon” becomes inaccessible. It is not a coincidence that in these works Yuri Bessmertnyi moves from the category of “incomparability/incommensurability” to the idea of gradation of the concepts that form it. He introduces the division between the category of the “Different” (which implies “a certain, more or less noticeable specificity that do not require any distinct logical foundations for its analysis”) and the “Other” (which hints at the “extreme form of difference of a phenomenon in focus”).

It is clear that the persistent denial of successiveness and absolutization of discontinuity in these works serves more as an “antidote”, as an instrument of the historian’s self-control. Such forms of control become critically important in the context of the development of a *neoclassical model* of historical research, which reflected the transition from “one-dimensional interpretations of history to the multi-dimensional ones on the basis of the synthesis of “positive” cognitive principles of classical and non-classical models”¹⁴. Hence the question of the relation between empirical and theoretical components of historical study is raised on new grounds. A rational explanation in history is being rehabilitated and therefore *historical theories* are being developed, that are not a mere derivative of social theories, but “interpret the relationship between the individual actions and social structures” on their own

¹³ Idem, *К изучению разрывов в интеллектуальной истории западноевропейского средневековья* [For a study of the ruptures in the intellectual history of the Middle Ages], in Л. П. Репина (ред.), *Преемственность и разрывы в интеллектуальной истории* [L. P. Repina (Ed.), *Continuities and discontinuities in the intellectual history*], Москва, 2000, p. 34-36.

¹⁴ А. В. Лубский, *Альтернативные модели исторического исследования* [A. V. Lubsky, *The Alternative Models of Historical Research*], Москва, 2005, pp. 86, 267, 271.

right¹⁵. It is hard to disagree that *historical theory* is instrumental, probabilistic; it is not universal and always implies existence of alternative theoretical interpretations.

Such evaluation of the cognitive potential of middle-level theories has led to the task to create a historical methodology based on the synthesis of these competing strategies. An innovative construction of multidisciplinary methodology of analysis was developed by Irina Nikolaeva who successively implemented it into research of massive social transformations of early medieval and early modern Europe¹⁶. This model was created “on the basis of the *methodologically matching and complementary approaches focused on the problem of the unconscious*” and oriented towards the solution of the problem of variability of mental structures in their complex relationship with historical context. Such poly-disciplinary technology enables the author to verify the results of her study and examine its heuristic potential on specific historical material. It is particularly important here to ensure the compatibility of the instruments chosen by the author (and hence the suggested synthetic technology) with the macro-historical middle-level theories of the typology of the genesis of feudalism and typology of early European modernization.

These models offer a dual system of determination: the social context is understood as a situation, which determines not only conditions but also the challenges and problems that require solution. This is combined with the assumption that the subjectivity of a historical actor (an individual or a group) significantly affects the results of his or her activity, which, in the end, transforms its own context. It needs to be said, however, that the multi-level dynamics, characteristic of the neoclassical theoretical model, with its complex interweaving of actions, phenomena and processes of various scale, cannot be described within the *linear narrative logic of consequent events*. Variety of research perspectives leads to the variety of historical narratives. Depending on the personal position of a scholar, the result can be characterised in a twofold way, as a crisis of history or as the enrichment of our understanding of historical past.

The current historiographical situation is indicative of the wide-scale theoretical reflection of historians over the problems of historical research and ways of constructing historical texts. The difficulties of cognitive re-orientation and corresponding re-organization of professional conventions, the need in theoretical reconsideration of the own historiographical practice are realized by the leading historians, who proved themselves ready to productive interdisciplinary dialogue. For many participants of these discussions of the turn of the centuries it becomes

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 282.

¹⁶ И. Ю. Николаева, *Проблема методологического синтеза и верификации в истории в свете современных концепций бессознательного* [I. Yu. Nikolayeva, *The Problem of Methodological Synthesis and Verification in History in the Light of Contemporary Conceptions of the Unconscious*], Томск, Изд-во Томского университета, 2005, p. 301.

increasingly obvious that the socially significant status of a historian cannot be retained any longer without a reconsideration of main epistemological problems and all consequences of “methodological turns”.

As Jörn Rüsen demonstrated, objectivity can be legitimated within the narrative theory of history. According to Rüsen, the notion of objectivity also includes the “subjective” side of historical interpretation, which means that interpretation is not arbitrary in relation to the cultural discourse and social life, within which the historical narrative is being created. It means that there is an inter-subjective truth: the pluralism of historians’ viewpoints is understood not as the denial of the objectivity of a historical interpretation but on the contrary, as the condition to its realization. Interpretation is seen through a prism of the crossing perspectives that correspond to various identities, or “incorporates them as complementary”¹⁷.

The polemics around the problems of “objectivity” and “truthfulness” of historical knowledge, which is so prominent nowadays, has long history that needs to be explored. Robin George Collingwood once considered as a potential “Copernican revolution” in the theory of history the recognition of the idea that the historian’s thought was self-authorizing and possessed of a criterion to which his so-called authorities must conform and by reference to which they are criticized. And this criterion was the idea of history itself. The reference to “Copernican revolution” in the theory of history brings to the mind the reflections of Michael Polanyi on the “lessons of Copernican revolution” in the history of science and the problem of ineradicable human perspective of mind.

The present-day state of the natural sciences allows historiography to overcome its age-old scientific inferiority complex by countering radical post-modernist relativism with a “healthy” relativism, borrowed from the contemporary natural sciences. One of the proposals made in this vein is a “correlative theory of truth”, according to which our knowledge of the past is conditioned but not pre-determined by culture, and realism in regard to the past is compatible with cultural relativism in regard to the knowledge about it¹⁸. As a response to the challenge of the time, significant changes have occurred both in the problematic field and the image of history. These include the emergence of new approaches to the understanding of historical truth, which have provoked heated debates over “facts” and “fictions”. However, even in the milieu of professional historians, the assumptions that history must give an account of “how it really was”, or to “rebuild” and “resurrect” the past, are still alive.

¹⁷ J. Rüsen, *Narrativity and Objectivity in Historical Studies*, in *Symposium: History and the Limits of Interpretation*, Rice University (USA), March 15–17, 1996; <http://cohesion.rice.edu/humanities/csc/conferences>.

¹⁸ C. Behan McCullagh, *The Truth of History*, London and New York, Routledge, 1998, p. 26–28.

An interesting argumentation regarding the specificity of the use of imagination by historians and “non-fictionality” of historical narrative is given by David Carr, who takes as a premise, that the “product of... imagination” can equally pertain to something that did not exist and something that existed. He insists that “the human world manifests a concrete version of the narrative form in the very structure of action itself”, as “human beings live their lives by formulating and acting out stories that they implicitly tell both to themselves and to others... by remembering what was and projecting what will be”. Narrative structures are already present in the fabric of human reality, and there is no need for the historian to inscribe them inside it... The structures of narrative are already inherent in human reality. The historian does not have to “reinscribe” lived time into natural time by the act of narration... This is not to say that every historical narrative is true, or that some narratives are not better than others” or “that every use of the imagination in history is legitimate”¹⁹.

An extended analysis of the problem of truth in history is given in the works of Irina Savel'eva and Andrei Poletaev. They discuss the specificity of historical knowledge, the relativity of criteria of truth, objectivity and veracity in historical research; they convincingly prove that the radical renovation of theoretical foundations of historical knowledge is both inevitable and irreversible. At the same time the authors do not blur the border between “fact” and “fiction”, they still believe in the possibilities of historical knowledge and the need to pursue “historical truth” that is so specific and difficult to achieve. The process of re-formatting and specification of contemporary historiography does not lead to its loss of the image of a “strict science” with its own ways of creating new knowledge. “Knowledge” is the key word here, and the whole range of issues of “truthfulness” and “objectivity”, as well as those of “reality” and “historical fact” etc. are incorporated into reflections on the current presumptions of this complex concept. Drawing on contemporary studies of knowledge in philosophy of science, sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, the authors strongly reject the thesis that the difference between subjective beliefs or opinions, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other hand, is connected with the object of knowledge itself. They define knowledge (according to the place of its formation) as socially objectified. The separate types of knowledge – in this case it is historical knowledge – are rightly treated as the equal forms of construction of historical reality, which are distinguished by their specific characteristics²⁰.

¹⁹ D. Carr, *History, Fiction and Human Time* in *Symposium: History and the Limits of Interpretation*, <http://cohesion.rice.edu/humanities/csc/conferences>. See also: G. Noiriel, *L'historien et l'objectivité*, in *L'histoire aujourd'hui*, Auxerre, 1999, p. 421-426; R. Harrison, A. Jones, P. Lambert, ‘Scientific’ *History and the Problem of Objectivity*, in P. Lambert, Ph. Schofield (eds.), *Making History. An Introduction to the history and practices of a discipline*, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 26-37.

²⁰ И. М. Савельева, А. В. Полетаев, *Знание о прошлом: теория и история* [I. M. Savelieva, A. V. Poletayev, *Knowledge of the Past: Theory and History*], Т. 1-2. СПб., 2003–2006.

The problem of historical truth is discussed in numerous works of Ksenia Khvostova and Victor Finn²¹, combining strict logical analysis with deep understanding of research practice of the professional historian. Historical truth is identified (with the help of quaternary logic, implying the existence of degrees of veracity) as pluralistic. Assumptions about the consensus character of historical truth are criticized as based on binary logic (in which a judgment is understood unambiguously, either as true or false, and the intermediate states, characterizing various degrees of truthfulness and falseness, are excluded). The specificity of historical truth is seen by Ksenia Khvostova in that it is always understood as a certain extreme limit, around which various hypotheses, opinions and conclusions of historians are arranged according to the degree of their probability.

The introduction of reputable theoretical conceptions and cognitive logical analysis into reflections on the specificity of historical truth significantly expands the horizons of methodological discussions and contributes to the intensification and further development of theoretical thinking on the research and expert practices of historians.

²¹ К. В. Хвостова, В. К. Финн, *Проблемы исторического познания в свете современных междисциплинарных исследований* [K. V. Khvostova, *Problems of Historical Cognition in the Light of Contemporary Interdisciplinary Studies*], Москва, 1997, p. 256; idem, *Диалог со временем и современная количественная история* [Dialogue with Time and Contemporary Quantitative History], in "Диалог со временем", 2006, № 16, pp. 134-146; В. К. Финн *Интеллектуальные системы и общество: идеи и понятия* [V. K. Finn, *Intellectual Systems and Society: Ideas and Conceptions*], Москва, 2007, p. 309.

CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIVITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF 'MOLDOVAN ARMY', M. I. KUTUZOV, FOR ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES

Sergiu Cornea

B. P. Hasdeu State University of Cahul, Republic of Moldova
s_cornea@yahoo.com

Rezumat: *Raptul Basarabiei în 1812 a constituit rezultatul direct al politicii expansioniste, promovată în Balcani de către Rusia și Turcia în a doua jumătate a sec. al XVIII-lea – începutul sec. al XIX-lea. Etapa finală a războiului ruso-turc din 1806-1812 a fost influențată de generalul M. I. Kutuzov. Demersul studiului constă în prezentarea activității lui M. I. Kutuzov în calitate de comandant suprem al „armatei din Moldova” și analiza impactului acțiunilor sale asupra Țărilor Române. Sunt examinați principalii factori care au influențat traseul socio-profesional parcurs de Kutuzov până a fi numit în funcția de comandant suprem. În baza memoriilor și a documentelor epocii s-a reconstituit portretul moral al lui Kutuzov și au fost reliefate consecințele nefaste ale activității sale asupra autohtonilor. Pentru Țările Române M. I. Kutuzov a fost comandantul suprem al armatei rusești de ocupație care a jefuit nemilos populația pașnică și care a avut o contribuție esențială la dezmembrarea Moldovei.*

Abstract: *The Rapt of Bessarabia in 1812 was a direct result of expansionary policy pursued by Russia and Turkey in the Balkans during the second half of the XVIIIth century – beginning of the XIXth century. The last period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 was influenced by M. I. Kutuzov, the supreme commander of the Russian army. The main objective of the study is to elucidate the activity of M. I. Kutuzov as the supreme commander of the „Moldovan Army” and to analyze the impact of his actions on the Romanian countries. The study analyzes the main factors which have influenced his socio-professional route until he was appointed as supreme commander. According to memoirs and documents from that period the moral portrait of Kutuzov was reconstructed and the negative consequences of his activities for Romanians were outlined. M. I. Kutuzov was nothing more than the supreme commander of the Russian army of occupation who robbed ruthlessly the Romanian Countries and who had an essential contribution to the dismemberment of Moldova.*

Résumé: *Le Rapt de la Bessarabie en 1812 était le résultat direct de la politique expansionniste, promu par la Russie et la Turquie aux Balkans dans la deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle – début du XIX^e siècle. L'étape finale de la guerre russo-turque de 1806-1812 a été influencé par le général M. I. Koutousov. Le but de l'étude est de mettre en évidence l'activité de M. I. Koutousov comme le commandant suprême de „l'armée moldave” et d'analyser quel est l'impact de ses actions sur les Pays Roumains. Dans cet article sont analysés les principaux facteurs qui ont influencé la trajectoire socio-professionnelle de Koutousov avant d'être nommé comme le commandant suprême. Sur la base des mémoires et documents d'époque a été reconstitué le portrait moral de Koutousov et ont été élevés les*

conséquences néfastes de son activité pour les indigènes. Pour les Pays Roumains M.I. Koutouzov n'était pas que le commandant suprême de l'armée d'occupation Russe qui a pillé impitoyablement la population pacifique et a joué un rôle déterminant dans le démantèlement de la Moldavie.

Keywords: *expansionism, Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Romanian Countries, Kutuzov.*

The Bucharest Peace Treaty, signed on May 16, 1812 ended the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812, one of the longest and most expensive wars for Romanian countries. According to the estimates made by A. Agachi, in the six years of war, Romanian countries provided material goods for the Russian army in the amount of 110,057,245 lei. The numerous requisitions, taxes, abusive purchases are not included in this amount so it can be doubled without any exaggeration.¹ After the annexation of Bessarabia, from a theatre of military operations it became the main base of support and supply of Russian troops, which continued to march towards the Balkans.²

The signing of this treaty was an arbitrary act of expansion and conquest. Turkey, in defiance of international law, gave up the territory of a state that was in suzerainty relationship with it and, in fact, did not belong to Turkey. As a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, Moldova has not lost its quality of sovereign state, maintaining its national statehood, political, economic, legal, administrative, fiscal systems and religion.³

“The Russian Empire, without any historical, ethnic or political right” ripped off “half of Moldovan territory”⁴ – in this way M. Kogălniceanu qualified the act of 1812, showing his attitude of non-acceptance of the event. N. Titulescu mentioned that “Russian complicity to the violation of a contract from international law cannot create the right”.⁵ Thus by signing the Treaty of Bucharest neither “Suzerain power” nor “protector one” have respected their obligations towards Moldova.

¹ Alexei Agachi, *Țara Moldovei și Țara Românească sub ocupația militară rusă (1806-1812)* [Moldovan and Romanian Country under Russian military occupation]. Chișinău, Ed.: Pontos, 2008, p.353-356.

² Anatol Leșcu, *Regiunea pruto-nistreană în contextul politicii externe ruse din secolele XVIII-XIX. Aspecte istorico-militare* [The Pruto-Dniester region in the context of Russian external policy of XVIIIth-XIXth centuries]. in: „Revista militară”, nr.2(4), 2010, pp.59.

³ Dumitru Grama, *Evoluția statutului juridic al Basarabiei în anii 1812-1818* [The evolution of legal status of Bessarabia during the 1812-1818 years]. in: *Revista de istorie a Moldovei*, 1994, nr. 2, p.62; Idem, *Principatul Moldova – stat suveran sub protecție* [The Principality of Moldova - a sovereign state under protection]. in: „Revista de filosofie și drept”, 1998, nr. 2-3, p.43-46.

⁴ Apud: C. Bodea, *Bucovina: momente din drumul ei spre 1918* [Bukovina: moments of its way towards 1918 year]. in: „Academica”, 1992, nr. 26, p.1.

⁵ Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente confidențiale* [Confidential documents]. București, 1992, p.83.

Taking into consideration the territorial Rapt in 1775, the ratio of the remaining territories of Moldova and those which were kidnapped is the following: Bucovina - 10442 km² (11%), Bessarabia - 45,630 km² (48%), Moldova - 38,230 km² (41%).⁶

The Rapt of Bessarabia in 1812 was a direct result of expansionary policy pursued by Russia and Turkey in the Balkans during the second half of the XVIIIth century – beginning of the XIXth century. In a note written by the Russian government to the Austrian Cabinet on July 21, 1823 it was stated that: “The Cabinet of St. Petersburg has already actively involved into internal affairs of Walachia and Moldova for 50 years. Our rights and powers of attorney in this regard are based on agreements with Ottoman Empire, a multi-annual-and numerous previous practices.”⁷

The territory annexed by the Russians was 7400 km larger than the territory to Moldova⁸ and it brought important benefits to the Russian Empire. Tsar Alexander I, during the manifest of August 5th 1812, asserted: “This peace given to us by God, brought brilliant benefits to Russian Empire, including in its boundaries a well-populated and fertile land which extends from Akkerman till the mouths of the Prut River, being at a distance of 6 miles (nine versts) from Iasi and from its mouths till the Cesarian border and thence to down of Dniester River, in total approximately 663 miles (1,000 verstes), encompassing its most famous cities: Hotin Bender, Chilia, Ismail, Akkerman and many other trade cities”.⁹

The last period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 was influenced by M. I. Kutuzov, the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Russian historiography from all times glorified Kutuzov for the fact that he has ended the war until Napoleon's invasion and has signed the peace with Turkey on terms beneficial for Russia.

How did Russian General Kutuzov succeed to become remarkable for Romanian countries? What impact did Kutuzov have on the prosperity of the Romanian people? Due to what merits until now there are streets named after him and busts which immortalize his image? For example, in Ploiesti there is a street named

⁶ Vlad Mischevca, *Moldova în raporturile internaționale la începutul secolului al XIX* (1802-1812) [Moldova in international relations in the beginning of XIXth century (1802-1812)]. Teza..., Chișinău, 1997, p.127.

⁷ *Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века* [Russian Foreign Policy in XIX and the beginning of XXth century]. *Серия вторая. Том. V. Москва: Наука*, 1982, с.155.

⁸ Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei* [The History of Bessarabia].- Chișinău, 1991, p.179.

⁹ *Собрание высочайших манифестов, грамот, указов, рескриптов, приказов войскам и разных извещений последовавших в течении 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 и 1816 годов* [Collection of the highest manifestos, charters, decrees, rescripts, orders to troops and different notifications followed during the 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1816 years]. В Санктпетербурге: В Морской типографии, 1816, с.26-27. (further: Collection of the highest manifestos, charters, decrees, rescripts, orders to troops and different notifications followed during the 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1816 years)

after him, and a bust of Kutuzov sculptured by Michael Onofrei is located in the Philanthropy hospital courtyard in Bucharest.¹⁰ In Moldova, hitherto, in many cities, especially in the region of Transnistria and the Gagauz Autonomy there are streets named after Kutuzov.¹¹ There was a district called Kutuzov in the Republic of Moldova until 1988.¹²

In order to elucidate in a more veridical way the status of Kutuzov as the commander in chief of the Moldovan army, it is important to clarify primarily how the Russian general was treated by senior Russian officers and which were the main factors of influence of the social- professional route passed until being appointed as the commander in chief, due to which qualities, virtues or deeds he rapidly advanced in military ranks of the Russian Empire.

Over the years, a whole army of Russian image makers, and especially the Soviets had worked hard to polish the image of “saviour of the fatherland”.

The appreciation of Kutuzov's image was determined by the period of country development and promoted the ideological content of that period. The Kutuzov appreciation was made from the position of class struggle and visions of country leaders. The soviet propaganda exploited the historical past in order to create the new man in the spirit of love for the socialist homeland. The soviet ideology had a critical approach to the image of Kutuzov in the '20s of XX century, presenting it positively during the 30's and exalting it in the 40's.¹³ Beginning with 1947, the soviet historians have adopted as a methodological background Stalin's answer to the Colonel E. A. Razin's letter¹⁴ which stated: “Our genius army commander Kutuzov ... has destroyed Napoleon and his army using carefully prepared counteroffensive.” And further:

¹⁰ It is considered that the location of Kutuzov's bust in hospital courtyard was due to the fact that he was one of the initiators of the hospital foundation. According to the reports of a contemporary, Kutuzov deplored the lack of medical institutions in the city at a ball given in honor of his arrival in Bucharest, after which he put his hand in pocket and took out a fist full of coins in order to begin a subscription, this gesture was followed the other boyars. See: Alexandru G. Galeşescu, *Eforia spitalelor civile 1832-1932* [The Ephor of civil hospitals 1832-1932]. Bucureşti: Tipografia G. A. Lăzăreanu, 1899, p.656.

¹¹ In this context I mention that in Russia there are 96 cities where the streets are named after Kutuzov. See: О. В. Шульгина, Д. П. Шульгина, *Топонимика как объект нематериального наследия, связанного с Отечественной войной 1812 года в России* [Toponymy as intangible heritage related to the Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia]. http://www.e-notabene.ru/hr/article_351.html (accessed in 23.10.2012)

¹² Ialoveni district was created in 1977 under Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet RSS Moldova, no. 9th of March 25, 1495, with the initial name of Kutuzov, changed later (1988) in the historical name of Ialoveni.

¹³ М. В. Юдин, *Образ фельдмаршала М. И. Кутузова в отечественной культуре XX в.* [The image of Field Marshal M. I. Kutuzov in the national culture of the XXth century]. http://evestnik-mgou.ru/vipuski/2012_4/stati/pdf/yudin.pdf. (accessed in 14.10.2012)

¹⁴ Published in *Bolşevic*, nr.3, 1947, p.7-8.

“Engels noted, inter alia, that the Russian generals during the year 1812, Gen. Barclay of Tolly would be the unique commander of army who deserves attention.¹⁵ Certainly, Engels was wrong because Kutuzov as the commander of army stands head and shoulder above Barclay of Tolly”.¹⁶

After this propagandistic impulse the efforts of soviet historiography were focused on the glorification of Kutuzov. The historical parallels were made between the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1812 and its failure in 1941. The idea of Stalin wisdom was confirmed, it was inspired by the brilliant theory of Kutuzov.

The study of contemporary memoirs and documents show that Kutuzov seen by the contemporaries differs from Kutuzov – the icon created by the inventive imagination of Russian historiography and especially of the Soviet Union.

M. A. Miloradovich said that Kutuzov was devoid of military capabilities considering him as a petty and sordid courtier, L. L. Bennigsen - as an incapable man¹⁷ and P. I. Bagration regards him as a villain, able to betray for money.¹⁸ F.V. Rostopchin painted a gloomy picture of Kutuzov in the following way: “This man was a great tattler, a notorious lecher, a liar, a rude person and cringing. In order to obtain the favors from the upper class he was ready to endure everything, to sacrifice all, without any complaint and due to the intrigues and servile behaviour he got always the goal to be employed exactly in the minute it was thought forgotten forever”.¹⁹

M. I. Kutuzov was born on September 5, 1745, the only son of General L. M. Kutuzov. Kutuzov's mother died early and he spent his childhood with his grandmother. As a child he was gentle, smart but peevish and irresponsible at the same time, lazy in learning, he was fond of sleeping and languishing.²⁰ This was the early life of Kutuzov. The Earl A. Langeron knew Kutuzov in the last years of his life and characterized him in following way: “...He is endowed with so much spirit, but with so little character so that all things expected from his qualities were paralyzed by his defects. His selfishness was more revolting. Everything is subordinated to his infamous pleasures and comfort.”²¹

¹⁵ К. Маркс, Ф. Энгельс, *Сочинения* [Essays] (2-е издание), Том 14. М.: Издательство политической литературы, 1959, с.94.

¹⁶ Аруд: Н. А. Тронцкий, *Отечественная война 1812 г. История темы* [The Patriotic War of 1812. A History of the Subject]. Саратов, 1991, p.47.

¹⁷ Из воспоминаний А. И. Михайловского-Данилевского [From the memoirs of A. Mikhailovsky Danilevsky]. In: *Русская старина*, 1897, № 6, с.466-467.

¹⁸ Ф. В. Ростопчин, *Записки о 1812 годе* [F.V. Rostopchin, Notes of 1812 year]. In: *Русская старина*, 1889, № 12, с.693.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p.694.

²⁰ А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, *Император Александр I и его сподвижники в 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 годах* [The Emperor Alexander I and his associates in 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 years]. Т.3. СПб., 1846, с.1-2.

²¹ *Călători străini despre Țările Române în secolul al XIX-lea* [Foreign Travelers about Romanian Countries in the XIXth century]. Serie nouă, Vol. I (1801-1821). București, Ed.

According to the memoirs of his contemporaries, Kutuzov was known as the embodiment of three distinctive qualities: a) skilful courtier, b) plotter and double-dealer, c) incurable lecher. His military career and social progress were largely achieved due to these “virtues”.

Kutuzov succeeded to be noticed and accepted in the entourage of Catherine II and her successor Paul I. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov was among the guests invited at dinner in the evening that preceded the death of both monarchs.²²

In the last period of the reign of Catherine II, her favourites practiced a system of promotion based on protectionism in the Russian army. A large part of the generals had permanently lived in Moscow or Petersburg and were more concerned with personal issues than those of the army. Many generals and senior officers of the Russian army used their subordinates systematically for personal purposes. The abuses had reached such proportions that senior officers treated military service as a profitable business.²³

When Kutuzov returned from Constantinople in 1794, he had got special abilities in preparing coffee, acquired in Turkey. Having this ability he prepared coffee by a special recipe to P. Zubov, a favourite of Catherine II, and had just brought to him with an hour before he woke up under the public gaze.²⁴

As a result of these flattering efforts, Kutuzov was appointed as the commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of Finland and of the Corps of cadets of the ground troops.

In Russian society “Kutuzov's coffee pot” signified the superlative degree of flattery, and Kutuzov was called “the coffee pot of P. Zubov”. The Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, analyzing the ways in which Catherine II subjugated the Russian nobility, claimed that this activity was aided by her favourites. “It is necessary to remember, Pushkin wrote, about the palms offered generously to our Princes and Boyars by the favourites, about Potemkin's ill-famed receipt, kept so far in a state institution, about the monkey of Count P. Zubov, about the coffee pot of Prince Kutuzov and other facts”.²⁵

Kutuzov wanted his actions to be heard and to have much resonance in the court of Tsar. Kutuzov began to tremble while hearing the name of the Court,

Academiei Române, 2004, p.354 (Further: *Călători străini despre Țările Române ...*).

²² Н. А. Троицкий, *Фельдмаршал Кутузов: Мифы и факты* [Field Marshal Kutuzov: Myths and Facts]. Москва: Центрполиграф, 2002, с. 74, 90.

²³ Л. П. Богданов, *Русская армия в 1812 году* [Russian army in 1812]. М.: Воениздат, 1979, с.13-14.

²⁴ *Русский биографический словарь* [Russian Biographical Dictionary]. Жабокритский-Зяловский. Петроград, 1916, с.533.

²⁵ А. С. Пушкин, *Заметки по русской истории XVIII в* [Remarks to the Russian history XVIII]. In: А. С. Пушкин, *Полное собрание сочинений в 10 т* [Complete Works in 10 volumes]. Т. 8. Л.: Наука, 1978, с.91.

confirmed Langeron.²⁶ In a letter to his wife on October 29, 1811 Kutuzov confessed about his worries that he has not yet received any news from Tsar about the victorious fight of October 2, 1811.²⁷

Langeron stated in his memoirs that Kutuzov liked to use small matters, sordid intrigue, etc.²⁸ P. V. Ciceagov sustained that: "this General used the intrigue as the main affair of his life".²⁹ Kutuzov's qualities of intriguer were fully manifested in his detachment to the army in Moldova in spring of 1808. A. A. Prozorovski, having trouble with his health,³⁰ requested to Tsar to be sent as Deputy M. I. Kutuzov, appreciating him as: "He is nearly my disciple and he knows my method".³¹

According to the rescript of Alexander I of March 4, 1808, Kutuzov had to resign his post, and to move with his the 8th and 22nd divisions to the Moldovan Army, commander in chief of which was A. A. Prozorovski. M. I. Kutuzov reported to Alexander I that he set out from Kiev to Iasi on April 5, 1808, where the location of Moldovan army general headquarters was situated, where he arrived on April 20, 1808, as stated the order of Field Marshal A. A. Prozorovski.³²

Kutuzov was involved in organization of intrigues even at his coming, in order to take the position of A. A. Prozorovski. Although Kutuzov reported to his wife on May 2, 1808 that he is on good terms with A. A. Prozorovski³³, the reality was different. The Count A. H. Benkendorf described the relationships between M. I. Kutuzov and A. A. Prozorovski in the following way: "Prozorovski weakened due to his advanced age, and Kutuzov, eager to be commander in chief, suspected him. They were more occupied with intrigues than with military operations. The siege of Braila fortress ended with heavy losses, but to no avail. Field Marshal accused Kutuzov for this state of things, but Kutuzov hoped that because of this failure the count Prozorovski will be revoked and he will stand at the head of the army. But Emperor decided otherwise: to end the humiliating clashes he appointed Count Bagration in place of Kutuzov".³⁴

²⁶ *Călători străini despre Țările Române ...*, p.351.

²⁷ *М. И. Кутузов. Письма. Записки* [M.I. Kutuzov. Letter. Notes]. М.: Воениздат, 1989, с.264

²⁸ *Călători străini despre Țările Române ...*, p.351.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p.543.

³⁰ He was 75 years old at the time of his appointment as commander in chief of Moldova (September, 1807).

³¹ *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том II. Москва, 1951, с.464.

³² *Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов* [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents]. Москва, 1947, с.100-101; *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том II. Москва, 1951, с. 492, 498, 523.

³³ *М.И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III (1808–1812). Москва, 1952, с.10.

³⁴ *Из мемуаров графа А. Х. Бенкендорфа* [From the memoirs of Count Alexander H.

A. A. Prozorovski insisted upon the revocation of Kutuzov during the campaign in spring of 1809, especially after the failure of storming the Braila fortress. A. A. Prozorovski reported to Alexander I that Kutuzov incited the officers to distrust him, defamed his actions and this situation creates obstacles for him rather than benefits, insisting to be revoked.³⁵ Considering the A. A. Prozorovski's request, Alexander I ordered the drafting of rescript through which Kutuzov was appointed as the commander of Moldovan corps reserve.

Due to the resignation of the General Rimsky-Korsakov as military governor of Lithuania, there was drawn the second rescript by which Kutuzov was appointed instead of the last.³⁶ Both rescripts were sent to A. A. Prozorovski and he should decide which of them to present to Kutuzov. Obviously, A. A. Prozorovski, wanting to escape the intrigues of Kutuzov, handed to Kutuzov the second rescript.³⁷ General P. I. Bagration was appointed instead of Kutuzov, on July 25, 1809, as the commander of the main body of Moldovan Army.³⁸

An extreme manifestation of cynicism and malevolence was the case of Kutuzov's vengeance upon P. V. Ciceagov for the negative emotions caused by the appointment of Ciceagov as the commander in chief of Moldova and because he has revealed the numerous abuses and frauds which have occurred in the Moldovan Army.

As the supreme commander of the Russian army, Kutuzov was complaining to Alexander I that P. V. Ciceagov did not provide him the information on his activities and directions of movement of the army commanded by him.³⁹ The culmination of Kutuzov's revenge was the way of how Kutuzov has exposed P. V. Ciceagov while Napoleon crossed over the river Berezina. About this, Denis Davydov reported: "Kutuzov, in turn, wanting to avoid the clash with Napoleon and his bodyguard, did not pursue persistently the enemy and remained far behind. This didn't prevent him to announce P. V. Ciceagov about his appearance in the enemy rear-guard. Being signed retroactively, the Kutuzov's disposals had arrived with delay to the admiral. P. V. Ciceagov often chastised the couriers but they answered him that they were sent from headquarters much later than the dates indicated in the disposals and, in fact, they

Benkendorf]. In: *Российский архив*, Том XVIII. М. 2009, с.288.

³⁵ *Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов* [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents]. Москва, 1947, с.101; А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, *op. cit.*, p.25.

³⁶ Both rescripts were published in: *Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов* [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents. Moscow]. Москва, 1947, с.102-103.

³⁷ А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, *op.cit.*, p.25.

³⁸ *Багратион в Дунайских Княжествах (сборник документов)* [Bagration in the Danubian Principalities: Compilation of Documents]. Кишинев, 1949, с.17.

³⁹ *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том IV, Часть 1, (июль – октябрь 1812 г.).Москва, 1954, с.432-433.

arrived to him in time.”⁴⁰

Regarding this episode, P. V. Ciceagov has communicated to Count S.R. Vorontsov on September 15, 1813: “... My biggest fault is that I arrived at the location indicated by the Emperor, while others who did not arrive there, have proved to be correct. Unfortunately, I have positioned myself so that during the military campaigns my army followed and attacked the enemy who stood before; this fact contradicts our new tactics, which state: «To win is to withdraw»”. P. V. Ciceagov insisted in his letter of May 25, 1813 to Count Vorontsov: “You must know that I have resigned not because of excessive sensitivity, but because of unfounded claims of Marshal K. (Kutuzov). He endeavoured to hinder all my actions, even if it was detrimental to his own glory ... I am accused of having committed some mistakes, but what did they consist of? Nobody told me. The main criticism is that I did not take Napoleon as the prisoner, but did I promise this? Did I get such kind of order? Did I have such assignment? Was this possible to do?”⁴¹

During his lifetime and long military career, Kutuzov had a double behaviour. The same topic was addressed under different ways, depending on the person with whom he has interacted. Analyzing Kutuzov's correspondence two parallel attitudes emerge: on one side the fawning and patriotic tone used in official letters and selfish and opportunist, on the other side, used in correspondence with his family.

In this regard, Kutuzov's correspondence on his possible appointment as the commander in chief of Moldova is interesting. Kutuzov was informed by the Minister of Tolly's M. B. Barclay about his possible appointment as the commander of the army of Moldova on February 23, 1811.⁴² In a letter to his daughter Elizaveta from February 27, 1811, Kutuzov, while mentioning about his appointment as commander in chief of Moldova, stated: “I assure you I am not happy of the appointment, on the contrary, it grieves me, I swear. The Minister prepares me for this appointment. But I keep it a secret and tell you this. Never disclose this news until it will be published. And if, fortunately, it will be cancelled, then, generally do not talk about it. Someway or another, this detachment, mentioned above, worries me deeply. At my years to split out from my friends, abilities and tranquility!”⁴³ But in the official correspondence the tone of speaking was different, in the address to the Minister of Tolly M. Barclay dated on March 1, 1811, Kutuzov noted that “the trust showed by Tsar in a matter so

⁴⁰ Д. В. Давыдов, *Военные записки* [Military Notes]. М.: Воениздат, 1982, с.224.

⁴¹ В. Юлин, *Адмирал П.В. Чичагов – истинный патриот Отечества. Новое в трактовке его роли в истории России* [Admiral P. Chichagov - a true patriot of the Motherland. New in the interpretation of his role in the history of Russia]. In: <http://www.museum.ru/1812/library/Chichagov/part4.html> (Accessed in 28.10.2012).

⁴² М. И. Кутузов. *Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III (1808–1812). М.1952, с.291.

⁴³ Кутузов М. И. *Письма и записки* [Kutuzov M.I. Letter and notes]. Москва: Воениздат, 1989, с.224-225.

important includes everything that can flatter any man, even if he is ambitious in the slightest measure.”⁴⁴

Being detached in March 1808 in the Army of Moldova, Kutuzov wrote to his wife on March 18, 1808: “...I am full of trouble, I prepare two divisions for march and I’m facing many difficulties, ... I would have to go also but the worries retain me here, if someone asks you about me in Petersburg, tell them that you think I’ve already gone ...”.⁴⁵

Following the official correspondence of Kutuzov on the eve of the Battle of Borodino one can notice the firmness to fight a decisive battle with Napoleon and the confidence in success, but at the same time, in a letter to his daughter Ana Hitrovo of August 19 1812, he insisted that she had to withdraw away from the theatre of military operations and to keep simultaneously his letters in the greatest secret, because if they will be made public, they will bring him the great harm.⁴⁶

Kutuzov was known as a notorious lecher, this fact was confirmed by his behaviour during his stay in the Romanian lands. The local nobility and Russian body of officers were surprised by the actions which were undertaken by the newly commander in chief of Moldovan Army. Kutuzov's first concern while arriving to Bucharest was to find a mistress, according to the memoirs of A.F. Langeron. The choice was made in favour of “a child of 14 years”⁴⁷ who “unfortunately” soon she dominated him, as happened to all women of all quality who obtained from him any advantages both for pleasure and for their family”.⁴⁸ “... She was a true lover for him, a favourite sultana. She came to him every night and together spent time in front of everyone: the familiarities that degenerated into indecency, revolting the honest people who were forced to go to him. When he was invited to dinner, it was necessary to invite Mrs. Guliano, after dinner they locked themselves into a cabinet for intimacy... I saw this puny and shameless creature always near him: at balls, clubs, public places. She often sits on knees of her lover of 70 years playing with his decorations and leaving him overwhelmed of her hugs and smile.” Joseph de Maistre the messenger of the Sardinia Kingdom to the court of Petersburg confirmed that Kutuzov in place to deal with the peace negotiations was “smitten by a Wallachian,

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁴⁵ М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том II. Москва, 1951, с.508.

⁴⁶ Кутузов М. И. Письма и записки [Kutuzov M.I. Letter and notes]. Москва: Воениздат, 1989, с.310.

⁴⁷ Lucsandra Bărcănescu (daughter of Ioan Bărcănescu, the great chancellor and Catincea Ghica), married to Nicholas Guliano.

⁴⁸ *Memoriile contelui Langeron* [Memoirs of Count Langeron]. in: *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor: Urmare la colecția lui Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki* : Supliment 1, Volumul 3: 1709-1812. București: Socec, 1889, p.327. (În continuare: *Memoriile contelui Langeron...*).

spending all his days and nights with her...”⁴⁹

It seems that Kutuzov himself was not too bothered by this situation. On April 28, 1812, Kutuzov invited his daughter Elizabeth, who has reached by that time Odessa, to visit Bucharest, where “she will see new faces, inter alia, a married woman of 13-14 years, very naive and very pleasant”.⁵⁰ It is obvious that the status of a “naive and pleasant” woman was not a secret for his daughter, who was very attached to her father and as before he informed his daughter about the ladies of his entourage.⁵¹

Even during the time when Russia was at the lock, Kutuzov did not change his habits. In his letter to Alexander I from September 20, 1812, the military governor of Moscow F. V. Rostopcin reported: “The Prince Kutuzov no longer exists - no one sees him, he is always in a state of lying and sleeping. The soldiers despise and hate him. He did not dare do anything, a young, dressed in Cossack uniform occupies all his time. ... Kutuzov, as an old gossip, has lost his head, thinking to do something through nothing”.⁵²

This was broadly the old general Kutuzov, appointed as the commander in chief of the Moldovan Army by Alexander I on March 7, 1811.

Kutuzov arrived in Bucharest on March 31, 1811 and entered on duty the next day.⁵³ By this I would like to emphasize that Kutuzov was in the Army from Moldova, but as I have already mentioned, due to the conflict with A. A. Prozorovski he was assigned in Lithuania. The “Moldovan Army” counted about 46,240 people when Kutuzov became the leader.⁵⁴ Only one fifth of the persons promoted to officer grade had military training between 1806-1811.⁵⁵

Kutuzov took the lead from General Langeron, who has shown in his memoirs a little bit of dismay by the activity of the new commander in chief: “Kutuzov had ceased to constrain soon after his arrival. Laziness, as a dominant his quality covered everything and I realized quickly, how blackguard he is. Kutuzov has always had

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p.381-382.

⁵⁰ Е. Ф. Тизенгаузен, Князь Михаил Илларионович Голенищев-Кутузов-Смоленский. Письма его дочери графине Е. М. Тизенгаузен, во втором замужестве Хитрово [Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov -Smolensk. Letters to his daughter, Countess E.M. Tiesenhausen, during the second marriage Hitrovo]. In: Русская старина. Т. X. СПб, 1874, с.361.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 342-343, 344, 346, 347, 355-356.

⁵² Письмо графа Федора Растопчина Александру I после оставления Москвы [Letter of Count Fyodor Rostopchin to Alexander I after leaving Moscow]. <http://academkniga.ru/-1812-> (Accessed in 22.10.2012)

⁵³ М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III (1808–1812). М.1952, с.293, 295-296.

⁵⁴ А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, *op. cit.*, p.26.

⁵⁵ Л. П. Богданов, Русская армия в 1812 году [Russian army in 1812]. М.: Воениздат, 1979, с.75.

enough mind, but his defects were more pronounced than his degree of wisdom ...”.⁵⁶

The abusive involvement of the supreme commanders of the “Moldovan Army” into the internal affairs of the Romanian countries, including the appointment of loyal people in high administrative positions, became a common practice. On April 3, 1811, Kutuzov ordered to Major-General Stetter, vice-president of the Romanian Country Divan to impose Divan to undertake the necessary measures to build very soon two bridges over the river Olt,⁵⁷ obviously for Russian army needs.

M. I. Kutuzov excelled at getting involved into people promotion to loyal administrative functions and at providing various facilities and privileges to his entourage. Thus, in his letter to V. I. Krasno - Milașevici of November 22, 1811 M. I. Kutuzov insisted to appoint the officials who were appointed in 1812 with his approval because of “the current political circumstances.”⁵⁸ General Langeron, in his memoirs, noted that Kutuzov during his stay in Bucharest “was no longer ashamed of anything, moving towards the most shameful rascals, facing the most revolting degree of respect for himself.” And after the detailed description of the group of charlatans and opportunists who surrounded Kutuzov in Bucharest, Langeron noted regretfully that: “an old man of 68 has appeared in public decorated with all orders of Russia. In the midst of this dirty society he spent his life. Nothing was more disgusting than a dirty old man and the condemned relations with those people who surrounded him. He could refuse nothing to these ‘parasites’. They had all places and all favour.” (...) “Kutuzov's Chancellery was also the core of all intrigues. The weak and guilty man was teased by all people who were looking to profit of his confidence and once they got some trust, they abused with indecency and without remorse... Every one of these employees, of these parasites, defendants had a purpose: the desire to obtain a job or wealth at any cost”.⁵⁹

According to General Langeron, Count Vorontsov said nastily but well-suited that this company lacks the presence of Kutuzov's wife and of the two daughters.⁶⁰

The abuses committed by the Russian soldiers during the stay of Kutuzov as the commander in chief of Moldovan Army were considerable; this prompted the Metropolitan Gavriil Banulescu-Bodoni to intervene to clarify or resolve this kind of situations. This led to the fact that relations between them became tensed and Metropolitan opponents were supported by Kutuzov. It is eloquent in this sense the case of Bishop Ignatius. Metropolitan Gavriil Banulescu-Bodoni sent P. Kunițki to Bucharest in order to clarify the activity of the Metropolitan. P. Kunițki discovered a

⁵⁶ *Memoriile contelui Langeron ...* p.327.

⁵⁷ *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents], Том III (1808–1812). M.1952, c.299.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p.706.

⁵⁹ *Memoriile contelui Langeron ...* p.382-383.

⁶⁰ *Călători străini despre Țările Române ...*, 184 note from the footnote of the page 356.

lot of irregularities and abuses, and then presented them in a report to Gavriil Banulescu-Bodoni, who in turn sent it to the Ober-Prosecutor of Synod. Although the decision was made to dismiss the Metropolitan Ignatius, Kutuzov not only refused to comply but he expelled P. Kunițki from Bucharest.⁶¹

The local authorities and people was in charge of the maintenance of the large occupation army. The care for continuous and safe supply of the army imposed the Russian command to intervene periodically in order to prevent the robberies and abuses which could exterminate completely the inhabitants. Kutuzov stated, into the disposal given to the General F. F. Erteli at August 10, 1811: "I should pay attention not to have the situation of the country depletion of grain, in order to prevent the circumstances from the last year when people were starving to death."⁶²

The admiral P. V. Ciceagov reported that after his appointment as the commander in chief of the Moldovan Army, Alexander I gave him a detailed memorandum which included the complaints of unfortunate inhabitants of Moldova and Romanian Country regarding the Kutuzov's army. Thereafter, checking these complaints, he found them absolutely valid and Kutuzov replied to all these requests in the following way: "They will remain only with eyes for weeping".⁶³ He noted that "the discipline was neglected in such a way that robberies were committed conformably and soldiers took from the merchants everything they needed". „But you should wonder of soldiers' debauchery", Ciceagov said while General Kutuzov thought only of his own pleasures. And moreover, to please his mistresses, he freed their friends and favourites from the customs duties.⁶⁴

The inhabitants complained on one part about the increasing taxes, requisitions, records, benefits and on the other part about the arbitrary abuse, robberies and murders committed by Russian soldiers. People left the villages and hid themselves into less accessible places. The peasants' situation was described by Langeron as follows: "Unfortunate Romanian peasants were so terribly tortured that many of them fled to Transylvania. They perceived themselves as subprefects putting women on coal and whipping children to snatch little money remained after their husbands or fathers have fled. ... but none of these killers was punished than through the loss of job but some of them have even kept it. In this circumstance Kutuzov showed an inexcusable indifference."⁶⁵ Ciceagov passing through Moldova

⁶¹ А. Филипенко, *Петр Кунитцкий*. <http://odesskiy.com/k/kunitskij-petr-semenovich.html> (accessed in 19.11.2013)

⁶² *Călători străini despre Țările Române ...*, p. 431.

⁶³ Из записок адмирала Чичагова [From the notes of Admiral Chichagov]. In: „Русский Архив”, № 8-9, 1870, с.1525.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p.1534.

⁶⁵ *Călători străini despre Țările Române...*, p.358.

and the Romanian Country remarked that everywhere houses were abandoned and the inhabitants were hiding in the forests to escape the authorities' requisitions and soldiers' persecutions."⁶⁶

Ecclesiarch Dionysius, a contemporary chronicler, expressed the feelings of the inhabitants against an army that came to free them, but which has acted more severely than the Ottomans "they were not satisfied with houses and places to fit (...) they even stole everything they found".⁶⁷

This situation has generated an attitude of hostility among the Russian authorities, or as L. Casso said, 'population has lost confidence in our government's ability to reduce their sufferings.'⁶⁸ The Russian officials admitted in 1813, that this country ... robbed and deserted from the military operations of 1806-1810 presents a vast and unpopulated wilderness."⁶⁹

The tradition of robbing the peaceful population was deeply rooted in the Russian army. The looting of civilians was a big problem during Napoleon's invasion, the population was robbed of its own army. Kutuzov mentioned in his letter of August 18, 1812 to the commander of Muscovite Guard (opolcenie) the General Lieutenant I. I. Markov that robberies have taken huge proportions and necessary measures must be taken to combat this phenomenon.⁷⁰ At the same day, the order no. 2 issued by him as commander in chief of the Russian armies said that military police captured more than 2,000 deserters. And "the habit of dealing with robberies, tolerated by commanders, has influenced the morality of soldier."⁷¹

Through his rescript of September 29, 1812 Alexander I requested Kutuzov to take the most severe measures to exterminate the phenomenon of people robbing, the most criminal vice of a soldier who is obliged to defend his homeland.⁷²

If the Russian soldiers, at home, have robbed their countrymen during harsh times for their country, it is easy to imagine what kind of behaviour these foreign soldiers had on the occupied territories, such as the Romanian Countries. Meanwhile, Kutuzov showed a great concern for arranging and careful treatment of

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷ Apud: Vlad Georgescu, *Istoria românilor. De la origini până în zilele noastre* [History of the Romanians. From its origins till present day]. Ediția a III-a. București, Humanitas, 1992, p.87.

⁶⁸ Л. Кассо, *Россия на Дунае и образование Бессарабской области* [Russia on the Danube and the formation of Bessarabia]. Москва, 1913, с.203.

⁶⁹ Valentin Tomuleț, *Reflecții generale privind dezvoltarea social-economică a Basarabiei (1812-1868)* [General reflections on social and economic development of Bessarabia (1812-1868)]. In: „Cugetul”, 1992, nr. 2, p.11.

⁷⁰ *Русская старина*, Т.88, 1896, с.648.

⁷¹ М. И. Кутузов. *Сборник документов*. [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents], Том IV, Часть 1, (июль – октябрь 1812 г.). Москва, 1954, с.93.

⁷² *Собрание высочайших манифестов ...*, с. 40.

Transdanubian colonists in the Romanian territories occupied by the Russians. In order to create favourable conditions the Transdanubian colonists were removed from the jurisdiction of Divans. A Ward Committee was created for their administration, led by the colonists' curator - A. Koronelli – the state counsellor.⁷³ According to Kutuzov's disposal of April 26, 1811, Transdanubian colonists have been freed from any type of labour conscriptions and taxes for three years “with possibility of extension by few years.”⁷⁴

On July 16, 1811 Kutuzov requested the support of Metropolitan Gavriil with regard to the exemption of the colonists established on the monastic lands from the Tithe, for the benefit of the owners. These quantities of grain were expected to accumulate in a reserve fund to help the poor colonists managed by A. Koronelli⁷⁵ who was characterized by the General Langeron as: “the worst from the miserable and disgraceful persons of this dead ends”.⁷⁶ In March 1812, more than 20 000 families have profited from the conditions created and have established their residence on the left shore of the Danube.⁷⁷

One of the tasks set to Kutuzov as the commander in chief of Moldovan Army was the speedy conclusion of peace with Turkey. But, as noted later in the court of Petersburg, he did not show enough interest to achieve this task. Besides his proverbial inactivity, Kutuzov was in no hurry to conclude the peace because he feared being removed from the army command.⁷⁸ On April 18, 1812 Kutuzov wrote to his wife: “If thank God I will sign for peace, I fear that I will not be allowed to St. Petersburg. Finally, it seems I'll have nothing to do in the army. Thank God the posts are filled by worthy people. All will be done only if there will be peace with Turks...”⁷⁹

As the war against Napoleon was imminent, Alexander requested insistently Kutuzov to speedily conclude the peace with Turkey. The case of ex-ambitions on the principalities was not mentioned. Thus, in his rescript on March 22, 1812 to M. I. Kutuzov, Tsar Alexander I insisted on concluding the peace with Turkey as soon as possible: “You will do a great service to Russia concluding a speedy

⁷³ *Устройство задунайских переселенцев в Бессарабии и деятельность А. П. Юшневского*. [Device of Transdanubian settlers in Bessarabia and activity of A. P. Yushnevskov] *Сборник документов*. Кишинев, 1957, с.4-5, 18-19.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p.1-2.

⁷⁵ *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III (1808–1812). Москва, 1952, с.500.

⁷⁶ *Memoriile contelui Langeron ...*, p.382.

⁷⁷ *Устройство задунайских переселенцев...* [Device of Transdanubian settlers in Bessarabia and activity of A.P.Yushnevskov], с. 37.

⁷⁸ *Из записок графини Эдлинг, урожденной Стурдза* [From the notes of the Countess Edling, born as Sturdza] (писано в 1829 г.). In: „Русский Архив”, 1887 г., т. I., с. 209.

⁷⁹ *М. И. Кутузов. Письма. Заметки* [M. I. Kutuzov. Letter and notes]. М.: Воениздат, 1989, с.285.

peace with Porte. I beg you, as a manifestation of love for the motherland to pay attention and put your efforts into this goal. You will have eternal glory. There is no time to lose in this situation. Give up secondary activities, and with the clairvoyance which characterizes you, assume this important work.” Alexander I allowed Kutuzov to accept his own responsibility as an exception, the setting of the border on the Prut River only if the Ottoman Empire would agree to sign a treaty of alliance with Russia.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, the court's dissatisfaction on M. I. Kutuzov work had increased because the matters did not advance in the direction desired by Tsar. This is confirmed by Langeron who wrote in his memoirs: “On December the negotiations did not advance. Petersburg was not content. There has already been a talk of Kutuzov’s recall. His wife sent him the rumours and advised him to establish peace before arrival of his successor. She did not know the successor but there was a talk in Petersburg that Ciceagov will be.”⁸¹ The rumours about his dismissal made Kutuzov more active and he seriously began to negotiate with the Turks. As reported by Lanjeron, Kutuzov summoned him in one of the days, at 7.00 o’clock but usually he is available at 10.00 - 11.00 o’clock and Kutuzov spoke to him “of what he was instructed to do, and what he has not yet succeeded to do and he will lose his reputation and glory if he did not sign this peace”.⁸²

Alexander I, in a discussion with Admiral P. V. Ciceagov, assessed this situation as follows: “... our peace with Turkey does not advance; instead of advancing it seems to be going back. The excesses of our troops in Moldova and the Romanian Country have exasperated the inhabitants; the negligence and the intrigue prevail here. Besides, I do not think that the current commander (General Kutuzov), the author of this situation, is able to do something that would require energy, goodwill and rapidity in execution.”⁸³

F. V. Rostopcin wrote in his memoirs: “There is no doubt that the peace could have been done earlier, but Kutuzov, being convinced that after the peace he will be removed from command of the army and ignoring received orders, has considered that best for him would be to delay the talks, but when he found out that Ciceagov has been appointed in his place, he did not want to give him the honor of ending the war and he concluded the peace in three days.”⁸⁴

Alexander's impatience and the harsh words against M. I. Kutuzov, who

⁸⁰ *Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов* [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents]. Москва, 1947, с.136-137.

⁸¹ *Memoriile contelui Langeron ...*, p.365.

⁸² *Ibidem*, p.366.

⁸³ *Călători străini despre Țările Române...*, p.536; *Из записок адмирала Чичагова* [From the notes of Admiral Chichagov]. In: „Русский Архив”, № 8-9, 1870, с. 1522-1523.

⁸⁴ *Ф. В. Ростопчин, Записки о 1812 годе* [Notes about the 1812 year]. In: „Русская старина”, 1889, № 12, с.665.

delayed unreasonably negotiations with the Turks conformable to the imperial court's opinions, were justified from the perspective of the Napoleonic invasion. In this situation, Alexander decided to replace M. I. Kutuzov by the Admiral P. V. Ciceagov who was appointed as the supreme commander of Danube Army, of the Black Sea fleet and general governor of Moldova and the Romanian Country. Sending P. V. Ciceagov to replace M. I. Kutuzov, the Tsar handed him two rescripts: one of April the 5th – if the peace treaty was not signed, by which M. I. Kutuzov was recalled to St. Petersburg as a member of the State Council and another from April the 9th – if the treaty has already been signed M. I. Kutuzov was invited to the capital to be awarded for his merits.⁸⁵ On May 6, 1812 P. V. Ciceagov arrived in Bucharest and found out that Kutuzov had signed preliminary documents of peace treaty the day before on May 5, he handed him the rescript dated on April 9, P. V. Ciceagov delayed only one day.

I mention that 1812 was the year of Kutuzov's glory. Alexander I presented to M. I. Kutuzov his portrait adorned with diamonds⁸⁶ for the successful end of the Rusciuc operation; on October 29, 1811 he was granted the title of Count for “successes in the war against the Turks”,⁸⁷ and on July 29 1812, he received honorary title of Kniaz (Prince) for “contribution to the end of war and Peace Treaty with the Ottoman Empire.”⁸⁸ For the battle near Borodino, Alexander I gave to Kutuzov the rank of general-field marshal on August 31, 1812,⁸⁹ and for the Battle of Smolensk - the title of “Smolensk” (Титул Смоленского) on December 6, 1812.⁹⁰ In a year M. I. Kutuzov has received different titles of nobility, functions and military ranks as have never been offered in the previous 67 years.

It seems that by granting titles of nobility and supreme military rank, Alexander I demonstrated that he gave up the antipathy towards M. I. Kutuzov. But there is a hint: both Ukases (decree) on giving titles of nobility had the following statement: “and to his heirs”, knowing the fact that Kutuzov had only daughters⁹¹ and

⁸⁵ *Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов* [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents]. Москва, 1947, с.138-139; *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III (1808–1812). Москва, 1952, с. 867.

⁸⁶ *Исторические записки о жизни и воинских подвигах князя М. Л. Голенищева-Кутузова-Смоленского* [Historical notes about the life and military deeds of Prince M. L. Golenischev-Kutuzov-Smolensky]. Санктпетербург, 1813, с.103.

⁸⁷ *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III (1808–1812). Москва, 1952, р.694.

⁸⁸ *Собрание высочайших манифестов ...*, с.24.

⁸⁹ *М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов* [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том IV, Часть 1, (июль – октябрь 1812 г.). Москва, 1954, с.193.

⁹⁰ *Собрание высочайших манифестов ...*, с. 90.

⁹¹ Kutuzov had six children: five daughters and a son who died in the first year of life due to smallpox (November, 1790). See: А. В. Шишов, *Кутузов*. М.: Вече, 2012, с.86.

could not transmit the nobility title.

General Kutuzov, who succeeded through deceptions and guiles, to end the long Russo-Turkish war on favourable terms for Russia, but with serious consequences for the Romanian countries, must not be excessively glorified. For the Romanians, Kutuzov was nothing more than the supreme commander of the Russian army of occupation who ruthlessly robbed the Romanian principalities and contributed to the dismemberment of Moldova.

ROMANIA ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND PLANNING AGENDA OF BRITAIN AND U.S.A. DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1940-1944)

Dan Dragoș Sichigea

Ovidius University Constanța
dragos_sichigea@yahoo.com

Rezumat: România pe agenda diplomatică și de planificare a Marii Britanii și SUA pe parcursul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial (1940-1944)

Cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial a fost probabil cel mai important eveniment care a marcat lumea în secolul anterior. Fără îndoială el a condus la o schimbare a felului în care analizăm și interpretăm relațiile internaționale deoarece a adus în discuție un nou statut de forță la nivel global: superputerea. Încă din timpul războiului a devenit evident faptul că noua lume de la sfârșitul conflictului va fi dominată de către S.U.A și de către Uniunea Sovietică. În ceea ce privește subiectul de față – România și relațiile ei cu Vestul, apropierea geografică de Rusia a rămas un factor determinant. Modul în care Marea Britanie și partenerul ei evident mai puternic, S.U.A., vedeau România în perioada tulbură a războiului era puternic influențată de U.R.S.S. Acest adevăr a rămas neschimbat în ciuda existenței unor elemente care ar sugera contrariul. Britanicii, în mod special, au început să considere România ca un potențial câmp de luptă și nu au ignorat importanța ei strategică atunci când au declanșat procedurile de planificare postbelică. Această lucrare are ca scop analizarea locului ocupat de către România în calculele și planurile aliate, mai ales cele care includeau o imagine mai largă care să cuprindă și Uniunea Sovietică.

Abstract: *The Second World War was arguably the most important event that shaped the world in the last century. Without a doubt it marked a significant change in the way we see and interpret international relations because it brought into question a new word a status of strength: the superpowers. Even during the war it became apparent that the new world emerging from the conflict will be dominated by the U.S.A and the Soviet Union. For the subject at hand here – Romania and its relations with the West at the time, Russian vicinity is a very determining factor. The way Britain and its bigger partner, the U.S. viewed Romania during those troubled years was unquestionably altered by Russian influence. This fact remained unchanged, even though there were some elements that may suggest otherwise. Especially the British started to think of Romania as a future battlefield and didn't ignore its strategic importance when they started postwar planning procedures. This paper focuses on the place occupied by Romania in the Allied plans and predictions, especially in the bigger of picture, which included the Soviet Union.*

Résumé: *La Roumanie sur la diplomatie agenda et planification de la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (1940-1944)*

La Deuxième Guerre mondiale a été sans doute l'événement le plus important qui a façonné le monde dans le siècle dernier. Sans doute, il a marqué un changement important dans la façon dont nous voyons et interprétons les relations internationales, parce qu'il met en question un nouveau mot, un statut de force: les superpuissances. Même pendant la guerre, il est devenu évident que le nouveau monde en émergence de ce conflit sera dominée par les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Pour le sujet en question - la Roumanie et ses relations avec l'Occident, la proximité de Russie est un facteur très déterminant. La façon dont la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis vu la Roumanie, au cours de ces années troublées, a été incontestablement altéré par l'influence russe. Ce fait resté inchangé, bien qu'il y eût certains éléments qui peuvent suggérer le contraire. En particulier, le Royaume-Uni a commencé à penser de la Roumanie comme un futur champ de bataille. Et ne pas ignorer son importance stratégique quand ils ont commencé les procédures de planification de l'après-guerre. Ce document se concentre sur la place occupée par la Roumanie dans cette plans et les prévisions connexes, plans qui comprenaient l'Union soviétique aussi.

Keywords: *postwar, diplomacy, strategic, Romania, Great Britain, United States, influence.*

INTRODUCTION

After the unexpected fall of France in the summer of 1940, both London and Washington were forced to change their policies regarding Eastern Europe, which seemed likely to be the new sector where Germany will focus its attention. Indeed, the rapid surrender of France changed many plans including Stalin's. The Soviet dictator gambled on a prolonged conflict between the Western capitalist powers, which would allow him the much needed time to build up his armed forces. For Romania, the fall of its most important ally was close to a national disaster. The new Romanian leader, General Antonescu had assumed power after the catastrophic events in the summer of 1940, when Romania was forced to give in to the U.S.S.R., Hungary and Bulgaria significant parts of its territory. Antonescu was first mentioned as a potential candidate for power during these same negotiations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian foreign minister made it clear to the American diplomats that Antonescu was tied to Germany and was expected to follow it in the near future. Consequently, the American minister in Bucharest, Franklin Mott Gunther, transmitted similar information regarding Antonescu's trust relations with high ranking Reich officials. However, Gunther believed that the general was mistaken if he put too much trust into the German territorial guarantees¹. Therefore, after the announcement of the

¹ *The Minister in Romania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State, Bucharest, November 1, 1940,*

founding of the new national-legionary state and Romania's adherence to the Axis, its relations with the U.S. declined significantly. They will culminate with the announcement of the state of war between the two countries one year later. Romania's diplomatic relations with Britain followed a similar pattern, but with a more dramatic curve towards open conflict. Under Antonescu Romania was forced to take much more radical steps against Britain since it was fighting a war with Romania's ally, Germany. They will climax with the withdrawal of the British mission in Romania. One important crisis occurred at the end of September 1940, soon after Antonescu assumed power. Britain accused Romania of kidnapping and hurting British citizens under the claim they were secrets agents. British foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, protested vehemently against these abuses and warned Radu Florescu, the Romanian charge in London, that if these acts of abuse continued, the British Government will have to assume they are made with the approval of the Romanian government².

A CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE

Until the launch of *Operation Barbarossa* – the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany and its allies, Romania's relations with the U.S. and Britain were almost on the same coordinates. During a statement by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs from the House of Representatives on January 15, 1941, the American official made a resume of his country's diplomatic efforts to avert war in the last couple of years. He supported *Lend-Lease* as an integrant part of American security policy and furthermore, he made a presentation of Germany and Italy aggressive acts that had lead to war. What is more significant, Hull made some remarks on Romania:

"[...] The period of the war has witnessed the invasion and occupation of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, in violation of the scrupulously observed neutrality of these countries and in contravention, in the cases of some of these countries, of assurances expressly given by Germany of her intention to respect their independence and sovereignty; the invasion and partial occupation of France; the splitting up of Rumania and the German occupation of the remaining portion of that country [...]"³.

in *Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers* (further will be quoted *FRUS*) 1940, vol. I, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 525.

² Gheorghe Buzatu, *România și Marile Puteri: 1939-1947* [Romania and the Great Powers: 1939-1947], Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 334.

³ *Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, January 15, 1941*, in *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy*,

If we take into account the reports sent by the American mission in Bucharest we can safely assume that, as far as the Department of State was concerned, Romania was now clearly in the German sphere of influence. This was proven by her adherence to the Axis, as well as by the entrance of German occupying forces into the country. Gunther informed Washington that Romania was negotiating with Germany and Italy for military assistance and training, and that meant the presence of Axis (German) forces in Romania. Rumours begin to circulate in the diplomatic circles that German air and land instructors were entering Romania in October 1940. They were housed around Bucharest and some other strategic areas:

“[...] the Rumanian General Staff and the German Military Attaché state categorically that no German troops or equipment have entered Rumania. The latter adds however that negotiations between the Rumanian, German and Italian Governments with a view to supplying Rumania with instructors and training cadres have been going on for some time and will probably be successfully concluded at an early date [...]”⁴.

As for Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill did not hesitate to announce his opinion that Romania was clearly on German side, even before it had adhered to the Axis. In a message to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he makes clear that he intends to take punitive actions against Romania:

“Now that the Roumanian Government is helping themselves to the property of British subjects, ought we not show the Roumanians that we shall use their frozen fund to compensate our people? I understand that about six weeks ago you blocked Roumanian assets in London. We have been treated odiously by these people”⁵. There were however some other British opinions on Romania, originating mainly from the Foreign Office. They tended to analyze Romania’s actions in the context of the much larger picture of Eastern Europe. For British interests Turkey played a significant role. But the Empire’s resources were dwindling and its options were limited, especially the military ones. Also, British prestige was at its lowest after Dunquerque. There was the ever growing prospect of Turkey falling into the arms of Germany, as did Romania in response to Soviet pressure. This made Britain examine her options in Eastern Europe in the early months of 1941. The press published a series of articles about Romania’s departure from the *Balkan Entente* and the dangers this move presented for the security of Turkey and consequently the Suez channel⁶. The

1931-1941 (further will be quoted Peace and War), Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, p. 615.

⁴ *FRUS*, 1940, vol. I, p. 519.

⁵ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. II, *Their finest hour*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1985, p. 574.

⁶ Nicholas Tamkin, *Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, 1940-45: Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean*, Londra, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, p. 33.

entrance of German troops into Romania was also a warning sign for London. Britain followed the standard policy in this case and declared that Romania was an occupied country. Hoare protested repeatedly against this seeming violation of Romania's neutrality and reported back to London the alarming numbers of German soldiers in the country. Considering this act as an obstruction of normal diplomatic activity in a neutral country, Hoare obtained permission from the Foreign Office to sever British relations with Romania. The British legation moved to Istanbul, but Hoare himself stayed in Bucharest a little longer. He conveyed with major Ratay, the American military attaché, and both of them concluded that German forces in Romania exceeded earlier numbers. Ratay even suggested that almost 10.000 German soldiers were entering Romania every day, which made the total German forces about 15 to 20 divisions strong⁷.

After that the Romanian government, at the request of Germany, restricted British and American diplomatic travels in the country and had their legacies under constant watch. Romanian citizens who were meeting with American or British diplomats were under surveillance. This made Hoare tell Antonescu that "his Majesty's Government decided to recall him" because "the Germans were using Romania as a military base"⁸. British interests in Romania would be represented by the American embassy. Romania retaliated to this action by withdrawing the Viorel Tilea led mission in London on February 23 1941. Romania also cancelled all of its oil shipments to Turkey, since they were sold to Britain⁹.

The Foreign Office and C.O.S.-the British Chiefs of Staff, both misinterpreted the build-up of German military forces in Romania. The arrival of Wehrmacht troops in Romania, which continued throughout the winter of 1940, was considered to be based on Germany's desire to have a strong presence in the area. British analysts also thought that these forces were meant to allow Germany leverage in the eventuality of talks with Turkey¹⁰. Even Churchill clearly states in his memoirs that in the autumn of 1940 London didn't have a clear picture of the Balkan area. British secret services could only detect a significant German build-up in this region¹¹. Germany's objectives, that is, her next target, could not be identified at that time. Coincidentally, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary made a quick working trip in the region at that time. This gave Adolf Hitler a reason for pause and a pretext for invading Greece in the spring of 1941. The entire British diplomatically construction in the Balkan area collapsed after that, although it is safe to say London didn't have great

⁷ Gheorghe Buzatu, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's forgotten ally: Ion Antonescu and his regime, Romania 1940-44*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 75.

¹⁰ Nicholas Tamkin, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

¹¹ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. II, p. 524.

expectation to begin with; it all came down to military strength and Britain didn't have resources except those committed in Greece. Although Under-Secretary Alexander Cadogan had expressed doubts that Yugoslavia and Greece would put up a fight¹², they actually opposed Hitler with arms, even if to no avail.

The concentration of German forces and equipment in Romania was also the focus of several diplomatic telegrams sent back to Washington by the American legation in Bucharest. Gunther made a very accurate assessment about the numbers of German soldiers in the country – roughly about 100.000. Yet, much like his British counterparts, he didn't see any long term goal for Germany's presence in Romania. He thought that the German policy was "purely opportunist, preventive and mandatory". He added that "Germany just wishes to be prepared for all contingencies". The similarity between his point of view and those of British diplomats is striking:

"[...] the great bulk of the German troops at both places have been sent – possibly amounting to over 25,000 – have been sent south to Giurgiu, Oltenita and other bridgeheads on the Danube where they face Bulgaria with pontoon and bridge equipment [...] It would therefore seem full pressure is mobilized to impress Filoff¹³ during his Vienna visit [...] Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are, however, in for a period of peaceful bullying and I wonder whether it is not time for a few words of direct encouragement. This however, to be effective should be backed with British assurance of real aid"¹⁴.

So although the Department of State was well informed of Romania's increasing diplomatic isolation and of the German penetration in the region, Gunther's efforts were rebuked by Washington. His conclusions were irrefutable – the new Romanian Prime-Minister, Ion Gigurtu will steer Romania towards Germany and the Axis; as for the Foreign Office, even official documents speak of the absence of any other choice for Romania given that Germany dominated Europe in the autumn of 1940:

"When called upon to form a government in September 1940, Antonescu made the King's abdication a condition, and having secured that, faced the task of governing the country in the face of a German menace of occupation with the people incensed at the loss of territory, with the new King only 18 years of age, and with the Iron Guard ready and anxious to make trouble ... As regards the German occupation, the only question was whether this should take place with or without consent. Although Antonescu had always been pro-British in sympathy, he decided that it would be better for the country not to be occupied by an openly hostile force. His

¹² Keith Neilson, T.G. Otte, *The permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs, 1854–1946*, New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 251.

¹³ President of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

¹⁴ *FRUS*, 1941, vol. I, p. 273.

decision has been severely criticized, but in view of the impossibility of obtaining help from the Allies, it is hard to see what else he could have done”¹⁵.

This alignment of Romania with Germany's new order in Europe was therefore, understood up to a point by Britain and by the U.S. At the same time events were on the rise again in Eastern Europe with the Fuhrer at their centre stage. His decision to attack the Soviet Union, *Operation Barbarossa*, altered the course of the war, and brought Romania furthermore under the scope of Washington and London based analysts. The main reason for it was that Romania was the largest contributor to the German war effort among her satellite allies. Antonescu was the only allied leader warned by Hitler of the impending onslaught unleashed on the Soviets.

At that point, the U.S. Minister in Bucharest was involved in a massive analysis for the Department of State and for the President with the aim of „clearing the fog” around the German military presence in Romania. It was clear that, since the German build-up of forces exceeded the needs of the campaign in the Balkans, Berlin had further goals in the area. Gunther made some predictions about the developments which we feel were interesting:

„[...] Inasmuch as war between Germany and Russia is being increasingly discussed in this part of the world I have endeavoured to analyze from this angle the chances for and against such a conflict [...] Russia is daily getting stronger militarily and economically and according to some good military opinion will be fairly well organized in 2 years [...] There is at work adroit pressure from General Antonescu and his Government to the end that Hitler should not play second fiddle to Stalin in Russian occupied Rumania or condone the latter's continued threats to the mouth of the Danube [...] It would seem that the balance tips in favour of an early war between Germany and Russia [...]”¹⁶.

Even after June 22 1941 Gunther had intensified his working meetings with contacts in the Romanian government, despite the fact that the U.S. had arranged war shipments for the Soviets. During his discussions with Mihai Antonescu, the new Romanian Foreign Minister, and with General Antonescu, Gunther was able to form a clearer picture of the front for his superiors in Washington. He did promise to M. Antonescu that the Romanian point of view would be made known to the Department of State and vice versa¹⁷. Gunther made significant efforts to change America's perception that Romania was an occupied country. This was even more pressing since

¹⁵PRO, FO 371/37379, document R5111, 10 June 1943. *Foreign Office Research Department Handbook, 'Constitution and Politics of Romania'*, 20 April 1943, Foreign and Press Service, Balliol College, Oxford, *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, directed by Arnold Toynbee, pp. 3–4, *apud* Dennis Deletant, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁶FRUS, 1941, vol. I, pp. 129–130.

¹⁷Gheorghe Buzatu, *op.cit.*, p. 337.

the U.S. had decided to freeze all Romanian assets, which made the Romanian charge in Washington to say that America was no longer neutral in the war¹⁸.

The invasion of the Soviet Union was a pivotal event for the way U.S.A. and Britain regarded Romania, now involved militarily as an ally of Germany in war. Churchill had warned in London in a radio cast on February 9 1941 that Germany had major interests in the Black Sea region now that it had managed to occupy Romania and Hungary¹⁹. British and American interest for Eastern Europe took a sharp increase after June 22 1941, when the Romanian Army helped liberate Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. British press noted through *The Times* that Romanians supported the campaign against the Soviet Union, although the alliance with Germany was more of a necessary evil²⁰. From his post in the capital of Romania, Gunther made similar remarks as he remembered a discussion with general Antonescu:

“[...] Nevertheless, it has always been my impression – one which has recently been confirmed by the General’s pro-German as well as his anti-British feelings are not dictated by sentiment but solely by what he considered to be national interests and date from Russia’s incursion into Rumania and the collapse of France [...]”²¹.

The Romanian government however made significant efforts to persuade both Britain and U.S.A. that its participation in the war against the Soviets was the just thing to do. Through discussions with opposition members – Iuliu Maniu in particular – Gunther was able to understand and relay back home the difficult position in which Romania found itself. Alexandru Cretzianu notes that the American minister “did everything humanly possible to achieve some measure of understanding so that America would not think of us as German partners”²². Gunther pressed further by asking the Department of State to issue a statement in which it would express sympathy for the war of freedom these small states – Romania and Finland – were forced to fight against the U.S.S.R. He noted his sorrow that the Romanian people thought America was on the side of the Soviets. For that same reason he believed it was necessary that the U.S. clarify its position regarding this conflict²³.

On July 25 1941, the Department of State declined Gunther’s requests and reminded him of Undersecretary Sumner Welles’ statement a day after Germany attacked Russia. In it was the only position the U.S. government would take for the time being. America’s view of the war in Europe was well detailed:

“[...] But the immediate issue that presents itself to the people of the United States is whether the plan for universal conquest, for the cruel and brutal enslavement

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Alexandru Cretzianu, *Ocazia pierdută* [Missed Occasion], Iași, Institutul European, 1998, p. 87.

²⁰ Dennis Deletant, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

²¹ *FRUS*, 1941, vol. I, p. 291.

²² Alexandru Cretzianu, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

²³ *Ibidem*.

of all peoples, and for the ultimate destruction of the remaining free democracies, which Hitler is now desperately trying to carry out, is to be successfully halted and defeated [...] the opinion of this Government, consequently, any defence against Hitlerism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defence and security. Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas"²⁴. Unfortunately for the future of mutual relations, this meant that the Department of State remained rigid regarding Romania. Still, the Americans were willing to wait some time before taking more drastic measures. There is proof for that in the fact that the U.S. didn't reply immediately to Romania's declaration of war. Instead there was hope in Washington that ignoring this declaration will not inflate the situation and will allow time for the opposition in Bucharest to remove Romania from the Axis. For the moment the Department of State choose to maintain relations and, more significantly, promised via Gunther that if the American government should at some point consider important to change its position, it would take into consideration Romania and Finland²⁵.

One important person that worked to ensure Romania and the Saxon powers are maintaining close relations was Mihai Antonescu. The Foreign Minister was keen American and British officials know the Romanian side of the story concerning military operations against the Soviet Union. Immediately after Romanian troops liberated Bessarabia and proceeded to the siege of Odessa, he sent instructions so that the Romanian legation in Washington could explain with clarity the objectives that Romania pursues beyond the Dniester. At that time it was understood that it would limit its participation at a defensive posture along the banks of that river²⁶. The Department of State was to be informed that Romania's only goal in the war was the retrieval of the robbed territories in 1940. Any incursion beyond the river was purely military motivated²⁷. Here was an attempt by the Romanian government to convince America that crossing the Dniester was a military decision and was no based on any desire of territorial expansion.

On the 1st of July 1941, Iuliu Maniu, head of National Peasants' Party, had a talk with Gunther. The Romanian politician expressed his concerns over the crossing of the Dniester and informed the American diplomat that he had asked Antonescu to withdraw the troops back to the river, even though he wasn't sure Hitler would allow such a daring move. For Gunther though the main issue was the diminishing sympathy of the Romanian people for American and for Britain. The cause of this, he

²⁴ *Statement by the Acting Secretary of State (Welles) at a Press Conference*, iunie 23, 1941, in *Peace and War*, pp. 683-684.

²⁵ Alexandru Cretzianu, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 92.

²⁷ Dennis Deletant, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

felt, was the unwavering support these countries had shown to the cause of the Soviets, with which Romania was at war. Most of the Romanians were hoping for an Allied victory, but not a Soviet one. It was puzzling for them as to why the U.S. was backing the U.S.S.R. and there was cause for concern about the treatment in store for Romania at the future peace conference²⁸.

We can conclude that even though the official position the U.S. and British governments was quite reserved on the matter of Romania's participation on the war with the Soviet Union, the media from these countries had already labelled Romania as an enemy state. The Romanian politicians made significant efforts to prevent this, but to no avail. For the U.S. in particular, the fact that Romania had given in to Germany's demands so easily, with no fight, was a tale tell sign and made quite a terrible impression for the common American, especially when Finland or Yugoslavia tried heroically to stave the German onslaught²⁹.

The German attack of the U.S.S.R. had the immediate effect of alleviating the position of Britain in the war. At a time when the military situation seemed desperate, the news from Russia was welcomed at London. Still, this attack came as a surprise for Britain, as for the entire world. Even though British intelligence was aware of the „concentration of important German forces in Eastern Europe”, an attack on Russia was „too good to be true”.³⁰ From conversations at the Foreign Office and the Army we know that all of these institutions harboured a natural distrust of Russia's goals and plans. The Chiefs of Staff noted that the best course of action was to avoid any official understanding with the Soviet Union regarding territorial changes until after the conclusion of the war³¹. Yet almost immediately after the German attack, Churchill open a channel of communication with the Soviet dictator, Josef Stalin, which would go on for the whole war. It was necessary to harmonize the relations and put together the military plans if Nazi Germany was to be defeated. Through this personal channel of communication Stalin made his partner aware that the Soviet Union desired a clarification of both partners' intentions in the war. In his telegram on September 3 1941 Stalin clearly states that the balance of forces on the front was broken because Germany had aid from Romania. Because of this the U.S.S.R. was forced to evacuate Western Ukraine³². Consequently, to the increasing demands of

²⁸ *FRUS*, 1941, vol. I, p. 322.

²⁹ Dennis Deletant, *op.cit.*, p. 84.

³⁰ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. III, p. 317.

³¹ Geoffrey Warner, *From ally to enemy: Britain's relation with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948*, in Michael Dockkrill, Brian McKercher (eds.), *Diplomacy and world power: studies in British foreign policy, 1890 – 1950*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 222.

³² *Personal message from Premier Stalin to the Prime-Minister, Mr. Churchill*, 3 septembrie 1941, in *Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain durin the Great*

materials and war equipment he soon added the additional request that Britain and the Soviet Union should reach an arrangement regarding territorial clauses *during the war*, as opposed to after it. He also wanted that Britain would immediately declare war on Romania and Finland. As Churchill notes in his great book, these requests mark one of the toughest chapters in British-Soviet negotiations during the war.

The fate of Romania in the context of British-Soviet talks (soon the U.S. would join them too) rested on Moscow's ability to convince its partners of the necessity to declare war on Germany's minor partners. British and American plans and projections had to navigate Stalin's increasingly bigger plans for Eastern Europe. London and Washington had to find a way to balance the Soviet Union's fair desire for security and the fears that it may overrun the whole region. During these negotiations, Romania played a central part. As 1941 was closing, Soviet Russia's pressure on its partners increased dramatically and was two-folded: the recognition of the borders as they stood in 1940, and the declaration of war on Romania. Those were Stalin's main concerns regarding Romania.

THE SOVIET FACTOR BECOMES DOMINANT

Until August 3, 1941, Romania benefited from U.S. and British sympathy. Its struggle with the Soviets was seen as a just fight to take back its territories. Romanian diplomacy managed on some levels to present this position with moderate success. Hull had shown sympathy towards the retrieval of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. As for Churchill, he had clearly stated that the annexations of 1940 were made by force. Britain could not applaud Romania's contribution on the Nazi war effort, but it would not condemn it either. After August 3, however, the situation was modified. The Foreign Office protested immediately after Romanian troops had passed the Dniester. The Romanian Army was conducting military operations deep into Soviet territory and Britain had no choice but to criticize this act. Because of this and of increasing Russian pressure, Britain began to back down on its issue of the war declaration³³.

When the British and the American missions led by Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman respectively, began talks with the Soviets, Stalin showed his interest for a declaration of common goals in the war. He did not believe that the *Atlantic Charter* held all that Britain and America hoped to achieve. For the U.S.S.R. the Charter was vague and didn't touch important subjects such as war reparations. Beaverbrook even had the feeling that Stalin wanted to turn the war-limited agreement into a full-fledged alliance that would satisfy the long-term objectives of

Patriotic War (further will be quoted Correspondence), 2nd edition, vol. I, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 28.

³³ Dennis Deletant, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

both Soviet Russia and Great Britain³⁴. What Stalin basically wanted was: 1) Britain to declare war on Finland and Romania; 2) the recognition of the borders prior to June 22 1941 – that meant that the Baltic States, Bessarabia, Eastern Poland would be given back to the U.S.S.R. Without these concessions he could not see a future for the alliance against Germany. Over the coming months his demands became increasingly fervent and he even went so far as to say that without them there could be no mutual trust between the Soviet Union and Britain. In his message for the British Prime-Minister on the 8th of November, Stalin noted that the Soviet demands had somehow reached the press and claimed that this could be used to weaken the Russian-British relations in the future³⁵. For the moment however, Churchill wasn't prepared to be forced in this matter. He believed that a war declaration would just silence those voices in Romania and Finland that opposed the war with Russia. In this matter he and the Americans were seeing "eye to eye". Still, he announced that, if these countries would not stop the support they are giving to the Nazi war effort by December 7, he would have to make the final step of declaring the state of war. Furthermore, he would send Anthony Eden to Moscow to discuss these issues with Stalin. For territorial matter however, the British government was quite clear: they would not be discussed until Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the U.S.A. would sit together at the "conference table as equal partners in the struggle against Nazism"³⁶.

Thus Antony Eden travelled to the Soviet capital convinced that his task was quite difficult. His prerogatives were limited and he was to sign no treaty that included territorial clauses. Yet he personally believed that a soviet victory in the war, as unlikely as it seemed at that time, would make Stalin want to impose his own borders in Eastern Europe. For that reason he had recommended to the War Cabined to reach a full agreement with the Soviets as early as possible so as to use it to limit communist expansion after the war. He would openly say a few months after, in February of 1942, that any German defeat in that year could only happen on the Eastern front; Britain, even with the help of the Americans, could not mount any significant invasion of Europe during that 1942. So any victory would be "strictly soviet", with all of "its implications". It was of the highest importance to "solve the differences and to sign a long-term deal with the Russians". That did not mean that Eden ignored his suspicions about the Soviet Union however. He simply thought that such a deal would "eliminate Russian pretexts, which are quite numerous at the moment"³⁷.

³⁴ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 24.

³⁵ *Personal Message from Premier Stalin to Prime-Minister Churchill*, 8 November, 1941, in *Correspondence*, p. 40.

³⁶ *Winston Churchill to J. V. Stalin*, 22 November, 1941, in *Ibidem*, p. 40.

³⁷ Geoffrey Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

Despite Churchill's hesitation in the matter, Eden was convinced of the necessity of this step so in the following weeks he worked to convince the other Cabinet members. Unexpectedly however, the Soviets increased their demands. They required that after the war Romania and Finland would sign a secret protocol that enabled the Red Army to build military bases on their territories. Officially this would be backed by a treaty of mutual friendship and cooperation. Even Oliver Harvey, who worked with Cadogan at the Secretary of the Foreign Office, and who was an ardent believer in the cooperation with the Soviets, opposed this latest demand. When Molotov arrived the next spring in London to sign the treaty, Harvey will state that such a demand would mean in practice handing those countries to Moscow. He recalled that the Baltic States suffered a similar fate after signing such treaties in 1940³⁸. But the real opponent was Cadogan. As his colleague, Orme Sargeant, he wanted to build a common front with Turkey and Russia together, Britain acting as a mediator. Unlike the British ambassador in Russia, Sir Stafford Cripps, Cadogan wasn't too sympathetic towards Russian needs and interests however. He saw the Balkan area as just secondary theatre where British agents would create problems and distractions for the Germans. If there were war between Britain and these countries, those agents would have a hard time accomplishing their tasks³⁹. In this matter he had the support of Churchill. They both wanted to delay the territorial issue until the end, unlike Eden, who as Cadogan said, "was ready to throw all principles to the wind", which would upset the Americans⁴⁰. On the other hand, Churchill did not want to alienate the Soviets. The fear that Stalin would sign a separate peace treaty with Hitler stayed with him for years.

Yet the British Prime-Minister had other concerns on his mind at that time; during the crucial week of 20-27 of December 1941 there was the final attempt on behalf of the American government to find a peaceful resolution on its conflict with Japan. These last propositions were quite hard and Churchill was aware that Japan was likely to reject them. We have no real evidence to support that Churchill openly said that war was imminent, but he must have thought it. He could suspect that America would join the war on Nazi Germany and that would spare him of any commitment with the Soviets. This is one reason why he delayed the talks with Stalin and he carefully avoided any agreement. Eden's instructions for the Moscow trip were handed to him only on December 4 1941 and Churchill was careful to say to the American ambassador, Winant, that Eden's only task was to discuss common plans in the war. Eden had no prerogatives to sign any territorial treaty and he would have to convince Stalin to uphold the Atlantic Charter and its principles. The only discussion

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ Keith Neilson, T. G. Otte, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 250.

on the future of Europe he was authorized to carry was that of disarming Germany and the possibility that small states would form federations⁴¹.

By the time Eden had his first round of negotiations with Stalin and Molotov on December 16 1941, the global situation was very much different; the German offensive on Moscow had been halted and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor meant that Germany had to face the might of the U.S.A. in the near future. As so, even though Eden had to give the soviets the bad news about the suspending of shipments in the near future, Stalin had his own concerns. He needed to get the British to sign an alliance with clear territorial clauses and he needed it very soon before the American contribution to the war effort would outweigh his. But Eden was unmovable; he wouldn't sign the proposed document and all the basis he had to offer was the postponement of territorial talks until the end of the conflict with the Axis⁴².

On his side, Churchill did discuss these events with American president, Franklin Roosevelt, during the *Arcadia Conference*, in January 1942. Both agreed that territorial discussions would nullify the Charter and its moral standards; the U.S. media would strongly oppose it⁴³. Yet some members of the British Cabinet were making strong demands for the appeasement of the Soviets. Halifax, now the British ambassador in the U.S. discussed this with Sumner Welles soon after taking office. All that he obtained was the promise that the American ambassador in Moscow, William H. Standley, would open negotiations with the Soviet Union. Personally, Roosevelt was convinced that Stalin didn't trust the British because they "didn't live up to their promises"⁴⁴; he was sure he could appease the Soviets without giving in on the issue of territorial discussions.

On the British side however Churchill was beginning to lose the battle with the Foreign Office. The War Cabinet members as well were convinced that the cooperation, both during and after the war, between Britain and Soviet Russia depended on the issue of mutual trust and security. They recommended reaching a compromise on the issue of the borders. If not, at least agree the idea of Soviet military bases in Finland and Romania⁴⁵. Eventually Britain would agree to an alliance treaty that recognized the Soviet borders of June 22 1941, with the exception of the one with Poland⁴⁶.

⁴¹ Herbert Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴² Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Londra, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962, p. 192.

⁴³ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 337.

⁴⁴ Susan Butler, *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2005, p. 63.

⁴⁵ Robert Dallek, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

⁴⁶ Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

As for the war declaration, the matter was resolved with significant speed. Earlier that year Britain had issued an ultimatum to Finland, Hungary and Romania to withdraw their troops and support for the Wehrmacht. In the case of Romania, the document was sent through the American Minister, Gunther, since Britain had broken relations. Romania did not respond in time and so the following message was issued by the Foreign Office on the 6th of December 1941:

“On 29 November, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom sent the Romanian Government through the US minister a message according to which if, by 5 December, the Romanian Government did not cease military operations and did not withdraw effectively from any active participation in the hostilities against the USSR, His Majesty’s Government would have no option than to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries. Since the Romanian Government has not responded to this message and since, according to the information available to His Majesty’s Government there is no indication that the Romanian Government intends to accept the conditions mentioned above, a state of war will exist between the two countries from 12.01 Greenwich Mean Time on 7 December⁴⁷”.

Romanian-American diplomatic relations seemed to follow a similar direction with the one exception: the U.S. did not declare war immediately. Between June 22 1941-2nd of June 1942 Gunther tried to play a significant role in the Romanian political life despite the fact that his position was rapidly deteriorating. He maintained contacts with opposition leaders, especially Iuliu Maniu. But, as a further proof that Washington was contemplating more decisive actions, he was soon instructed to gather information on Romanian oil equipment, which would be sent to London⁴⁸. The U.S. was subordinating relations with Romania to the more important issue: helping the British war effort.

In the first half of 1942 Romania had to engage more troops on the Eastern Front. Germany had suffered huge losses in the previous winter at Moscow and the Russian counteroffensive even threatened to tear the line apart. As a consequence, for the next offensive in the summer on 1942 the German High Command (O.K.H.) required the participation of greater allied forces. That was especially true in the south, where the main thrust would take place. For the attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus Germany demanded the commitment of numerous Romanian divisions⁴⁹. By the time the American field agents and diplomats identified these new Romanian

⁴⁷ ANIC, *Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Trial of Ion Antonescu, file 40010, vol. 8, p. 100, apud Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 91.*

⁴⁸ Paul D. Quinlan, *Ciocnirea deasupra României: Politica anglo-americană față de România, 1938-1947* [Clash over Romania: Anglo-American policy towards Romania, 1938-1947], translated from English to Romanian by Gheorghe Onișoru, Iași, Fundația Culturală Română, 1995, p. 72.

⁴⁹ Basil Lidell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, London, Casell & Company, 1970, p. 247.

forces Romania had taken the step of declaring open war, alongside of Hungary in December 1942. It was a decision taken because of increasing German pressure, of course. Marshall Antonescu did not consider the U.S. an enemy; when the American charge, Webb Benton came to say goodbye to his friend Mihai Antonescu, the Romanian Foreign Minister made a remarkable statement by saying that “Romania will commit no aggression against the United States”⁵⁰. The American response didn’t arrive immediately. The U.S. would declare war on Romania and the other German minor allies on the 2nd of June 1942.

ROMANIA AND THE LOCATION THE “SECOND FRONT”

Relations in the Allied camp were even from the onset affected in some way or another by the issue of the “second front”. The idea was to support the Red Army by opening a second front against the Germans, but where and when? It had to be somewhere in Western Europe, of course and it had to be an amphibious operation. In the beginning it seemed that there was a chance for a common position between American and British planers. At least as 1942 was concerned, it was imperative to draw German forces away from Russia, especially, after in the spring, their offensive was picking momentum. At that time, and this is true for 1943 as well, Stalin didn’t have any preferences; Any landing would suit him just fine as long as it accomplished the goal of forcing the Germans to relocate some of their divisions away from the Eastern Front. Roosevelt proved to be a fervent supporter for a landing as soon as possible to avoid the unsettling prospect of a separate German-soviet peace treaty. America had to make a move in 1942 to claim participation at the peace conference since at that time Britain and particularly Soviet Russia were carrying the war for the Allies. The first real talk about the second front took place with Molotov, during his visit in Washington in May 1942. Roosevelt took the opportunity to assure the Soviet Foreign Deputy that he intends to open a second front later that year. More so, in the common statement it is specified that the operation will be directed against Europe, even though the President was aware that the British side wanted to invade Axis North Africa⁵¹.

In fact for the first two year of cooperation, the U.S. War Department officials insisted on their British counterparts for an early attack against “fortress Europe”. For the American side the Soviets were bearing the brunt of the German war machine and they had to be helped soon or else Stalin would admit a peace with Hitler. So in 1942-1943 American planning services emphasized the need to support the Soviet war effort and the main way of doing that was to cross the English Channel as soon as possible⁵². But the British side had its own plans and from the beginning we have the

⁵⁰ Alexandru Cretzianu, *op.cit.*, p. 93.

⁵¹ Wilfried Loth, *The Division of the World, 1941-1955*, London, Routledge, 1988, p. 60.

⁵² Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and*

so-called “the Great Strategic Debate”: the C.C.S. (Combined Chiefs of State) was witness to some strong arguments about where and when to attack the Germans. The British, Churchill most of all, wanted a flexible approach and an offensive against the enemy’s weakest link – Italy and the Mediterranean and then the Balkans. The American Chiefs of Staff, with George Marshall at their lead, supported a crushing blow in Northern France as soon as possible. At their very first meeting in Washington in the winter of 1941, Churchill scored an important victory over his friend, Roosevelt: in the common statement of the meeting we find the location of the next Allied target, North Africa:

“[...] In 1942, the methods of wearing down Germany’s resistance will be[...] ever increasing air bombardment by British and American forces [...] assistance to Russia’s offensive by all available means [...] (and operations) the main object (of which) will be gaining possession of the whole Northern African coast [...] It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany, except on the Russian front, will be possible [...] (but) in 1943, the way may be clear for a return to the continent across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe [...]”⁵³.

The fact that Churchill managed to squeeze in the Balkans as a potential new front for the Allies was an important accomplishment for him. This proved that, at least in the beginning, the British had the upper hand in this dispute thanks to their superior logistics and their greater experience. Later on however, this would change dramatically. Still, for the moment Roosevelt didn’t give up on the idea of helping Soviet Russia by means of a direct attack on “fortress Europe” that same year. Through two long telegrams to Churchill on March 7 and 9 he formulated his strategy:

“[...] I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of this new front this summer, certainly for air and raids [...] And even if though losses will doubtless be great, such losses will be compensated by at least equal German losses and by compelling (the) Germans to divert large forces of all kinds from Russian fronts”⁵⁴.

Churchill resisted these advances and there were no Allied landings in France in 1942. But there was a moderate success in Tunisia and although the Axis forces there would be removed only after 6 months, in the spring of 1943, this meant that the Allied airpower could now hit Italy and Central Europe. But even as the German forces were still in Tunisia, in December 1942 the dispute was reheated. General Alan Brooke insisted that the Allies should continue on the “Mediterranean” path and

the U.S. strategy in World War II, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 123.7

⁵³ Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, p. 9, *apud* Herbert Feis, *op.cit.*, pp 47-48.

⁵⁴ Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, Manfred Jonas (eds.), *Roosevelt and Churchill, Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, New York, E. P. Dutton&Co., Inc., 1975, pp. 184-190, *apud* Robert Dallek, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

should attack Italy in the summer. He thought that the conditions for an invasion of France were not met. It was necessary that the Germans suffer a series of crippling blows to soften their potential. On the other hand, Italy was vulnerable, both military and politically. A bombing campaign would sap its morale and a beachhead there would bring Allied bombers in range of Ploiesti, where the Axis oil reserves rested. Furthermore, with Italy eliminated, the Allies could attack the shipments in the Aegean and cut Germany's chrome supplies from Turkey⁵⁵.

After the defeat and the expulsion of the Axis forces in Northern Africa, the third Washington Conference, codename *Trident*, was held. The same Brooke continued to plea for taking the offensive into Sicily and then mainland Italy. Beyond the obvious gains – taking Italy out of the war, this course of action would enable the now huge Allied Air Force to engage Romanian oil targets with increased efficiency⁵⁶. *Trident*, which started on May 11 1943, masked for some time the decreasing influence the British had on Allied affairs. The decision was made to continue down the path wanted by Churchill and his staff: the next Allied target would be Italy. It seemed at first that this was a major British success⁵⁷. Yet again they managed to convince their partners of the justness of their reasoning. At a closer look we can see this was not the case; the whole of North Africa was indeed in Allied hands. This meant increased security for the shipping in the Atlantic and the losses during May 1943 were just 5% compared to March that same year. Overall the strategic initiative was firmly in Allied possession. Still the American build-up in Britain did not reach the intended parameters. In the Isles there were only 2 operational divisions. In Africa on the other hand, there were 9, plus 30 British ones. It was obvious that for the remainder of 1943 the Allies would have to act on the Mediterranean theatre of war, much to the disappointment of the Americans.

As for Romania, *Trident* marked the determination of the Allied commanders to bring the full might of the bombing campaign down on Ploiesti, the site of many of Romania's oil refineries. The decision to start this campaign as Admiral William D. Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief said, was part of a set of measures designed to soften the German resistance potential in preparation for *Overlord*, the landings in Normandy, which was set to take place in 1944⁵⁸.

After Italy fell, Churchill tried to convince the Americans that the best course of action was to prepare an expeditionary force for the Balkans. This time however Roosevelt declined with resolution. At the first Quebec Conference, codenamed

⁵⁵ Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945*, New York, Harper Collins, 2009, p. 303.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 367.

⁵⁷ Brian J. C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-Eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 324.

⁵⁸ Andrew Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

Quadrant, he was adamant that all of the Allied resources were to be poured into *Overlord*. By the end of this conference it became apparent that the balance of power in the Allied camp was shifting in favour of the Americans. The differences in the approach to war remained the key to understanding the relations between the two partners and at first the British were able to impose their views because they had the experience and the logistics. But by 1943 the increasingly greater U.S. financial and military contribution began to leave their mark. Britain had a long-standing military tradition stretching back to the Napoleonic age that was all about attrition warfare; the U.S. on the contrary, were still the adept of a Civil War style decisive hit to win the war in one blow. The fact that *Overlord* remained ironclad meant that America had the greater say in the alliance now⁵⁹.

Still, there were signs of cracks even in the American camp. By mid-1943 we can see some differences of opinion between the President and Marshall. Even before the meeting with Stalin in Teheran, Roosevelt told Marshall that the Soviets might accept cooperation in the Balkans if the Allies would commit enough troops there that the Germans would be forced to pull divisions away from Russia. Russian forces were just sixty miles away from the Polish border and just forty from Bessarabia so for Roosevelt the ideas seemed doable. Marshall however found it frightening; this was exactly what Churchill had been advocating for 2 years and he and the other American Chiefs of Staff had been fighting it all along. Marshall advised Roosevelt not to bring it up in Teheran since the British Prime-Minister would pick it up and present it to Stalin as a common Allied proposal⁶⁰. Which indeed happened; happily for Marshall, Stalin refused it bluntly – Eastern Europe would be liberated by the Red Army alone.

Some early conclusions are in order after this first round of Allied negotiations on the role of Eastern Europe in and after the war. Romania, and its neighbours for that matter, did not represent a priority for the U.S. or for Britain. Still, the British in particular could not ignore the fact that Romania was close to Turkey and Greece. So throughout 1942-1943 British diplomacy strived to ensure the existence of a “Balkan alternative” to *Overlord*. Although initially considered just a way of distracting the Germans away from Russia, this British proposal had bigger ambitions in store; it would turn into a full-fledged second front if the Americans would take the bait. They did not since American planners were suspicious of British interests to start with. The U.S. participation in the Second World War, they announced, was not to be in favour of British influence in Eastern Europe or anywhere. Marshall and his fellow Chiefs of Staff had no intention of bringing American troops in this little conflict of influence in

⁵⁹ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict, and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 1995, New York, Routledge, p. 77.

⁶⁰ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Sfere de influență-împărțirea Europei între Marile Puteri, de la Munchen la Ialta* [Spheres of Influence. The Partition of Europe, from Munich to Yalta], translated from English to Romanian by Anca Angelescu-Boldor, Bucharest, Editura Elit, 1995, p. 222.

Eastern Mediterranean between the British and the Soviets. It had a long standing history stretching back to the tsar area and the Americans wanted nothing to do with it⁶¹.

POSTBELIC PLANNING

American planners started to analyze U.S. post-war security only at the end of 1943. Even then they emphasized the idea of acquiring forward air and naval bases to ensure the defence in depth of the American mainland. This was thought as the best defence against a new Pearl Harbor. At that point the American studies were quite lenient with Soviets demands in Eastern Europe. This would change in the following years, but generally speaking, until the end of 1944 there was no major opposition against giving the Soviet Union a white check in Eastern Europe⁶². In Washington it was considered that this appeasement would make Stalin feel safe and he would be willing to work together with the West in building the new order after the defeat of the Axis. It was imperative to make the Soviet dictator feel safe since all of the assessments revealed that the U.S.S.R. will become the greatest land power in the world at the end of the war. The Department of State regarded Romania and the whole of Eastern Europe only in connection with the Soviet Russia. As early as 1942, G-2, the U.S. Military Information Division, warned that the Soviet Union will be able to defeat Germany and will, most likely, communize the whole of Eastern Europe. American planners were not oblivious to the dangers presented by these prospects, but Russia's contribution was vital in defeating Germany. More so, Britain was undoubtedly on the decline, so it was imperative to convince the Soviet leaders to continue to cooperate after the war for the security of the world⁶³.

Both G-2 and J.S.S.C. (*Joint Strategic Survey Committee*), the last being formed by Roosevelt, considered Britain a second rate power, its influence being a thing of the past. Since the Army was insisting on securing Soviet help for the war with Japan after the defeat of Germany in Europe, J.S.S.C. proposed a list of measures for the relations with Moscow. Among those, the emphasize rested on "acceptance of the fact that after that defeat Russia will be in a military position to impose whatever territorial settlements it desires in Central Europe and the Balkans", and on the idea that "the great importance to the United States of Russia's full participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany as essential to the prompt and crushing defeat of Japan at far less cost to the United States and Great

⁶¹ Mark A. Stoler, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁶² Melvyn P. Leffler, *National Security and US Foreign Policy* in Melvyn P. Leffler, David S. Painter (edit.), *Origins of the Cold War. An international history*, New York, Routledge, 2002, p. 24.

⁶³ Mark A. Stoler, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

Britain”⁶⁴. These conclusions were approved by the Chiefs of Staff and by the President himself and were the basis on which he conducted the negotiations at Yalta.

In the end, for Washington the future of Eastern Europe seemed sealed; the postwar world would be dominated by just two powers: the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Britain was on a down slope economically. Although J.S.S.C. and G-2 would say it openly a year after that, they delivered their conclusions as early as 1943. J.S.S.C. also warned at that time that any Allied military operation in Eastern Europe would only raise suspicions in Moscow and would pull the U.S. in the influence contest taking place there between the Soviets and the British. American military planners wanted from their diplomats to guarantee to the Soviets a free card in the affairs of Eastern Europe and even in the Balkans. Still some pressure groups, mostly ethnic, forced Roosevelt to take some actions the Soviets could only interpret as an American encroachment into their sphere of influence. Roosevelt thought that he should indeed recognize Soviet control (note that “control” didn’t mean that he would be allowed to install communist regimes in these areas), since the Soviet Union had to suffer the German aggression through Eastern Europe. But once Stalin would be assured he would feel safe and he would be swayed to work closely with Britain and America to make the new world a better place. He would relinquish the control he once had over Eastern Europe. That was the plan, but when Stalin took unilateral decisions about these areas, the President did not understand that it failed. American diplomacy was trapped somewhere between the desire to appease Moscow and the goal of integrating Eastern Europe in the new world order and organizations and it failed at both⁶⁵. When the more realistic Churchill reached stroke a bargain with Stalin, Roosevelt and the Department of State disapproved it stubbornly. This only made Stalin even more suspicious of a plot against the Soviet Union.

British views of this matter were changing also. It regarded the Eastern Europe-Balkan area with some interest, but it focused its attention of Greece and Turkey. Practically, any other country could be bargaining chips except these two. That didn’t mean that the Foreign Office did not recognize some importance for Romania. At Casablanca and other Allied Conferences it was the British side that wanted to include Romania both in military operations and different plans of reorganization after the war. As we pointed out, at the start of the war there were some British plans for the federalization of Eastern Europe. The idea behind this was that, after Germany’s inevitable defeat, there would be a power vacuum in this region. That proved to be disastrous at the end of World War I and Britain didn’t want to repeat the mistake. Three new federal actors, one in North, another in Centre and the third in

⁶⁴ JCS 506, “*Instructions concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conference*,” Sept. 18, 1943, CCS 337 (9-12-43), sec. 1, RG 218, NA, *apud*, Mark A. Stoler, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁶⁵ Wilfried Loth, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

South, would bring stability on the continent as they would be controlled by the Great Powers. Britain was ready to accept some kind of Soviet special interest in the Eastern⁶⁶. Admiral Roger Bellairs, part of the M.S.C. (Military Subcommittee) wrote the first memorandum about this matter and he circulated it at the Foreign Office at the end of 1942. The document supported Roosevelt's idea for "the four policemen" that would organize the world after the war; for Eastern Europe it reverted back to an older Foreign Office idea to create federations of small states that would work with the U.S.S.R. and Britain and that would act as "forts against German penetration". More importantly, there is phrase in the document that states that the "Primary responsibility for Europe would fall on Britain and the U.S.S.R for geographical reasons and 'by virtue of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which...however, need not preclude arrangements being made by Great Britain in Western Europe and by the Soviet Government in Eastern Europe in order to control the foreign policies of the local Powers". The War Cabinet, through Eden, approved of this plan on November 27 1942 as "the present basis of our foreign policy"⁶⁷.

The analysis on the Soviet demands at the end of 1941 made British analysts very sceptical about Moscow's good will and intentions. If in London there were the tendencies to accept with some compensation the idea of Soviet special interests in Eastern Europe, the British agents and diplomats in the field disapproved it. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British ambassador in Moscow, told Eden in his report that the Russians are not to be trusted and they will not accept any Western intrusion in their influence zone. Kerr thought that the Soviets were interested in securing their Western border and they would push it westwards as much as they are allowed to⁶⁸. The same conclusion was reached by the head of the S.O.E. (*Special Operations Executive*) in Moscow, General Hill. He put forward a memorandum about Russia's intentions after the war in which he specified that:

"1) General. Russia will insist on incorporating Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia. No compromise will be accepted with these countries. Post-war Russia will need almost anything it can get its hands on in order to rebuild its devastated territories [...] Reconstruction will be their main goal and it could take some time. For now they show no sign of wanting to install communist regimes in Poland or Germany"⁶⁹.

Of course, the General's opinion was not the only one; the clashes between the Foreign Office and the S.O.E. are documented. What is certain is that at the time of

⁶⁶ Marian Zidaru, *Relații economice și politice româno-britanice, 1939-1947* [Romanian-British political and economical relations], Bucharest, Universul Științific, 2005, p. 222.

⁶⁷ Julian Lewis, *Changing direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-1947*, Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, pp. 36-37.

⁶⁸ Marian Zidaru, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

⁶⁹ Mihai Retegan, *Din arhivele britanice: Preludiu la acordul de procentaj* [From British archives: prelude to the percentage agreement], in *Magazin Istoric*, nr. 4 (505), aprilie 2009, p. 42.

this document – November 1943 – there was the common perception that the U.S.S.R. wanted to ensure its security and nothing else. Stalin was thought to be shrewd enough to understand his position and negotiate “Great Powers” style his own influence zone after the war was won. Still, General Hill warned:

“[...] In my opinion, no matter how hard Russia will bleed until it obtains victory, it will be there at the conference table whether we like it or not, relying on a huge and experienced land army, on well equipped and trained tank forces and on a considerable air power. Soviet Russia is the only <European> power ready and willing to financially support a permanent army. Those who think (like America’s representatives) that at the end of the war the Russian generals will take action in to their own hands and force a clash with the government and will topple the current Soviet leadership are living in a fantasy land. The Red Army would never do that. What Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Turkey think about the Soviet military domination does not matter. What will Britain and the U.S. do at the Peace Conference and afterwards does and that is the only factor that will determine how the Soviet army will be used by the regime”⁷⁰.

American planners had, by now, reached similar glooming conclusions. Admiral Leahy thought by 1944 that the Soviet power had grown at a phenomenal rate, but he still nurtured hopes for cooperation⁷¹. At the same time, in a J.C.S. report in that same summer, it was told that quite clearly after the war the Soviet Union would dominate Central Europe and Nord-East Asia⁷².

The British also circulated a lot of documents in 1944 mapping the future Soviet moves in diplomacy and power projection. In march 1944 the *Foreign Office Research Department* theorized that Soviet Russia’s “desire to prevent any risk of a revival of the German menace in Central and South-Eastern Europe would lead to the exertion of powerful influence upon Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia”⁷³. Of all of these countries the British officials realized they could stop this process only in the latter. This assessment came after the notorious conflict between Eden and Sargent on how to react to increasing Soviet pressure in Eastern Europe. Sargent had analyzed the reports from all over the region as well as from the South-Eastern Department which was the Foreign Office’s structure tasked with supplying event analysis and political prognosis in that area. The head of the Department, Howard, had suggested that an Anglo-American military presence was required to counter Soviet hegemonic tendencies. E. M. Rose, another key figure of the Department, claimed that the Soviets will use the abundant ethnic problems

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

⁷¹ Melvyn P. Leffler, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁷² Emanuel Ploeanu, *Politica Statelor Unite față de Turcia între anii 1943 și 1952* [U.S. policy towards Turkey between 1943 and 1952], Iași, Institutul European, 2009, p. 108.

⁷³ Julian Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

present there in order to facilitate their penetration⁷⁴.

The issue of the second front was finally resolved at the Teheran Conference. Roosevelt brought the problem to the table suggesting that an Allied landing in the Balkans could link up with Tito's partisans and help the Soviets break the German line. Churchill was enthusiastic. This was his brain-child - an Allied offensive sweeping through Bulgaria and Romania would safeguard British interests in Greece and would put them at a better bargaining position at the peace conference. Stalin was opposed however and he was well prepared to block off any attempt. He claimed that this plan would only serve to divert resources and men away from the main strike in France. His position is shockingly similar to the one J.C.S. supported before the conference. Roosevelt had no option but to endorse it by the end of that meeting. *Overlord* was on as the main Allied push for 1944⁷⁵.

CONCLUSIONS

It is fair to say that Romania played only a minor role in the big scheme of things that was the Great Alliance, as Churchill called it, between Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States. But these smaller matters tend to mask bigger strategic conflicts and the case of Romania is no exception. Bucharest found itself in the middle of a wider struggle for dominance that stretched from the Baltic to the Adriatic between Britain and the U.S.S.R. American interests were limited in the area at the beginning years, but as the war progressed it became obvious that American diplomacy will play an important role in the shaping of the post-war world. In the course of the Second World War Eastern Europe was included in a series of plans by both the British and the Americans but only the former truly realised the danger that the Soviet Union posed for a united Europe.

It could be argued that the lack of commitment on the part of Washington allowed the Soviets to extend their influence on the whole region. On a more thorough analysis this idea becomes less clear; while America seemed determined to follow the "Big Four policemen" concept for post-war security (especially under President Roosevelt), it didn't however ignored the obvious fight for influence in Eastern Europe between Britain and the U.S.S.R. American policy-makers just assumed Stalin will be reasonable and agree to a certain relaxation and democratisation of the area after the war's end. Here lie the seeds of the emerging Cold War when it became clear that this was not the case, and Romania was on the forefront during the next years after 1947.

⁷⁴ Marian Zidaru, *op.cit.*, p. 224.

⁷⁵ David Stone, *War Summits: The meetings that shaped World War II and the Postwar World*, Washington, Potomac Books, 2005, p. 120.

ПЕРВЫЕ ВОЕННЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ ВЕЛИКОЙ СЕВЕРНОЙ ВОЙНЫ ИЛИ ЧТО ПРЕДШЕСТВОВАЛО БИТВЕ ПОД НАРВОЙ (1700), В СВЕТЕ ПОЛЬСКОЙ И ШВЕДСКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИЙ

THE FIRST WARFARE DURING THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR – BATTLE OF NARVA 1700, ON THE BASIS OF POLISH AND SWEDISH HISTORIOGRAPHY

Катаржина Вагнер

Исторический музей города Варшавы

Институт истории Варшавского университета

wagner.katarzyna@gmail.com

k.wagner@mhw.pl

Резюме: Смерть Карла XI Виттельсбаха и вступление на престол его 15-летнего сына Карла XII усугубило проблемы Швеции на международной арене. Правители Дании, России и Саксонии приступили к переговорам с целью заключения соглашения против Швеции. Каждый из них стремился получить новые земли за счёт королевства Швеции. Никто не ожидал, что молодой, неопытный Карл XII перехитрит опытных монархов и в первую очередь победит Данию, вынуждая её подписать перемирие, потом Саксонию (безуспешная осада Риги саксонцами) и Россию в битве под Нарвой. После этой битвы Карл XII был уверен, что Россия побеждена и долго не придёт в себя после сокрушительного поражения. Поэтому он решил напасть на Речь Посполитую и победить Фридриха I Веттина, короля, правящего в Польше под именем Август II.

Abstract: After the death of Charles XI the throne of Sweden was taken by his 15-year-old son, Charles XII, and so was starting the beginning of Sweden's international problems with other countries. Monarchs of Denmark, Russia and Saxony started negotiations, because they wanted to sign the anti-Swedish treaty. Every of them had plans to divide Sweden's territory and took a part for itself. Nobody expected that Charles XII with almost no military experience will enforce the Danes to submit to the Peace of Travendal in August 1700, Saxony overcame after the siege of Riga and Russia during the battle of Narva. After the battle of Narva, where the Russians suffered a crushing defeat, Charles XII turned his attention upon the other powerful neighbor – Frederic I of Saxony (who was also the king of Poland as August II).

Résumé: La mort de Charles XI Wittelsbach et la succession du trône par son fils de 15 ans, Charles XII de Suède, a aggravé les problèmes au niveau international. Les seigneurs du Danemark, de la Russie et de la Saxe ont entamé des négociations en vue de conclure un

accord contre la Suède. Chacun d'entre eux cherchant à obtenir des nouvelles acquisitions territoriales au détriment du royaume de suède. Il n'était pas prévu que l'adolescent Charles XII, sans expériences pratiques, a déjoué les monarques expérimentés. Charles XII a d'abord vaincu le Danemark, en le forçant à signer une paix dans Traventhal en Aout 1700, suivi par la saxe (sans succès menée par le saxon qui est le siège de Riga) et enfin la Russie à la suite de la bataille de Narva. Après la bataille, Charles XII était convaincu que la Russie était vaincue car elle ne se rassemblait pas durant une longue période.

Keywords: *The Great Northern War, battle of Narva, Swedish-Polish War, 18th century*

Вступление

Начало XVIII века принесло Европе конфликт, называемый в историографии Великой Северной войной, датируемой 1700-1721 гг. Можно смело утверждать, что битва под Нарвой, первое крупное сражение этой войны, как и вся Великая Северная война, являются событиями, забытыми польскими историками.

Польская историография обращала внимание больше всего на основные вопросы Великой Северной войны и только в общих чертах занималась проблемами присутствия шведских войск в Польше и польско-шведскими отношениями в XVIII веке. В качестве примера приведем работы таких исследователей как: Ян Виммер «Польское войско в период Северной войны», Павел Скворода «Войны Речи Посполитой Обоих Народов со Швецией», Яцек Бурдович-Новицки «Петр I, Август II и Речь Посполита 1696-1707» и Владислав Конопчински «Швеция и Польша от Оливского соглашения до упадка Речи Посполитой 1660-1795»¹. Во всех этих работах мы находим информацию о битве, но её очень мало, чтобы не сказать крупницы, и ничего нового она не несёт. Похожим образом выглядит ситуация в работах на английском языке, рассчитанных на большее число читателей. Здесь тоже мало публикаций и самой информации, как например, в работах Майкла Робертса «Очерки истории Швеции» или Роберта Низбета Бейна «Карл XII и гибель Шведской империи 1682-1719»².

¹ J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej* (Армия Речи Посполитой во время Великой Северной войны), Варшава 1956; P. Skworoda, *Wojny Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją* (Войны Речи Посполитой Обоих Народов со Швецией), Варшава 2007; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II i Rzeczpospolita 1696-1706* (Петр I, Август II и Речь Посполита 1696-1707), Краков 2010; W. Konopczyński, *Szwecja a Polska od pokoju oliwskiego do upadku Rzeczypospolitej 1660-1795* (Швеция и Польша от Оливского перемирия до падения Речи Посполитой 1660-1795), Варшава 1924.

² M. Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, London 1967; R. N. Bain, *Charles XII and the*

Другая серия исследований, в которых присутствует информация о Северной войне, это биографии Карла XII и Петра I. Но и там нет подробного изучения первой серьёзной битвы Великой Северной войны, битвы под Нарвой. Правда, появилась шведская публикация Маргуса Лайдрена на эту тему, но её не перевели ни на английский, ни, тем более, на польский языки. Поэтому круг читателей гораздо меньше. Лайдрен описал конфликт подробно, но тему не исчерпал.

Цель данной статьи – прежде всего собрать и систематизировать доступную информацию о первых военных действиях Великой Северной войны, а также попытаться представить её широкой группе читателей, интересующихся историей этой части Европы. Моя цель – показать, что именно предшествовало этой битве, какова была панорама политических событий, а также, как проходила битва и каковы были её последствия для Швеции, России и Речи Посполитой. В главной части я сосредоточусь на том, как проходило сражение, с подробным описанием воюющих сторон, географической характеристики места сражения, погодных условий и состояния армий.

Подготовка к войне

Король Швеции Карл XI Виттельсбах после проведения «редукции», переворота в структуре землевладения³ и военно-административной реформы⁴,

Collapse of the Swedish Empire 1682-1719, New York 2001.

³ На заседании Риксдага осенью 1680 г. Карл XI, опасаясь угрозы для Швеции со стороны других стран, искал средства на модернизацию армии и флота, которые должны были обеспечить защиту королевства и его провинций. В связи с этим в XVII веке имущество, принадлежавшее короне, было заложено, король провёл редукцию, целью которой было возвращение земель и имущества, принадлежавших государству. Риксдаг принял, таким образом, закон о переходе в пользу государства ранее пожалованных крупным владельцам королевской короны, земель и имущества, годовой доход которых превышал сумму 600 серебряных далеров. Целью, так называемой, большой редукции было возвращение собственности, принадлежавшей шведской короне, с тем, чтобы она стала дополнительным источником постоянных публичных и государственных доходов. Это ограничило влияние магнатов, поскольку после этого процесса 36% земель перешли в собственность короля (перед, так называемой, большой редукцией аристократии принадлежало 72% земель, а после неё только 33%). Перед редукцией доходы казны шли в руки небольшой группы семей внутри аристократических кланов. См: S. A. Nilsson, *Reduktion eller kontribution. Alternativ Inom 1600-talets svenska finanspolitik* (Редукция или контрибуция. Альтернатива в финансовой политике Швеции XVII века) [в:] G. Ystad (ред.), *Svenskt 1600-tal* (Швеция. XVII век), Malmö 1977, с. 144-183; A. F. Upton, *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism*, Cambridge University Press 1998, p. 51-70; I. Andersson, *Dzieje Szwecji* (История Швеции), Варшава 1967, с.

начал укреплять абсолютистское правление. Это было не просто ввиду конфликта с Данией, управляемой Христианом V Ольденбургским, из-за Скании и Гольштейна. Скания перешла от Дании к Швеции в 1658 году, а герцогством Гольштейн с 1694 года правил Фридрих IV Гольштейн-Готторпский, искавший поддержку шведского короля⁵. Эта ситуация была также выгодна Швеции, которая, благодаря своим отношениям с герцогством Гольштейн, держала Данию в постоянном страхе, поддерживая атмосферу, что в любой момент она может оказаться в окружении. Датчанам эта ситуация не нравилась и они искали возможность присоединить герцогство к своим землям⁶.

Когда 5 апреля 1697 года умер король Швеции Карл XI, а его преемником стал пятнадцатилетний Карл XII, усугубились проблемы с Данией. Пользуясь ситуацией замешательства в шведском королевстве, датские войска уже в мае 1697 года напали на близлежащие к Готторпу территории, разрушая пограничные гольштейнские крепости⁷. Фридрих IV, опасаясь подчинения своего герцогства Дании, в апреле 1698 года взял в жёны шведскую принцессу - сестру Карла XII, Гедвиг Софию, чтобы таким образом заручиться помощью брата жены⁸. Христиан V, понимая тщетность попыток занять герцогство, попробовал

175-176; S. E. Åström, *Gospodarka szwedzka a mocarstwowa rola Szwecji w latach 1632-1697* (*Шведская экономика и великодержавная роль Швеции в 1632-1697 годах*) [в:] A. Mączak (ред.), *Europa i świat w początkach epoki nowożytnej, cz. 2: ideologie, kryzysy, konflikty*, (*Европа и мир в начале новой истории, ч. 2: идеологии, кризисы, конфликты*), Варшава 1992, с. 298-302; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (*Армия Речи Посполитой во время Великой Северной войны*), с. 31.

⁴ В результате обогащения шведской казны, после проведения редукции была осуществлена административно-военная реформа, суть которой сводилась к тому, что страна была разделена на военные округа, которым принадлежала часть доходов и собственности страны. Это обозначало, что кавалерийские войска получали оплату из королевской казны. Кроме того, свободные крестьяне могли откупиться от военной службы, оплачивая наёмных пехотинцев, также получавших оплату в виде земельных наделов. См: E. Rostworowski, *Всеобщая история. XVII век*, Варшава 1977, с. 358-359; M. Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, London 1967, p. 233-237; Z. Anusik, *Karol XII* (*Карл XII*), Вроцлав 2006, с. 22-24; I. Andersson *Dzieje Szwecji* (*История Швеции*), с. 174-176.

⁵ E. Cieślak, *W obronie tronu króla Stanisława Leszczyńskiego* (*В защиту престола короля Станислава Лещинского*), Гданьск 1986, с. 7; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* (*Карл XII*), Гданьск 2010, с. 67.

⁶ B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* (*Карл XII*), с. 67-68.

⁷ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva. Början till en stormakts fall* (*Битва под Нарвой. Начало падения державы*), Стокгольм 2001, с. 41.

⁸ Z. Anusik, *Karol XII* (*Карл XII*), с. 17-21; R. N. Bain, *Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire 1682-1719*, New York 1980, p. 36-41.

применить другую тактику - склонить молодого Карла XII к женитьбе на датской принцессе. Когда и эти действия оказались безрезультатными, у него осталась последняя возможность – найти союзников для ведения войны с очень молодым королём Швеции⁹. Король Дании начал переговоры с Москвой и одновременно со своим племянником, курфюрстом саксонским, а с недавнего времени также королём Польши, Фридрихом Августом I.

Ситуация, в которой Фридрих Август Веттин, после долгого периода без королевской власти после смерти Яна III Собеского, был выбран королём Польши, как Август II Польский, была довольно благоприятной для Швеции. Фридрих Август был сыном Анны Софии Ольденбург, дочери датского короля Фридриха III, то есть он являлся родственником Карлу XII, что давало повод последнему считать, что он не будет стремиться к конфликту со своим шведским кузеном¹⁰. Однако, действительность оказалась другой.

Христиан V, в поисках поддержки других правителей, в случае с Августом II попал на благодатную почву. Новый польский монарх обязался в *pactach conventach* вернуть так называемые «авульсы», земли некогда утраченные Речью Посполитой Обоих Народов, в состав которых входили также Инфланты, принадлежавшие Швеции. Владислав Конопчински пишет, что „*avulsarum provinciarum*” обозначало стремление вернуть польской короне в первую очередь Подолье, Смоленск и Киев. Инфланты в этом списке занимали менее важное место, как земли давно уже не принадлежавшие Речи Посполитой¹¹. Однако, после возвращения Каменца-Подольского (по условиям перемирия в Карловицах) внимание Августа II переключилось как раз на Инфланты, у него появилась надежда вернуть эти земли. Проблема заключалась в том, каким образом это должно было произойти. Веттин хотел вернуть Инфланты только при помощи саксонских войск, что в случае успеха давало ему возможность распоряжаться этими землями. Юзеф Геровски пишет также, что в случае успеха этого предприятия Инфланты могли бы служить Веттинам торговой базой, способствующей строительству сильного флота¹².

⁹ Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 31-33.

¹⁰ Мать Августа II Саксонского - Анна София Ольденбург и мать Карла XII Ульрика Элеонора Ольденбург были сёстрами, их отец Фридрих III был королём Дании. См: Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 33.

¹¹ W. Konopczyński, *Szwecja a Polska (Швеция и Польша от Оливского)*, с. 32.

¹² J. Gierowski, *Problematyka bałtycka w polityce Augusta II Sasa (Балтийская проблематика в политике Августа II Саксонского)* [в:] J. Trzosek (ред.), *Strefa bałtycka w XVI-XVIII w. Polityka – społeczeństwo – gospodarka. Ogólnopolska sesja naukowa zorganizowana z okazji 70-lecia urodzin Prof. Edmunda Cieślaka (Балтийский регион в XVI-XVIII в. Политика – общество – экономика. Всепольская научная*

Идея заключения датско-саксонского соглашения, направленного против Швеции с целью отвоевания Инфлантов, заинтересовало Фридриха Августа. Уже 24 марта 1698 года Фридрих Август, уже будучи польским королём, заключил оборонительный союз с правителем Дании Христианом V (25 сентября 1699 года союз превратился в наступательно - оборонительный). Несколько месяцев спустя копия этого соглашения попала в руки генерального губернатора Бремена – Мауриция Валлингка. На первый взгляд это соглашение не касалось непосредственно Швеции, поэтому он выслал его в Стокгольм с указанием наблюдать за действиями Дании. Но будучи опытным дипломатом, обратился с официальным вопросом к Августу II насчёт его планов, касавшихся внешней политики. Веттин заверил в своей дружбе, отрицая ведение какой-либо двойной дипломатической политики¹³.

Планы правителей Саксонии и Дании немного осложнились, когда в августе 1699 года умер Христиан V. Однако новый правитель Фридрих IV продолжал политику отца и стремился объявить войну Швеции. Таким образом, первое звено зарождавшегося Северного союза было закреплено¹⁴. А напряжённая ситуация в Гольштейне предвещала скорое начало открытого конфликта.

Одновременно Август ищет сближения с русским царём Петром I, который также хотел иметь доступ к Балтийскому морю. В то время Россия была отделена от Чёрного моря турецкими землями, а от Балтийского – территориями, подвластными Речи Посполитой и Швеции (царю очень нужен был доступ в порты на восточном побережье этого моря, между Финским заливом и Двиной, то есть так называемое «окно в море»)¹⁵. Владислав Конопчински пишет, что Пётр I, желая создать собственный флот, был главным заинтересованным лицом в развязывании войны со Швецией, и именно он планировал войну на севере¹⁶. Немного другую точку зрения выдвигают Эммануэль Ростворовски и Ян Виммер. Они пишут, что с самого начала царь явно подчёркивал, что примет участие в военной кампании позже, поскольку срок начала этой кампании также зависел от момента заключения мира с Турцией, который должен был положить конец войне, длившийся с момента

сессия, организованная по случаю 70-летия профессора Эдмунда Тесляка), Гданьск, 1993, с. 59.

¹³ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 42.

¹⁴ E. Rostworowski, *Historia powszechna...* (*Всеобщая история...*), с. 359; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (*Армия Речи Посполитой...*), с. 32-33; J. A. Gierowski, *W cieniu Ligi Północnej* (*В тени Северного союза*), Вроцлав, 1971, 7-8.

¹⁵ A. Andrusiewicz, *Piotr Wielki. Prawda i mit* (*Пётр Великий. Правда и миф*), Варшава, 2011, с. 249.

¹⁶ W. Kończuński, *Kwestia bałtycka do XX w.* (*Балтийский вопрос до XX в.*), Гданьск, 1947, с. 128.

штурма Азова (приблизительно с 1695 года)¹⁷. Оба эти мнения не исключают друг друга. Царь не хотел вести войну на два фронта, поэтому стремился закончить конфликт с Турцией, не открывая одновременно свои планы в отношении шведских земель.

Между 10 и 13 августа 1698 года произошла встреча царя с саксонским курфюрстом, избранным польским королём, в Раве Русской. Целью встречи было согласование вопросов анти – шведской коалиции¹⁸. В. Д. Королук подчёркивает, что Пётру I принадлежала здесь руководящая роль. Во время встречи проходили официальные переговоры, касающиеся турецкой войны, а также доверительные разговоры по вопросу концепции северной войны и планов усиления позиции России на Балтийском море¹⁹. А Юзеф Геровски утверждает, что «оба правителя были в равной степени заинтересованы в ослаблении позиции Швеции на Балтийском море [...] Спор о том, кому первому пришла эта идея, по большому счёту является второстепенным»²⁰.

Более того, недавно избранный польский король с момента вступления на престол вынашивал планы завоеваний, которые должны были привести к усилению его позиции в Польше, а также всего рода Веттинов в Европе. Именно поэтому Август II мечтал о завоевании Инфлантов. Эти стремления поддерживал Иоганн Рейнгольд Паткуль, инфлантский аристократ, который, недовольный редукциями, прибыл в конце 1698 года на двор польского монарха и представил ему проект присоединения Инфлантов к Речи Посполитой или к саксонско - инфлантскому союзу (в случае, если бы Веттин принимал участие в

¹⁷ E Rostworowski, *Historia powszechna...* (Всеобщая история...), с. 360; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (Армия Речи Посполитой...), с. 33-34. Подробнее о русской политике в этот период: H. Almqvist, *Från Azov till Narva. Kejsarens hjälpsändning till Rysland och österrikarnas öden i tsar Peters tjänst 1696-1700* (От Азова до Нарвы. Непостоянство в оказании помощи императором России - Петром I в 1696-1700 годах), "Karolinska Förbundet Årsbok" (KFÅ) 1938.

¹⁸ Встреча длилась несколько дней, но самые важные переговоры проходили 13 августа 1698 г. J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II i Rzeczpospolita 1697-1706* (Пётр I, Август II и Речь Посполита 1697-1706), Краков 2010, с. 172-173; P. Ullgren, *Det stora nordiska kriget 1700-1721. En berättelse om stormakten Sveriges fall* (Великая Северная война и история о падении шведской державы), Стокгольм 2008, с. 16; W. Konopczyński, *Kwestia...* (Балтийский вопрос...), с. 128; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (Армия Речи Посполитой...), с. 30, 33; E. Rostworowski, *Historia powszechna...* (Всеобщая история...), с. 359. О неофициальной стороне встречи, см: *Pamiętnik Jana Stanisława Jabłonowskiego, wojewody ruskiego* (Дневник Яна Станислава Яблоновского, русского воеводы), A. Bielowski (wyd.), Львов 1862, с. 57-60.

¹⁹ W. D. Koroluk, *Polska i Rosja a wojna północna* (Польша и Россия и Северная война), Варшава 1954, с. 97-98.

²⁰ J. Gierowski, *Problematyka bałtycka...* (Балтийский вопрос...), с. 59.

войне исключительно как саксонский курфюрст)²¹. Недовольная редукцией инфлантская аристократия перешла под покровительство Августа II 24 августа 1699 года. Король принял предложение, в котором предусматривалась сильная зависимость Инфлантов от Речи Посполитой, которые, по мнению польского короля должны были являться защитной стеной от Швеции и России. Вместо этого Инфланты в случае конфликта должны были предоставить Польши войска, а Веттин гарантировал им все привилегии инфлантской аристократии²².

Таким образом, северный союз увеличился за счёт последующих союзов. Первым звеном, о котором уже говорилось, было саксонско-датское соглашение 24 марта 1698 года (превращённое 25 сентября 1699 года в союз наступательно-оборонительного характера). Следующим звеном было подчинение инфлантской аристократии польскому монарху 24 августа 1699 года. И наконец, последним, но главным решением этого союза было Преображенское соглашение 12 ноября 1699 года. Оно было заключено после того, как Фридрих Август послал в Москву с важной миссией предводителя инфлантского рыцарства Иоганна Рейнгольда Паткуля. Это был союз России, Саксонии и Дании против Швеции, дополненный 2 февраля 1700 года соглашениями Саксонии и Дании с Брандербунгом, после частичного решения конфликта, связанного с Эльблонгом. В этом соглашении определялись условия совместных военных действий в войне со Швецией. Фридрих Август должен был переманить на себя шведские войска из Инфлантов, чтобы помочь России в нападении на Ингрию и Карелию. Чтобы этот план осуществился, русскому царю надо было постараться как можно скорее подписать перемирие с Турцией.

Таким образом, каждый из названных правителей, для осуществления своих захватнических планов, был заинтересован в объединении усилий с целью победить шведского монарха, стоявшего во главе довольно сильного государства.

Общий план государств Северного союза предполагал, что Саксония в феврале 1700 года нанесёт удар по Инфлантам. Одновременно Дания должна была напасть на Гольштейн, а затем двинуться к южной Швеции, чтобы таким образом отвлечь часть шведских войск от Инфлантов. Пётр I со своими войсками должен был вторгнуться в Карелию и Ингрию. Царь вместе с Паткулем планировали, что граница между Россией и Инфлантами должна

²¹ E. Rostworowski, *Historia powszechna...* (Всеобщая история...), с. 359; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (Армия Речи Посполитой...), с. 30.

²² J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (Армия Речи Посполитой...), с. 32; M. Wagner, *Stanisław Jabłonowski: kasztelan krakowski, hetman wielki koronny* (Станислав Яблоновский: краковский кастелян, великий королевский гетман) Варшава 2000, с. 189; W. D. Koroluk, *Polska i Rosja...* (Польша и Россия...), Варшава 1954, с. 111-112.

проходить по реке Нарва, однако захват Нарвы мог означать, что в будущем царь хотел бы занять всю Эстонию²³.

Все соглашения, заключаемые Фридрихом Августом были тайными для измученной войнами Речи Посполитой. После заключения двустороннего польско-саксонского союза Речь Посполита должна была вести собственную заграничную политику, но в действительности здесь надо говорить о саксонской политике короля Августа II²⁴. И таким образом, Польша, хоть формально и не заключала никаких соглашений с другими государствами и не вступала ни в какие союзы, постепенно всё больше втягивалась в войну.

План Августа II предполагал захват Инфлантов исключительно саксонскими войсками, без необходимости привлечения Польши. Монарх всё же сообщил своим приближённым об этом намерении. Некоторые из них, как например, примас Михал Радзеёвски главный казначей Иеромин Любомирски, или род Сапеха, поддержали замысел войны со Швецией²⁵. Как утверждает летописец того времени Аноним Отвиновски, уже в 1699 году они планировали свержение с престола Августа II в случае поражения в войне со Швецией²⁶. Тем временем Август II хотел заручиться нейтралитетом Речи Посполитой и польской шляхты, а потом после захвата Инфлантов выйти из военной кампании, чтобы использовать военные силы на другом фронте, а именно, в испанской войне за наследство. Следующим шагом должна была быть *absolutum dominium* в Польше...²⁷.

Тем временем шведы, встревоженные встречей Августа II с царём Петром I в Раве Русской, послали в Варшаву своего дипломата с целью ознакомиться с ситуацией в Речи Посполитой. Польскому королю, однако, удалось усыпить его бдительность. Но, несмотря на это было понятно, что саксонские войска концентрируются в южной части Великого Литовского Княжества, правда, всем казалось, что это связано с абсолютистскими планами Августа II²⁸. Отвиновски вспоминает, что шведы были посвящены в планы Августа II примасом

²³ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 44-45.

²⁴ W. D. Koroluk, *Polska i Rosja...* (*Польша и Россия...*), с. 81-82.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, с. 34.

²⁶ A. Otwinowski, *Dzieje Polski pod panowaniem Augusta II. od roku 1696 – 1728* (*История Польши во время правления Августа II в 1696-1728 годах*), Краков 1849, с. 18.

²⁷ W. D. Koroluk, *Polska i Rosja...* (*Польша и Россия...*), с. 72; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (*Армия Речи Посполитой...*), с. 34.

²⁸ J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej...* (*Армия Речи Посполитой...*), с. 36; W. Serczyk, *Piotr I Wielki* (*Пётр I Великий*), Вроцлав 1977, с. 79.

Радзеёвским²⁹, однако нет источников, подтверждающих этот факт.

Начало военных действий

Ситуация на шведском дворе выглядела относительно спокойной³⁰ до момента, когда 2-го февраля 1700 года саксонские войска вторглись в Инфланты. Как пишет Збигнев Анусик, не было возможности перебросить к Риге значительные шведские силы, поскольку надо было подождать возможность безопасно спустить на море флот³¹. Но шведские войска были брошены в совсем другом направлении, поскольку в марте 1700 года Дания напала на Гольштейн-Готторп.

В середине апреля канцлерская коллегия в Стокгольме (*kanslikollegium*), ознакомившись с донесениями Мауриция Веллинга, предложила королю план дипломатических и военных действий на востоке. Самым важным пунктом этого плана была изоляция Августа II (благодаря неожиданному вторжению в Инфланты, Август показал себя сильным и уверенным предводителем) и старания не допустить конфликта с Россией³².

На гольштейнском театре военных действий ситуация была под контролем, поскольку со времени правления Карла XI велась подготовка к войне с датчанами³³. Реакция Карла XII была практически незамедлительная, поскольку уже в конце 1699 года началась мобилизация перед приближающимся конфликтом. Шведские полки на местах получили приказ двигаться в направлении пунктов формирования отдельных группировок. Часть полков с южной и западной Швеции (около 10 000 человек) должна была следить за порядком на границе с Норвегией, следующее несколько полков были

²⁹ A. Otwinowski, *Dzieje Polski...* (История Польши...), с. 18.

³⁰ В 1699 г. В Стокгольм была выслана дипломатическое представительство, во главе которого стоял воевода Иновроцлава – Франчишек Галецки. Польский король заверял тогда шведов в нерушимой дружбе и предлагал заключить договор с Карлом XII. Анусик пишет, что Галецки не осознавал ту роль, которую он должен был сыграть на шведском дворе. См: Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 35; E. Otwinowski, *Dzieje Polski...* (История Польши...), с. 27.

³¹ Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 36.

³² G. Jonasson, *Karl XII och hans rådgivare. Den utrikespolitiska maktkampen i Sverige 1697-1702 (Карл XII и его совет. Заграничная политика Швеции в 1697-1702 годах)*, с. 232.

³³ Подробнее пишет об этом: J. Cavallie, *Från fred till krig. De finansiella problemen kring krigsutbrottet år 1700 (От мира до войны. Финансовые проблемы к 1700 году)*, Uppsala 1975.

доставлены в Германию, где они усилили корпус генерала Нильса Гилленстерны и должны были «отпугивать» Саксонию³⁴. Кавалерийские полки (среди них Смаландский, Заподноготландский и Восточногоотландский) были высланы к датской границе с целью проведения военных операций против датчан в Гольштейне. С королём выступили, среди прочих, четыре батальона пехоты (2 100 человек), а также королевские телохранители из Копинга и Арбуги, которые составляли хорошо обученный элитарный корпус Его Величества, предводителем которого являлся король. Остальные части шведской армии концентрировались на юге страны (недалеко от Ланцкруны и Истад)³⁵.

Кроме того, Карл XII обратился с просьбой помочь к государствам Оливского мирного договора в 1660 году и получил помощь от английского и голландского флотов. Сначала англичане и голландцы выступали на стороне Швеции и Гольштейна, как гаранты мира и безопасности в Европе. После начала конфликта им пришлось стремиться к восстановлению мира в Европе³⁶.

Карл XII оказался в положении, когда два противника одновременно объявили ему войну. Чтобы победить каждого из неприятелей по отдельности, шведский король должен был действовать быстро. Карл XII неожиданно появился вместе с войском недалеко от Копенгагена, который не был укреплен, где после слабого отпора моментально победил датчан, с которыми потом заключил перемирие в Травендале 19 августа 1700 года. На основании этого перемирия Дания должна была выйти из войны. Договор также возвращал независимость готторпскому герцогству, давая ему возможность содержания армии и заключения договоров, а гольштейнский герцог вернул свои владения³⁷.

³⁴ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 57; P. Ullgren, *Det stora nordiska kriget...* (*Великая Северная война...*), с. 20-21.

³⁵ *Självtbiografiska anteckningar af öfverste Anders Koskull* (*Воспоминания Андерса Коскулла*), „Karolinska Krigares Dagböcker” (далее: KKD) VI, Lund 1912, с. 302; K. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Narwą* (*Битва под Нарвой*), „Mówią wieki” («Говорят века») 2009, № 1 (588), с. 32.

³⁶ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 58; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II i Rzeczpospolita...* (*Пётр I, Август II и Речь Посполита...*), с. 219.

³⁷ *Självtbiografiska anteckningar af öfverste Anders Koskull* (*Воспоминания Андерса Коскулла*), с. 302; *Korplaren Erik Larsson Smepests dagbok och anteckningar 1701-1718* (*Воспоминания Эрика Сменустса 1701-1718 годы*), KKD III, Lund 1907, с. 117-118; письмо Josiaka Cederhielma брату Germunda [в:] KKD VIII, Lund 1910, с. 150-151; K. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Narwą...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 32-33; R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, London 1968, p. 140-143; G. Jonasson, *Planu wypraw wojennych Karola XII w latach 1700-1702* (*Планы военных походов Карла XII в 1700-1702 годах*), „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka” (dalej: „Sobótka”) (Силезский исторический

В это же время саксонцы под предводительством лично Фридриха Августа предпринимали попытки захватить Ригу, обороной которой руководил шведский генерал Эрик Дальберг. Яцек Сташевски выдвигает предположение, что «поспешность, с которой польский король принял решение о вторжении в Инфланты» связана была с опасением, что царь Пётр I закончит войну с Турцией и опередит Веттина в попытках захватить Инфланты. Более того, он считает, что неожиданное нападение на Ригу должно было быть неожиданностью не только для Карла XII, но также для Петра I³⁸.

Саксонский курфюрст во второй половине июля переправил через реку Двину 17-ти тысячную армию и начал осаду города. Однако блокада Риги и попытки преодолеть городские укрепления не увенчались успехом. Саксонская армия сдалась³⁹.

Нарва

В качестве одной из причин вторжения на шведскую территорию был преувеличенный факт оскорбления русского царя во время его пребывания *инкогнито* в Риге, когда ему якобы не оказали должного уважения. Карл XII не успел предпринять каких-либо действий, поскольку 24 августа 1700 года Пётр I объявил войну Швеции и вторгся в Ингрию⁴⁰. Этот шаг спас общий замысел Северного союза, а Карлу XII вскоре должен был принести большую славу.

Стоит ненадолго задержаться над проблемой шведских прибалтийских провинций [карта 1]. Шведские провинции с другой стороны Балтийского моря имели большое значение для Швеции ввиду их географического положения.


квартильник Субботка. Дальше: «Субботка»), 1992, № 1-2, с. 123-124; Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 37-42; I. Andersson, *Dzieje Szwecji (История Швеции)*, с. 183.

³⁸ J. Staszewski, *O miejsce w Europie. Stosunki Polski i Saksonii z Francją na przełomie XVII i XVIII w. (За место в Европе. Отношения Польши и Саксонии с Францией на рубеже XVII и XVIII веков)*, Варшава 1973, с. 197.

³⁹ *Självlvbiografiska anteckningar af öfverste Anders Koskull (Воспоминания Андерса Коскулла)*, с. 302; *Korplaren Erik Larsson Smepests dagbok och anteckningar 1701-1718 (Воспоминания Эрика Сменустса 1701-1718 годы)*, с. 118-119; R. M. Hatton, *op. cit.*, p. 145; G. Jonasson, *Planu wypraw wojennych... (Планы военных походов...)*, с. 124; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 79-83; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II i Rzeczpospolita... (Пётр I, Август II и Речь Посполитая...)*, с. 220.

⁴⁰ Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 49; R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII...*, p. 151; A. Andrusiewicz, *Piotr Wielki (Пётр Великий)*, с. 252.

Карта 1 – Шведские балтийские провинции около 1660 г.



Источник: M. Laidar, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 28.

Речь шла, прежде всего, об их стратегическом значении в случае возможного военного конфликта – провинции эти могли исполнять роль отправных баз в случае военных действий на территориях потенциальных противников, или также могли там находиться базы для отпора нападения противника. Кроме того, реки, болота и большие озёра Эстонии, Инфлантов и

Ингрии представляли природные защитные препятствия, трудные для преодоления противником⁴¹.

В связи с важным стратегическим значением балтийских провинций, в них были различные гарнизоны, из которых самые основные находились в больших городах, например в Нарве, Риге, Дорпаче, Ревеле или Парнаве. Чтобы обеспечить своё существование гарнизоны должны были вести с городами хозяйственный и экономический обмен, и зачастую это приводило к общественным и культурным контактам. Это были ситуации, способствующие контактам военного и гражданского населения.

Армия Петра I старалась захватить основную крепость Ингрии. Захват Нарвы, поскольку о ней идёт речь, расположенной на берегу реки с тем же названием на расстоянии около 14-ти километров от устья Финского залива, дало бы царю возможность направить свои войска в другие города этого региона, а также в Инфлянты.

Нарва являлась исключительным гарнизонным городом благодаря Ивангороду, расположенному в настоящее время по российской стороне реки Нарвы [фото 1]. В этом городе было три тысячи жителей, и был он вторым (после Ревеля) по величине городом в Эстонии, но по «шведскости» занимал без сомнения первое место. С 1684 года шведский язык был официальным языком общения с городским управлением. А начиная с сороковых годов XVII века, Швеция собиралась основать в Нарве вторую столицу, в которой король мог бы останавливаться раз в четыре года. К сожалению, город оказался слишком маленьким, чтобы вместить весь двор⁴².

С восточной стороны Нарвы был овраг, в который стекала вода реки Нарвы. С южной и в значительной степени с северной стороны город был окружён глубокой долиной. Западная часть оставалась практически открытой, но там находились крепостные стены и высохший ров. Кроме того, Нарву

⁴¹ M. Laidre, op.cit., с. 33-34; T. Eng, *Riksbegreppet Sverige. Inrikes och utrikes områden 1561-1721 sedda utifrån statsrättsliga akter* [w:] *Stat – kyrka – samhälle. Den stormaktstida samhällsordningen i Sverige och Östersjöprovinserna*, Стокгольм 2000, с. 335-336.

⁴² M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva... (Емва под Нарвой...)*, с. 35-36; J. Naber, *Tysk och svenskt i Göteborg, Norrköping och Narva. Motsättningar i församlingslivet under svensk stormaktstid* [в:] *Stat – kyrka – samhälle... (Немцы и Шведы в Гетеборге. Антагонизмы в совместном существовании во времена шведской державы. Государство – церковь – общество...)*, с. 155-162; E. Küng, *Narvas handels- och ekonomiskrättsliga position i svenska väldet 1581-1704* [в:] *Stat – kyrka – samhälle... (Торговое и экономическое положение Нарвы в Шведской действительности в 1581-1704 годах. Государство – церковь – общество)*, с. 286-287.

Фото 1 – Расположение Ивангорода (справа) по отношению к крепости в Нарве, в настоящее время



Источник: Личный архив автора.

охраняли бастионы, из которых можно было стрелять по противнику. Город был разделён на две части: старую и новую, между которыми проходила стена. Новая часть города была расположена на севере и являлась своеобразным пригородом. Южнее старой части города находился замок, окружённый стеной и рвом [рис. 1].


В 1699 году было принято решение, что гарнизон города будет состоять из 3100 человек. В действительности было по-другому. С 1695 года комендантом Нарвы стал Хеннинг Рудольф Хорн, а в июне 1699 года в его подчинении было около 1460 человек. Кроме сил Хорна в Нарве находилось около 150 верховых. Маргус Лайдре говорит, что могло быть триста человек для обслуживания фортификаций, но в литературе не говорится об участии этих людей в сражении. В городе были также орудия разных калибров (основными были 18-ти фунтовые)⁴³.

В марте 1700 года за несколько дней до нападения саксонских войск на Ригу, Карл XII писал в письме коменданту Хорну, чтобы тот был предельно внимательным, поскольку русские могут начать мобилизацию и предпринять

⁴³ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой*), с. 95-96, 97-99.

попытку занять крепость. Вскоре после этого, в сентябре, началась осада Нарвы под предводительством саксонского инженера Людвига Галлера и обстрел крепостных стен. Русские прятались за длинной насыпью, которая формой напоминала полукруг с двух сторон, упирающийся в реку, кроме того вели обстрел города из мелких окопов. Согласно российским планам крепость должна была сдать до конца ноября.

Рис. 1 – Укрепления Нарвы в конце XVII века



Источник: M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 93.

24 сентября в Нарву прибыл лично царь Пётр I. В то время российская армия состояла из 2 300 воинов новгородского воеводы, 14 520 солдат дивизии генерала Фёдора Головина и 11 164 человек генерала Адама Вейде. В сумме было около 28 000 солдат и офицеров российской пехоты и драгунов. В кавалерии было от 7 500 до 10 000 коней и от 35 000 до 38 000 людей. Предполагалось, что в Нарву прибудет еще столько же людей, но не все формирования прибыли вовремя⁴⁴. В распоряжении армии были необходимые артиллерийские орудия, привезённое из Москвы, Пскова и Новгорода. Туда входили 118 пушек, гаубиц, мортир, а также порох, пули, бомбы и ручные гранаты⁴⁵.

Многие офицеры российской армии были плохо обучены или настроены на быстрое карьерное продвижение в армии. Часть солдат не доверяла своим начальникам-иностранцам, даже если у них был большой военный опыт. Были также трудности в общении между представителями разных национальностей⁴⁶. Солдаты гвардейских полков направлялись в самые трудные военные сражения, поскольку лучше всех владели оружием, но и они были недостаточно обучены, например, с трудом попадали в цель. Часто также у солдат замечалось неэкономное отношение к боеприпасам, что в одном из писем подтвердил лично Пётр I⁴⁷. Это создавало проблемы, так как боеприпасов было немного, а рядовые солдаты часто были вооружены только луками. Кроме того, солдаты были уставшими после походов, и не хватало еды.

Следует сказать, что в самом начале Великой Северной войны согласно уставу Карла XI, шведская пехота была разделена на пикинеров (1\3 каждого батальона), мушкетёров и гренадёров (всего 2\3 батальона). Пикинеры были вооружены пиками и шпагами, мушкетёры – шпагами и мушкетами, но без штыков, а гренадёры воевали шпагами, ручными гранатами и мушкетами со штыками. Кавалерия же была вооружена шпагой, карабином и двумя пистолетами, в то время, как у драгунов была шпага, два пистолета, мушкет, как пишет Гуннар Артеус в статье, посвящённой шведской тактике боя во время Великой Северной войны⁴⁸. Кроме того, каждый солдат имел холодное оружие,

⁴⁴ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой*), 102; P. Ullgren, *Det stora nordiska kriget...* (*Великая Северная война...*), с. 47.

⁴⁵ P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne za panowania Piotra I* (*Русские вооружённые силы во время правления Петра I*), Краков 2010, с. 156.

⁴⁶ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой*), с. 103.

⁴⁷ P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...* (*Русские вооружённые силы...*), с. 45-46.

⁴⁸ G. Arteus, *Stosunek szwedzkich i polskich sił zbrojnych podczas Wielkiej Wojny Północnej* (*Соотношение шведских и польских вооружённых сил во время Великой Северной*

что особенно помогало пехотинцам во время ближнего боя.

Шведская армия была основана на принципе принадлежности формирований к определённым территориям, поэтому после объявления мобилизации военные формирования собирались на соответствующих территориях – сборных пунктах. Недостатком армии было то, что она была плохо испытана в бою, мало было известно о короле, а его молодой возраст предполагал нехватку практического опыта командования армией во время битвы⁴⁹.

1 октября шведская армия по морю направилась из Карлсхамна в Инфланты. Самым удобным и лучше всего расположенным местом, между саксонской и российской армией выбрали порт в Парнаве. Через неделю по прибытии шведского монарха в Парнаву, он получил известие, что саксонские войска прекратили осаду Риги, то есть город был уже в безопасности. Король объявил мобилизацию всех формирований и встречу в городке Везенберг, откуда нужно было преодолеть расстояние в 120 километров, чтобы дойти до Нарвы. 13 ноября Карл XII вместе с 10,5 тыс. армией покинул Парнаву, чтобы продолжать поход и встретиться с армией Петра I⁵⁰. Король в письме от 15 октября писал Горну, что уже скоро к защитникам крепости присоединится остальная часть армии и поможет им победить русских. У полковника Горна не оставалось другого выхода, как дальше защищать нарвскую крепость⁵¹.

Один из шведских офицеров вспоминает, что походы длились целыми днями. Были опасения, что русские войска могут напасть на пути следования шведов, поэтому случалось, что шведы шли в боевом строю. 18 ноября Карл XII получил известие, что недалеко находятся русские (об этом свидетельствовали выжженные близлежащие деревни). Тогда король вместе с драгунами и телохранителями вышел им навстречу. Оказалось, что это было только несколько десятков русских, высланных с тем, чтобы отвлечь боем часть шведских сил⁵². Иногда такие сигналы тревоги бывали ложными. В любом

войны), "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" («Исследования и материалы для истории военного дела») (далее: SMHW) 1976, т. 20, с. 122-123.

⁴⁹ G. Arteus, *Stosunek szwedzkich i polskich sił zbrojnych (Соотношение шведских и польских вооружённых сил)*, с. 123-124; K. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Narwą (Битва под Нарвой)*, с. 33; C. O. Nordesvan, *Svenska armén åren 1700-1709 (Шведская армия в 1700-1709 годах)*, KFA 1916, с. 120-129.

⁵⁰ B. Liljegen, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, 86-87.

⁵¹ K. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Narwą (Битва под Нарвой)*, с. 34; B. Liljegen, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 87.

⁵² *Löjtnanten Grefve C. H. P. Sperlings dagbok 1700-1710 (Дневник лейтенанта Сперлинга 1700-1710)*, KKD III, с. 8.

случае войско быстро принимало боевую позицию и таким образом продвигалось дальше, будучи готовым к каждой ситуации.

17 ноября произошло первое серьёзное столкновение. Вдали был замечен противник и было послано 40 драгунов генерала Жоржа Иоганна Майдла с тем, чтобы они заняли овраг Пюхяйоки. Вскоре оказалось, что там находится 5 000 человек Бориса Шереметева. Узнав об этом, Карл XII выслал в часть генерала Майдла орудия и батальон гвардейцев. Русские вынуждены были быстро отступить на другой берег реки (надо сказать, что русские перешли реку в поисках еды)⁵³.

Узнав о первой победе шведов, Пётр I передал командование армией генералу князю Карлу Евгению Кроу, а сам покинул военный лагерь. Чем руководствовался Пётр I? Исследователи этих событий выдвигают предположения, что царь хотел собрать более многочисленные войска для защиты от армии Карла XII, поскольку, по словам одного из захваченных пленных, речь шла о якобы 30-ти тысячной армии Карла XII. Другие историки отмечают, что царь понимал, что состояние армии плохое и поражение близко. Поэтому он отправился в Новгород, забирая с собой Меншикова и главнокомандующего Фёдора Головина⁵⁴. Недавно Анджей Андрусевич объединил эти две причины и написал, что царь предполагал, что его войско будет побеждено, а он, опасаясь попасть в плен, покинул военный лагерь, чтобы подготовиться к следующему сражению со шведами.

Известия о высадке Карла XII в Парнаве с многочисленной и прекрасно обученной армией, донесения о продвижении его армии к Нарве, усталость солдат, а также длительные морозы - всё это привело к тому, что в рядах армии Петра I началось дезертирство. Стало также не хватать боеприпасов. Все эти факторы привели к частичной деморализации солдат, которые, не зная причины отъезда царя из лагеря, готовились к трудному сражению.

Битва. „Med Guds hjälp”⁵⁵

Восемнадцатилетний король Карл XII и генерал-поручик Карл Густав Реншильд возглавили армию, насчитывающую 10 537 человек и 37 орудий. Армия состояла из 21 батальона пехоты (5 889 человек), 47 кавалерийских рот

⁵³ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой*), с. 142-143; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, s. 89-90; M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, 151-152.

⁵⁴ Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 53; A. Andrusiewicz, *Piotr Wielki (Пётр Великий)*, с. 252.

⁵⁵ «С Божьей помощью».

(4 314 лошадей) и 334 артиллеристов. Среди пехотинцев большинство было шведов (72 %), а в кавалерии – финны (62 %) ⁵⁶.

Утром 20 ноября 1700 года шведы вышли из лесу, по которому они приблизились к позиции противника. Они заняли высоты Хермансбург, менее чем в двух километрах от передовой линии российских войск, и заняли боевую позицию. Бесспорным преимуществом этого места было то, что русские не видели всех манёвров шведов, но зато Карл XII и его генералы хорошо знали дислокацию войск Петра I. Сначала шведы начали обстреливать русских вместе с гарнизоном крепости Нарва, а около 14-ти часов началась битва ⁵⁷.

Территория предстоящей битвы находилась в широкой излучине реки Нарвы на уровне Хермансбургской возвышенности и застроек города Нарвы. На равнине к югу от города русские возвели систему полевых укреплений длиной 6,5 километра и высотой около 2,7 метра в форме полукруга, доходящего до берегов реки ⁵⁸. На правом северном крыле укреплений территория была очень заболоченной, а на левом южном территория была холмистая и слегка поросшая кустарником [рис. 2].

Рис. 2 – План осады Нарвы в 1700 году. Автор Габриель Боденер, 1720 год.



Источник: Z. Wójcik, *Dzieje Rosji (История России) 1533-1801*, Варшава 1971, с. 224.

⁵⁶ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (Битва под Нарвой), с. 146.

⁵⁷ *Löjtnanten Grefve C. H. P. Sperlings dagbok 1700-1710 (Дневник лейтенанта Сперлинга 1700-1710)*, с. 10; M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (Битва под Нарвой), с. 147; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 91; R. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, с. 152; Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 55.

⁵⁸ R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 152.

Поскольку главным пунктом русских укреплений был бастион, расположенный в центре, Карл XII решил начать атаку именно в этом месте. По плану предполагалось начать атаку с помощью пехоты и кавалерии, разделённых на две группы, у самого бастиона, с целью разбить линию русского войска. После этого одна группа должна была отбросить часть русских налево, а другая направо, чтобы таким образом нарушить целостность русского войска⁵⁹.

Как пишет в своём дневнике поручик Сперлинг, предводителем правого фланга был генерал Отто Веллинг, а кроме того командовали там Ханс Вахтмейстер и генерал майор Кнут Поссе. Во время сражения был сильный снегопад, который ограничивал видимость, поэтому русские с некоторым опозданием заметили приближающихся шведов, чья кавалерия устремилась к флангам противника. В центре были пехотные войска. В какой-то момент шведы произвели манёвр, заставляющий поверить в их отступление, а пехота в это время направилась в тыл за фашинами, чтобы засыпать ров. Это ввело в заблуждение русскую армию и только ускорило захват укрепления и разрушение большого центрального бастиона с двух сторон. Цель была достигнута – пехота со штыками прорвалась в гущу русских войск и начала их сталкивать вдоль оборонительной линии неприятеля. Русские были полностью дезориентированы и обескуражены⁶⁰.

Сам Карл XII сражался на левом фланге, которым командовал генерал-поручик Реншильд. Они отбросили до самой реки Нарвы весь правый фланг противника, чтобы таким образом отрезать ему путь к отступлению. Кавалерия всё время держала русских в лагере, не давая им возможности выхода в открытое поле⁶¹. Когда в какой-то момент многочисленная группа русских солдат решила убежать с поля битвы по единственному возможному пути, то есть по мосту Кампергольм, мост обрушился, а все солдаты утонули в быстром течении реки Нарвы. Это событие дополнительно ослабило русский боевой дух.

Особенно трудными условия для ведения боёв стали после наступления темноты, поскольку солдатом трудно было отличить «своих» от «чужих». В

⁵⁹ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой*), с. 150-151; Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 55-56; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 92-93.

⁶⁰ *Löjtnanten Grefve C. H. P. Sperlings dagbok 1700-1710* (*Дневник лейтенанта Сперлинга 1700-1710*), с. 11; M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой*), с. 157; R. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, с. 153; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 92-93; K. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Narwą* (*Битва под Нарвой*), с. 35-36.

⁶¹ *Löjtnanten Grefve C. H. P. Sperlings dagbok 1700-1710* (*Дневник лейтенанта Сперлинга 1700-1710*), с. 11.

северной части лагеря шведская лейб-гвардия напала однажды на полк из Даларны, предполагая, что атакует неприятеля. Несчастья не произошло, благодаря трубачам, которые сыграли сигнал, считавшийся опознавательным знаком шведов⁶².

Видя поражения отдельных формирований и групп солдат, сдался главнокомандующий российской армией князь де Кроу и генерал Галлер. Следующим явился к шведскому монарху Долгорукий, чтобы договориться об условиях капитуляции. Карл XII отпустил русских, воевавших на правом фланге, правда они должны были отдать всю артиллерию флаги и знамена.

Дольше всего не сдавался командующий левым фланга – он был взят в плен, а его солдаты были лишены оружия. Однако до этого Борис Шереметев, сражавшийся на левом фланге, опасаясь очередного столкновения со шведами, бросился со своим войском в реку. Утонуло тысяча человек⁶³. Нарвская битва была закончена.

Шведы потеряли в битве 30 офицеров и около 700 солдат (6,7 %), а 1 200 человек были ранены (из них 28 % были офицеры). Большое число раненых или убитых офицеров объясняется тем фактом, что командующие отдельными войсками сами шли в первой линии атаки и бросались на русских, чтобы придать своим солдатам смелости в бою. Среди раненых солдат было больше пехотинцев, чем кавалеристов⁶⁴.

Русские потеряли около 8 000–9 000 солдат (убитыми и ранеными), то есть около 20 %, принимавших участие в битве. Если прибавить к этому числу умерших от голода и холода в бою или по дороге в Новгород (около 6 000 человек), потери в людях составили бы 37,5 %, что является очень высокой ценой одного сражения.

⁶² *Löjtnanten Grefve C. H. P. Sperlings dagbok 1700-1710 (Дневник лейтенанта Сперлинга 1700-1710)*, с. 12-13; M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 158-160; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 93-95; Z. Anusik, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 58-59; R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, с. 153.

⁶³ *Löjtnanten Grefve C. H. P. Sperlings dagbok 1700-1710 (Дневник лейтенанта Сперлинга 1700-1710)*, с. 13-16; P. Ullgren, *Det stora nordiska kriget...* (*Великая Северная война...*), с. 50-52; M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 163-167; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII (Карл XII)*, с. 94-95; R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, с. 153. Подробнее о битве, а также о пропаганде после битвы: P. T. Ekengren, *Några intryck från slagfältet vid Narva (Несколько впечатлений и выводов после битвы под Нарвой)*, KFÅ 1939; A. Isberg, *Propaganda och fakta om slaget vid Narva (Пропаганда и факты о битве под Нарвой)*, KFÅ 1963.

⁶⁴ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 175.

Шведы захватили у русских 145 орудий разных калибров, 28 мортир, 4 гаубицы и оставшиеся боеприпасы. Большое символическое значение имел захват 151 флага и 20 флажков и кавалерийских знамён⁶⁵.

Нехватка еды и усиливающиеся болезни не позволили армии Карла XII оставаться дольше под Нарвой. Король забрал войска на зимний постой в замке Лайс и окружающих его деревнях⁶⁶.

Заключение

Естественно напрашивается вопрос, как армия, насчитывающая чуть более 10 000 человек, победила армию, превышающую её в четыре раза. Следует помнить об усталости русской армии, которая после долгого похода два месяца обстреливала Нарву, а также об отсутствии главнокомандующего армии царя Петра I в лагере. Если к этому прибавить плохую выучку русских солдат, проблемы в общении между офицерами и солдатами (как по причине языковых барьеров, так и из-за недоверия русских рядовых солдат к иностранцам, их начальникам), а также растянутость военной линии на 6,5 километров, нам бы представилась полная ситуация русских под Нарвой. Нам известны также письма русских с просьбами о помощи, направленные, например, Фридриху Августу. В одном из писем русскому послу в Речи Посполитой Судейкину, говорилось, что царь лично просит гданьских купцов обеспечить войска провиантом. Таким образом понятно, что трудная ситуация с продовольствием не позволила русским действовать эффективно.

Шведы также были уставшими после долгого похода, но бесспорно большим плюсом было участие в боях самого Карла XII, что, конечно, поднимало боевой дух. Относительно большая свобода, которую король предоставил Реншильду, и согласие на ведение битвы по его плану, свидетельствует о доверии короля своему генералу. Благоприятным для шведов было состояние паники в русском лагере, где ожидали атаку 40 000-ой прекрасно обученной армии. Никто даже не подозревал, что это будет только

⁶⁵ M. Laidre, *Segern vid Narva...* (*Битва под Нарвой...*), с. 176, 177.

⁶⁶ *Självtbiografiska anteckningar af överste Anders Koskull* (*Воспоминания Андерса Коскулла*), с. 303; Samuel Åkerhielm к Josias Cederhielm 18 XII 1700 из Стокгольма [в:] S. W. Olsson, *Samuel Agriconius Åkerhielms brev till Josias Cederhielm och Mauritz Vellingk 1700-1702* (*Письма Самуэля Агриконюса Иосиасу Цедерхельму и Морицу Веллингку 1700-1702*), Stockholm 1979, с. 9-10.

R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, с. 158.

000 солдат, и фронтальная атака во время снежной пурги. Многие авторы указывают на погоду, как решающий фактор победы шведов. Говорится о снежной пурге, которая воспрепятствовала эффективным действиям русских, но стоит помнить, как эта же погода повлияла на боевые возможности шведов.

В результате победы под Нарвой, Карл XII стал главным действующим лицом в начинающемся конфликте. Теперь была его очередь сделать следующий ход: он мог поверить слухам, что Пётр I собрал и обучает многочисленную армию и двинуться на Москву, мог также отомстить Фридриху Августу. Король посчитал, что Нарва принесла Петру I не только военное поражение, но также приведёт к изоляции его на международной арене. Он также думал, что разбитая русская армия не скоро оправится после такого поражения. Поэтому, он решил «сосредоточиться» на Веттине. Будущее вскоре показало, что это не было правильным решением, потому что в то время, как Карл XII «гнал» за саксонцем, русский царь приобрёл за границей вооружение, иностранных офицеров для обучения армии и готовился к реваншу.

**DIE GRUNDZÜGE DER POLITIK DES WIENER HOFES
GEGENÜBER DEN SOZIALEN KLASSEN UND KATEGORIEN
SIEBENBÜRGENS (1688-1790)**

**THE PRINCIPLES OF THE POLICY OF THE VIENNESE COURT
TOWARDS THE SOCIAL CLASSES AND CATEGORIES OF
TRANSYLVANIA (1688-1790)**

Marinel Ovidiu Koch – Tufiş

Karl-Franzens Universität in Graz
marinelovidiu.kochtufis@edu.uni-graz.at

Rezumat: Principiile politicii Curţii de la Viena faţă de clasele şi categoriile sociale din Transilvania (1688-1790)

Politica socială a fost o componentă de bază a politicii absolutiste a Habsburgilor în Transilvania. Un aspect important al acestei politici a fost dat de poziţia Curţii Vieneze faţă de clasele şi categoriile sociale din Principat. Măsurile luate de Habsburgi în acest sens au condus la o anumită modificare a structurilor sociale din perioada Principatului autonom al Transilvaniei, ele urmărind însă şi disciplinarea populaţiei şi creşterea devotamentului acesteia faţă de dinastia de Habsburg. Curtea Veneză încearcă, de asemenea, prin intermediul diferitelor măsuri, să se amestece şi în ordinea sistemului social al stărilor generale transilvănene, moştenit din perioada Principatului autonom (1541-1691).

Abstract: Social policy has been a key component of the absolutist regime of the Habsburgs in Transylvania. An important aspect of social policy was the Viennese Court's position regarding social classes and categories from Principality. The measures taken by the Habsburgs in this respect led to some modification of the social structures of the autonomous Principality of Transylvania, as well as they targeting the discipline of the population and increase its commitment to the Habsburg dynasty. Likewise, through various measures, the Court of Vienna tried to interfere in the social order of the general state of Transylvania, a system inherited from the autonomous Principality (1541-1691).

Résumé: Les principes de la politique de la Cour Vienneoise concernant les classes et les catégories sociales de la Transylvanie (1688-1790)

La politique sociale représentait une composante fondamentale de la politique absolutiste des Habsbourgeois en Transylvanie. La position de la Cour Vienneoise vis-à-vis les classes et les catégories sociales de la Principauté constituait un aspect important de sa politique sociale. Les mesures que les Habsbourgeois adoptèrent à cet égard menèrent à une certaine modification des structures sociales dans la période de la Principauté autonome de la Transylvanie; mais elles suivirent, aussi, de discipliner la population et d'augmenter le dévouement de celle-ci pour la dynastie habsbourgeoise. La Cour Vienneoise essaya, aussi, à

l'intermédiaire des mesures différentes se mêler dans l'ordre du système social des états généraux transylvains, système hérité de la période de la Principauté autonome (1541-1691).

Keywords: *Habsburgs, Transylvania, Populationism, Social Policy, Social Structures, Disciplining of the Population*

Die Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen

Die Sozialpolitik war eine wichtige Komponente der absolutistischen Politik der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen¹. Es stellt sich die Frage. Was charakterisierte die Sozialpolitik der Habsburger im Fürstentum? Die wichtigen Grundzüge dieser Politik waren: I. Die Politik der Erhöhung der Einwohnerzahl Siebenbürgens mittels verschiedener Methoden², II. die Politik gegenüber den wichtigen ethnischen Gruppen Siebenbürgens – Ungarn, Szekler, Sachsen und Rumänen – und ethnischen Minderheiten³, III. die Politik gegenüber den sozialen Gruppen und Kategorien, seien es die Stände oder die einfachen Einwohner – Bauern und arme Staatsbewohner – und nicht zuletzt die Betreibung einer Wohlfahrtspolitik (IV.). Viele Komponenten der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger konnten, genau wie im Fall anderer Maßnahmen der Habsburger, in Siebenbürgen, im Gebiet der Grenzregimente und auf den fürstlichen Domänen besser und mit mehr Erfolg durchgeführt werden, als in den Territorien, die sich direkt unter der Verwaltung der drei ständischen Nationen befanden. Im vorliegenden Artikel wird nur der dritte Aspekt der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen analysiert und erleuchtet bzw. die Politik des Wiener Hofes gegenüber den sozialen Gruppen und Kategorien des Fürstentums.

Die soziale Struktur des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen

Die Grundzüge der Politik des Wiener Hofes gegenüber den sozialen Klassen und Kategorien Siebenbürgens könnte ohne eine entsprechende Analyse der sozialen Struktur des Landes nicht richtig beleuchtet und verstanden werden. In diesem

¹ Über die populationistischen Theorien und über die Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger im Allgemein und in Siebenbürgen, vgl. auch KOCH-TUFIŞ Marinel Ovidiu, *Aspekte der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen (1688–1790). Maßnahmen zur Erhöhung der Anzahl der Einwohner des Fürstentums*. In: Codrul Cosminului, Bd. XVIII, Nr. 2, Suceava 2012, S. 349 ff.; KOCH-TUFIŞ Marinel Ovidiu, *Die Politik der Habsburger gegenüber den wichtigen ethnischen Gruppen Siebenbürgens – Ungarn, Szekler, Sachsen und Rumänen – und ethnischen Minderheiten (1688–1790)*. In: Codrul Cosminului, Bd. XIX, Nr. 1, Suceava 2013, S. 142 ff.

² Dieser Aspekt der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen wurde in unserem Artikel analysiert: KOCH-TUFIŞ Marinel Ovidiu, (2012), S. 347–360.

³ Dieser Aspekt der Sozialpolitik der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen wurde in unserem Artikel analysiert: KOCH-TUFIŞ Marinel Ovidiu, (2013), S. 141–160.

Zusammenhang ergeben sich folgende Fragen: Wie hoch war das Gewicht der einzelnen sozialen Klassen und Kategorien verglichen mit der Gesamtbevölkerung des Fürstentums? Welches Gewicht hatten die ethnischen Gruppen in den einzelnen sozialen Klassen und Kategorien?

An der Spitze der sozialen Hierarchie Siebenbürgens befand sich, genau wie zur Zeit des autonomen Fürstentums, der Adel. Sein Anteil an der gesamten Bevölkerung war sehr hoch, je nach Literaturangabe wurde er zwischen 4,4 und 6,74 Prozent geschätzt⁴. Der siebenbürgische Adel stellte aber keine homogene soziale Klasse dar. Er setzte sich aus Hochadel oder Magnaten und aus dem Mittel- und Kleinadel zusammen. Im 18. Jahrhundert gab es in Siebenbürgen etwa 50 - 60 Geschlechter, die zum Hochadel gehörten⁵. Zum Hoch- und Mitteladel gehörten im Jahr 1767 4.324 Familien⁶, davon waren 262 Magnatenfamilien⁷. Im Jahr 1772 gehörten 20.500 Personen zum Hoch- und Mitteladel⁸.

Ein Großteil des siebenbürgischen Hoch- und Mitteladels wohnte auf dem Territorium der ungarischen Komitate, ethnisch gesehen handelte es sich vorwiegend um Ungarn. Die Zahl des szeklerischen Mitteladels und insbesondere des Hochadels

⁴ Im Vergleich zum westeuropäischen Durchschnitt war das ein sehr hoher Anteil (in Frankreich machte er nur 1,3 Prozent aus), der den Verhältnissen in Polen ähnlich war. Vgl. GÖLLNER Carl, *Die Siebenbürgische Militärgrenze. Ein Beitrag zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1762–1851*. In: Adam Wandruszka (Hg.), (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Bd. 28), München 1974, S. 10; SCHASER Angelika, *Siebenbürgen unter der Habsburger Herrschaft im 18. Jahrhundert*. In: Siebenbürgische Semesterblätter, Drittes Jahr, Heft 1, München 1989, S. 25 f.; ANDEA Avram, *Absolutismul lăminat în Transilvania. Politica iosefină der reforme* [Der Aufgeklärte Absolutismus in Siebenbürgen. Die josephinische Reformpolitik]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 547; RĂDUȚIU Aurel, *Populație și societate în Transilvania și Banat* [Die Bevölkerung und die Gesellschaft in Siebenbürgen und im Banat]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 83.

⁵ Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, *Siebenbürgen im Habsburgerreich. Das lange 18. Jahrhundert (1711–1830)*. In: Béla Köpeczi (Hg.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*. Budapest 1990, S. 412.

⁶ Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel, (2002), S. 83

⁷ Vgl. SURDU B., *Situația social-economică a țărilor române în secolul al XVIII-lea. Situația social-economică a Transilvaniei până la răscoala lui Horea* [Die soziale und wirtschaftliche Lage der rumänischen Länder im 18. Jahrhundert. Die soziale und wirtschaftliche Lage Siebenbürgens bis zum Bauernaufstand unter der Führung Horeas]. In: Oțetea A. u.a. (Hg.), *Istoria României. Feudalismul dezvoltat în secolul al XVII-lea și la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Destrămarea feudalismului și formarea relațiilor capitaliste*. București 1964, Bd. 3, S. 421.

⁸ Die Zahl von 135.370 Personen, die Gouverneur Auersperg im selben Jahr für den Groß- und Mitteladel anführte (Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 83), war sicherlich übertrieben.

(„Primores“) war nicht sehr groß, sprach man nicht von den wenigen Rumänen, die zum Mitteladel gehörten und schon vor der habsburgischen Herrschaft im siebenbürgischen ungarischen Adel integriert wurden. Die Mehrheit des siebenbürgischen Adels gehörte aber zur Kategorie des Kleinadels. Die Familienzahl des Kleinadels stieg von 9.177 Familien in den Jahren 1765/1766 auf 9.186 Familien im Jahr 1772 und auf 11.373 Familien im Jahr 1785. Im Jahr 1795 sank ihre Zahl auf 10236 Familien⁹.

Die Kategorie des Kleinadels war in den Stühlen der Szekler (die sog. „Primipili“) zahlreich, in den ungarischen Komitaten, wo sie sich aus Ungarn und Rumänen zusammensetzten, relativ klein vertreten. Im 18. Jahrhundert wurden dem Kleinadel auch die rumänischen Bojaren aus dem Distrikt Făgăraş (Fogaras) zugeordnet¹⁰. Zur siebenbürgischen Adelsklasse gehörte auch eine relativ niedrige Anzahl von Sachsen, die aber keinen Grund besaßen und auf dem Königsboden keine feudalen Rechte ausüben konnten. Was die wirtschaftliche Kraft des siebenbürgischen Adels betrifft, besaßen die Magnaten die meisten Landgüter und die größte Anzahl untertäniger Bauern. Im Vergleich zu den Magnaten aus Ungarn verfügten die siebenbürgischen Magnaten über weniger ausgedehnte landwirtschaftliche Güter und auch über weniger untertänige Bauern¹¹. Viele Kleinadelfamilien besaßen nur einen kleinen Hof und bis zu drei untertänigen Bauern¹². Alle Kategorien des Adels verfügten über politische Rechte, aber nicht alle Kategorien hatten die gleichen Privilegien. Während der Hoch- und Mitteladel von der Bezahlung von Steuern befreit war, bezahlte jeder Kleinadelige, dem weniger als drei untertänige Bauern zur Verfügung standen, Steuern¹³. Die Privilegien und Rechte des Adels als soziale Klasse leiteten sich aus ihrer mittelalterlichen Pflicht ab, Waffendienst zu leisten¹⁴. Weil die Habsburger vom Waffendienst des Adels nach 1711 keinen Gebrauch mehr gemacht hatten, justifizierten sich eigentlich auch ihre Privilegien und Rechte nicht mehr.

⁹ Vgl. RĂDUŢIU Aurel, (2002), S. 83.

¹⁰ Vgl. EDROIU Nicolae, *Populație și societate în Transilvania și Banat* [Die Bevölkerung und die Gesellschaft in Siebenbürgen und im Banat]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 98.

¹¹ In Siebenbürgen standen einer Adelsfamilie im Durchschnitt, genau wie in Polen, nur 9 untertänige Bauernfamilien zur Verfügung. Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Absolutismul luminat...*, S. 547.

¹² Vgl. auch TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 412; Joseph II. selbst notierte im Jahr 1773, dass der siebenbürgische Adel „viel ärmer“ als der ungarische sei. Vgl. BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, *Călătoria împăratului Josif al II - lea în Transilvania la 1773 (Die Reise Kaiser Josephs II. durch Siebenbürgen im Jahre 1773)*. Cluj - Napoca/Klausenburg 2006, Vol./Bd. I., S. 749.

¹³ Vgl. RĂDUŢIU Aurel., (2002), S. 83 und 89.

¹⁴ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, *Institutionen und Verwaltung zur Zeit der Habsburger*. In: Siebenbürgische Semesterblätter, Drittes Jahr, Heft 1, München 1989, S. 56.

An der Basis der sozialen Pyramide befanden sich die Bauern, die in der Bevölkerung die absolute Mehrheit ausmachten. Der Anteil der Bauern an der Gesamtbevölkerung Siebenbürgens, der im 18. Jahrhundert in der historischen Literatur mit etwa 80–82 Prozent angegeben wird¹⁵, dürfte aber etwas höher gewesen sein¹⁶. Laut der Volkszählung in den Jahren 1785–1786 wohnten 1.256.806 Personen (247.029 Familien) in den 2.530 Dörfern Siebenbürgens, die unter der Zivilverwaltung standen, was einen Durchschnitt von 497 Einwohnern pro Dorf ergab¹⁷. Zu diesen hätte auch ein guter Teil der 134.144 Personen, die im Militärgrenzgebiet wohnten und vorwiegend Bauern waren, gezählt werden müssen. Auch die Bauern waren keine homogene soziale Klasse. Sie setzten sich aus der Kategorie der unfreien (untertänigen) und freien Bauern zusammen.

Die Mehrheit der Bauern gehörte zur Kategorie der unfreien Bauern, ca. 59–62 Prozent der siebenbürgischen Bevölkerung¹⁸. Die unfreien Bauern setzen sich ihrerseits aus der Gruppe der Leibeigenen (Hörigen), die auch unter dem Begriff „Jobagy“ bekannt waren, und aus der Gruppe der Häusler („Inquilinen“ oder „jeleri“) zusammen¹⁹. Die Zahl der unfreien Bauern stieg von 159.316 Familien (109.190 Familien von Leibeigenen und 50.126 Familien von Häuslern) in den Jahren 1765/1766 auf 164.869 Familien (114.602 Familien von Leibeigenen und 50.267 Familien von Häuslern) im Jahr 1772²⁰ und schließlich auf 196.364 Familien (128.258 Familien von Leibeigenen und 68.106 Familien von Häuslern) im Jahr 1795²¹. Die Verteilung der unfreien Bauern in den Territorien der drei Nationen war sehr ungleich. Ein Großteil wohnte in den ungarischen Komitaten und bestand ethnisch betrachtet mehrheitlich aus rumänischen, weiters aus ungarischen und aus

¹⁵ Vgl. MÜLLER Konrad, *Siebenbürgische Wirtschaftspolitik unter Maria Theresia*. In: Harold Steinacker (Hg.), (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Bd. 9), München 1961, S. 32; SCHASER Angelika, (1989), S. 25 f.; ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Absolutismul luminat...*, S. 547.

¹⁶ Aus der josephinschen Volkszählung in den Jahren 1785/86 resultiert, dass 87,07 Prozent der siebenbürgischen Bevölkerung Dorfeinwohner (Vgl. ANDEA Avram, *Transilvania. Habitat. Modul de trai [Siebenbürgen. Die Siedlungen. Die Lebensart der Bevölkerung]*. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 139), also Bauern waren; eine spätere Berufsstatistik im Jahr 1833 ergab noch 92 Prozent Bauern. Vgl. MÜLLER Konrad, (1961), S. 12 f.

¹⁷ Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 138 f.

¹⁸ Vgl. SCHASER Angelika, (1989), S. 25; ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Absolutismul luminat...*, S. 547.

¹⁹ Das Verhältnis von 2/1 zwischen Leibeigenen und Häuslern blieb auch im 18. Jahrhundert erhalten. Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 84.

²⁰ Gouverneur Auersperg gab im selben Jahr die Zahl der unfreien Bauern mit 1.112.250 Personen an (754.400 Leibeigene und 357.850 Häusler). Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 84.

²¹ Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 84.

relativ wenig sächsischen Bauern. Unfreie Bauern befanden sich auch auf dem Territorium der Szekler, ihr Anteil an der Gesamtbevölkerung war aber nicht sehr hoch. Im Sachsenland, wo theoretisch alle Einwohner freie Menschen waren, befanden sich keine unfreien Bauern. Die sächsischen Magistrate behandelten die dort ansässigen Rumänen, die Grundstücke gepachtet hatten, aber oftmals nicht als Zinsbauern, sondern als, ähnlich wie die adeligen Grundherren, ihre Leibeigenen.

Die Kategorie der freien Bauern machte im 18. Jahrhundert knapp 20 Prozent der Bevölkerung Siebenbürgens aus²². Die Zahl der freien Bauern stieg von 45.637 Familien in den Jahren 1765/1766 auf 50.697 Familien im Jahr 1772²³ und auf 64.083 Familien im Jahr 1785. Im Jahr 1795 gab es sogar 71.043 freie Bauernfamilien²⁴. Betrachtet man die Verteilung der freien Bauern in den Territorien der drei Nationen, zeigt sich folgendes Bild: Auf dem Königsboden waren alle Bauern freie Menschen und auch auf dem Territorium der Szekler gehörten vielen Personen zur Kategorie der freien Bauern („Pixidarii“). Den kleinsten Anteil an freien Bauern hatte das Territorium der Ungarn. Durch die Errichtung der Militärgrenze stieg ihre Anzahl aber auch hier.

Die Entwicklung der siebenbürgischen Urbansiedlungen, der Städte, und der Semiurbansiedlungen, der Märkte, im 18. Jahrhundert könnte auch durch ihren Anteil an der Gesamtheit der Orte des Fürstentums erklärt werden. Dieser Anteil stieg am Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts von 2,71 Prozent²⁵ bis zur Zeit der Volkszählung in den Jahren 1785–1786 nur leicht auf 2,84 Prozent²⁶. Das bedeutet, dass die Dörfer in diesem Zeitraum eine höhere Wachstumsdynamik als die Urban- und Semiurbansiedlungen aufwiesen. Die niedrige Dynamik beim Wachstum der siebenbürgischen Städte resultierte auch aus der Verschiebung der Hierarchie der wichtigen Städte im Gebiet des historischen Ungarns. War Kronstadt, die bevölkerungsreichste Stadt Siebenbürgens, am Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts mit etwa 16.000 Einwohnern die größte Stadt des ungarischen Raumes, befand sie sich in den 1780er Jahren mit fast 18.000 Einwohnern nur noch an neunter Stelle²⁷. Die josephinische Volkszählung aus den Jahren 1785/86 enthält auch genaue Daten über die Einwohnerzahl der siebenbürgischen Städte und Märkte. 12,91 Prozent der Einwohner des Fürstentums wohnten in Städten (4,93 Prozent) und Märkten (7,98 Prozent). Das bedeutet eine Summe von 186.565 Personen oder 42.277 Familien.

²² Vgl. SCHASER Angelika, (1989), S. 25.

²³ Gouverneur Auersperg gab im selben Jahr die Zahl von freien Bauern mit 333.508 Personen an. Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 84.

²⁴ Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 84.

²⁵ Von den 2.466 Orten (Siedlungen) Siebenbürgens waren nur 67 Siedlungen Städte und Märkte (15 Städte und 52 Märkte). Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 137.

²⁶ Von den 2.604 Orten (Siedlungen) Siebenbürgens waren nur 74 Siedlungen Städte und Märkte (9 Städte und 65 Märkte). Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 137.

²⁷ Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 413.

Außerdem war die Zahl der Personen, die in den königlichen Freistädten wohnten, mit 71.281 Personen oder 16.706 Familien niedriger als die Zahl der Personen, die in den Märkten wohnten (115.284 Personen oder 25.571 Familien)²⁸. Der Anteil des siebenbürgischen Bürgertums selbst, der Besitz hatte und Steuern zahlen musste, wurde im 18. Jahrhundert in der historischen Literatur auf nur 2 Prozent geschätzt²⁹. Aufschluss über die Anzahl des siebenbürgischen Bürgertums könnte die Statistik der Familien, die Fiskalpflichten leisten mussten, geben. Die Zahl dieser Familien stieg in den Städten und in den Märkten von 13.238 Familien in den Jahren 1765/1766 auf 14.303 Familien im Jahr 1772 und sank auf 10.791 Familien im Jahr 1785³⁰.

Zur Kategorie der Urbansiedlungen gehörten in Siebenbürgen die königlichen Freistädte (*liberae regiae civitates*), die Adelsstädte (*oppida nobilium*) und die Taxalorte (*loca taxalia*). Die Märkte (*oppida*) gehörten zur Kategorie der Semiurbansiedlungen. Die königlichen Freistädte waren die wichtigsten Städte des Fürstentums, sie verfügten über Sonderrechte und unterstanden direkt dem Landesfürsten. Sie befanden sich in allen Territorien der drei Nationen, insbesondere aber im Sachsenland. Die Adelsstädte und Taxalorte befanden sich in den Territorien der Ungarn und Szekler, auch sie verfügten über Sonderrechte und unterstanden direkt dem Landesfürsten³¹. Die siebenbürgischen Städte waren nicht groß, laut der

²⁸ Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 138 f.

²⁹ Das entsprach dem Niveau von Ungarn, war aber wesentlich niedriger als im Lande unter der Enns und in Böhmen, von England und Frankreich ganz abgesehen. Vgl. BENDA Kálmán, *Politische Strömungen in Siebenbürgen während der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts*. In: Arbeitskreis für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde (Hg.), (=Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde, 2 (73.) Jahrgang, Heft 2 /79), Köln - Wien 1979, S. 189 ff.; SCHASER Angelika, (1989), S. 25 f.; ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 139.

³⁰ Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel, (2002), S. 85.

³¹ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, *Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbürgen 1688–1869*. In: Paul Philippi (Hg.), (= *Studia Transylvanica*, Ergänzungsbände des Siebenbürgischen Archivs, Bd. 11), Köln - Wien 1985, S. 37 f.; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1989), S. 57; Laut den Fiskalkonskriptionen, die in der Zeit von 1698 bis 1727 in Siebenbürgen durchgeführt wurden, befanden sich im Fürstentum nur drei königliche Freistädte. Ihre Zahl nahm zu, denn die Habsburger erhoben, wie im Jahr 1784, mehrere siebenbürgische Städte in den Status einer königlichen Freistadt. Während der josephinischen Volkszählung aus den Jahren 1785–1786 gab es in Siebenbürgen neun königliche Freistädte: Braşov (Kronstadt/Brassó), Sibiu (Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben), Cluj-Napoca (Klausenburg/Kolozsvár), Alba Iulia (Weissenburg, Karlsburg/Gyulafehérvár), Bistriţa (Bistritz/Beszerce), Sighişoara (Schäßburg/Segesvár), Mediaş (Mediasch/Medgyes), Orăştie (Broos/Szászváros) und Târgu Mureş (Neumarkt am Mieresch/Marosvásárhely). In den Jahren 1786–1787 bekamen auch die armenischen Städte Gherla (Armenierstadt, Neuschoß/Szamosújvár) und Dumbrăveni (Elisabethstadt/Ebesfalva) den Status einer königlichen Freistadt. Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 37 f.; JOSUPEIT - NEITZEL Elke, *Die Reformen Josephs II. in Siebenbürgen*. In: Georg Stadtmüller u.a. (Hg.), (= *Studia Hungarica*. Schriften des Ungarischen Instituts, München, Bd. 33), München 1986, S. 115 f.; ANDEA Avram, *Habitat şi populaţie în Transilvania secolului al XVIII-lea* [Die

Volkszählung im Jahr 1787 hatten nur drei Städte über 10.000 Einwohner³². Die Märkte befanden sich in allen Territorien der drei Nationen und hatten nur eine niedrige Einwohnerzahl. Die Territorien der drei Nationen unterschieden sich auch durch den Anteil der Stadt- und Markteinwohner an der Gesamtheit ihrer Bevölkerung. Während im Sachsenland durchschnittlich ca. 20 Prozent der Bevölkerung in diesen Siedlungen wohnten³³, hatten die Territorien der Ungarn und Szekler im Durchschnitt vermutlich nur etwa 5-10 Prozent Stadt- und Markteinwohner³⁴. Alle Einwohner der siebenbürgischen Städte, Taxalorte und Märkte waren freie Menschen. In den Adelsstädten wohnten auch Adelige, die bürgerliche Berufe und Handwerke ausübten und Handel betrieben. An der Führung der Städte beteiligten sich insbesondere die vermögenden Patrizier. Das sächsische Patriziat, das Handel betrieb und Werkstätten besaß, war politisch und wirtschaftlich besonders einflussreich³⁵. Auch die vermögenden Händler aus den Reihen der Minderheiten der Armenier und der „Griechen“ spielten in manchen siebenbürgischen Städten eine immer wichtigere finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Rolle³⁶.

Als Folge der Entwicklung des Manufakturwesens und insbesondere des Berg- und Salzwesens begann auch in Siebenbürgen der Prozess der Ausbildung einer dünnen Arbeiterschicht (Proletariat), die aber, wie im Fall der Bergleute, auf ihre mittelalterlichen Privilegien pochte. Die Habsburger selbst erkannten die alten

Siedlungen und die Bevölkerung Siebenbürgens im 18. Jahrhundert]. In: *Civilizație medievală și modernă românească. Studii istorice*. Cluj - Napoca, 1985, S. 132; RĂDUȚIU Aurel, (2002), S. 85; ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat...*, S. 137 ff.; ANDEA Avram, *Transilvania. Instituțiile orășenești* [Siebenbürgen. Die Stadt-institutionen]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 378.

³² Braşov (Kronstadt/Brassó) - 17.792 Einwohner, Sibiu (Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben) - 14.066 Einwohner und Cluj - Napoca (Klausenburg/Kolozsvár) - 13.928 Einwohner. Über 5.000 Einwohner hatten nur Târgu Mureş (Neumarkt am Mieresch/Marosvásárhely) - 5.934 Einwohner und Sighişoara (Schäßburg/Segesvár) - 5.517 Einwohner. Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel, (2002), S. 85 f.

³³ Vgl. BENDA Kálmán, (1979), S. 190; Im Distrikt Kronstadt (Braşov) wohnten in den Städten und Märkten sogar 28,33 Prozent der Bevölkerung. Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 139.

³⁴ Den höchsten Proporz gab es im Komitat Kolosvár (Cluj) mit 21,34 Prozent Stadt- und Markteinwohner, und den niedrigsten im Komitat Hunyad (Hunedoara) mit nur 3,93%; Im szeklerischen Stuhl Udvarhely (Odorhei) waren nur 7,74 Prozent der Bevölkerung Stadt- und Markteinwohner. Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 139; In der Stadt Cluj - Napoca im Komitat Kolosvár (Cluj) machten die Sachsen einen beträchtlichen Anteil der Bevölkerung aus. Vgl. auch ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Instituțiile orășenești*, S. 379 und 382; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 38, Fußnote 146.

³⁵ Joseph II. notierte im Jahr 1773, dass ca. 60–70 vermögende und einflussreiche sächsische Familien die Macht im Sachsenland hatten und diese in Wirklichkeit die sächsische Nation ausmachten. Vgl. BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 751.

³⁶ EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), S. 98.

Privilegien der Bergleute und Salzhauer an und verliehen ihnen zudem neue Privilegien³⁷. Juristisch betrachtet war die Mehrheit der erwähnten Arbeiter frei.

In Siebenbürgen gab es auch eine sehr dünne Intellektualitätsschicht, die sich aus Beamten, Notaren, Mittel- und Volksschullehrern, Ärzten, Ingenieuren sowie aus Geistlichen, insbesondere katholische und protestantische, zusammensetzte. Sie stammten, ethnisch gesehen, hauptsächlich aus den Reihen der Ungarn und Sachsen, die Zahl der rumänischen Intellektuellen war sehr niedrig, sozial gehörten sie meistens zum Adel oder Bürgertum, nur wenige zählten zum freien Bauerntum³⁸.

Zusammenfassung: Die Habsburger hatten in Siebenbürgen mit folgender sozialen Situation zu tun, auf die sie bei der Ausbildung ihrer Herrschaftsbasis und bei der Treffung und Durchführung der absolutistischen Maßnahmen achten mussten. Die siebenbürgischen sozialen privilegierten Klassen und gleichzeitig auch die Eliten des Landes stammten zu einem Großteil aus dem Adel, der in den ungarischen Komitaten konzentriert war, und aus dem Patriziat der sächsischen Städte. Der Anteil der unfreien Menschen war nicht höher als in anderen Gebieten der Monarchie, ihre Situation war aber schlechter als in den österreichischen Erbländern und ähnelte der Situation in Ungarn. Sie wohnten größtenteils auf dem Gebiet der Komitate. In Siebenbürgen befand sich aber auch ein relativ hoher Anteil an freien Menschen, ihre absolute Mehrheit war in den Territorien der Sachsen und Szekler zu finden, im Militärgrenzgebiet und in den Städten. Der Anteil der Stadteinwohner war mit Ausnahme des Sachsenlandes relativ niedrig.

Die Grundzüge der Politik des Wiener Hofes gegenüber den sozialen Klassen und Kategorien Siebenbürgens

Drei wichtige Aspekte der Politik des Wiener Hofes gegenüber den sozialen Klassen und Kategorien Siebenbürgens werden weiter analysiert und beleuchtet werden. Es geht um Maßnahmen, die eine bestimmte Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur des Landes zur Folge hatten (1), um die Einmischung der Habsburger in die soziale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens (2), und letztendlich um die Maßnahmen,

³⁷ Vgl. auch FERBER Johann Jacob (Hg.), *Born Ignatz v., Briefe über mineralogische Gegenstände, auf seiner Reise durch das Temeswarer Bannat, Siebenbürgen, Ober- und Niederungarn*. Frankfurt und Leipzig 1774, S. 156; FICHTEL Johann v., *Beytrag zur Mineralgeschichte von Siebenbürgen, Zweyter Theil, welcher die Geschichte des Steinsalzes enthält*. Nürnberg 1780. In: Rainer Slotta u.a. (Hg.), *Silber und Salz in Siebenbürgen*. Bochum 1999, Bd. 1., S. 254 f.; GERSTORFF Franz v., *Siebenbürgischer Bergwercks Commissions Bericht (1762)*. In: Rainer Slotta u.a. (Hg.), *Silber und Salz in Siebenbürgen*. Bochum 1999, Bd. 1., S. 161–224; WOLLMANN Volker, *Der siebenbürgische Bergbau im 18. Jahrhundert*. In: Rainer Slotta u.a. (Hg.), *Silber und Salz in Siebenbürgen*. Bochum 1999, Bd. 1., S. 44.

³⁸ Vgl. auch BENDA Kálmán, (1979), S. 191 f.

mit denen der Wiener Hof die Disziplinierung der sozialen Klassen und Kategorien des Fürstentums beabsichtigte (3).

1. Die Verschiebung der sozialen Strukturen Siebenbürgens durch die Maßnahmen der Habsburger

Es stellt sich die Frage, ob die Maßnahmen der Habsburger im 18. Jahrhundert zu einer wesentlichen Änderung der sozialen Struktur des Fürstentums beitrugen? Die historische Forschung ist sich hinsichtlich dieser Problematik nicht einig. Während manche Historiker der Auffassung sind, dass die habsburgische Herrschaft zu wichtigen Änderungen der sozialen Struktur des Landes geführt hat³⁹, vertreten andere Historiker die Meinung, dass es im 18. Jahrhundert keine Modifizierung der sozialen Struktur gegeben hat⁴⁰. Wie weiter präsentiert wird, zielten die Maßnahmen der Habsburger durchaus auf eine gewisse Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur Siebenbürgens, zu einer wesentlichen Modifizierung kam es mit Ausnahme der Periode der Herrschaft von Joseph II. aber nicht. Die Habsburger beabsichtigten nicht, die feudale soziale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens radikal zu modifizieren oder gar zu ersetzen, sie versuchten vielmehr, die siebenbürgische ständische Gesellschaft in ihrem eigenen Interesse in einen treuen Untertanenverband zu transformieren. Welche Ziele wurden mit der Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur des Fürstentums verfolgt? In erster Linie ging es um die Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur als Folge des Prozesses der Bildung neuer siebenbürgischer Eliten⁴¹ als wichtige Komponente der Herrschaftsbasis der Habsburger im Fürstentum (a), und um die Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur als Folge der Berücksichtigung der machtpragmatischer, finanziellen und wirtschaftlichen sowie der religiösen und militärischen Interessen des Wiener Hofes. (b)

a) Die Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur als Folge des Prozesses der Bildung neuer siebenbürgischer Eliten. Was die Politik der Konsolidierung der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen betrifft, stellt sich die Frage: Auf welchen sozialen Klassen und Kategorien des Fürstentums konnte die habsburgische Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen basieren? Eine Antwort liefert die bereits oft erwähnte Denkschrift General Caraffas. Seiner Auffassung nach konnte sich die habsburgische Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen nicht auf die breite Masse der Bevölkerung, sondern auf

³⁹ Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 412; EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), S. 96.

⁴⁰ Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 82.

⁴¹ Der Prozess der Elitenbildung wird von manchen Historikern als Teil der habsburgischen Entwicklungspolitik bezeichnet. Vgl. HEPPNER Harald, *Die Entwicklungspolitik der Habsburger in Südosteuropa infolge der Türkenkriege*. In: Adam Wandruszka (Hg.), (= Südostdeutsches Archiv, Bd. XXVI/XXVII), München 1983/1984, S. 96 f.

wichtigen Persönlichkeiten des Landes stützen⁴². Und diese waren, wie schon im Leopoldinischen Diplom angesprochen, die Magnaten, der Adel und das sächsische Patriziat⁴³. Nicht alle dieser Eliten waren aber dafür geeignet. Der Wiener Hof konnte, insbesondere im Fall des ungarischen Adels, nur jene Personen aussuchen, die bereit waren, zur Konsolidierung der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen zu dienen. Die Habsburger versuchten ihre Herrschaftsbasis in Siebenbürgen auch durch die Ausbildung neuer siebenbürgischer Eliten zu erweitern und gleichzeitig zu konsolidieren. Der Prozess der Ausbildung neuer siebenbürgischer Eliten fand auf zwei Wegen statt: In erster Linie durch die gezielte Verschiebung der herkömmlichen sozialen Struktur Siebenbürgens, sekundär durch den Transfer der Eliten.

Die Verschiebung der herkömmlichen sozialen Struktur des Fürstentums im Dienst des Prozesses der Ausbildung der neuen siebenbürgischen Eliten erfolgte hauptsächlich durch die Dynamik auf der Vertikale der sozialen Hierarchie – zwischen den verschiedenen sozialen Klassen und Kategorien – und durch die Dynamik auf der Horizontale der sozialen Hierarchie – innerhalb der sozialen Klassen.

Ein Charakteristikum der neuen siebenbürgischen Eliten war ihre mehrheitliche Zugehörigkeit zur Adelsklasse. Zu den neuen siebenbürgischen Eliten gehörten aber auch Patrizier, Beamte, der hohe katholische und protestantische Klerus, Militärs, vermögende Händler und Intellektuelle. Fast alle dieser sozialen und beruflichen Kategorien strebten die Erlangung eines Adelstitels an, wenn sie ihn nicht schon hatten. Aus diesem Grund spielte die Dynamik auf der Vertikale der sozialen Hierarchie eine wichtige Rolle im Prozess der Ausbildung neuer siebenbürgischer Eliten. Es ging hauptsächlich um die Verleihung des Adelstitels durch die Habsburger an Personen, die aus den Reihen der freien Bauern und Bürger stammten, und die für die Dynastie als Beamte, Militärs, Geistliche usw. Dienste geleistet hatten. Das Ausmaß dieses Prozesses scheint durch die schon präsentierte Steigerung der Anzahl siebenbürgischer Kleinadelsfamilien bestätigt zu werden. Die freien Bauern und einfachen Bürger wurden in die Kategorie des Kleinadels aufgenommen, die mächtigen sächsischen Patrizier aber auch in die Reihen des siebenbürgischen Mittel- und Hochadels⁴⁴.

⁴² Vgl. PRODAN David, *Instaurarea regimului austriac în Transilvania [Der Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen]*. In: Oțetea A. u.a. (Hg.), *Istoria României. Feudalismul dezvoltat în secolul al XVII-lea și la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Destrămarea feudalismului și formarea relațiilor capitaliste*. București 1964, Bd. 3, S. 230 f.

⁴³ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 334.

⁴⁴ Schon am Anfang der habsburgischen Herrschaft wurden Valentin Franck und Johann Zabanius für ihre Dienste in den Adelsstand erhoben, Vgl. GÜNDISCH Konrad, *Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen*. In: Wilfried Schlau (Hg.), (= Studienbuchreihe der Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kulturrat, Bd. 8), München 1998, S. 111 f.; Diese Politik wurde auch später fortgesetzt, so wurden auch die Mitglieder der Familien Seeberg, Bruckenthal (Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 412) und andere in den

Die neuen siebenbürgischen Adeligen waren im Vergleich zum traditionellen Adel in der Regel aber keine Grundbesitzer, so genannte Leistungs- und Dienstadelige also. Ihre wirtschaftliche Kraft bestand nicht in der Größe der landwirtschaftlichen Güter, sondern in erster Linie, genau wie im Fall der neuen bürgerlichen Eliten, in der Höhe des Einkommens, das sie für ihre Dienste erhielten, ein zusätzliches Element für die Bindung an die Interessen des Wiener Hofes⁴⁵.

Auch die Dynamik auf der Horizontale der sozialen Hierarchie spielte eine wichtige Rolle im Prozess der Ausbildung der neuen siebenbürgischen Eliten. Sie bestand in der Verleihung des habsburgischen Adelstitels eines Barons oder Grafen an verdiente Personen aus den Reihen des Adels durch den Wiener Hof⁴⁶, was in punkto ständische rechtliche Traditionen aus der Zeit des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen tatsächlich einen Durchbruch darstellte⁴⁷. Diese Titel wurden nicht nur an den ungarischen Adel⁴⁸, sondern auch an den szeklerischen Adel⁴⁹ und an das sächsische Patriziat⁵⁰, und sogar an den rumänischen Adel verliehen⁵¹. Dieser Prozess

Adelsstand erhoben; Joseph II. schlug schon im Jahr 1773 die unentgeltliche Verleihung von Adelstiteln an führende sächsische Familien vor; auch nach der Einführung der Konzivilität im Jahr 1781 und nach der Abschaffung der Territorien der drei Nationen in den Jahren 1783/84 beabsichtigte er die unentgeltliche Erhebung führender sächsischer Familien in den Adelsstand; der sächsische Adel durfte auf dem Königsboden aber keine Adelsrechte ausüben, das wurde ihm nur außerhalb gestattet. Vgl. JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 83 und 103 f.; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 757.

⁴⁵ Vgl. auch EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), S. 97 f.

⁴⁶ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 215 ff. und 226; ANDEA Avram, *Transilvania. Reformarea administrației* [Siebenbürgen. Die Reform der Administration]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. România între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 403.

⁴⁷ Die autonomen siebenbürgischen Fürsten verliehen keine Baron- oder Grafentitel. Der siebenbürgische Adel, der diese Titel vor der habsburgischen Herrschaft erhalten hatte, bekam sie für verschiedene Verdienste von habsburgischen Kaisern oder polnischen Königen; Im Jahr 1685 zum Beispiel verliehen die Habsburger an Mihail Teleki für seine Dienste den Titel eines Grafen. Vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), S. 227.

⁴⁸ Der Vizekanzler der siebenbürgischen Hofkanzlei, Samuel Kálnoki, erhielt schon im Jahr 1696 den Grafentitel. Vgl. ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Reformarea ...* S. 403.

⁴⁹ EGYED Ákos, *Der Verlust der Freiheitsrechte der Szekler Nation – die Voraussetzungen für die bürgerliche Umgestaltung im Jahr 1848*. In: Harald Roth (Hg.), (= Siebenbürgisches Archiv. Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde), Dritte Folge, Bd. 40, Köln – Weimar - Wien 2009, S. 230.

⁵⁰ Der zukünftige Gouverneur Siebenbürgens, Samuel Bruckenthal, bekam im Jahr 1761 den Barontitel. Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., *Samuel von Brukenthal*. In: Theodor Mayer (Hg.), (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Bd. 18), München 1967, Bd. I., S. 130 f., 235 und 267.

⁵¹ Insbesondere ging es um den Hochklerus der griechisch-katholischen Kirche. Der griechisch – katholische Bischof Samuel Micu Klein bekam im Jahr 1729 den Titel eines Barons.

führte auch zu einer Vertiefung der Ausdifferenzierung in den Reihen der siebenbürgischen Adelsklasse.

Der zweite Weg für die Ausbildung der neuen siebenbürgischen Eliten bestand im Transfer der Eliten. Konkret ging es um die Politik des Wiener Hofes, ausländische Beamte und Militärs, seien sie adeliger oder bürgerlicher Abstammung, durch die Verleihung des siebenbürgischen Indigenats einzubürgern. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen übte der Wiener Hof sogar Druck auf den Landtag aus, der für die Verleihung des siebenbürgischen Indigenats zuständig war⁵². Die Einsetzung der deutschen Beamten hatte nicht eine „*systematische Germanisierung*“ als Ziel⁵³, sondern die Verbesserung der siebenbürgischen Administration und die Ausbildung einer Beamtenschicht, auf die sich der Wiener Hof verlassen konnte.

Trotz der erwähnten Erfolge der Habsburger in der Ausbildung der neuen siebenbürgischen Eliten behaupten manche Historiker, dass das politische Leben Siebenbürgens im 18. Jahrhundert nicht von den „*Hominis novi*“, der neuen Aristokratie und den bürgerlichen Eliten, sondern von etwa 6-7 alten siebenbürgischen Magnatenfamilien bestimmt wurde. Zudem gab der traditionelle siebenbürgische Mitteladel im politischen Leben der Komitate auch weiterhin den Ton an⁵⁴.

Zusammenfassung: Die Politik der Habsburger der Integration sowohl der traditionellen als auch der neuen Eliten Siebenbürgens auf eine kluge Art und Weise spielte bei der Integration des Fürstentums in der Monarchie eine wichtige Rolle.

b) Zu einer Verschiebung der sozialen Struktur Siebenbürgens kam es auch durch die Berücksichtigung machtpragmatischer, finanzieller und wirtschaftlicher sowie religiöser und militärischer Interessen des Wiener Hofes. Diese Verschiebung war komplexer und flächendeckender, als jene, die durch den Prozess der Bildung neuer siebenbürgischer Eliten verursacht wurde. Sie betraf alle sozialen Klassen und Kategorien und nahezu alle ethnischen Gruppen Siebenbürgens. Aus sozialer Sicht scheint es aber, dass die unfreien Bauern den größten Nutzen aus dieser Verschiebung davon trugen, auch wenn der schon präsentierte Anstieg der Zahl der Familien der Leibeigenen und Häusler nicht dafür plädiert, ethnisch betrachtet waren es die Rumänen. Es genügt, dafür ein paar chronologisch geordnete Beispiele anzuführen: Die religiöse Union eines Teiles der Rumänen mit Rom öffnete nicht nur den Weg für die Bildung der rumänischen Eliten, inklusiv durch die Verleihung des Adelstitels⁵⁵,

Vgl. EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), S. 98 f.

⁵² Vgl. auch WOLLMANN Volker, (1999), S. 44.

⁵³ Vgl. MAYER Theodor, *Verwaltungsreform in Ungarn nach der Türkenzeit*. In: Josef Fleckenstein, Heinz Stob (Hg.), Sigmaringen 1980, S. 55.

⁵⁴ Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 412.

⁵⁵ Etwa die Hälfte der Personen, die im 18. Jahrhundert in Siebenbürgen von den Habsburgern geadelt wurden, waren Rumänen. Konfessionell gesehen stammten sie aus den Reihen der griechisch – katholischen Rumänen. Erst um 1800 wurden auch Personen aus den Reihen der Orthodoxen geadelt. Vgl. EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), S. 97 f.

für einen Teil dieser ethnischen Gruppen, insbesondere für viele Geistliche, bedeutete sie auch den sozialen Aufstieg aus der unteren sozialen Kategorie der unfreien Bauern in die Kategorie der freien Bauern. Der gleiche Prozess fand für die Rumänen auch im Fall der Errichtung der Militärgrenze statt: Die Bildung ihrer Eliten und die Steigerung der Anzahl der freien Bauern. Ein Element erscheint in diesem Zusammenhang sehr wichtig zu sein: Der neue rumänische Adel integrierte sich nicht mehr wie früher im ungarischen Adel, sondern beteiligte sich neben anderen rumänischen Eliten (Klerus, Beamte, Militärs und Bürgertum) sogar am Kampf für die nationale Emanzipation der Rumänen⁵⁶.

Trotz der Politik der Verleihung von Adelstiteln an verdiente Personen beabsichtigten die Habsburger aus machtpragmatischen, finanziellen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen keine unbegrenzte Zunahme der siebenbürgischen Adelsklasse. Kaiser Joseph II. selbst hatte keine gute Meinung über den ungarischen siebenbürgischen Adel⁵⁷. Als die bürgerlichen Sachsen, unterstützt von General Buccow, im Jahr 1762 um die Verleihung des Titels „*inclyti*“ (Hochlöbliche), den die Ungarn und Szekler als adelige Nationen trugen, am Wiener Hof ansuchten, stimmten der Staatsrat und der Thronfolger Joseph II nicht zu. Maria Theresia verlieh den gewünschten Titel an die Sachsen, aber nur unter der Bedingung, dass sie als Nation keine Adelsrechte bekommen, was für die Eliten der Sachsen unter anderem aber die Befreiung von Steuern bedeutet hätte⁵⁸.

Die Zunahme des Anteiles der freien Bauern in Siebenbürgen durch die Errichtung der siebenbürgischen Militärgrenze⁵⁹ kann teilweise auch durch die Steigerung der Familien der Grenzsoldaten erklärt werden⁶⁰. Durch die Errichtung der

⁵⁶ Vgl. auch EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), S. 98 f.

⁵⁷ Während seiner ersten Reise durch Siebenbürgen, 1773, bemerkte er, dass das „*Fanatismus Constitutionum*“... *bey dem den Siebenbürgisch – ungarischen Adel viel weiter getrieben, als bey den Hungarischen in Hungarn*“ ist. Vgl. BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 749; Weiters notierte der Kaiser: „*Die Ungarische Nobilität ... scheüet in der Welt nichts mehrers, als was ihre Einkünften betreffen könnte, oder was des Recht beschränkte selbe nach Billig - oder Unbilligkeit soweit, als sie nur immer können, zu erstrecken, und ihren Unterthnen recht aussagen und mit selbem nach Willkuhr disponieren zu können, dahero sie alles mögliche ehender thäten, als diese Verminderung einzugestehen. Diese sind, was eigentlich der Ungarn ihr Haupt – Absehen ist*“. Vgl. JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 72; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 751.

⁵⁸ Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I, S. 182–186.

⁵⁹ Vgl. auch PRODAN David, *Regimul austriac în Transilvania. Lupta pentru ridicarea politică a românilor* [Die habsburgische Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen. Der Kampf um die politische Emanzipation der Rumänen]. In: Oțetea A. u.a. (Hg.), *Istoria României. Feudalismul dezvoltat în secolul al XVII-lea și la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Destrămarea feudalismului și formarea relațiilor capitaliste*. București 1964, Vol. 3, S. 514.

⁶⁰ Ihre Anzahl stieg von 22.415 Familien in den Jahren 1765/1766 auf 23.077 Familien im Jahr 1772 und letztendlich auf 27.435 Familien im Jahr 1785. Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel, (2002), S. 84.

Militärgrenze nahm die Zahl der freien Bauern vorwiegend im Gebiet der rumänischen Grenzregimente zu. Die Maßnahmen der Habsburger führten aber nicht immer nur zu einer Steigerung der Anzahl der freien Menschen im Fürstentum. Durch die Abschaffung der Wehrsystems der Szekler im Jahr 1711 fielen viele szeklerische freie Bauern in Folge der Anordnung des Wiener Hofes in die Kategorie der unfreien Bauern zurück⁶¹. Auch den freien Bauern, und sogar dem Kleinadel, die zuvor in den Festungen des Fürstentums Dienst geleistet hatten, drohte aufgrund ihrer Ersetzung durch habsburgische Garnisonen der Verlust ihres sozialen Status freier Menschen⁶². Die Gefahr, den Status freier Menschen zu verlieren, drohte in ihrer Gesamtheit auch den Sachsen auf dem Königsboden. Das siebenbürgische Thesaurariat und der Kommandierende General in Siebenbürgen, O'Donnell, mit der Unterstützung der Hofkammer bzw. des Präsidenten des Hofkriegsrates, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy, versuchten in den 1760er Jahren nicht nur die Rechte der Sachsen auf dem Königsboden in Frage zu stellen, sondern sie auch anstatt freier Menschen als „Kammerbauern“ einzustufen. Auf Anraten des Staatsrates genehmigte der Wiener Hof diesen Versuch aber nicht⁶³. Manche Historiker sind sogar der Meinung, dass der siebenbürgische Mittelstand unter der Herrschaft der Habsburger Gefahr lief, in den Status abhängiger Bauern abzusinken⁶⁴. Letztendlich siegte aber doch die Idee Joseph II., alle Untertanen aus juristischer Sicht zu freien Personen zu machen. So wurden die untätigen Bauern im Jahr 1785 durch die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft in Siebenbürgen aus juristischer Sicht zu freien Personen. Das war eine wichtige Errungenschaft mit weit reichenden Konsequenzen, nicht nur für die Kategorie der untätigen Bauern, sondern auch für das gesamte Fürstentum: Alle Siebenbürger waren nun juristisch betrachtet freie Personen. Eine weitere Auswirkung der Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft war auch das schrittweise Verschwinden der Unterschiede zwischen den damaligen Leibeigenen und den Häuslern⁶⁵.

Eine Folge der Errichtung der Militärgrenze war auch der Verlust der Kontrolle der Behörden der drei ständischen Nationen über einen Teil der Bevölkerung ihrer nationalen Territorien, die militarisiert wurden. Durch die Errichtung der Militärgrenze kam es auch zu einer Spaltung der rumänischen und insbesondere die szeklerischen Gesellschaft in eine Provinzial- und eine Militärbevölkerung, die sich unter der Aufsicht der Zivil- bzw. der Militärbehörden befand⁶⁶. Besonders hart traf

⁶¹ EGYED Ákos, (2009), S. 229.

⁶² Vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), *Instaurarea regimului ...*, S. 235 f.

⁶³ Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I., S. 80 f., 92–96, 208 f. und 215–236; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 698 f.

⁶⁴ Vgl. VÁRKONYI R. ÁGNES, *Die letzten Jahrzehnte des autonomen Fürstentums (1660–1711)*. In: Béla Köpeczi (Hg.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*. Budapest 1990, S. 391.

⁶⁵ Vgl. RĂDUȚIU Aurel., (2002), S. 84.

⁶⁶ Vgl. EGYED Ákos, (2009), S. 229 f.

dieser Prozess die Szekler – die Einheit ihrer Nationen drohte langsam zu zerbrechen.

Die Erhebung von manchen siebenbürgischen Städten in den Status einer königlichen Freistadt durch die Habsburger verursachte auch eine Dynamik, die nicht nur zu Änderungen innerhalb der Hierarchie der Städte des Fürstentums, sondern auch zu einer gewissen Modifizierung des sozialen Status ihrer Einwohner führte.

Für die Habsburger bedeutete die Erhebung von manchen siebenbürgischen Städten in die Kategorie königlicher Freistädte nicht nur die Steigerung der Einkünfte des Finanzamts (Ärars), sondern auch eine Zunahme der Anzahl der Einwohner aus den Territorien der drei ständischen Nationen Siebenbürgens, die ihnen als Landesfürsten direkt unterstanden. Es geht konkret um die Erweiterung der Basis der Herrschaft des Hauses Habsburg in Siebenbürgen auch durch die Steigerung der Loyalität eines Segments der siebenbürgischen Gesellschaft, in diesem Fall der Bürger der königlichen Freistädte, gegenüber der Dynastie.

Durch die Verleihung von Privilegien an armenische und „griechische“ Händler aus wirtschaftlichen Interessen, und durch die Erhebung mehrerer siebenbürgischer Städte in den Status freier königlicher Städte, trugen die Habsburger auch zu einer weiteren Konzentration der wirtschaftlichen Macht in den Händen eines bestimmten Teiles der bürgerlichen Schicht bei.

Die Einbürgerung der „griechischen“ Händler im Jahr 1777 durch den Wiener Hof führte auch zu einer Steigerung der einheimischen bürgerlichen Elemente im Fürstentum, das gleiche ereignete sich nach der Einführung der im Jahr 1781 im Sachsenland, die auch zu einer Zunahme der Stadteinwohner führte. Ein wichtiges Humanpotential für die Zunahme der Stadteinwohner stellte die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft dar. Die Bauern, die jetzt Berufe lernen und frei ausüben durften, konnten sich teilweise als Handwerker auch in den Städten niederlassen. In der historischen Forschung wird aber auch die Auffassung vertreten, dass die habsburgische Herrschaft die Situation der Stadteinwohner verschlechterte⁶⁷ oder sogar schwere Verluste mit sich brachte⁶⁸.

Die Zahl der Intellektuellen in Siebenbürgen stieg durch die Maßnahmen Maria Theresias und insbesondere durch Joseph II.: Die Erweiterung der Möglichkeit einer allgemeinen und höheren Schulbildung für die breite Masse der Bevölkerung und die immer häufigere Besetzung der Ämter durch die Intelligenz. Durch die Maßnahmen der Habsburger, die Union mit Rom, die Errichtung der Militärgrenze nahm auch der Zahl der rumänischen Intellektualität zu. Am Ende der 1780er Jahre bildete sich auch in Siebenbürgen, genau so wie in der gesamten Monarchie, eine kleine Gruppe

⁶⁷ Vgl. PÁL JUDIT, *Zur Frage der städtischen Kommunalverwaltung und der mehrfachen Gerichtsbarkeit im Szeklerland*. In: Harald Roth (Hg.), (= Siebenbürgisches Archiv. Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde, Dritte Folge, Bd. 40), Köln - Weimar - Wien 2009, S. 197–212.

⁶⁸ Vgl. VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 391.

Intellektueller, die josephinsche Intelligenz. Insbesondere nach 1792 wandte sich ein Teil der siebenbürgischen josephinschen Intelligenz gegen die reaktionäre Politik der habsburgischen Kaiser. Sie verlangten Reformen, einige wenige von ihnen wurden unter dem Einfluss der französischen Revolution auch zu Jakobinern⁶⁹.

2. Die Einmischung des Wiener Hofes in die soziale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens

Durch das Leopoldinische Diplom hatten die Habsburger auch die soziale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens anerkannt. Aus machtpolitischen, finanziell – wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Interessen, aber auch aus humanitären Gründen mischten sich die Habsburger im Laufe der Zeit auch in die historisch gewachsenen und gesetzlich verankerten ständischen Verhältnisse zwischen den verschiedenen sozialen Klassen und Kategorien des Fürstentums ein. Die wichtigsten Eingriffe des Wiener Hofes in die soziale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens waren: Die Versuche, die Verhältnisse zwischen den Grundherren und ihren untertänigen Bauern zu regeln, die Befreiung eines Teiles der untertänigen Bauern als Folge der Union der Rumänen mit Rom und die Errichtung der Militärgrenze und insbesondere die Befreiung aller siebenbürgischen untertänigen Bauern durch die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft gegen den Willen der Grundherren, weiters die Einmischung in historisch gewachsene Verhältnisse zwischen den siebenbürgischen Nationen und ethnischen Gruppen durch die Einführung der Konzivilität im Jahr 1781, die Versuche, die Missverständnisse zwischen den Sachsen und Rumänen auf dem Königsboden („Fundus Regius“) zu beseitigen und nicht zuletzt die Einmischung des Wiener Hofes in Konflikte zwischen den sozialen Klassen und Kategorien Siebenbürgens, wie im Fall des Konfliktes zwischen den Stadteinwohnern aus den Territorien der Ungarn und Szekler und des Adels. Ein Teil der erwähnten Eingriffe des Wiener Hofes in die ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens wurde bereits vorgestellt, die restlichen werden noch analysiert.

Ein sehr bedeutender Eingriff in die soziale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens waren die Versuche des Wiener Hofes, die Rechte und Pflichten der untertänigen Bauern und der Grundherren gesetzlich zu reglementieren. Ein Grund dafür war neben den schon erwähnten Interessen des Wiener Hofes auch die Unterdrückung und Ausbeutung der Leibeigenen und Häusler durch die Grundherren. Die Berichte der Hohen siebenbürgischen Beamten, wie die Gouverneure, die Kommandierten Generäle und Leiter des Thesaurariats in den 1760er und 1770er Jahren⁷⁰, aber auch die zahlreiche Klagschriften der Bauern selbst, sind Beweise für die Unterdrückung

⁶⁹ Vgl. BENDA Kálmán, (1979), S. 191 ff.

⁷⁰ PRODAN David, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române* [*Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Aus der Geschichte der Entstehung der rumänischen Nation*]. București 1998, S. 292–295.

und den Missbrauch der untertänigen Bauern, und insbesondere der rumänischen, durch ihre Grundherren. Joseph II. überzeugte sich selbst von dieser Situation während seiner Reisen durch das Land in den Jahren 1773 und 1783⁷¹.

Die Reglementierung der Rechte und Pflichten der untertänigen Bauern und Grundherren erfolgte durch die Errichtung der so genannten Urbarien, in denen in erster Linie die Höhe der Abgaben und insbesondere die Robotzeit der untertänigen Bauern festgelegt und die Gerichtsbarkeit der Grundherren beschränkt wurde. An die Reglementierung der Pflichten der untertänigen Bauern gegenüber den Grundherren wurde teilweise schon im „Einrichtungswerk Ungarns“ gedacht⁷², tatsächlich passierte in diese Richtung in Siebenbürgen bis zur Zeit Maria Theresias aber nicht viel. Mit der so genannten Urbarialreglementierung⁷³ wollte der Wiener Hof mehrere Ziele erreichen: Die Zurückdrängung der Macht des Adels auf die gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche und automatisch auch auf die politische Ebene, die Steigerung der steuerlichen und wirtschaftlichen Kraft der zahlreichen sozialen Kategorie der untertänigen Bauern im Dienst des Staates⁷⁴ und nicht zuletzt die Fürsorge um die Wohlfahrt der Untertanen im Allgemeinen. Durch die königliche Verordnung Maria Theresias vom 12. November 1769, die so genannten „Gewissen Punkte“, deren Grundlage die Urbarialgesetze der Landtage aus den Jahren 1714 und 1742 und die Hofreskripte aus den Jahren 1742 und 1747 bildeten⁷⁵, wurden in

⁷¹ Vgl. PRODAN David, *Transilvania sub regimul absolutismului luminat* [Siebenbürgen in der Zeit der absolutistisch aufgeklärten Herrschaft]. In: Oțetea A. u.a. (Hg.), *Istoria României. Feudalismul dezvoltat în secolul al XVII-lea și la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Destrămarea feudalismului și formarea relațiilor capitaliste*. București 1964, Bd. 3, 737 ff.; PRODAN David, (1998), S. 286 f.; JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 60–64 und 92; EDROIU Nicolae, *Viața socio - economică a Transilvaniei* [Die Gesellschaft und die Wirtschaft Siebenbürgens]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 250 ff.; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 524–781; So schrieb der Kaiser während seiner Reise durch Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1773: „Der Jobbag ist ein Slav seines Herrn, er hat keine Ressource, er mus nach Willkuhr viel oder wenig dienen, wann, wie und wo der Herr will.“ Vgl. JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 62, Fußnote 196; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 742.

⁷² Vgl. MAYER Theodor, (1980), S. 43 f. und 48.

⁷³ Über die Urbarialreglementierung in Siebenbürgen im 18. Jahrhundert, vgl. MÜLLER Konrad, (1961), S. 32 f.; PRODAN David, (1964), *Transilvania sub regimul ...* S. 736–739; SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I., S. 319 und 377; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 264 ff.; JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 63 f., 157–173 und 203–256; TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 422–437; PRODAN David, (1998), S. 192–203; EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), *Viața socio-economică ...*, S. 249–252.

⁷⁴ In Siebenbürgen waren die Pflichten der Leibeigenen ihren Grundherren gegenüber höher als die Pflichten gegenüber den Staat. Vgl. EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), *Viața socio-economică ...*, S. 249.

⁷⁵ Für die Reglementierung des Robots der rumänischen untertänigen Bauern setzte sich auch der

Siebenbürgen die Rechte und Pflichten der untertänigen Bauern sowie der Grundherren gesetzlich geregelt⁷⁶. Diese Urbarialverordnung, von Maria Theresia nur als Provisorium angesehen, wurde von den Grundherren aber torpediert. Diese Tatsache bestätigt auch eine Bemerkung Joseph II. während seiner ersten Reise durch Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1773⁷⁷.

Die Ausarbeitung einer neuen Urbarialreglementierung erfolgte aufgrund des stillen Widerstandes der siebenbürgischen Beamten, einschließlich des Guberniums, erst im Jahr 1779. Ihre Durchführung wurde aber durch den Ausbruch des Bayerischen Erbfolgekrieges verzögert. Erst unter Joseph II. kam es wieder zu einem Fortschritt in der Urbarialfrage, insbesondere durch das Reskript im Jahr 1783. Die Rechte und Pflichten der damaligen untertänigen Bauern, jetzt „Colone“, und der Grundherren mussten vor allem nach der Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft in Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1785 an die neue rechtliche und juristische Situation angepasst werden. Tatsächlich passierte das durch ein Reskript und eine Verordnung aus dem Jahr 1785 bzw. 1787⁷⁸. Die Urbarial – Reglementierungen von Maria Theresia und Joseph II. bedeuteten einen Eingriff in die Verhältnisse zwischen den Grundherren und den untertänigen Bauern, nicht nur durch die Reglementierungen der Pflichten der letzterwähnten sozialen Kategorie, sondern auch durch die Beschränkung der Gerichtsbarkeit der Grundherren und durch die Eröffnung der Möglichkeit für die untertänigen Bauern, im Fall von Missbräuchen seitens der Grundherren auf rechtlichem Weg Schritte zu unternehmen⁷⁹.

Ein weiterer, sehr wichtiger Eingriff der Habsburger in die ständische soziale Ordnung Siebenbürgens war die Abschaffung der Leibeigenschaft. Nachdem erste Schritte in diese Richtung schon durch das Reskript im Jahr 1783 eingeleitet worden waren, hob Joseph II. durch das Patent vom 22. August 1785 aus finanziellen und

griechisch-katholische Bischof Inochentie Micu in seiner Petition an den Wiener Hof, „Supplex Libellus Valachorum“, im Jahr 1743 ein. Vgl. PRODAN David, (1998), S. 194-204.

⁷⁶ Die wichtigsten Punkte waren: Der Robot wurde bei 3 Tagen mit dem Vieh und 4 Tagen mit den Händen pro Woche für die Leibeigenen, die ein ganzes Grundstück bearbeiteten, und bei 1–2 Tagen nach der Größe des bearbeiteten Grundstückes und der Viehzahl in der Woche für die Häusler festgelegt; Die Gerichtsbarkeit der Grundherren wurde beschränkt und die untertänigen Bauern konnten im Fall eines Missbrauches der Grundherren rechtliche Wege beschreiten.

⁷⁷ Der Kaiser notierte in seinem Reisejournal: „Von Urbarial - Regulation ist hier gar nichts zu gedenken“. Vgl. JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 63; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 742.

⁷⁸ Auch die Applizierung des neuen Urbariums in der Praxis wurde in Wirklichkeit durch den Widerstand des Adels verhindert. Er versuchte mit allen Mitteln, insbesondere die technischen Aktionen, die für die Einführung des Urbariums notwendig waren, wie z. B. die Bemessung der landwirtschaftlichen Flächen und die Feststellung ihrer Qualität, zu torpedieren.

⁷⁹ Vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), *Transilvania sub regimul ...*, S. 739; JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 60–63; 212–216; 230 f.; 246 ff. und 254–256.

wirtschaftlichen, aber auch aus humanitären Gründen, die Leibeigenschaft im Fürstentum auf⁸⁰. Die damaligen untertänigen Bauern waren aus jurisdiktorischer, wenn auch nicht aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht, zu freien Personen geworden. Sie konnten aus ihren Dörfern wegziehen, Berufe erlernen und ausüben, über ihren Besitz frei verfügen, mussten keine zusätzlichen Lasten tragen, durften frei heiraten usw. Die Verwendung des abschätzigen Namens „Jobagy“ wurde verboten und durch den Begriff „Colone“ ersetzt.

Ein letztes Beispiel für den Eingriff in die ständische soziale Ordnung Siebenbürgens, das präsentiert wird, ist die Einmischung des Wiener Hofes in den Konflikt zwischen den Stadteinwohnern aus den Territorien der Ungarn und Szekler und dem Adel. Die Wurzeln des Konfliktes, der schon in der Zeit des autonomen Fürstentums begonnen hatte, befanden sich in erster Linie in den finanziellen Angelegenheiten: Das Bürgertum wollte die Adeligen, die in einer Stadt über Besitz verfügten, zur Teilnahme an der Tragung öffentlicher Lasten verpflichten. Die Habsburger versuchten dieses Problem teilweise mit verschiedenen Maßnahmen, wie die in den Jahren 1703, 1708, 1720 und 1757, die für manche Städte getroffen wurden, im Sinne des Wunsches des Bürgertums zu erledigen. Die Klagen des Bürgertums diese

⁸⁰ Über die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft, vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), *Transilvania sub regimul ...*, S. 736–739; WAGNER Ernst (Hg.), *Quellen zur Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen 1191–1975*. In: Schriften zur Landeskunde Siebenbürgens. Ergänzungsreihe zum Siebenbürgischen Archiv, Bd. 1, Köln - Wien 1976, S. 186 ff.; JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 224–231 und 245–256; EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), *Viața socio - economică ...*, S. 250 ff.; Zu dieser Entscheidung des Wiener Hofes dürfte neben der Politik von Joseph II., die Leibeigenen in der gesamten Monarchie zu befreien, auch die Befreiung der untertänigen Bauern in den benachbarten Ländern mit Siebenbürgen, Walachei und in Moldau, im Jahr 1746 bzw. 1749 (Vgl. CONSTANTINIU Florin, *Relațiile agrare din Țara Românească în secolul al XVIII-lea [Die Agrarverfassung der Walachei im 18. Jahrhundert]*, București 1972, S. 95–135; CONSTANTINIU Florin, *Reformele lui Constantin Mavrocordat [Die Reformen von Constantin Mavrocordat]*. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 505–507) beigetragen haben. Ein Argument für die Unterstützung dieser Hypothese wäre die Position des Wiener Hofes aus dem Jahr 1770 die Notwendigkeit der Verbesserung der Lage der untertänigen Bauern in Siebenbürgen betreffend, um die Auswanderung in den Donaufürstentümer zu reduzieren (Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I., S. 244), und ebenfalls die Aussagen des Kommandierenden Generals Preiß aus dem Jahr 1782: „... weil der Landmann in der Walachey kein Unterthan, oder Jobagy, sondern ein freyer Mensch ist, der nach entrichteten Abgaben von einem Grund auf den andern ziehen, und sich niederlassen kann, ...“. Vgl. GÖLLNER Carl, (1974), S. 73; Ein Teil der historischen Forschung sah die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft in Siebenbürgen als direkte Folge des Bauernaufstandes im Jahr 1784. Vgl. VOCELKA Karl, *Glanz und Untergang der höfischen Welt. Repräsentation, Reform und Reaktion im Habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat*. In: Herwig Wolfram (Hg.), *Österreichische Geschichte 1699–1815*. Wien 2001, 2004, S. 90.

Problematik betreffend, die aus manchen Städten noch im Jahr 1790 kamen, waren aber ein Beweis dafür, dass das Problem noch nicht wirklich gelöst war⁸¹.

3. Die Disziplinierung der sozialen Klassen und Kategorien des Fürstentums

Der Wiener Hof betrieb in Siebenbürgen auch eine Disziplinierungspolitik. Ziel dieser Politik war die Erziehung der Einwohner des Fürstentums zu gehorsamen Untertanen, die ihre Pflichten gegenüber dem habsburgischen Herrscher und dem Staat ihrem sozialen Status entsprechend bewusst erfüllen mussten. Dabei ging es in erster Linie um Treue gegenüber dem Hause Habsburg, um die regelmäßige Zahlung von Steuern und die Lieferung von Abgaben, um den Dienst in der Armee oder in den Grenzübereinheiten, um die Respektierung der Gesetze des Landes und der königlichen Verordnungen und nicht zuletzt um die Beteiligung der Untertanen an Maßnahmen, die auf eine Rationalisierung der Herrschaft zielten. Die Habsburger betrieben zwar eine Wohlfahrtspolitik, gingen aber auch mit harten Maßnahmen gegen die Untertanen vor, wenn diese ihre Pflichten gegenüber dem Herrscher und dem Staat nicht erfüllen wollten. Von der Disziplinierungspolitik der Habsburger waren in erster Linie die führende soziale Klasse des Fürstentums, der Adel, und die zahlenmäßig große und für den Staat die finanziell und wirtschaftlich wichtigste soziale Klasse, die Bauern, betroffen. Die Disziplinierung der Untertanen wurde im Sinne der Vorschläge von General Caraffa sowohl durch harte („Timor“) als auch durch sanfte Methoden („Amor“) durchgeführt.

Auch im Falle der Disziplinierung und „Domestizierung“⁸² des Adels machte der Wiener Hof von beiden Methoden Gebrauch. Am häufigsten schienen aber sanfte Methoden zur Anwendung gekommen zu sein, mit deren Hilfe der siebenbürgische Adel für das Haus Habsburg gewonnen werden konnte. Ein Teil dieser Methoden wird kurz erwähnt und analysiert. In seinen Verhältnissen zum siebenbürgischen Adel setzte der Wiener Hof in erster Linie auf den Kompromiss, in manchen Fällen auch auf Versöhnung. Die Habsburger versuchten nicht, die feudale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens radikal zu modifizieren, sondern nur ihren Interessen entsprechend zu verschieben. Die Rechte und Privilegien der siebenbürgischen Stände, deren wichtigster Nutznießer der ungarische Adel war, wurden im Leopoldinischen Diplom, wie schon im „Einrichtungswerk Ungarn“ empfohlen, vom Wiener Hof anerkannt und bestätigt. Das Rückgrat der feudalen ständischen Ordnung Siebenbürgens, der Adel, bekam von den Habsburgern für seine Dienste Grafen- und Barontitel⁸³, so wie

⁸¹ Vgl. PÁL Judit, (2009), S. 197–212.

⁸² VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 392 f.

⁸³ Der siebenbürgische Adel begann sogar damit, um diese Titel zu wetteifern (Vgl. VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 392 f.), ein zusätzlicher Beweis dafür, wie wirksam

habsburgische Orden verliehen⁸⁴. Auch die Politik der Habsburger bei der Besetzung der Ämter in Siebenbürgen „*erzog den Adel zur devolution*“⁸⁵. Ein Teil des siebenbürgischen Hochadels vernetzte sich sogar durch Heirat mit den Familienkreisen des Adels der Monarchie, wo er sich letztendlich auch integrierte⁸⁶. Eine andere Form der Disziplinierung und Integration des siebenbürgischen Adels bestand in der Anziehungskraft des Wiener Hofes selbst und der Hauptstadt der Monarchie⁸⁷, aber auch der Kurorte, die von den Eliten der gesamten Monarchie besucht wurden⁸⁸. Immer mehr siebenbürgische Hochadelige, aber auch Patrizier, genossen das Angebot der Hauptstadt und des Hofes oder versuchten zumindest in Siebenbürgen, die Lebensart des Adels der Monarchie zu imitieren: Luxus und Pracht in ihren Höfen und Residenzen oder Häusern im Fall der Patrizier, der Konsum teurer und wertvoller Waren usw. Im Leopoldinischen Diplom versprachen die Habsburger auch die Verwendung der Methode der Versenkung von Gütern an „*wohlverdiente Siebenbürger*“⁸⁹. Aus zumindest zwei pragmatischen Gründen vermieden es die Habsburger aber, den siebenbürgischen Adel durch diese Methode an sich zu binden: Sie wollten den alten siebenbürgischen Adel nicht wirtschaftlich stärken und außerdem war die fürstliche Domäne nicht so ausgedehnt. Wenn sie Güter verschenkten, taten sie das in der Regel nur an auswärtige Elemente⁹⁰.

Durch den Einsatz der oben erwähnten Methoden gewannen die Habsburger in Siebenbürger nicht nur in den Reihen des katholischen sondern auch in den Reihen des protestantischen Adels und der sächsischen lutherischen Patrizier treue Anhänger. Ein relevantes Beispiel in diese Richtung war der mehrmals erwähnte Hofkanzler Graf Gabriel Bethlen, der aus der Familie des siebenbürgischen Fürsten Gabriel Bethlen, ein Vorkämpfer für den reformierten Glauben, stammte. Er wurde nicht nur von einem „*siebenbürgischen Sonderpolitiker zum Wiener Hofpolitiker*“, sondern trat auch freiwillig zur katholischen Kirche über⁹¹.

Die Disziplinierung und „Domestizierung“ des siebenbürgischen Adels erfolgte

diese Methode des Wiener Hofes für die „Domestizierung“ des Adels war.

⁸⁴ Der siebenbürgische Hofkanzler Graf Gabriel Bethlen erhielt im Jahr 1765 für seine Dienste das Goldene Vlies. Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I, S. 172.

⁸⁵ MÜLLER Konrad, (1961), S. 18.

⁸⁶ Hofkanzler Graf Gabriel Bethlen hielt durch seine Vermählung mit einer Tochter des Obersthofmeisters Grafen Khevenhüller Einzug in die höchsten Wiener Gesellschaftskreise. Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I, S. 97.

⁸⁷ Vgl. VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 392 f.; MÜLLER Konrad, (1961), S. 75.

⁸⁸ Gouverneur Samuel Brukenthal kam oft zusammen mit seiner Gattin zum Zwecke eines Kuraufenthaltes nach Baden bei Wien. Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1969), Bd. II, S. 22.

⁸⁹ KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 338.

⁹⁰ Vgl. auch EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), *Viața socio-economică ...*, S. 272; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 757.

⁹¹ SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I, S. 98.

aber auch durch harte Methoden des Wiener Hofes. Gegen den rebellierenden Adel, der sich an den bewaffneten antihabsburgischen Aktionen unter der Führung von Emeric Thököly, 1790, Franz. II. Rákóczi, 1703–1711 und 1716–1718 und Josef Rákóczi, 1737–1738, beteiligt hatte, wurden auch harte Maßnahmen ergriffen. Eine dieser Methoden war im Jahr 1703 die Beordnung eines Großteils des siebenbürgischen Adels auf den Befehl des habsburgischen Generals Rabutin nach Herrmannstadt. Auf diese Weise wurde der Adel nicht nur unter der Kontrolle der habsburgischen Behörden gehalten, auch seine Teilnahme am antihabsburgischen Aufstand von Franz. II. Rákóczi konnte so teilweise verhindert werden⁹². Bei den Teilnehmern am Aufstand der Kurruzen lässt sich hingegen wieder eine milde Form der Politik des Wiener Hofes erkennen. Als Zeichen der Versöhnung mit den rebellierenden ungarischen und siebenbürgischen Ständen, zum Großteil Adelige, schloss der Wiener Hof einen Kompromiss mit ihnen, den Frieden von Satu Mare (Sathmar/Szatmárnémeti), 1711. Ein Teil der Rebellen, der sich an den erwähnten Aufständen gegen die Habsburger beteiligt hatte, musste aber ins Ausland fliehen, insbesondere ins Osmanische Reich, andere wurden verhaftet⁹³. Für Personen aus den Reihen der siebenbürgischen Stände, die sich den Habsburgern gegenüber treulos verhielten, war schon im Leopoldinischen Diplom die Konfiszierung ihrer Güter als Strafe vorgesehen⁹⁴. Aus finanziellen und wirtschaftlichen, aber auch aus machtpragmatischen Gründen, erhöhte der Wiener Hof mit der Durchführung periodischer Aktionen zur Verifizierung seiner Besitzakten den Druck auf den siebenbürgischen Adel⁹⁵. Eine solche Aktion wurde auch im Fall der Sachsen gestattet⁹⁶. Letztendlich versuchten die Habsburger den siebenbürgischen Adel auch durch Maßnahmen, wie die Verpflichtung zur Steuerzahlung zu disziplinieren. Im

⁹² Vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), *Instaurarea regimului ...*, S. 245; VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 393; MAGYARI Andrei, *Începutul regimului habsburgic în Transilvania și mișcarea adversă a lui Francisc Rákóczi al II-lea* [Der Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen und der antihabsburgische Aufstand unter der Führung von Francisc Rákóczis II.]. In: Virgil Cîndea (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*. București 2003, Bd. 5, S. 380.

⁹³ Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 408–416; BĂLAN Constantin, *Domniile fanariote în Țara Românească și Moldova* [Die Herrschaft der Phanarioten in der Walachei und Moldau]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Bd. 6, S. 449 f.

⁹⁴ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 338.

⁹⁵ Vgl. EDROIU Nicolae, (2002), *Populație și societate...*, S. 98.

⁹⁶ Als, wie schon erwähnt, ihre Rechte und Privilegien auf dem Königsboden in Frage gestellt wurden, entschloss sich der Staatsrat im Jahr 1769 zur Verifizierung des Originals des Freibriefes der Sachsen von König Andreas II. aus dem Jahre 1224, das Andreanum, das in den Archiven aber nicht ausfindig gemacht werden konnte. Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I., S. 208–232.

Jahr 1783 drohte Joseph II. dem siebenbürgischen Adel sogar mit der jährlichen Einberufung zu militärischen Übungen für die Insurrektion bei einer fehlenden Bereitschaft, Steuern zu bezahlen⁹⁷.

Auch im Fall der Disziplinierung der Bauern verwendete der Wiener Hof beide oben erwähnten Methoden „Timor et Amor“. Einerseits betrieben die Habsburger eine Wohlfahrtspolitik und schützten die einfache Bevölkerung gegen die Missbräuche der Beamten, der Armee und der Grundherren, andererseits gingen sie aber auch mit harten Maßnahmen gegen sie vor, wenn sie die feudale ständische Ordnung Siebenbürgens und die Verordnungen des Wiener Hofes nicht respektierten oder ihre Pflichten gegenüber dem Staat und den Grundherren nicht erfüllten. Die Urbarialreglementierungen Maria Theresias und Joseph II. enthielten zum Beispiel auch Strafen für Bauern, die ihre gesetzlich fixierten Pflichten gegenüber den Grundherren nicht erfüllten. Manchmal wurden die Steuern bei der Bevölkerung von den Steuereinnehmern auch mit Hilfe der Armee eingetrieben. Bei der Rekrutierung der Soldaten für die Armee wurden nicht selten junge Männer im Rahmen von Aktionen, die in ganz Siebenbürgen durchgeführt wurden, mit Gewalt aus ihren Dörfern geholt⁹⁸. Geld- und sogar Leibesstrafen waren auch für Personen vorgesehen, welche die Verordnung aus dem Jahr 1764 die Bekämpfung der Vögel als Schädlinge für die Landwirtschaft betreffend nicht respektierten: Jeder Steuerzahler musste jährlich eine bestimmte Anzahl an Vogelköpfen abliefern⁹⁹.

Eine wichtige Disziplinierungsmethode der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen zielte auf die Erreichung der Sesshaftigkeit der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung, die sehr mobil war, und auf die Regulierung oder Systematisierung der Dörfer. Für den Wiener Hof war die Sesshaftigkeit der Bevölkerung und die Regulierung der Dörfer aus mehreren Gründen sehr wichtig: Die Sicherung der Steuereinkünfte des Staates, die Durchführung der Maßnahmen, die zur Rationalisierung der Herrschaft dienten (Konskriptionen, Urbarialaufzeichnungen, Grundbücher, Landesbeschreibungen)¹⁰⁰, die Unterbindung der Flucht der Bauern innerhalb des Landes und ins Ausland, die Bekämpfung der Räuberbanden, und nicht zuletzt die Kontrolle und Überwachung der Bevölkerung. Die Habsburger versuchten also in ihrem Interesse, die traditionellen Habitattypen eines Teiles der siebenbürgischen Dörfer zu modifizieren¹⁰¹. Ihre Absichten konnten sie eigentlich, und das auch nur in einem

⁹⁷ Vgl. JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 179 f., Fußnote 644.

⁹⁸ Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., *Samuel von Brukenthal*. In: Theodor Mayer (Hg.), (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Bd. 19), München 1969, Bd. II., S. 15 ff.

⁹⁹ Vgl. MÜLLER Konrad, (1961), S. 29.

¹⁰⁰ Vgl. auch HEPPNER Harald, (1983/1984), S. 94 f.

¹⁰¹ In den Hügel- und Hochlandgebieten und insbesondere im Gebirge waren die Dörfer zerstreut angelegt. In den Tälern der wichtigen Flüsse und in den mittelalterlichen

relativ bescheidenen Maß, lediglich im Gebiet der Grenzregimente und auf den fürstlichen Domänen, wie etwa in Zlatna nach dem Bauernaufstand im Jahr 1784, verwirklichen. Hier wurden die verstreuten Häuser in den Gebirgsgegenden teilweise abgerissen und die Einwohner in größere Siedlungen gebracht¹⁰². Zu einer Zwangsumsiedlung der Bevölkerung kam es auch bei der Errichtung der Militärgrenze. So wurden die Einwohner aus den Dörfern der Grenzgebiete, die nicht in den Grenzregimenten dienen wollten, auf Befehl des Wiener Hofes in innere Gebiete Siebenbürgens umgesiedelt. Im Gegenzug wurden von dort jene Personen gebracht, die als Grenzsoldaten dienen wollten¹⁰³.

Bei der Durchführung der harten Disziplinierungsmethoden wurde auch an die Hilfe der habsburgischen Truppen appelliert, die sich in Siebenbürgen befanden. Der Widerstand eines Teiles der Szekler bei der Errichtung der Militärgrenze wurde zum Beispiel von General Siskowich am 7. Januar 1764 mit Hilfe der Armee, gerüstet mit Kanonen bei Madéfalva (Siculeni) im Stuhl Csik, blutig niedergeschlagen. Mehrere hundert Szekler blieben auf dem Feld. Der Hofkriegsrat ordnete eine strenge Untersuchung an, zahlreichen Personen sollte wegen Aufwiegelung der Prozess gemacht werden. Die Untersuchungen wurden erst im Jahr 1766 auf Anraten des Präses des siebenbürgischen Guberniums, General Hadik, durch ein königliches Reskript eingestellt¹⁰⁴. Auch der Aufstand der vorwiegend rumänischen Bauern im Jahr 1784 wurde mit Hilfe der Armee unterworfen. Kaiser Joseph II. gab dem Militärkommando am 12. November 1784 den Befehl der Intervention. Am 7. Dezember 1784 gelang den habsburgischen Truppen unter dem Befehl von Vizeoberst Kay der entscheidende Sieg gegen die Aufständischen. Joseph II. ließ eine Untersuchungskommission zusammenstellen, mit deren Leitung Graf Anton von Jankovich beauftragt wurde. Allen wichtigen Teilnehmern am Aufstand, mit Ausnahme der drei wichtigen Anführer, wurden vom Kaiser begnadigt. Horia und Cloșca (Crișan nahm sich im Gefängnis das Leben) wurden am 28. Februar 1785 in Karlsburg vor den Augen zahlreicher Bauern grausam hingerichtet. Mehrere Verordnungen wurden in der darauf folgenden Zeit erlassen und in den vier wichtigen gebräuchlichen Sprachen veröffentlicht: Mit harten Strafen bis zu lebenslanger Haft oder gar der Todesstrafe wurde weiteren Aufrührern und jenen, die ihre Waffen nicht

Kolonisierungsgebieten der Sachsen waren sie zusammengeschlossen. Vgl. auch ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 140 ff.

¹⁰² ANDEA Avram, (2002), *Transilvania. Habitat ...*, S. 141-146; GÖLLNER Carl, (1974), S. 51 und 72; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 606, 612 ff., 623, 664 f. und 703.

¹⁰³ Vgl. auch BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 607.

¹⁰⁴ Vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), *Regimul austriac ...*, S. 518 ff.; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 229-236; TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 424 f.; PÁL-ANTAL Sándor, *Die Szekler unter den Völkern Siebenbürgens*. In: Harald Roth (Hg.), (=Siebenbürgisches Archiv. Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde, Dritte Folge, Bd. 40), Köln - Weimar - Wien 2009, S. 8.

abgeben wollten, gedroht¹⁰⁵. Auch für die Bekämpfung der Räuberbanden wurden in Siebenbürgen harte Methoden und Strafen verwendet, wie man Borns Reisebriefen entnehmen kann¹⁰⁶.

Eine andere Methode der Disziplinierung der siebenbürgischen Untertanen war, im Bewusstsein der Bevölkerung ein Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit mit der Habsburgischen Monarchie und den habsburgischen Herrschern zu fördern und zu festigen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, wurden neben anderen Maßnahmen materielle Symbole der habsburgischen Herrscher auf den Fassaden der Festungen¹⁰⁷, Verwaltungsgebäude, Kasernen usw. angebracht oder wie im Fall des habsburgischen Adlers auch an den Grenzen Siebenbürgens mit der Walachei und Moldau montiert¹⁰⁸. Diese Maßnahmen, deren Erfolge sich erst im Laufe der Generationen zeigten, wirkten insbesondere in den Reihen der einfachen Bevölkerung, die großteils nicht lesen und schreiben konnte.

¹⁰⁵ Vgl. JOSUPEIT – NEITZEL Elke, (1986), S. 238–241; TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, (1990), S. 434–437; EDROIU NICOLAE, *Răscoala lui Horea (1784–1785)* [Der Aufstand unter der Führung Horeas (1784–1785)]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*, București 2002, Bd. 6, 557–562; VOCELKA Karl, (2004), S. 90.

¹⁰⁶ Vgl. FERBER Johann Jacob, (1774), S. 94.

¹⁰⁷ Die prächtig gebaute Festung Alba Iulia (Weissenburg, Karlsburg/Gyulafehérvár) war ein Beispiel in diesem Sinn. Vgl. auch SABĂU Nicolae, *Le programme iconographique de la citadelle d' Alba Iulia (1715–1738)* [Die Verwendung der Kunst als Dekoration im Fall der Festung Alba Iulia (1715–1738)]. In: Heppner Harald (Hg.), *Festung und Innovation*. Bochum 2005, S. 73–92; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 593.

¹⁰⁸ Vgl. auch SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I., S. 334; BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, (2006), S. 586, 626, 643 und 652.

**UNTER KRANKHEITSBEDROHUNG.
VORBEMERKUNGEN ZU EINER HISTORISCHEN ERFORSCHUNG DER
GROSSEN EPIDEMIEN IN DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN BUKOWINA**

**UNDER THREAT OF DISEASE.
INTRODUCTION TO A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE GREAT
EPIDEMICS IN AUSTRIAN BUKOVINA**

Harieta MARECI-SABOL

Stefan cel Mare Universit  t in Suceava
harieta@atlas.usv.ro

Rezumat: *Sub amenin  area bolii. Preliminarii la o cercetare istoric   a marilor epidemii   n Bucovina austriac  .*

Asemenea catastrofelor naturale, r  zboaielor   i foametei, epidemiile   nregistrate   n Bucovina austriac   au afectat popula  ia din toate straturile societ  ţii, l  s  nd urme ad  nci   n memorie   i mentalitate. Considerate pedepse divine sau puse pe seama s  r  ciei, a ignoran  ei   i a lipsei de igien  , ele au modelat comportamente, reac  ii   i atitudini diverse, provoc  nd panic  , tensiune, izolare, descre  tere economic     i,   n unele cazuri, depopulare. Informa  iile desprinse dintr-o varietate de surse (de la condici parohiale   i registre de stare civil     i parohiale   i p  n   la periodice sau memorii) ofer   o imagine de ansamblu asupra evenimentelor morbide   nregistrate   n Bucovina, de la sf  r  itul secolului al XVIII   i p  n   la   nceputul secolului XX. Episoadele consecutive sau recurente de cium  , holer  , difterie, febr   tifoid     i tifos, de pojar, scarlatin  , variol     i grip   au bulversat deopotriv   comunit   ile rurale   i urbane, impun  nd autorit   ilor imperiale, oficialilor locali, medicilor, preo  ilor,   nv    torilor, jurnali  tilor s   ini  ieze mecanisme de prevenire, limitare sau eradicare a bolii.

Abstract: *Under Threat of Disease. Introduction to a Historical Study of the Great Epidemics in Austrian Bukovina*

Like natural disasters, wars and famine, epidemics recorded in Austrian Bukovina, affected people from all layers of society, leaving deep traces in memory and mentality. Considered as divine punishment or attributed to poverty, ignorance and lack of hygiene, they modeled different behaviors, reactions and attitudes, causing panic, tension, isolation, economic decline and, in some cases, depopulation. Information drawn from a variety of sources (from parish and civil registers to newspapers or memories) provides an overview of morbid events recorded in Bucovina, from the late XVIIIth century to the early XXth century. Consecutive or recurrent episodes of plague, cholera, diphtheria, typhoid fever and typhus, measles, scarlet, smallpox and influenza have disrupted both rural and urban communities, imposing the imperial authorities, local officials, doctors, priests, teachers, and journalists to initiate some mechanisms for prevention, limitation or eradication of the disease.

Résumé: *Sous la menace de la maladie. Préliminaires pour une recherche historique des grandes épidémies dans la Bucovine autrichienne*

De même que les catastrophes naturelles, les guerres et les famines, les épidémies enregistrées dans la Bucovine autrichienne affectèrent la population de toutes les couches sociales et laissèrent des traces profondes dans leur mémoire, mais aussi dans leur mentalité. Considérées des punitions divines ou mises à la charge de la pauvreté, de l'ignorance et du manque d'hygiène, celles-ci modelèrent les comportements, les réactions et les diverses attitudes, provoquant panique, tension, isolation, décroissement économique et, en certains cas, dépopulation. Les informations résulte d'une variété de sources (des registres paroissiaux et d'état civil jusqu'à périodiques ou mémoires) offrent une image d'ensemble sur les événements morbides enregistrés dans la Bucovine, de la fin du XVIII-ème siècle et jusqu'au début du XX-ème siècle. Les épisodes consécutifs ou récurrents de peste, choléra, diphtérie, fièvre typhoïde et typhus, de rougeole, scarlatine, variole et grippe bouleversèrent les communautés rurales, mais aussi les campagnes et imposèrent aux autorités impériales, aux officialités locales, aux médecins, aux prêtres, aux enseignants, aux journalistes à initier des mécanismes de prévention, mais aussi de limitation ou d'éradication de la maladie.

Keywords: *Bukovina, epidemics, Hygiene, mortality rate, disease, children.*

Einleitung

Epidemien in der rumänischen Geschichte Ereignisse und die verschiedensten Lagen erzeugt haben. Sie anwesend überall im rumänischen Raum waren und die Bevölkerung aus allen Gesellschaftsschichten hat gelitten, auch tiefe Spuren in ihrer Erinnerung und Mentalität hinterlassen haben. Darüber entstanden die schrecklichsten Legenden und Geschichten, die unsere Phantasie an apokalyptischen Szenarien durcharbeitete. Ihre tragische Folgen die Ärzte, die Herrscher und die Schriftgelehrten aller Art bestimmten, um die anspruchsvollen Mechanismen, die tödlichen Krankheiten begünstigten oder auslösten, zu suchen. Eine echte Medizinliteratur und Geschichte des menschlichen Körpers in den Verkehr gebracht wurden veröffentlicht, deren Autoren auf die allgemeinen Psychologischen Verhalten und weniger den Krankheiteneinfluß über die sozialen und individuellen Strukturen oder das Alltagsleben bedrängten. Doch, seit der zweiten Hälfte des letzten Jahrhunderts, die Analyse der epidemischen Erscheinungen sich kompliziert hat, nicht nur aus den biologischen / pathologischen und sozialen Perspektiven, sondern auch in kultureller Hinsicht verstanden werden, als verwurzelte Gefüge im kollektiven Geist. Wie bekannt, ein historischer Überblick nicht die politischen und sozialen Aspekte, auch die demographischen und, warum nicht, die wirtschaftlichen Wandlungen, die gefolgt haben, übergehen kann, deshalb die Historiker aus den letzten Jahrzehnten bei eingehenden Forschungen engagiert und die Ergebnisse, vor allem für den siebenbürgischen Raum, lobenswert sind.

Wenn man an die historische Provinz Bukowina denkt, ist diese Forschung noch am Anfang. Wie erwartet, die Informationen aus einer großen unterschiedlichsten Vielzahl von Quellen, wie Pfarrei- und Zivilsätzen, auch Erinnerungen derjenigen, die das Pech, in einer unruhigen Zeit geboren werden musste, erhalten werden können. Wenn, für den Arzt Nandriș - Förderer einer Geschichtesrubrik in der Zwischenkriegszeitzeitschrift *Ärztliche Bukowina* – die “epidemiologische Vergangenheit” der Bukowina “stellt eine besondere Bedeutung, sowohl für diese Bevölkerung und für den Hygienikerarzt vor”¹, aus dem Historikersstandpunkt, zeigt die gleiche “epidemiologische Vergangenheit” Szenen aus dem Leben der Einwohner der Bukowina, mit seinen sozialen, kulturellen Eigenheiten usw.

1. Epidemien «von Heiden»: die Pest und die Cholera

Es ist wahr, dass in der österreichischen Bukowina, gleich wie überall, die epidemischen Ereignisse nicht einzig die Dramen, die in den Jahrhundertjahren hergestellt wurden, erklären. Sie gehören einem Faktorenkomplex, der, sonst, sehr gut im religiösen Gebet zu Gott, um “vom Krieg, Hunger und Plage” geschützt zu werden, zusammengefasst wurde, drei Bestandteile, die in der Bibel, als Ungehorsamsstrafe, wiederholt werden: “Und ich ihnen Säbel, Hunger und Plage senden werde, wie das Land, das ich ihnen und seinen Eltern gegeben hat, sterben wird” (Jeremia 24:10). Eigentlich, das Vorbild der erschwerenden Faktoren für den Epidemienausbruch von den extremen Wetterereignissen, die Folgen über die Menge und Qualität der Ernte hatten, ergänzt wurde. Samenmangel oder schlechtes Wetter während der Besamung, überschüssige Feuchtigkeit oder Kälte und Spätfröste während der Keimung, Überschwemmungen, Hagel, Dürre oder Reif, “zusammen” mit Heuschrecken, Mäusen und Soldaten, so viele Gründe zur Sorge bedeuteten. Wie Lebensmittelknappheit führte, unweigerlich, zu Hunger, verminderte die Widerstandsfähigkeit des Körpers und die Epidemienentstehung begünstigte.

Von den Plagen, die die rumänische Bevölkerung aus dem rumänischen Raum in der zweiten Hälfte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts betroffen haben, verursacht die Beulenpest die meisten Todesopfer. Leider, Informationen über ihre Auswirkungen in

¹ Dr. Teodor Nandriș, *Din trecutul epidemiologic al comunei rurale Banila pe Ceremuș, jud. Storojineț (1814-1938)* [Aus der epidemiologischen Vergangenheit der ländlichen Gemeinde Banila pe Ceremuș, Kreis Storojinetz (1814-1938)], in “Bucovina Medicală” [Ärztliche Bukowina], nr. 3-4, 1943, p. 71.

der Bukowina noch unbekannt sind. Gemäß der Notizen des finnischen Chirurgen Gustav Oraeus, der in Sankt Petersburg ausgebildet und in der russischen Armee angestellt wurde, die Beulenpest, die die schon dezimierte die städtische Bevölkerung der Moldau verwüstet hat, wurde durch die "türkischen Schiffe aus Konstantinopel" gebracht und weit verbreitet, sowohl unter den Soldaten und Zivilisten wurde². Allein in Botosani machte die unerbittliche Pest 800 Opfer von insgesamt 2.500 Einwohnern³.

In den Dörfern aus der nord-westlichen Moldauseite, war die Pest weniger sichtbar, aber sie einen Vorwand, der die Österreicher für die Annexion der Bukowina verwendet haben, unter der Berufung, um hier einen Sanitärkordon zu erstellen⁴. Um den "Pesteingang" im Reich, die wieder in der Moldau geschlagen hatte, zu verhindern, die Behörden aus Wien im Jahr 1819 den "Pestinspektor", Dr. Gebauer, in einen Besuch nach Jassy (wo er gute besten Maßnahmen" fand) und nach Botosani sandten (wo die Maßnahmen ineffizient oder "schlecht" zu sein bewiesen). Das Ergebnis dieser Initiative war, gemäß der *Dokumenten von Hurmuzaki*, die Quarantäneeinleitung in der Bukowina⁵, die zwischen 11 und 25 Tage dauerte, viel weniger als die Dauer der russischen Regierung am Pruth, nämlich 40 Tagen⁶.

Stärker aber war die Choleraepidemie, die, beginnend mit den ersten Jahrzehnten des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, insbesondere in Jahren 1819 und 1820, 1829 und 1848, die Bukowinabevölkerung⁷ dezimiert hat und die Spuren in der allgemeinen Mentalität in der Volksphrase "Dass die Cholera dich nehme" überlegt wurden. Grigorovitza erwähnt, dass "in Czernowitz, eines der ersten Opfer dieser prächtigen Epidemie ein guter Rumäne von uns war, der Arzt Dimitrovici"⁸. Sonst,

² Maria Holban, M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu (eds.), *Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Fremde Reisende über die rumänischen Länder], vol. X, partea 1, București, 2000, p. 54-56.

³ Friedrich Prinzing, *Epidemic resulting from wars*, ed. Harald Westergaard, Oxford, 1916, p. 86.

⁴ Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor* [Geschichte der Rumänen], Chișinău, 1992, p. 288-289; Ion Nistor, *Istoria Bucovinei* [Geschichte der Bukowina], București, 1991, p. 10; Mihai Iacobescu, *Din istoria Bucovinei* [Aus der Geschichte der Bukowina], București, 1993, p. 61.

⁵ Hurmuzaki, *Documente* [Dokumente], București, vol. X, 1897, apud Iacob Felix, *Istoria igienei în România în secolul al XIX-lea și starea ei la începutul secolului al XX-lea* [Die Geschichte der Hygiene in Rumänien im neunzehnten Jahrhundert und ihr Stand anfangs des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts], partea I, București, Institutul de Arte Grafice "Carol Göbl", 1901, p. 297.

⁶ Iacob Felix, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁷ Amy Colin, Peter Rychlo, Czernowitz, Cernăuți, Chernovtsy, Chernivtsy, Czerniowce. *A testing ground for pluralism*, in Marcel Cornis-Pope, John Neubauer (ed.), *History of the Literary Cultures of East-Central Europe*, vol. II, John Benjamins Publishing, 2004, p. 62.

⁸ Emanoil Grigorovitza, *Cum a fost odată. Schițe din Bucovina* [Wie war einmal. Skizzen aus der Bukowina], București, Ed. Librăria Națională, 1911, p. 86.

seine Großmutter starb von Cholera, am 9. November 1853, an 46 Jahre alt⁹. Unter diesen Veranstaltungen, er stellt Iasik vor, einen "polnischen Bettler", "lustig und klug", von der Trunkenheit "ruiniert", der "ein hilfloser Alter" geworden ist, aber noch lustig und bereit, Scherze zu tun. Eines Morgens, er die Türklinke berührt und "den Weg zeigt, wo die Krankenhausangestellten gerade eine kranke Frau im bedeckten Wagen legten". Ich schaue unserem Bettler an – schrieb Grigorovița – und ihm das Almosen vom jeden Samstag geben will, als sein Gedicht sich verzerrte, sein gewöhnliches unflätiges Lächeln im Schmerz wurde und sein Mund voll von Speichel war. Ein heiser Schrei, vom schwierigen Leiden, und sofort sah ich den Armen mit seinen Händen auf dem Bauch, gefallen und sich in schrecklichen Peinen wand. Die Cholera ihn berührt hat und, bis ich nach Hause schnell ging und sagte, was passiert war, die Leute mit dem Krankenhauswagen ihn entdeckt und sofort genommen haben, dass ich nicht Zeit hatte, zu sehen wohin sie gegangen waren"¹⁰.

Im Fall des István Fazekas, ein Nachfolger der Bukowinaungarn, nicht nur die Dorfsreaktion an die Fremdeanwesendheit, insbesondere eines Juden, als Potentialfaktor der Gemeindedestabilisierung, auch eine Szene aus der ärztlichen Ortschaftsgeschichte zeigt: "Von Czernowitz kam ein jüdischer Hausierer, der von Tür zu Tür kleine Sachen verkaufte: Nägel, Fäden, farbige Bänder, Pfauenfedern, Perlen. Er ging durchs Dorf für drei Tage und am Abends kehrte er zum Stall eines Ladeneigentümers, Herskowich zurück, um zu schlafen. Nach drei Tagen, zog er nach Andrásfalva oder Istensegits. Aber am Sonntag, Leti, die einzige Eigentümerstochter, krank wurde (...). Einige Tage später, das Mädchen starb (...). Nach einigen Tagen seit der jüdische Hausierer fuhr, er tot neben dem Dorf Fratautz gefunden wurde. Die Leute ihn für den Infektionsbezug belastet haben"¹¹. Nach Deimer – ein berühmter Spezialist im Fach der Epidemiengeschichte aus Österreich –, Friedrich Prinzing meint, dass das Jahr 1866 das Ende der Epidemie, die die Bukowina schädigte und eine Krankheitsverlängerung aus dem Türkischen Reich und den Rumänischen Fürstentümer war, markiert¹². Über Preslstatistik, von 522.481 Einwohnern der Provinz Bukowina am 31. Dezember 1869, 11.656 Personen starben von Cholera¹³.

⁹ Dumitru Teodorescu, *Em. Grigorovitza. Viața și opera* [Em. Grigorovitza. Leben und Werk], Chișinău, 1995, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 87-88.

¹¹ István Fazekas, *Hetedíziglen: Bukovinai székegy családi krónika*, Polis, Kolozsvár/Cluj 2005, p. 48, apud H.F. van Drunen, *A sanguine bunch. Regional identification in Habsburg Bukovina 1774-1919*, University of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 239.

¹² Friedrich Prinzing, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

¹³ Fr. C. Presl, *Die öffentliche Gesundheitspflege in Österreich seit dem Jahre 1848*. Statist. Monatsschrift, 1898, vol. III, p. 392, apud Friedrich Prinzing, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

Auch "Gazeta Bucovinei"/Bukowinazeitung vom 1892 ermahnte über "den zerstörerischen und tödlichen Feind, die Cholera aus Asien", die „aus Russland, das Land und das Reich" bedrohte. In solchen Bedingungen, die Quarantäneeinleitung nicht nur ein sozialer Imperativ, sondern auch eine bürgerliche und politische Pflicht war: "Wir, die uns auf der östlichen Reichsseite befinden, sind angerufen und die Pflicht haben, in der ersten Linie zu sein, damit wir uns vor diesen Feind schützen, auch um diesen Feind zu halten und abzulehnen, die Land- und Monarchiebevölkerung zu schützen. Die Regierung und die autonomen Herrscher organisierten alle diesen Maßnahmen, die uns die Forschungen- und Erfahrungenergebnisse geben, um die Eingang, Infektion und Verbreitung dieser Krankheit zu halten, auch zu kämpfen und zu zerstören."¹⁴ Obwohl in seinem Studium für Jahr 1893, der Arzt Iacob Felix erklärte, dass "kein Cholerafall in der Bukowina angemeldet wurde"¹⁵, im August "erschien die Krankheit in der Region Hetza, auch in vier Dörfern in der Nähe dieser kleinen Stadt, die aus der Bukowina, durch Personen vom infektiösen Dorf Hliboka heimlich, nachts, die Grenzwachposten vergangen waren, gebracht worden ist"¹⁶. Obwohl die Provinzbehörden nicht die Quarantäne oder "die Sanitärrevision für die Reisenden aus Galizien"¹⁷ eingeleitet haben, der rumänischen Staat schloss „den Eingangspunkt von Österreich-Ungarn nach Rumänien, von Mamornita bis Vârciorova, außer der Sanitärrevisions- und Desinfektionsorte von Mamornița, Michăileni, Burdujeni, Predeal, Vârciorova"¹⁸.

Auch nach 1900, Cholerafälle in der Bukowinasiedlungen signalisiert wurden, im 1915, die Zeitung "Northern Times/Nördliche Zeiten" vom 16. Januar veröffentlichte eine Notiz, in der Nachrichtenrubrik unter dem Namen *The Kaiser's Infamous War/Ehrloser Krieg des Kaisers*, über den Windpocken-, Cholera- und Typhusausbrücheschlag in Wien, seit über 1000 Bukowiner wanderte in der Reichshauptstadt aus¹⁹. Deutlich, neben der ärztlichen Behandlung aus den Krankenhäusern, erwähnt die Volksmedizin die speziellen Arzneien "gegen die Cholera" – wie erscheinen im *Kalender für Jahr 1884*, verfasst von Calistrat Coca: "man nimmt die innere Augenseite, die wie kleine, roten Knöpfe, aus den gekochten Krebsen, danach bratet man auf dem Herd und zerreibt sie"²⁰.

¹⁴ "Gazeta Bucovinei", Cernăuți, an. II, nr. 60, Iulie 1892.

¹⁵ Iacob Felix, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 316.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 313.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 315.

¹⁹ *Cholera epidemic in Vienna*, in "The Northern Times", Carnarvon, vol. X, nr. 490, 16 January 1915, p. 3.

²⁰ *Unele leacuri populare* [Einige Volksarzneien], în "Călimdariul pe anul ordinariu 1884", Cernăuți, an XI, 1884, pp. XXXVII.

2. Diphtherie, Windpocken und Scharlach – “Töten die Kinder wie Tod mit der Sense”

Mehr verbreiteter als die Cholera war die Diphtherie oder “die kremige Angina” oder “die weiße Mundfäule”; Teodor Nandriș erkennt, dass “von allen Epidemien, die die Gemeinde Banila geschädigt haben, die Diphtherie klassifiziert sich obenan (...) In 125 Jahren, Diphtherie gab 24 Epidemien, mit Gesamtanzahl von 508 Todesfällen”²¹. In den Memoiren von Pamfil Cuciureanu erwähnt er, dass “im Frühling des Jahres 1886, eine infektiöse Krankheit (Diphtherie) wütete durch die Gemeindenjugend (Bilca). Noch die Familie des Petrea Costinoae, aus 5 Knaben und 2 Mädchen, nicht von dieser Krankheit erspart wurde. Von 7 Geschwistern, 3 Knaben und 2 Mädchen starben in zwei Wochen”²². In der offiziellen Statistik, in der Bukowina des Jahres 1896 1295 Fälle registriert wurden, in 1897 -341, in 1898 – 631 Todesfälle, in 1899 - 186 Todesfälle, die verwundbarste Kategorie war, selbst verständlich, die Kinder mit dem Alter zwischen 1 und 5 Jahre²³.

Der *Volkskalender auf dem geringen Jahr 1883*, verfasst von Ion I. Bumbac, bezieht sich auf die Bemerkungen des Arztes A. Ștefanovici, der aus der Bukowina Stammte, aber in Botoșani wohnte, ermahnte, dass “eine der schrecklichsten Krankheiten, die in unseren neuen Zeiten erscheint, ist die *Diphtherieangina* – eine schlechte Halskrankheit, die insbesondere an Kinder erscheint und tötet sie so, dass, in einigen Dörfern, blieben keine Kinder mehr”²⁴. Gemäß der “Gazeta Bucovinei”/Bukowinazeitung vom Dezember 1891, die Diphtherieepidemie betraf schwer die Ortschaften Sucevița, Voitinell und Ostrița²⁵ und führte zum Tode einer großen Anzahl von Menschen.

“Revista Politică”/Die politische Zeitschrift vom September 1886²⁶ erwähnt den Schlag der Masernepidemie in Suceava (oder “cori”, auf Rumänisch). Trotz der Warnungen, in der Stadt “fanden mehrere Todesfälle statt, insbesondere in den armen Familien, die nichts von den Ärzten zu wissen wollen, auch noch Volksarzneien

²¹ Teodor Nandriș, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

²² Pamfil Cuciureanu, *Din carnetul vieții. Autobiografie* [Aus dem Lebensheft. Autobiografie], in Mircea Irimescu (coord.), *Izvorul. 150 de ani de școală la Bilca* [Die Quelle. 150 Jahre Schule in Bilca], Rădăuți, Ed. Septentrion, 2011, p. 111-112.

²³ Iacob Felix, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

²⁴ Dr. A. Ștefanovici, *Anghina difteritică sau boala de gât (mai ales la copii)* [Diphtherie oder Halskrankheit (insbesondere an Kinder)], in “Călimdriu pe anul ordinaru 1883”, Suceava, 1883, p. XVIII.

²⁵ “Gazeta Bucovinei”, Cernăuți, an I, nr. 70, Duminecă 29 Decemvrie 1891.

²⁶ “Revista Politică”, Suceava, an. I, nr. 13, 15 Noiembrie 1886.

verwenden wollen, um die Kranken zu retten”²⁷. Im November, das selbe Jahr, Suceava von “einer gefährlichsten Krankheit, nämlich dem *Scharlach*” geschädigt wurde, die mehrere Kinder getötet hat. Die beiden Krankheiten erschienen insbesondere an Schüler und Schülerinnen der Grundschule. Vorige Woche, wie uns informiert hat, waren über vierzig Mädchen, krank vom Masern. Dennoch, der Lokalschulrat²⁸ ordnet nicht an, um für einen Zeitraum die Schulen zu schließen, und so die Verbreitung dieser Krankheiten zu verhindern”²⁹. Auch “Gazeta Bucovinei”/Bukowinazeitung vom Dezember 1891 ermahnte über die Scharlachepidemiegefahr in Czernowitz, Ober-Horodnik, Bahrinestie, Camenca, Hatna, Capu-Codrului und Mitoka. Gemäß des Studiums des Arztes Nandris, die schreckliste Scharlachepidemie in der Gemeinde Banila auf Ceremuș zwischen 1904-1905 war, “das empfänglichste Alter für diese Krankheit ist *die zweite Kindheit*, nämlich zwischen 5 und 10 Jahre alt”³⁰.

3. Der Fluch des Krieges, der Hunger und des Kammers: Typhus

Über den Typhus (“*lungoare*” auf Rumänisch) – die Plage die, während des russisch-türkischen Krieges von 1877-1878, “eine größere Sterblichkeit wie die Schusswaffen bewirkte”, die rumänischen Truppen aus Bulgarien dezimiert und eine” 46%-Krankhaftigkeit”³¹ registriert hat – ,diese Krankheit die Bukowinabevölkerung beeinflusste. Nachdem Alter, die 40-70 Jahre alt Kategorie am stärksten exponiert wurde, in den nächsten Monaten wurde das Maximum in Januar-April erreicht, im Gegensatz mit dem Wasserfieber, das am Herbst nach den Regen, vom Oktober bis Dezember verbreitet war”³².

Im seinen Buch, *Der Verlauf meines Lebens*, der Pfarrer Constatin Morariu erwähnte den Typhus und die Unwirksamkeit der Arzneien von der alten Frau Pruna. Der Typhus – *Lungoare* – versteifte ihn im Bett “während der Osternfastenzeit” und das ganze Essen “das meine Mutter mir gab” bitter war. Nur das göttliche Wunder, die Familiegebete und der Arzt aus Suczawa ihn geheilt haben. *Die kleine Flasche*,

²⁷ *Ibidem*, nr. 12, Noiembrie 1886.

²⁸ An Bilca, im Schuljahr 1895-1896, die Unterrichte fingen am 23. Dezember 1895 an, wegen der Scharlachepidemie, die über 100 Kinder, davon 40 Schüler waren, getötet hat, according to Constantin Cuciureanu, Ionel Puha, *Învățământul în Bilca - schiță istorică* [Die Bildung aus Bilca. Historische Skizze], in Mircea Irimescu (coord.), *Izvorul. 150 de ani de școală la Bilca* [Die Quelle. 150 Jahre Schule in Bilca], Rădăuți, Ed. Septentrion, 2011, p. 29.

²⁹ “Revista Politică”, Suceava, an. I, nr. 13, 15 Noiembrie 1886.

³⁰ Teodor Nandriș, *op. cit.*, p. 89-92.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 82.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 83.

“mit einer klaren Flüssigkeit wie das reinste Wasser”, “davon man einige Tropfen auf einem Zuckerstück legte” (vielleicht Chinin) die Arznei für die Krankheit, die auch für ihn tödlich sein könnte, war. Über den Typhus schrieb auch Emanuil Grigorovita, der bestimmte, dass die Epidemie vom 1866 “nach den zwei unfruchtbaren Jahren 1864 und 1865”, auch wegen des schrecklichen Hungers, der die Leute “Schrotten”³³ zu essen verpflichtete, schlug. Im 1868, sein Großvater Irmolai starb von dieser schrecklichen Krankheit und *Typhus* erschien im Todbuch als Todesursache.

Anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts, die Ergänzung der “Deșteptarea”/der Weckzeitung veröffentlichte eine Information über den “Typhus/lungoare” der “von sechs Wochen die Gemeinde Ober-Partestie bewirkt” und, wenn er wiederkommt, “die Leuten sterben müssen. Ich verstand, daß auch die Schüler krank oder einige schon tot sind. In der Zeit verbreitet die Krankheit mehr und mehr. Sollen wir überrascht sein, daß die Hauptmannschaft und die Ärzte nichts daran getan haben? Warum, dann, existieren diese Bezirk- und Gemeinendärzte?”³⁴

Auch nach fast zwanzig Jahren, im *Volkskalender für das Jahr 1919*, verfasst vom Aurelian Tautul, einem orthodoxen Pfarrer aus Suczawa, man erwähnte die infektiöse Krankheit, “die die Personen über zwanzig Jahre alt bewirkt. Anfangs der Krankheit, man fühlt sich müde, dann will er schlafen, gähnen, gibt es Ohrenwirbel und der Kopf trüb wird. Danach, Fieber sich installiert, der Mund und der Hals trocken werden, der Kranke will immer trinken, dann ins Bett fällt. Später wird er unruhig und sehr schwach. Der Kranke trinkt nur Wasser, weil das Essen erscheint bitter, wegen der Fieber und Kopfschmerzen. Kaum nach zwei bis vier oder fünf Wochen im Bett, der Kranke weckt und fragt zu essen an. Danach, alle Haare auf dem Kopf fallen, aber es ist keine Verletzung, weil wächst ein anderes an. Diese Krankheit schwierig und gefährlich ist, deshalb man unbedingt bewachen soll, als der Kranke essen will, weil ist eine Darmkrankheit und, nach der Krankheit, die Därme so verdickt sind, dass, fast alles was der Kranke isst, außerdem Milch und Hühnersuppe, tötet ihn (durch Därmezerstörung)”³⁵. Die Warnung und Behandlung dieser Krankheit, die für die Epidemieiendämmung entscheidend waren, sah vor “daß, Sie alles was der Kranke entfernt, in einer speziellen Höhle mit Kalk im Garten beerdigen. Damit Sie sich nicht verseuchen, während Sie den Kranken pflegen, waschen Ihre Hände oft und keine Sorge! Während der Fieber, der Kranke spricht anderswo, die anderen schlagen oder laufen will. Bewachen Sie ihn, die armen, aber

³³ Emanoil Grigorovitză, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

³⁴ *Epidemie*, în Suplement la “Deșteptarea”, Cernăuți, nr. 64, 14/27 Ianuarie 1901.

³⁵ *Calendarul poporului pe anul 1919*, Suceava, an V, p. 95.

schlagen Sie ihn oder machen ihn nicht fest, weil er ist krank und weiß nicht, was er tut und können Sie mit Sanftmut ruhigen. Er braucht auch warme Bäder, wie Sommerwasser, aber nur der Arzt das tun kann. Wenn Sie wissen, dass gibt es Typhus in einem Haus, nehmen Sie Wasser aus diesem Brunnen nicht, bis der Arzt erlaubt es. Weil es ist möglich, daß Sie auch mit Typhus verseuchen können, sein Virus lebt mehr in den unreinen Brunnen. Berühren Sie nicht die Sachen, die der Kranke berührt hat, aber, wenn Sie berührt haben, waschen Ihre Hände”³⁶.

Durch die Rückgewinnung der mündlichen Tradition in der Monografie der Gemeinde Oprişeni, Dumitru Covalciuc erwähnt die Typhusepidemie vom 1866, “als die Opferanzahl so groß war, dass der Dorfpfarrer sie nicht christlich begraben konnte. Die Leichen in Wagen und außerhalb des Dorfes geführt wurden, um in den Tiefriedhof, der Pferdefriedhof oder Colentina hiess, zu legen”³⁷. Auch in der Arbeit *Analele medicale ale spitalului Bârlad și Elena Beldiman pe anul 1898/Ärztliche Annalen des Krankenhauses Barlad und Elena Beldiman für das Jahr 1898*, erschienen in Vaslui im 1900, der Arzt Cerchez besteht über die Epidemie, die in Barlad schlug, zwischen “Straßenkehrer” und “an die Nachbarn der schmutzigen Hütten dieser Kehrler verbreitet”³⁸. Die Epidemie bewirkte “fast 60 Personen, davon 34 im Krankenhaus waren und 4 starben” und “aus der Bukowina, durch einen Kehrler, der dort seine Ferien verbracht hat, gebracht wurde”³⁹.

Selbstverständlich, die verlustbringende Hygiene begünstigte die Epidemienverbreitung und die Pfarreibücher bestätigen, daß, als ein einziges Kind krank geworden ist, konnte sich das ganze Dorf verseuchen, in einigen Tagen oder Monaten, eine Familie einige ihrer Mitglieder verlieren konnte. Auch Filimon Rusu schrieb über die Ignoranz und Erwiderung gegen die Schulausbildung: “Was würden die Einwohner aus Cajvana geben, um die Kinder in die Schule nicht anzurufen? Die Kuh zu wenig für die reichen Leute war, die armen Leute gaben ein Kalb oder ein Schaf, um nicht den Knaben zu scheren [...] Danach, die Mütter weinen, die sagten, daß ihre Knaben “so hässlich” ohne lange Haare sind, nur das Lachen, auch das Mitgefühl für eine solche Entscheidung erwecken könnten. Außerdem, wievielte Hygienerräte über das Körperswaschen nicht gegeben werden sollten, weil wir nur ihre Hände, Ohren, Hals und Füße überprüfen konnten. Dann, die Hemden, weil, fielen die Frauen aus, sollten sie nicht anziehen, wie sie in die Kirche gehen! Deshalb

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 96.

³⁷ Dumitru Covalciuc, *Oprişeni, un sat la răspântiile istoriei* [Opriseni, ein Dorf an die Geschichteskreuzung], Zelana Bucovina, Cernăuți, 2008, p. 36.

³⁸ I. Felix, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

schlugen die Epidemien, so die Schulen in jedem Jahr, am Herbst oder am Frühling, auch bis zu sechs Wochen, geschlossen wurden”⁴⁰.

4. Die häufigste infektiöse Krankheit: die Pocken

Ion Nandriș erwähnt, in seiner Monografie, *Unser Dorf Mahala aus der Bukowina*, die Windpocken wie “die häufigste infektiöse Krankheit der Kinder”, auch weil “die Hygienegesetze” fehlten. “Die meisten alten Häuser nur einen Flur und ein einziges Zimmer hatten. Dort schliefen alle Familienmitglieder, oft 7-10 Personen, dort kochte man, aß und sich wusch, insbesondere am Winter und in der kalten Jahreszeit. Das Maß und die Verblüffung nicht ausreichend waren”⁴¹. Gemäß der Informationen, die vom Arzt Felix gegeben wurden, “in der Bukowina, teilweise starben vom Windpocke in 1896, 202 in 1897, 201 in 1898, 460 Personen”⁴², während der Arzt Nandriș setzte die erste Epidemie von Banila pe Ceremuș im Jahr 1832, die letzte im 1921 fest (wegen des Fehlens der “präventive Impfungen gegen die Windpocken” während des Weltkrieges 1914-1918; sonst, in Galizien und in der Bukowina, in 1915-1916 42.000 Fälle registriert wurden)⁴³.

Obwohl, der Bevölkerungsabschnitt am stärksten exponiert zum Erkranken das Alter zwischen 20 und 30 Jahre war, “die größte Sterblichkeit” blieb zwischen 1 und 5 Jahre, insbesondere an kleine Mädchen und am Frühling, genauer in den Monaten April-Mai⁴⁴. Im *Kalender der Gesellschaft für Kultur und Rumänische Literatur aus der Bukowina* vom 1914, erwähnt man den Abschnitt der Windpockenepidemie, die im 1898 im Sereth-Bezirk schlug. Die Verweigerung der lippowanischen Gemeinde Fontina Alba und Climăuți, um ihre Mitglieder zu impfen, gründete auf dem “Gesetz”, das ihnen verbot, “ihr Blut mit dem Blut der Gläubiger von anderer Konfession oder gar mit der Materie aus einem Tier”⁴⁵, weil sie dachten und

⁴⁰ Filimon Rusu, *Amintiri. Oameni și locuri din Țara Fagilor* [Erinnerungen.Leute und Gegenden aus dem Buchenland], ed. Vasile I. Schipor, București, Editura Academiei Române, 2009, p. 73.

⁴¹ Ion Nandriș, *Satul nostru Mahala din Bucovina* [Unser Dorf Mahala aus der Bukowina], ed. Gheorghe Nandriș, Sibiu, Casa de Presă și Editură Tribuna, 2001, p. 72.

⁴² Jacob Felix, *op. cit.* p. 125.

⁴³ Donald R. Hopkins, *The Greatest Killer: Smallpox in History*, University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 97.

⁴⁴ Teodor Nandriș, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁴⁵ Mit Bezug auf die Impfung (*oltuirea*) mit Kuhpocken, durch Hauteindrücken und Schnitteinweichen mit Pocken auf den Kuheuter, according to Luminița Dumănescu, *Universul copilăriei la românii din Transilvania* [Kindheitsuniversum an die Rumänen aus Siebenbürgen], Cluj Napoca, 2008, p. 134; Ana Grama, *Copiii – Într-o lume reală*

akzeptierten die "Krankheiten wie eine Gottstrafe"⁴⁶. Wenn, in den 21 Gemeinden aus dem Sereth-Bezirk, nur 231 Personen verseuchten, "nämlich 5 von 1000 Einwohnern", in den zwei lippowanischen Gemeinden, 667 Fälle registriert wurden, "nämlich 283 von 1000 Einwohnern", und die Sterblichkeit, gemäß Kramer, von 13,5% war⁴⁷. Weil "die Todesfälle vom Windpocken in Lipoveni nur Kinder waren", die Erklärung ist die Erwachseneimpfung für 2300 Erfasste Personen, "die früher krank waren", 1532 oder zwei Drittel "verseucht von dieser Krankheit waren". Das Fehlen der Gesundheitspflege (in der Bukowina, 12 Ärzte pflegten 100.000 Einwohner)⁴⁸ und die Verschwiegenheit vom Arzt verhindern die Anzahlbewertung derjenigen "die während der früheren Epidemien starben", andere Tausend "kämpften mit dem Tod für ganze Wochen und, nach sie wieder gesund sind, das ganze Leben Zeichen auf seinem Gesichten (Kneifen) haben"⁴⁹. Gemäß der Zeitschrift "Școala/die Schule", nicht nur die Narben, sondern die Blindheit über die Krankheitsschwierigkeit erwähnte, weil, von der ganzen Blindenanzahl in der Bukowina in 1908, 9,7% blind nach den Pocken geworden sind⁵⁰.

5. Die Pandemie der Jahre 1918-1920: Die Spanische Grippe

Die schwierigen Bedingungen im Verlauf des Grossen Krieges zwischen 1914 und 1918 den Schlag einer der schrecklichsten Epidemien aus Europa begünstigte, weil "die Kriege regelmäßig verschiedene infektiösen Krankheiten bringen"⁵¹. In *Briefe vom Gott*, Dragoș Vitencu beschrieb über den Versuch seiner Eltern, um ihre Kinder zu schützen, durch die Vermeidung seiner Kontakte mit Verunreinigungsfaktoren. Der Lehrer Alexandru Baloșescu aus Czernowitz, beispielweise, wollte nicht seinen

complexă, schimbătoare și mereu asemenea. Contribuții documentare [Kinder – In einer wahren, komplexen, ändernden Welt. Dokumentsbeiträge], in Luminița Dumănescu (ed.), *9 ipostaze ale copilăriei românești: istorii cu și despre copii de ieri și de azi* [9 Hypostasen der rumänischen Kindheit: Geschichten mit und über die Kinder von gestern und heute], Cluj Napoca, 2008, pp. 15-19.

⁴⁶ *Vărsatul (variola) și vaccinarea* [Pocken und Impfung], in "Calendarul Societății pentru Cultura și Literatură Română din Bucovina", anul I, 1914, Cernăuți, p. 79.

⁴⁷ R. Kramer, *Het vaccinatie-probleem*, Kampen, 1916, p. 141, apud Theo Engelen, John Robert Shepherd, Yang Wen-Shan (eds.), *Death at the Opposite Ends of the Eurasian Continent*, Amsterdam University Press, 2011, p. 188.

⁴⁸ Ivan T. Berend, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁴⁹ *Vărsatul...*[Pocken..], p. 79.

⁵⁰ D. Rusceac, *Institutul de orbi din Cernăuți* [Blindeninstitut aus Czernowitz], in "Școala", nr. 6, mai, 1912, p. 142.

⁵¹ *Epidemia spaniolă* [Spanische Epidemie], in "Calendarul poporului pe anul 1919", Suceava, an. V, p. 92.

Sohn in die Stadt mitnehmen, weil “neben dem Ekel für alles was er umsah, fürchtete, daß der Knabe sich von einer Krankheit wegen der Strassenschmutzigkeit verseuchte”. Auch so, der kleine und kränkliche Ler (der fiel ins Bett einige Tage, mehrmals pro Jahr) litt wegen der schrecklichsten Krankheit. Die neue Krankheit, “unbekannt, die die Leute *Spanische Grippe* nennt” und fiel ins Bett Hälfte der Czernowitzer, verwirrt und fürchtet “Blutausbrüche auf Nase und Mund, die die Ärzte nicht halten, auch erklären können”⁵².

Obwohl die verwundbarsten sind die Kinder, Vitencu behauptet, daß “viele Kranken starben. Einige wurden unerwartet gesund, den anderen keine Arznei helfen konnte”⁵³. Entweder wie *Schnupfen / troacna* (Halsschmerz, Husten, Kopfschmerz, Kälte und Müdigkeit), wie “Darmkrankheit”, “Nervenkrankheit, mit großen Kopf- und Beinenschmerzen” oder wie “Lungenentzündung” – “die letzte war auch die gefährlichste Variante” – äußerte, die Grippe brauchte “ärztliche Pflege” und die Hinweise zur Krankheitsprävention waren: “den Kranken nicht berühren”, “die größte Reinigung zu behalten” und Hände-, Mund- und Nasenwaschen, mit “warmem Wasser mit Salz, ein bisschen Alkohol und Kaliumpermanganat”⁵⁴. Es empfiehlt, daß, “die Leute sich entwöhnten, sich durch Händenberührung zu begrüßen, vom Besuch von einem verseuchten Haus zu anderem, an Gasthäuser oder veröffentlichen Orte, vom Todeskuss oder Teilnahme an die Gedenkgottesdienste für den Tod, der wegen dieser Krankheit starb (...), alle Ursachen, die diese Krankheit verbreiten, zu leiten”⁵⁵.

Es ist wirklich, daß die Isolierung die einfachste Möglichkeit, um die Krankheit zu vermeiden, war (“wenn ein Mitglied unserer Familie krank würde, dann schläft er in anderem Zimmer”)⁵⁶, aber die Einsamkeit des Kranken war, selbst verständlich, eine der peinlichsten Erfahrungen im Krankheitsverlauf. Vielleicht nicht zufällig, die Epidemien stellten große sozialen und persönlichen Veränderungen her: eine Demontage des Alltags, Lähmung der gewöhnlichen Tätigkeiten oder Angst (ein unangenehmes Gefühl). Deshalb, in seiner Arbeit, *Briefe vom Gott*, der Mann der Agripina (krank von Grippe), Fonfon, “ein Taschentuch mit kölnischwasser über die Nase trug, die Tür des Zimmers, wo seine kranke Frau war, zwei oder am meistens drei Mal täglich klaffte, um zu fragen, wie sie sich noch fühlte. Wenn sie nicht schlief oder noch nicht verstellte zu schlafen, Agripina kurz

⁵² Dragoş Vitencu, *Scrisori de la Dumnezeu [Briefe vom Gott]*, ed. Aura Brădăţan, Suceava, 2012, p. 330.

⁵³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁴ *Epidemia spaniolă...* [Spanische Epidemie...], p. 93.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

und unveränderlich antwortet: *Gut*. Die Antwort befriedigte den Fonfon, der sich nach Badezimmer beeilte, wo viele Desinfektionsmitteln benützte⁵⁷.

Rückschlüsse

Offenkundig, die Beispiele weitergehen könnten, weil, unsichtbare Geschichteschauspieler, die Epidemien eine große Rolle über den Alltag der österreichischen Bukowina gespielt haben. Das Studium dieses Bereiches zeigt uns unverdächtige Auswirkungen, die einen wahren Katalysator zum Verstehen der Zeitmentalität, Reaktion der beeinflussten Gemeinde oder des Behördenmechanismus – mehr oder weniger –, um die Krankheit zu begrenzen oder zu beseitigen, war. Es ist ein wahrer Spielplan auf wirtschaftlichen, psychischen und sozialen Strukturen. Die Hauptbedingung blieb diejenige, daß alle Forschungen die klassifizierten, systematisierten und analysierten Dokumente aus Archiven, ältere und neuere Publikationen, Memoiren usw. als Fundament, durch den Filter aus den anderen historiographischen Bereichen, benützen. Eine solche Thematik legt die Realität des Buchenlandes über und ihren Platz in der allgemeinen breiteren Historiographie finden wird, auch trägt, zusammen mit den unvermeidlichen Ähnlichkeiten, ihre eigene, spezifische, eindeutige Äußerung.

⁵⁷ Dragoş Vitencu, *op. cit.*, p. 330-331.

MARRIAGE IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: TRADITIONAL PRECEPTS AND INNOVATIVE EXPERIMENTS

Natalia Pushkareva

Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
pushkarev@mail.ru,

Rezumat: *Căsătoria în Rusia post-sovietică: Principii tradiționale și experimente inovatoare*

Acest articol prezintă preceptele tradiționale rusești și experimente inovatoare în domeniul căsătoriei de-a lungul ultimilor 25 de ani. Autorul este sigur că, în ciuda tuturor experimentelor în domeniul relațiilor conjugale și de familie, din perioada de sfârșit a regimului sovietic, precum și în cea post-sovietică, toate eforturile guvernului sovietic de a controla comportamentul marital al populației au fost sortite eșecului. După încetarea intervenției statului în viața privată a oamenilor, situația maritală și relațiile de familie în Rusia au evoluat la nivelul celor din țările Europei de Vest.

Abstract: *This article presents the Russian traditional precepts and innovative experiments in the area of marriage during the last quarter of the century. The author is sure that despite all the experiments in the sphere of marital and family relations throughout the late Soviet as well as post-Soviet period, all the efforts of the Soviet government to control the marital behavior of the individuals crashed. After government interference in the private lives of people ended, the marital and family situation in Russia evolved into something very much like that in the countries of Western Europe.*

Résumé: *Le mariage dans la Russie post-soviétique: Principes traditionnels et expériences innovatrices*

L'article ci-joint présente les préceptes traditionnels et les expériences innovatrices dans le domaine du mariage le long des derniers 25 ans. L'auteur est sûr que, malgré toutes les expériences dans le domaine des relations conjugales et de famille, de la période finale du régime soviétique, ainsi que de celle post-soviétique, tous les efforts du gouvernement soviétique de contrôler le comportement matrimonial de la population essuyèrent un échec. Après la fin de l'intervention de l'État dans la vie privée des personnes, la situation matrimoniale et les relations de famille en Russie évoluèrent au niveau de celles des pays de l'Europe d'Ouest.

Keywords: *Marriage, marital relations, gender asymmetry, women, marital law, reproductive behavior*

The serious changes that were taking hold of Russian society through the 1990s (the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the formation of a new legislative foundation for Russia) did not bypass the realm of family relations. There were three sources of change affecting the family: natural transformation of the demographic model, an end to tight government control (the sort of external regulation that came from being called in by the local party committee) and the socio-economic difficulties of the transitional period.

Between 1989 and 1993, the number of new marriages fell by almost a quarter (while the number of divorces increased by 14 percent).¹ The statistical low point came in 1998.² This decline touched all age groups but was particularly marked among the young, in as much as it was tied to changes in the model of demographic behaviour. Registered marriages declined both in absolute and relative terms. In other words, a retreat from universal marriage had begun. Young people preferred to live together, sharing a common household, but were in no hurry to register their status with government organs, making the number of such cohabitations difficult to ascertain. The 1994 "microcensus" established that 6.5 percent of men and 6.7 percent of women lived in unregistered marital unions, although the real figures were obviously higher.

By the beginning of the 1990s, unregistered cohabitation had indisputably become an acceptable social norm. A public opinion survey conducted in 1994 shows that 66 percent of men and 51 percent of women involved in such a relationship were loyal to their unregistered "marriage." At the same time, the majority of older people (63 percent) continued to take a negative view of unofficial marriages, while among respondents younger than 25, only 18 percent held such a view.³ Only three years later, in 1997, new data showed that tolerance toward unregistered marriage had grown even more: only 6 percent of those 16-50 years of age and 21 percent of those older than 50 condemned such unions.⁴

The increase in unregistered marital unions and out-of-wedlock births that took place during the 1990s could signify a tendency to conceptually separate the institutions of marriage and family (such a tendency can be seen not only in Russia, but has been noted even earlier in most Western countries). It must be noted that this tendency is tied to a more cautious attitude toward the regulation of individual marital rights. (Until the social upheaval of the 1990s, Russia was more socially

¹ *О положении семей в Российской Федерации* [On the state of family in the Russian Federation], Moscow, 1994, p. 17.

² *Население России 1999* [The population of Russia 1999], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., Moscow, 2000, p. 47.

³ *Население России 1998* [The population of Russia 1998], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., Moscow, 1999, p. 30.

⁴ V. Bodrova, *Russian Attitudes on Sex and Youth*, in "Choices", Vol. no. 25, 1996, p. 9.

homogeneous; with the growing distinction between “the rich” and “the poor,” the issue of material loss in the case of divorce became an obstacle to legal and official marital union – another factor behind the decline in marriage.) Young people also began to take a much more rational view of establishing a family,⁵ postponing the registration of a marriage and the birth of children until they were older and more financially secure. Other factors behind the decline in marriage were the stress associated with social crisis: loss or change of employment, housing problems, overexertion at work, etc.⁶ Certain features of the “marriage market” of the 1990s also played a role in the decline of marriage: the ratio of men to women in certain age groups – a ratio unfavourable to women who wanted a husband – increased competition for husbands and expanded the opportunities for men to enter a second marriage.⁷ The de-institutionalization of marriage was also hastened by the end of artificial government stimulus to marry: sanctions against those who divorce became a thing of the past and the advantages of family status began to disappear.⁸ The sexual revolution also had an impact – although much later than it had in the West: the availability of IUDs and birth control pills, as well as the spread of non-governmental health clinics, in which an undesired pregnancy could be terminated painlessly and without peril to health, furthered the rise in number of extramarital affairs and cohabitation between partners who were in no hurry to register their marriages at ZAGS.

The sexual revolution also had an effect on the age at which couples entered into marriage. In 1993 the age at first marriage ceased to decline, and beginning in 1994 began to gradually rise.⁹ The spread of unregistered marriages led not only to a decline in the percentage of unions that were officially registered, but to a rise in the average age of those entering into a “legal marriage.” If previously the age at which sexual activity was first entered into correlated closely with the age at which people married, and the trends in earlier sexual activity were matched by trends in earlier marriage, now the interval between these two events was beginning to grow significantly. Earlier, such landmarks as the beginning of regular sexual activity, marriage and the birth of the first child all took place within a fairly short period of time, from one to three years. This was the model on which Russians were traditionally brought up (the first sexual partner became the chosen partner for an entire, or at least the better part of a lifetime, children were produced immediately after marriage, literally allowing the birth date of the first child to be predicted based

⁵ Т. А. Гурко, *Трансформация института современной семьи* [Transformation of the institution of the contemporary family], in “СОЦИС», 1995, № 10, p. 96.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁷ *О положении семей в Российской Федерации* [On the state of the family in the Russian Federation], Moscow, 1994, p. 17.

⁸ Т. А. Гурко, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁹ *Население России 1999* [The population of Russia 1999], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., p. 49.

on the date of the wedding ceremony). For young people in the 1990s, sexual relations, marriage, and the birth and upbringing of children began to evolve into increasingly independent values, not as closely connected to one another as they had been for previous generations, even that of their parents.¹⁰

Early sexual activity was no longer linked to large numbers of unplanned pregnancies and “necessary” weddings. Additionally, despite the overall decline in births that began in 1989 (both in and out of wedlock), by the beginning of the 1990s, out-of-wedlock births (which had become an acceptable social norm) rose sharply. As a result, in 1998 an overall increase in the number of births was achieved only thanks to out-of-wedlock births, which had increased by 8.4 percent in that year.¹¹ Furthermore, less than half of all children born out of wedlock are currently officially recognized by their fathers, the mothers of out-of-wedlock children often have more than one, and those giving birth to these children in contemporary Russia are most often not teenagers or women over 30, but women in the prime reproductive age group (20-34).¹² This points to the possibility that often it is not single mothers bearing these children, but women in unofficial (unregistered) families.

Due to the higher average marriage age, the birth rate fell particularly sharply among those younger than 25. The birth rate for women older than 30 has even risen in recent years.¹³ The proportion of children born out of wedlock, as a percentage of total births, continues to steadily rise: 10.6 percent in 1970, 10.8 percent in 1980, 12 percent in 1985, 14.6 percent in 1990, 16 percent in 1991, 17.2 percent in 1992, 18.2 percent in 1993 and 28 percent in 1999.¹⁴ This represents a tripling in the incidence of out-of-wedlock birth since 1970 and a doubling since the end of the 1980s: the hard government stand on marriage and the family had evidently been a deterrent to out-of-wedlock birth in the past.

As for divorce, the rate in Russia continues to be high. The absolute number of divorces in recent years, however, has somewhat declined, tied to the decline in registered marriages, as the dissolution of unregistered unions is not reflected in official data. The proportion of marriages that are not first marriages remains fairly high: in 1997 28.5 percent for men and 27.6 percent for women. Among all “marriages” (official and unofficial), there has also been a significant increase in the share of second or subsequent “marriages” that go unregistered, which represent a larger share than

¹⁰ *Население России 2000* [The population of Russia 2000], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., Moscow, 2001, p. 31.

¹¹ *Население России 1999* [The population of Russia 1999], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., p. 61.

¹² *Население России 2000* [The population of Russia 2000], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., p. 46.

¹³ *Население России 1998* [The population of Russia 1998], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., p. 35.

¹⁴ *Российский статистический ежегодник. 1994* [The Russian statistics yearly. 1994]. Госкомстат России Moscow, 1994, p. 46; *Население России 2000* [The population of Russia 2000] отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., p. 44.

unregistered first “marriages.” By the end of the 1990s, unofficial first marriages represented 2.9 percent of total first unions, while 30.5 percent of second “marriages” remained unregistered. Among third unions the figure was 41.7 percent.¹⁵

The worsening demographic situation in Russia in the 1990s has caused concern on the part of the government and a variety of social institutions. Issues associated with marriage and family have also received increasing attention in the media and scientific literature.

Opponents of the current socio-economic restructuring in Russia (the Communists, in particular) have tried more than once to link the decline in marriage and birth to the social changes going on in the country. Objective demographic research, however, does not support this.¹⁶ There is a demographic indicator for marriage as a percentage of potential marriages (the actual number of marriages as a percentage of the theoretical maximum possible number). It factors in the structure of the population by sex, age, marital status and the accepted system of age combinations of potential husbands and wives. The trend of this indicator — 22.4 percent in 1958-59, 19.2 percent in 1969-70, 17.7 percent in 1978-79, 14.3 percent in 1988-89, 9.7 percent in 1993-94 — clearly demonstrates that the decline in marriage began long before the socio-economic reforms of the 1990s, although these reforms clearly were reflected in the acceleration of this process.¹⁷

The declining birth rate elicited a variety of proposed solutions to the complex demographic situation that had taken hold. Among these, some rather exotic proposals were advanced. In 1996, a faction within the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the leader of which is the notorious Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, drafted federal legislation intended to fundamentally change and expand the Russian Federation’s Code of Laws on the Family. In essence, the changes centred on the granting of polygamous families equal legal status with monogamous ones, as well as the regulation of polygamous relations. The authors of the bill believed that such innovations would increase the chances for unmarried women to have a family and would legalize the status of mistresses of married men, which, in the opinion of the authors, would lead to an increase in the birth rate.¹⁸ As with the other outlandish proposals by the LDPR, this bill was not passed by the Duma*. It should be noted, however, that one of the republics of the Russian Federation, Ingushetia (where a

¹⁵ *Население России 1999* [The population of Russia 1999], отв. ред. Вишневский А. Г., p. 51.

¹⁶ According to the calculations of the demographer V. Medkov, the economic crisis and decline in living standards are “responsible” for not more than 8-10 percent of the reduction in births and decline in overall population. In “Izvestia”, July, 20, 2000.

¹⁷ *Социальная энциклопедия* [The encyclopedia of society], ред. Горкин А. П. и др., Moscow, 2000, p. 48.

¹⁸ “Izvestiia”, September, 13, 1996.

* The lower house of the Federal Assembly (Parliament) of Russia.

great majority of the population is Muslim), passed a law allowing polygamy.

In the 1990s Russia saw a marked increase in the role of religion in society.¹⁹ The church began to openly express its views on a variety of socially significant issues and tried to influence society. In 2000, the Council of Bishops passed *The Russian Orthodox Church's Basic Teachings on Society*. This document formulates the position of the church on many issues, including marriage and family. In the section devoted to questions of personal, familial and societal morality it says, "the church has never disparaged marriage,"²⁰ and that a Christian marriage represents the eternal unity of the spouses in Christ.²¹ The church, the document underscores, insists on life-long faithfulness in marriage and the indissolubility of Orthodox marriage.²²

Under circumstances of rapid change, some priests attempted to proclaim civilly registered marriage "illegal," demanding that parishioners cease this practice, forbidding those not wed by the church to take part in Communion, and putting secular marriage on a par with debauchery. Nevertheless in December of 1998 the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church instructed priests applying such practices that the church, while emphasizing the necessity of church betrothal, respects secular marriage. This was reiterated in the *Basic Teachings* as well.²³

Today the vast majority of registered marriages are not church marriages, but civil ones. Only civil marriages are officially recognized. It is true that the government no longer creates obstacles to religious weddings, but as before, they hold no force of law. For this reason church wedding (which has become quite common) is usually conducted after registration of a marriage at ZAGS. After the civil ceremony, the newlyweds proceed to church, often drawn by the beauty of the ritual and the desire to "uphold tradition." In Soviet times, such opportunities practically did not exist.

The dissolution of a church marriage is rather complicated and the church recognizes only very limited grounds for divorce.²⁴ As in the past, the church continues to frown upon remarriage, although after a legal divorce most priests will not prevent the innocent party from entering into a new marriage. The church allows the side responsible for initiating the divorce a second marriage within the church

¹⁹ For more on this, see Olga Kazmina, *Freedom of Religion in Post-Soviet Russia*, in "Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies", 2001, Vol. 13, No 1/2.

²⁰ *Основы социальной концепции Русской Православной Церкви* [The Russian Orthodox Church's basic teachings on society], in "Информационный бюллетень. Отдел внешних церковных связей Московского патриархата", 2000, No. 8, p. 56.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

only after repentance and the doing of penance.²⁵ A third marriage is allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, and the period of penance is extended.²⁶ As in ancient times, Orthodox ideology insists that sexual relations are only possible within marriage, declaring extramarital or premarital sex to be debauchery.²⁷

The Russian Orthodox Church, thus, encourages its members to follow traditional norms of marital relations. The degree to which their teachings have been followed, however, is another matter. The contemporary situation (the spread of premarital affairs, unregistered couples living together as husband and wife, the high divorce rate) testify to the fact that the appeals of the church have not been widely heeded. Although the majority of the population considers itself to be religious, there are few who are deeply involved in the church. Those who consider themselves Orthodox now rather lightly and superficially do penance and mouth words of repentance for what they have done (in the case of divorce) just in order to receive formal blessing for the next marriage.

Views on what is and is not permissible in contemporary Russian society are reflected not only in the document described above, which was approved by the highest levels of the church hierarchy, but in legal documents of secular origin. In December 1995, in connection with reform of family and civil law, the State Duma passed a new Code of Laws on the Family (which came into effect in March of 1996). Some of the institutions governed previously by the Code of Laws on the Family were now placed under the purview of the Civil Code. In the Soviet era, family relations had been regulated by a special body of family laws (at a time when in most countries this was the prerogative of civil law). This arrangement was designed to underscore the idea that under socialism, questions of property did not play an important role in family relations.²⁸ From 1926, Soviet marital law featured the unwavering principle of commonality of possessions acquired during marriage, while property acquired before marriage was considered to be separate (marital contracts stipulating any special arrangements for dividing property acquired during marriage were not recognized). Beginning in the 1990s such a principle ceased to correspond to changing realities. Therefore, the changes undertaken in the 1995 code were oriented, wherever possible, toward changing the obligatory norms of disposition, giving spouses the opportunity to themselves determine the nature of their legal relationship through various agreements.²⁹ In comparison with the Soviet-era codes, the new family code allowed spouses (as well as other members

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65-66.

²⁸ М. В. Антокольская, *Лекции по семейному праву* [Lectures on family law], Moscow, 1995, p. 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

of the family) many more rights of self-regulation in settling disputes.³⁰ The authors of the new code rejected as well the sorts of extra-legal ideological and moral judgements that were typical of Soviet laws.

The new code (as its predecessor) underscored the voluntary nature of marriage. The minimum age for marriage remained at 18 (with an allowance for the lowering of this threshold to 16 at the request of the couple in certain cases, and even lower under extraordinary circumstances). A previously-existing marriage, a close blood relationship between the couple and mental incompetence due to mental illness continued to be grounds for ineligibility for marriage.³¹ Application to marry had to be submitted a month in advance of the event. Under certain circumstances this month-long period could be reduced or extended (but not by more than a month). Under extreme circumstances (pregnancy, the birth of a child, a life-threatening condition in one of the betrothed) the marriage could even be registered on the very day of initial application.³²

For the first time a provision was included in the code stating that — if desired and agreed upon by the betrothed — government and municipal medical facilities were required to perform medical and genetic tests on the couple free of charge. The results of the tests were considered confidential, and the results of one partner's test could only be released to the other with the permission of the first. If, however, one of the parties entering into marriage hides from the other the fact that he or she is infected with venereal disease (a sign that the government was still attempting to interfere in the private lives of its citizens where questions of populating the country were involved!), or HIV, the other party had the right to ask a court to declare the marriage null.³³ If one of the spouses turns out to be responsible for infecting the other with HIV, then the guilty party could be criminally liable and sentenced to incarceration for up to five years.³⁴

In light of the new socio-economic and political situation in the country, the code takes a new approach to the relative property rights of married couples. As before, property held by each spouse before marriage is regarded as an individual possession. Property acquired during marriage, however, can now be divided in a variety of ways. In keeping with legal procedures, such property is considered jointly held. But in addition to legal procedure, the new code allows for the possibility of dividing this property on the basis of a marital agreement spelling out the fate of

³⁰ Л. М. Пчелинцева, *Комментарий к Семейному кодексу Российской Федерации* [Commentary to the Russian Federation code of laws on the family], Moscow, 1999, p. 16.

³¹ *Семейный кодекс Российской Федерации* [The Russian Federation code of laws on the family], Moscow, 1996, p. 8.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁴ Л. М. Пчелинцева, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

property in case of divorce.³⁵

The new code also introduces changes in the divorce process. The changes are based on the precept that if marriage is a free and voluntary union, then its dissolution should also be free.³⁶ The State finally gave up its active interference in the preservation of marriages. While the divorce process through ZAGS, according to the new code, was not significantly changed (it is still possible under the same set of circumstances as before, but could now be completed within a month of application instead of three months),³⁷ the process of divorcing through a court of law has undergone significant modification. As before, a court divorce is required when minor children are involved (whether or not both spouses agree to the divorce) or when only one of the spouses agrees to the divorce (whether or not there are children). In cases where both spouses agreed to the divorce but children are involved, the sole purpose of the court proceedings is protection of the interests of the children; in contrast with the practices of previous years, there is no effort to determine the motivations behind the divorce. In cases where one spouse opposes divorce, the judge, after hearing arguments from the party in favour of divorce, is empowered to delay hearing the case, setting a time frame of up to three months during which the spouses may attempt to reconcile. At the end of this period, if reconciliation has not occurred, the judge is required to divorce the couple.³⁸ The judge no longer has the right to refuse to dissolve the marriage.

Detailed information about the state of marriage and family in the country will be provided by the upcoming Russian census, slated for October of 2002. The sociological surveys being conducted in the period leading up to the census have shown that women living in unregistered relationships are planning to designate their status as "married," while men living in similar arrangements will designate their status as "unmarried" — a phenomenon that reflects the greater dependence of women on the model of social expectations surrounding marital behavior (as in the past, to remain unmarried is not so much shameful as something that puts women in the position of being viewed as pitiable and unfortunate).

It is evident that the young continue to lend relative significance to marital ties in starting a family, although there appears to be a great deal of variety in their views on the nature of marriage and in their models for the mutual roles of the spouses or partners. There still exists the traditional model of marriage corresponding to historically established roles: the man as breadwinner, the wife as "keeper of the family hearth." (During the Soviet period a gender order based on the concept of the

³⁵ Семейный кодекс Российской Федерации [Code of laws on the family], p. 17-22.

³⁶ А. Ф. Изварина, Семейное право [Family law], Rostov-on-the-Don, 1998, p. 9.

³⁷ Семейный кодекс Российской Федерации [Code of laws on the family], p. 9.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 10-11.

“working mother” held precedence, one in which women, the equals of men in the workplace, performed all the traditional functions of the “good wife” in the home—maintaining an environment of cosiness, taking care of all housework and raising the children.) Over recent years, a modernized model has become more widespread, one in which both spouses carry equal, or nearly equal, responsibility both for providing family income and for running the household and raising the children. Such marriages turn out to be less durable, as the family roles of the husband and wife are interchangeable and each spouse understands that he or she is able to live without his or her partner. These marriages, therefore, are held together only as long as mutual respect, love, sexual and emotional-psychological attachment between the couple endure.³⁹

New varieties of gender contracts have appeared in Russian families. There now exists the successful husband-breadwinner, able to free his non-working wife from the cares of running a household (with housework being taken care of by servants and childrearing mostly handled by a nanny or governess). Under such circumstances, some wives have become business partners and colleagues to their husbands — others fall into complete material and psychological dependence on them. The durability of such marriages (in both scenarios) again turn out to rely on factors that are difficult to measure statistically — on the strength of feelings between the couple. Finally, it is now not uncommon to find marriages in which the main breadwinner is the woman, with the household run by both spouses. The stability of such marriages rests again on emotional-psychological factors — the tolerance of the wife and husband toward such a non-traditional arrangement.

Upon examining the changes that have taken place, the conclusion can be reached that at the turn of the century and millennium, Russia (following Western Europe) exhibits a tendency toward transition from officially registered marriage to unregistered relationships and simple cohabitation. This trend is particularly evident among the younger generation. The age at which the young enter into their first officially registered marriage has increased significantly. Evidently this can be explained by a lack of belief among the young in the idea of marriage as a life-long union and by their wish to avoid creating problems during divorce and the division of property.⁴⁰ In summary, it can be established that, despite all the experiments in the sphere of marital and family relations throughout the Soviet period and the efforts of the Soviet government to tightly control the marital behaviour of its citizens, after government interference in the private lives of people ended, the marital and family situation in Russia evolved into something very much like that in the countries of Western Europe.

³⁹ *Социальная энциклопедия* [The Encyclopedia of Society], ред. Горкин А. П. и др., p. 46.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

EXPLANATION OF SOME POINTS OF MIKHAIL PANARETOS “TRAPEZUND CHRONICLE”

Vazha I. Kiknadze

Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
Institute of History and Ethnology
vazhakiknadze@yahoo.com

Rezumat: *Explicarea câtorva chestiuni legate de „Cronica de la Trapezunt” a lui Mikhail Panaretos*

Articolul analizează un izvor semnificativ din secolul 14, așa-zisa „Cronică de la Trapezunt” a lui Mikhail Panaretos. Este arătată importanța acestei surse pentru istoria Imperiului de la Trapezunt, Georgia, Bizanț, Orientul Apropiat. Sunt explicate câteva chestiuni legate de „Cronica de la Trapezunt”, care sunt discutabile și nerezolvate până în prezent.

Abstract: *The article deals with the significant source of the 14th century so-called “Trapesund Chronicle” of Mikhail Panaretos. It’s shown the importance of this source for the history of Trapezund Empire, Georgia, Byzance, Near East. In the article are explained some points of the “Trapesund Chronicle” which are disputable and are not settled till now.*

Résumé: *L’explication des quelques questions de “Chronique de Trébizonde” de Michel Panaretos.*

Dans le présent article est examiné la source significative de XIV^e siècle dit “Chronique de Trébizonde” de Michel Panaretos et son importance dans l’histoire de Trébizonde, Géorgie, Byzance et Proche-Orient. On précise de même quelques questions en suspens discutées jusqu’a présent.

Keywords: *Trapesund, Georgia, Chronicle, Ilkhanate*

The so called “Trapesund Empire” was founded in 1204 on the Southern coast of the Black Sea, with the center in the city of Trapesund. Several factors have contributed to its establishment: the desire of the economic independence expressed by the region; weakening of the Bizantine Empire; geographical space etc.¹. But the major event, significantly determining the decline of the Byzantine Empire was the 4th Crusade, capturing the city of Constantinople. The event turned out to be profitable for the royal nobility of Georgia and its queen Tamar (1184-1212). Queen Tamar sent troops to these territories and contributed to the creation of the buffer state².

The Georgian influence remained significant over the Trapesund Empire till the very last days of its existence (1461). Meanwhile, the Trapesund Empire was mainly populated by the relative Georgian tribes, Lazs and Chans.

During the existence of the Trapesund Empire several famous historical writings were created, the “Trapesund Chronicle” of Mikhail Panaretos being the one among them, describing the history of existence of the Trapesund Empire from its establishment to the middle of the 15th century. There are no information records on the author – Mikhail Panaretos. He belonged to one of the most influential families of the Byzantium alongside with some other five families of the empire³.

The Chronicle is conserved in the form of the only one manuscript, dating back to the 1608, kept in the library of the St. Markoz Monastery (Venice). The manuscript was found by the German orientalist I. Fallmerayer, in the beginning of the 19th century, although it was published on the very first time in 1832, by other German scientist, Taffel. Since then, the chronicle was published several times, including in Georgian.

The presented paper aims at commenting on different parts of the chronicle. The first point interesting for us is dated to 1336 (Byzantine Chronology 6844). Chronicle informs us that: “On July 5, on Friday, Sheikh Hasan son of Tamarta came

¹ С. П. Карпов, *Трапезундская империя и Западноевропейские государства в 13-14 вв.* [S. P. Karpov, *The Trapesund Empire and West European States in the 13th – 14th Centuries*], Москва, 1981, с. 5.

² Irakli Beradze, *Trapizonis imperiis daarsebis sakitkhisatvis* [On the Foundation of the Trapesund Empire], Tbilisi, 1971, pp. 5-38 – in Georgian.

³ M. Panaretos, *Trapizonis khronika*, berdnuli teksti kartuli targmanit, shesavali cerilit, shenishvnebita da sadzieblebit gamosca Al. Gamkrelidzem, masalebi sakartvelosa da kavkasiis istoriasatvis, nakveti 33, Tbilisi, 1960 – In Georgian [M. Panaretos, *The Chronicle of Trapesund*, the Greek text with Georgian translation, introduction, commentaries and indices published by Al. Gamkrelidze in the “Materials of the Georgian and Caucasian History”, no. 33].

to Trapesund and the battle took place at st. Kviriak, Akhantaka and Mintrion”⁴ (stressing is mine, V. K.). The personality of “Sheikh Hasan” mentioned in the “Trapesund Chronicle” is not explained in any publication of the text. Besides, “Tamarta” is explained only etymologically, as an “Iron Man”. The publishers only, mentioned, that “it is not clear who is Sheikh Hasan.” Although, in the appendix of the chronicle edited by Al. Gamkrelidze is explained, that “Sheikh Hasan, son of Tamarta” is a Turkish invader.⁵

The paper aims at highlighting who is this personality. As it was turned out, he is not a Turkish invader, but the grandson of Choban-Noin, well known personality in the Ilkhan (Hulaguian) Mongol State, Sheikh Hasan, called as “Khuchukh” - “The Small”. The research aims at determining his personality and the real name of his father “Tamarta.” Sheikh Hasan was grandson of Choban-Noin and son of Timurtash. As we could see, the name “Tamarta” is the disfigured form of “Timurtash”. Father of Hasan, Timurtash, was appointed by Mongols as the head of the Rum Sultanate. In 1322 he rebelled against the central government, although the rebellion was easily subdued but he was not convicted as being afraid of Choban his grandfather. But in 1327, when Choban-Noin was set the death penalty and executed under the order of Abu Said (1317-1335), Khan of Ilkhans, Timurtash was detained in Egypt and killed⁶.

His son, Sheikh Hasan escaped and gradually strengthened his positions after the death of Abu Said. Sheikh Hasan “Kuchuk” and s. c. (i.e. so-called) “false Timurtash” appeared on the political stage from 1336. They were confronted by representative of the Jalairian tribe, Hasan Buzurg (“The Great”). Later on, Hasan and “false Timurtash” were confronted as well. By 1338 Hasan “Khuchukh” became the factual governor of the main area of the former kingdom of Ilkhanate.

Thus, the 1336 campaign of Sheikh Hasan in Trapesund, mentioned in the “Trapesund Chronicle”, deals with the abovementioned moment of Ilkhanate history. So, we could conclude: Sheikh Hasan, son of Tamarta, mentioned in the Chronicle, is the grandson of Choban-Noin and son of Timurtash⁷.

⁴ M. Panaretos, *Trapizonis khronika*, edition 1960, p. 21; The mentioned geographical points were located around the city Trapesund. The new Turkish name of “Minthron” is “Boz-Thepe.”

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 96.

⁶ Hafizi Abru, *Introdction in Cronique des Rois Mongols en Iran*, edition par Khanbaba Bayani, vol. II, Paris, 1936, p. 106.

⁷ V. Kiknadze, *M. Panaretosis trapizonis kronikis erti adgilis ganmartebisatvis, istoriul-ethnographiuli shtudiebi* [V. Kiknadze, On the Issue of One Aspect of the “Trapesund Chronicle” of M. Panaretos, The Historical-Ethnographyc Studies], tome II, Tbilisi,

The “Trapesund Chronicle” of Mikhail Panaretos helps us to identify the personality of “Khosia, Son of Baidar”, one of the Turkish invaders mentioned in the Family Chronicle of the governing branch of Khsani gorge (Inner Kartli). It seems, the name of the Turkish Amir (ruler) – Khajimir son of Bairam – was disfigured in the Georgian Chronicle. Amir Khajimir, son of Bairam, is continuously mentioned in the Chronicle between 1357-1382 years. His lands comprise the area on the western parts of Kerasunt⁸. Khajimir’s kingdom was notorious for its strength and frequent attacks against its neighbors⁹. Thus, we consider that “Khosia, son of Baidar” mentioned in the Georgian source s.c. “Chronicle of Eristavs” is “Khajimir, son of Baidar” mentioned in the “Trapesund Chronicle”.

The third moment, related to the “Trapesund Chronicle”, is the visit of the King of Trapesund to Batumi in 1372. Mikhail Panaretos writes: “On August 6 we went to Lazika and by the end of the month met with King Bagrat, in 1372. The trip went on crossing Batumi. The tents were arranged outside of the city, under the sky ... we had a conversation with Gurieli, who came to respect the king.”¹⁰

There are many interesting moments in the note. It informs us that in Lazika, i.e. in the Western Georgia, the King of Trapesund and his suit, meets with the King of Georgia, Bagrat the Great (1360-1393). Meanwhile, Batumi is also mentioned in the note, being the subject of Gurieli, the governor of West Georgian district of Guria. Only one moment comes as a matter of contention in this respect; a group of scientists (D. Khakhanashvili¹¹, S. Karpov¹² etc.) considers that the shown respect of the King of Trapesund by Gurieli, represents his attitude to the King of Trapesund.

As Al. Gamkhrelidze, the last editor of the “Trapesund Chronicle”, mentions the Greek word “proskunesis” means “showing respect”, thus the reasoning that Gurieli became the subject of the King of Trapesund, is not a right approach¹³. It

1985, p. 76-78.

⁸ M. Panaretos, *Trapizonis khronika*, Al. Gamkhrelidze’s edition (1960), p. 32-33.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32-33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹¹ Михаил Панарет, *Трапезундская хроника*, греческий текст с русским переводом и комментариями издал Ал. Хаханашвили [M. Panaretos, *The Trapesund Chronicle*, the Greek text with Russian translation commented by Al. Khakhanashvili], in “Восточные записки Лазаревского Института” [The Oriental Essays of the Institute of Lazarev], том. XXIII, Москва, 1905, с. 39.

¹² С. П. Карпов, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹³ M. Panaretos, *Trapizonis khronika*, Al. Gamkhrelidze’s edition (1960), p. 82, remark no. 145.

should be mentioned that this word in Ancient Greek means *showing respect* on the one hand, although at the same time it could be understood as "Greeting in a kneeled position"¹⁴. But as we think, the reasoning over the vassal attitude of Gurieli to the king of Trapesund could be excluded due to the following reasons: 1. If Gurieli (Kakhaber Gurieli, mentioned in the inscription of the Icon of Likhauri, is meant here) accepted the vassalage of the Trapesund Empire, the fact would have been directly mentioned by Mikhail Panaretos; 2. Besides, the Trapesund Empire is deeply weakened by the Turks, thus it could not make the new land as its vassalage; 3. If this is true, there ought to be shown protest against the actions of Gurieli from the side of the Georgian King Bagrat V; 4. If the King of Trapesund is the direct suzerain of Gurieli, he should not be camped under the open sky, outside the city, rather being stayed in the palace of Gurieli.

In order to prove the vassalage of Gurieli to the King of Trapesund, S. Karpov provides some interesting materials additionally, but according to our opinion, the materials do not serve as a reasonable basis to share with the statement. As S. Karpov writes, by 1444 the Burgundian marauder sailors attacked to the port of "Vati" (Batumi). The local residents of Batumi and Gurieli managed to counterweight the attack of Burgundians, detaining one of the leaders of Burgundians Joffrua d'Tuassi¹⁵. Afterwards, the head of the Burgundian naval, V. Wavrin, appealed to the Emperor of Trapesund to send people to Georgia in order to investigate the fate of J. Tuassi. The King of Trapesund Ioann immediately responded over the matter and arranged the case. This is an unique information on those days history of Batumi in itself, but we think Ioann IV is a mere mediator in this case and serves in terms of the international diplomatic mission. The fact that Gurieli set his captive free as being promised his kingdom not being attacked by Burgundians, serves as an indirect prove of the abovementioned statement¹⁶. Thus, if Gurieli is the vassal of the Trapesund Empire, no one would let him to set conditions in the negotiation. The fact preserved in the "Trapesund Chronicle" over the shown respect of Gurieli to the King of Trapesund in 1372, does not point to his

¹⁴ Древнегреческий-Русский словарь под редакцией Н. Дворецкого [The Ancient Greek-Russian Dictionary under edition of N. Dvoretskii], том. II, Москва, 1959.

¹⁵ С. П. Карпов, *op. cit.*, p. 157; See also V. Wavrin, *Anciennes Croniques d'Engleterre*, vol. II, Paris, 1859, p. 95-96.

¹⁶ С. П. Карпов, *op. cit.*, p. 157-158.

vassalage to the one [King of Trapesund]. This is more the matter of the economic and political collaboration.¹⁷

Concluding, it should be stressed once again, that the “Trapesund Chronicle” of Mikhail Panaretos is an unique source providing us with the basis to set the unknown details from the history of Byzantine, Trapesund, Georgia and the states of Asia Minor.

¹⁷ Tamaz Beradze, *Sakartvelos sazgvao vachrobis istoriidan XIII-XIV saukuneebshi* [From the History of Georgia Sea Trade in the 13th-14th Centuries], in “Matsne”, istoriis, ethnographiis, arkheologiis da khelovnebis istoriis seria [The Series of History, Ethnography, Archeology and Art History] no. 2, Tbilisi, 1983, p. 38 – In Georgian.

CALINIC MICLESCU: A CONSERVATIVE CLERIC IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMANCIPATE FATHERLAND (1857-1885)

Radu Gabriel Ichim

Ștefan cel Mare University of Suceava
ichim_radu_gabriel@yahoo.com

Rezumat: *Calinic Miclescu: un cleric conservator în serviciul patriei emancipate (1857-1886)*

Articolul pune în evidență participarea lui Calinic Miclescu (1822-1886), cleric cu ascendență nobiliară, la principalele acțiuni și decizii politice și religioase din viața statului modern român (1858-1885), în calitate de episcop, mitropolit al Moldovei și Sucevei și Mitropolit Primat al României. Încununarea activității sale politice și religioase a fost dată de obținerea recunoașterii de către Patriarhia Ecumenică de Constantinopol, după o luptă diplomatică îndelungată (1878-1885), a autocefaliei Mitropoliei României.

Abstract: *The article highlights the participation of Calinic Miclescu (1822-1886), cleric of noble descent, to the main action, and political and religious decisions of Romanian modern state (1858-1885), as a bishop, Metropolitan of Moldova and Suceava, and Metropolitan primate of Romania. Crowning his political and religious activities was given, after a long diplomatic struggle (1878-1885), by the recognition of the Romanian Metropolitan autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.*

Résumé: *Calinic Miclescu: un clerc conservateur au service de la patrie moderne (1857-1886)*

L'article ci-joint met en évidence la participation de Calinic Miclescu (1822-1886), cleric avec ascendance noble, aux principales actions et décisions politiques et religieuses de l'existence de l'Etat moderne roumain (1858-1885), en qualité d'évêque, métropolitain de la Moldavie et de Suceava et Métropolitain Primat de la Roumanie. Le couronnement de son activité politique et religieuse s'identifie avec l'obtention de la reconnaissance de la part du Patriarcat Œcuménique de Constantinople, après une longue lutte diplomatique (1878-1885), de l'autocéphalie de l'Eglise Métropolitaine de la Roumanie.

Keywords: *Calinic Miclescu, Metropolitan, Moldavia, Romania, 19th Century, political activity, religious activity*

Introduction

Since the foundation of the Romanian medieval states Moldavia and Wallachia, the rulers of Christian clerics had a significant influence on their religious and political evolution. Most of them were conservative in matters related to religion and not interested (or poorly interested) in the socio-economic, political or cultural progress of their country. Starting especially with the 3rd quarter of the 18th century, things significantly changed: many influential Romanian clergymen are really interested in progress of their countries, especially after beginning of French Revolution. In the 19th century, this kind of clerics gave up their traditionalist point of view about religion becoming “liberal” in religious terms. Also, they actively participated at the most important historical events such as the Union of 1859 and the War of Independence (1877).

Few Romanian clergymen in the 19th century were “conservative” in matters of religion and Church organization and “liberal” in matters concerning the organization of the state. Among clergymen placed in this special category was undoubtedly Calinic Miclescu.

Synopsis of Political and religious activity of Calinic Miclescu

Calinic Miclescu (1822-1886) was a monk of noble descent, the ancestors of this family being recorded in 1436¹. During the events that set the union of Moldavia and Wallachia (1858-1859), Calinic Miclescu, as lieutenant (i.e. *locum tenens*) of the Huși diocese received order from Metropolitan Sofronie to represent him in the affairs of the Moldavia's Mitropolity. Entitled in this position, he took an active part in the unionist movement. Conservative in matter of religion and Church organization but liberal in matter of political principles and devoted to the Union of the Romanian Principalities, he acted with all his powers against Caimacam (i.e. *locum tenens* of Moldavia's Hospodar) Vogoride's activity, which was a stubborn adversary of this union. By its unionist actions, Calinic drew everyone's admiration, even the attention of High European Commissioners, who came and took note of the wishes of the country in 1858².

Regarding the political activity of Calinic Miclescu³ we could say it was a rich

¹ Constantin Rezachevici, *Enciclopedia domnilor români. Cronologia critică a domnilor din Țara Românească și Moldova* [Encyclopedia of the Romanian rulers. Critical chronology of the rulers in Wallachia and Moldavia], vol. I, *Secolele XIV-XVI* [14th-16th Centuries], Bucharest, Albatros Printing House, 2001, p. 804.

² *** *Cronica* [The Chronicle], in “Candela – Foaie bisericească-literară” [The Candle – Literary ecclesiastic paper], Year V, no. 9, Cernăuți, 1886, p. 589.

³ Nicolae Șerbănescu, *Calinic Miclescu*, in „Biserica Ortodoxă Română” [Romanian Orthodox Church], Year LXXVII, no. 7-10, July-October 1959, p. 816.

and fruitful one, with deserved results according to his efforts, for giving the Romanian society the best economic, social and religious reforms and progress. During the turmoil's of 1857-1858, as Abbot (Rom. *stare Ț*) of Slatina, he disseminated among people unionist manifests, which brought to his uncle Sofronie Miclescu reproofs of the government.⁴

In 1857 he was elected deputy of the Ad-Hoc Divan, defending very skillfully the idea of unifying Moldavia and Wallachia. Having the quality of Lieutenant of the Huși diocese, he was also commissioned by Metropolitan Sofronie – who was sick – to lead the destinies of the Mitropoly of Moldova. Calinic used this prestigious position to support again, actively, the Union⁵.

He served as lieutenant of Moldavia's Metropolitan until December 1860, when he resigned. He took this decision in order to protest against the punishment with exile of his uncle, Metropolitan Sofronie Miclescu, followed by his removal from the top of Moldavian Church. These penalties were imposed by the prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, with the assistance of Prime Minister Mihail Kogălniceanu, because Metropolitan Sofronie opposed to secularization of the monasteries estates, made without giving any warranty to the Church⁶.

On 15 of January 1861 Calinic Miclescu returns as abbot at Slatina to be close to his uncle, who was old and sick. He remains here until 7 May 1863⁷. In January 1863, the government entitled the Archimandrite Melchisedec Ștefănescu to manage temporary the diocese of Huși⁸.

On 7 May 1863, following the death of his uncle Sofronie, bishop Calinic is appointed lieutenant of the Metropolitan seat of Moldavia in Iași, being favoured by government of prince Cuza, who saw him as a man of faith, devoted to the country and to the Church⁹. He was included in the secularization committee, completing his tasks with all responsibility. On 10 May 1865 the prince and the government¹⁰, seeing that Metropolitan Calinic Miclescu is a faithful servant of the Church, appointed him as Metropolitan of Moldavia and Suceava Mitropoly. This appointment was done by Alexandru Ioan Cuza according to the law for appointment of metropolitans and diocesan bishops in Romania.

Calinic Miclescu's appointment by decree as titular Metropolitan of Moldavia has caused him much displeasure in the battle for canonicity fought legally with the

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *** *Cronica*, p. 589.

⁶ Florin Țuscanu, *Sofronie Vârnav*, Iași, Saint Mina Publishing House, 2002, p. 64.

⁷ ****Cronica*, p. 589.

⁸ Mircea Păcurariu, *Mitropolia Moldovei și Episcopiile ei până în 1918* [The Metropolis of Moldavia and its Bishoprics until 1918], Bucharest, The Publishing House of Biblical Institute and Mission of Romanian Orthodox Church, 1981, p. 168.

⁹ ****Cronica*, p. 589

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 590.

Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1866 he was still writing to the Patriarch of Constantinople to recognize him as Metropolitan. In 1872, through the canon law, his situation as head of the Moldavian Church legalizes, being recognized as canonical the appointment made in 1865¹¹.

As Metropolitan of Moldavia, Calinic Miclescu was concerned about strengthening discipline among the secular and monastic clergy¹². He was interested especially in the good results get by students and teachers of the Faculty of Theology, conferring awards to deserving students. Between 1863 and 1864 he ordered that 30 poor students of this faculty, with good school results, to be accommodated free of any charge in monasteries¹³.

On 23 February 1866, Alexandru Ioan Cuza abdicates and the political situation of the United Principalities was not clear at all¹⁴. In Iași had started a separatist movement (with small popular support) which wanted the installation of Nunuță Roznovanu as ruler of Moldavia, just when in the country was taking place the plebiscite for the election of Carol of Hohenzollern as prince of Romania (2/14-8/20 April 1866). Thus the plebiscite for election of Carol had been disrupted by the emergence of social movements, especially among peasants, scared by a hypothetical abolition of Rural Law of 1864.

Because of this tense situation, European Powers (especially Russia, Austria and Turkey) were openly expressing hostility regarding the idea of bringing a foreign prince on the vacant throne, encouraging even a separatist movement between Moldavia and Wallachia. The movement of Iași was also rushed by the announcement of the plebiscite between 2/14 and 8/20 April 1866, for the election of Prince Carol, the new candidate to Romanian rule. In a contemporary writing of a Moldavian separatist it is said that was a “forced referendum, with governmental agents and bayonets behind them”¹⁵.

In Iași, the separatists have resumed their activity and tried to put Mr. N. Rosetti Roznovanu as ruler, supported by Prince Constantine Moruzi, head of the conspiracy, and by Metropolitan Calinic Miclescu. For this purpose, it was planned a popular riot on a 3/15 of April 1866, for whose suppression was needed the intervention of two infantry battalions. This riot was unsuccessful, for not being supported by the masses, but only by a heterogeneous band, which was drunk by

¹¹ Niculae Șerbănescu, *Calinic Miclescu*, p. 816.

¹² Mircea Păcurariu, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹³ T. G. Bulat, *Acte privitoare la Facultatea de Teologie din Iași* [Documents concerning the Faculty of Theology in Iași], in “Viitorul” [The Future], Year XIII (1911), no. 17-18, p. 13.

¹⁴ Florin Țuscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁵ Ion Moraru, *Ecspunire situațiunii Moldaviei de la 1859 și 1866, tristele evenimente din Iași de la 3/15 april anul corent 1866, preluat după adivăr* [The exposure of Moldavia's situation from 1859 and 1866, the sad events from Iași in 3/15 of April current year 866, taken after the truth], Iași, 1866, p. 12.

separatists. There were, however, dead and wounded. Separatist lords have submitted a petition to the Ottoman Court, in which they proclaimed the Moldavians' right to choose its own ruler, according to the Paris Convention (1858)¹⁶.

During the course of the uprising in Iași, Calinic Miclescu was injured by a military man from the troops. The Metropolitan, masked with a Jewish kaftan, being more frightened than hurt, has been hidden by his deacon Ion Creangă (an important Romanian writer) in the basement of a nearby house. Here came the influential literary critic and politician Titus Maiorescu, who convinced him to surrender¹⁷.

Metropolitan Calinic with other participants in the rebellion were arrested and imprisoned at the Monastery of Saint Spiridon and his apartments from Iași were sealed. For the trial was appointed a Church Court. This formed a consistory composed of a titular bishop as President and two of the ablest priests from Iași as members¹⁸ which should judge and condemn Calinic Miclescu. This was not possible because the beginning of the reign of Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen in Moldavia.

The first act signed by the new prince Carol on 10th of May 1866, was related to the amnesty of those arrested because of the above-mentioned popular uprising, the first of them being Metropolitan Calinic Miclescu¹⁹. Therefore, he kept his position of Metropolitan of Moldavia. In this capacity, Calinic Miclescu continued and developed his activity for the prosperity of the Mitropol, claiming with dignity and strength the rights of the Moldavian Church.

A significant episode occurred in the fall of 1872, when the Metropolitan Calinic of Moldova showed a „fraternally and friendly” interest for a priest who had left the church life. Bishop Melchisedec Ștefănescu has described the situation to the priest, and that made the Metropolitan Calinic to send an epistle to that priest on 29th of October 1872. After this epistle was known, bishop Ștefănescu show the following: “If all the brothers bishops would care for such principles both the country and the clergy in general would flourish”²⁰.

¹⁶ ****Formarea și consolidarea orânduirii capitaliste 1848-1878* [The forming and consolidation of capitalist system 1848-1878], in *Istoria României* [The History of Romania], vol. IV, Bucharest, Romanian Academy's Publishing House, 1964, pp. 525-526.

¹⁷ Dumitru Vitcu, *11 februarie 1866: hermeneutica unei pretinse revoluții* [11th of February 1866: hermeneutics of an alleged revolution], in „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A.D. Xenopol” Iași [Yearbook of the Institute of History ”A. D. Xenopol”], tom XXIX, 1992, p. 175.

¹⁸ Direcția Județeană Iași a Arhivelor Naționale [Iași County Direction of the National Archives] – D.J.A.N. Iași, Fondul Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei [Mitropol of Moldavia and Suceava Fund], no. of archive 33, file no. 2896/1866, 1v.

¹⁹ Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale București [National Central Historical Archives Bucharest] – A.N.I.C., „Casa Regală” [Royal House] Fund, file no. 2/1866, f.1.

²⁰ Paul Mihai, *Din corespondența episcopului Mechisedec* [Bishop Mechisedec's correspondence], in „Biserica Ortodoxă Română” [Romanian Orthodox Church], Year LXXVII, no. 5-6, May-June, 1959.

Calinic Miclescu supported all the time his moral principles even if the Holy Synod didn't accepted them entirely. Exactly those debates led the opponents to acknowledge Metropolitan Calinic as a man devoted to the Church.

He had to face two attacks which threatened his life. One of them was committed by Father Clement, who fired four revolver shots against him. The second attempt was made by a monk, who wanted to strangle the High Priest. Calinic Miclescu escaped safely from both attempts²¹.

In the summer of 1876, Serbia's and Muntenegru's armies joined the action of defending the coreligionists and blood brothers from Bulgaria. These events proved that Eastern Europe was threatened of new military-political convulsions and Romania had to enter later in the war, in order to win its independence²². Danubian provinces Moldavia and Wallachia were vassal lands of Ottoman Empire's until 1877, without being effectively integrated into the empire, as the others south-danubian provinces were. In this case they had a limited autonomy in exchange for a yearly tribute of variable size which could reach, as some sources say, up to two thirds of their total income²³.

At April 1/16, 1877, the Romanian government signed a convention with the Russian government that allowed the passage of Russian troops in Romania, and Russia pledged to respect the integrity of Romanian territory. Romanian Parliament began its work on April 14/26. The Throne speech exposed to the representatives of the Romanian nation the hard times that their country was crossing: "Russian imperial armies entered our territory with no protest from Guarantor Powers. A war that Romanians didn't want, didn't deliberately cause it, burst. Left without any support, they can count now only on themselves"²⁴. This war offered a new occasion to Calinic Miclescu, in order to demonstrate his stable patriotism.

As in other important moments in the history of the Romanians, the orthodox clergy did not remain apart from the rest of the people. Calinic Miclescu was fully aware of the great importance of the historical moment that country was living and he advised the clergy to act as such. In the War of Independence from 1877-1878, military priests accompanied the Romanian troops on the battlefield, as many monks and nuns were at the service of the Army's Medical Service²⁵.

Metropolitan Miclescu sends on 3rd of August 1877 a letter to Carol I to show his dissatisfaction because "one of the greatest military geniuses of our nation [i.e.

²¹ D.J.A.N. Iași, Mitropoly of Moldavia and Suceava Fund, file no. 3448/1871, f. 4-5.

²² T. C. Văcărescu, *Luptele românilor în resbelul din 1877-1878* [Romanians' battles of 1877-1878 war], Bucharest, F. Göbl & Fiii Publishing House, 1887, p. 2-3.

²³ Georges Castellan, *Histoire de la Roumanie*, Paris, PUF, 1994, p. 17.

²⁴ T. C. Văcărescu, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁵ Mircea Păcurariu, *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române* [The History of the Romanian Orthodox Church], Bucharest, Biblical and Mission Institute of the Romanian Orthodox Church Publishing House, 1981, p. 132-133.

Carol I himself] recognizes that the Romanians were alienated of the using of weapons because of the Muslim oppression. That sovereignty shorten the most sacred rights of the country”²⁶. Following the letter, the Metropolitan informs the king that all church servants and ordinary citizens were advised to contribute with different “offerings” (Rom. “ofrande”) and the mothers left their sons to the “blood baptism”, so that the national flag will be aroused in the name of God. Calinic Miclescu gives in this letter example of sacrifice made by the queen Elisabeta, Carol’s wife: “and his Highness, successor of ancestral virtues, bandages the wounds of the ones who fight for the country.

Romanian Church, as one who has always had taken part in major events cannot stay indifferent. The clerics are accompanying day and night your Highness and the fighters on battlefield of glory, with their prayers”²⁷.

Finally, the bishop gives his hierarchical blessing to the King, saying that the happiest day of his life will be the one when he will thank God for the success that He rewarded Carol I, speaking the words of the psalmist David who said : “Now we know that the Lord has saved his anointed with His righteous power. He will hear him from his holy heaven”²⁸ (Psalms, 19; 6.7). For those moments, the Metropolitan Calinic Miclescu prepares special prayers for war times, invoking God’s help. Before Carol I was leaving for the battle, Calinic Miclescu “had the honour to bless the sword given by the Romanian army, to its leader” (i.e. Carol I)²⁹.

In 1878, Romania was in a difficult situation after the war. In these circumstances, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople thought that would be the right occasion to claim damages for secularization of the church properties, made by prince Cuza in 1863. Firstly, the Romanian government postponed a clear answer in this matter. Afterwards, this government and Calinic Miclescu personally refused to discuss on this topic with Constantinople Ecumenical Patriarchate.

The ecumenical patriarch Ioachim III (1878-1884) thought he could force the Romanian government to reconsider its decision, making difficulties in sending documents to recognize the three titular bishops elected by the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church, and starting to show some doubts and criticisms of the organic law of the Romanian Orthodox Church and its claim to become autocephalous³⁰.

²⁶ A.N.I.C. Bucharest, Fond Casa Regală [Regal House Fund], file no. 8/1877, f. 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 1 f-v, f. 2 f.

²⁸ *Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptură* [The Bible or Holly Scripture], Bucharest, Biblical and Mission Institute of the Romanian Orthodox Church Publishing House, 1991, p. 573.

²⁹ Raymond Netzhammer, *Le cas du métropolitain Miclescu – Un document longtemps attendu*, Eschenz (Suisse), Typ. Eberhard Kalt-Zehnder Zoug, 1938, p. 3.

³⁰ ****Manual de istorie a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române* [Handbook of the Romanian Orthodox Church’s History], Bucharest, 1958, p. 528.

In 1879, Calinic Miculescu wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople: “The principle that things concerning the organization of the Church change themselves after changing of a political situation is recognized in the most obvious way by the Ecumenical Synods, and Church History gives a lot of examples about its compliance”³¹. The Patriarch Ioachim III did not confirm the autocephaly of the Romanian Orthodox Church until his death (1884) despite of the diplomatic struggle carried by Calinic Miculescu for achieving of this ideal. Anyway, the ecumenical patriarch Ioachim IV (1884-1886) decided to validate *de jure* this practical autocephaly in 1885. Therefore, he sent in 25th of April 1885 the patriarchal *tomos* by which the autocephaly of the Romanian Orthodox Church was officially certified by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople³².

Calinic Miculescu died in the following year, at 14th of August 1886, after a live entirely dedicated to his Church and Fatherland. The only wealth left by this clergyman of noble descent consisted in a lot of books and magnificent furniture³³.

Conclusions

Life, religious and political activity of Calinic Miculescu demonstrates that the representatives of the old nobility or princely families of Moldavian and Wallachia entered in the service the country in the second half of 19th century, acting “top-down” for *publico bono*. Without their action, combined with the action of Romanian bourgeoisie *in statu nascendi* and a favourable international context, Romania’s modernization would not have been possible.

³¹ Nestor Vornicescu, *Desăvârșirea unității noastre naționale – Fundament al unității Bisericii străbune* [Accomplishment of our national unity – Foundation of the unity of ancestral Church], Craiova, 1988, p. 8.

³² Nicolae Isar, *Relațiile stat-biserică în România modernă (1821-1914): sinteză și culegere de texte* [Relationships between State and Church in the Modern Romania (1821-1914): synthesis and collection of texts], Bucharest, “România de Măine” Foundation Publishing House, 2007, p. 37.

³³ *** *Manual de istorie a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*, p. 530.

EVERYDAY LIFE OF TAJIK WOMEN. SOME CONSIDERATIONS

Larisa Dodkhudoeva

A Donish Institute of History, Archaeology, Ethnography
Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan
E-mail: sofikomalik@gmail.com

Rezumat: Viața de zi cu zi a femeilor tadjice. Câteva considerații

Articolul propune o privire de ansamblu asupra complexului univers contemporan al femeilor din Tadjikistan. Sunt luate în considerație tradițiile, obiceiurile și cutumele care definesc viața cotidiană a acestora, ca și restricțiile și limitările impuse de dificultățile economice și sociale sau de mentalitate. De asemenea, sunt prezentate câteva dintre provocările și imperativele societății tadjice, precum nevoia de reconsiderare a rolului femeii în familie și comunitate.

Résumé: La vie quotidienne des femmes tadjikes. Quelques considérations

L'article ci-joint propose une image d'ensemble sur l'univers contemporain complexe des femmes de Tadjikistan. On y prit en considération les traditions, les usages et les coutumes qui définissent leur vie quotidienne, ainsi que les restrictions et les limitations imposées par les difficultés économiques et sociales ou de mentalité. On y présenta aussi quelques-uns des défis et des impératifs de la société tadjike, ainsi que le besoin de reprendre en considération le rôle de la femme dans la famille et la communauté.

Abstract: This paper proposes an overview of the complex world of contemporary women in Tajikistan. There are considered the traditions, customs and rules that define their daily lives, as well as the restrictions and limitations imposed by economic difficulties and social mentality. Additionally, there are presented some of the challenges and imperatives of Tajik society, such as the need to reconsider the role of women in family and community.

Keywords: Tajikistan, women, gender, custom, vulnerability, stereotype

“Paradise is located under a mother’s heel”
(Tajik proverb)

Tajikistan is an agricultural society with 72% of its population residing in rural areas; 60% of those employed in agriculture are women. Generally speaking, women represent 51% of Tajikistan population. The collapse of the Soviet empire (1991), and the civil war (1992-1995) produced a chaotic time for Tajik people, as society deconstructed and criticized the old values and struggled to find its national and ethnic identity. This movement has brought new challenges for Tajik women. The number of women’s and grass-roots organizations mushroomed after political

independence of Republic of Tajikistan. They have played an important role in assisting women and have encouraged them to express themselves through NGO's. The post-1991 liberalization of society and blossoming of women movement in Tajikistan opened space for female leaders, who spearheaded the reintegration of gender, class and ethnicity in patriarchal society.

The gender policy and gender study in Tajikistan began relatively recently, in the middle of the 1990s. It is necessary to recognize that numerous works on women's liberation or woman's involvement in the society management were conducted by Soviets. Notable results have been accumulated in the fields of education, health care, maternity and child protection.

Currently, Tajikistan has ratified a number of international conventions and agreements on human rights, participates in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), signing important international documents. However a situation analysis shows that there are traditional and new gender problems at all levels in the Tajikistan's political, economic and social spheres.

A dividing line exists between women in urban and rural areas, and gender proportion is different in Tajikistan. Travelling from cities into rural areas means leaving behind modern technology, information and know-how, and entering places where conservatism and religious control are entrenched in people's values and the poverty and gender inequality are the norm.

Tajikistan has another specific feature because of separating women's society, depending on where the women lived: in the mountain areas or in the valleys. The origins of traditions in the regions of Tajikistan had, in many respects, identified specifics of gender development in various districts. Following Islamic traditions (*Ismailiya*, the Shiite movement in Badakhshan, or the Sunni movement in Northern and Central Tajikistan), social and economic conditions in mountainous regions and in valleys imprinted on political, social, and spiritual culture, as well as on women's situation in society.¹

In Tajik Badakhshan (Pamir, currently GBAO/the Badakhshan Mountain Autonomous Region), where, since the 11th century, the ideology of *Ismailiya* has been accepted by the population as the main religion, and women had certain freedoms and rights, the female role has always been significant in solving issues, although their social cultural activities were never visibly displayed. Till this time, GBAO is the one area of the country does not show any decline in women's participation in education. There women and girls of all ages and all levels of

¹ *Tajikistan: On the Way to Gender Equality*, UNDP, Dushanbe, 2003, p. 8; *The Tajik Pamirs. Challenger and Sustainable Development in an Isolation Mountain Region*, SDE, SDC, 2003, p. 16.

education make up 50-51% of the total enrolment.²

Prof. S. Niyozov recorded some very interesting stories on female teachers from Pamir who shared their experiences in the Soviet and Post-Soviet epoch. One of them – Nigina – told that to be a teacher in the village was an honour in Soviet time. She was in the centre of the society, and led other women. They came to Nigina for everything, from consultation on women's health to borrowing money. A woman-teacher got good money and a higher education compared with the majority of women who were housewives and kolkhoz workers. Unlike them, Nigina argued and talked openly with men other than her husband. She was “the intelligentsia of the village” and knew more than any other woman did and that was the main source of her respect. Women-teachers felt other women looked at them to lead them.³

Yet, there are many worries “at home” after political independence of Tajikistan: in spring landslides, snow slides, planting; in summer, there are heal, mudslides and lack of water; in fall, harvesting, and collecting fuel and paying debts – too much work in a too short time; in winter, cold, darkness, and snow. July and August are supposed to be for rest. In fact, they are the busiest seasons: building a house or something added to, renovation after the winter and spring cutting the fodder, harvesting, and threshing wheat grass. Unlike in the cities, no one renovates and fixes anything here for “us”.

Another colleague of Nigina told that *now* female teachers in the mountains are *beiloj* (powerless). They have no time for themselves. All their life goes in serving others. For instance, she takes care of six children, a husband, old parents, guests and cattle, and has many worries with them. When they watch the lives of the women in the West they feel guilty for being born and living here. She asked: “What have we been punished for?”⁴

In the Northern Tajikistan, the men's meetings held in so-called “men's houses” – *gapkhona* (space for talking) regulated the social and ceremonial life of a village. In this context they were like a tribunal of a local parliament in which there was no place for a woman. Women gathered separately and during their meetings they talked about very different subjects, sewed, knitted, entertained themselves, danced, played music, drew etc. expressing through these activities their “women's view of life”. It is their traditional gender role or a “leadership behind the scene” that makes it possible for them to influence human development.

² S. Tuychieva, *History of Gender in Culture of Pamir (late 19th — early 21st centuries)*, Dushanbe, 2011, p. 26.

³ S. Niyozov, *The reality of Being a Women-Teacher in the Mountains in Tajikistan*, “Cahiers d'Asie Centrale”, 2004, no. 11-12, pp. 24, 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

The main factors that aggravate the vulnerability of women are related to their cultural isolation from the "outside world" and the stereotyped image of a woman as a housewife and object of sexual pleasure. The most evident way to earn money for uneducated women is using their household experience. Limitation of the women's activities by parts of the family, are "natural" conditions of the social relationships between men and women in traditional society.

Obviously, there are some other traditional stereotypes for women and men in Tajik contemporary society. The role of woman as wife, mother and home-maker is particularly important, but not politics and business. She should be involved in educating children. Man should be a family supporter, being involved in business, and politics, improving his qualifications and getting promotion. He should rest and expand his erudition.

Gender stereotypes influence women's aspirations and self-appraisal. There are no accidents therefore that only a small number of women wish to participate in political life and work in a higher position. Female politicians are usually the objects of public attention because they are judged according to stereotypes. In comparison with men, people more often discuss women's appearance, family situation and their own lives.⁵

It is also very important that not only the elder generation is the subject of gender stereotypes, but young people. Moreover, teenagers, in comparison with their parents, are oriented on gender stereotypes to a larger degree. Therefore practical reality is characterized by visible contradictions between the declared state gender policy directed at increasing the status of women in society, and traditional standards regulating the gender roles.

About 50% of the surveyed women-housewives are engaged in embroidery, sewing things for sale, trading produce from their own gardens in the market (milk, fruit, vegetables and nuts), and small trade near the house (especially in summer - drinks, groceries). The men mainly go to Russia to work as *mandikors* (loaders) in the construction industry and are engaged in repairing houses and electrical equipment; they also work in agriculture on collective farms (cotton, wheat) and trade. The children help their parents to earn money (wash cars in the city, collect wood, rhubarb, flowers and other plants for further sale).

The impact of mass labour migration on women is substantial and significantly vulnerable, particularly if the husband chooses not to return home or no longer send remittances. Young people – in search of proper income to lead a normal life and earn money enough for a car and their marriage – leave their home-towns, families whom they love just to return home in a zinc-coffin. For many of countrymen this mistake turns into the most tragic and the last one in their life.

⁵ *Tajikistan: On the Way...*, p. 24.

Women remain married, but their husbands from abroad, having withdrawn financial and social support could remarry and start new families. Women as “true widows”, living in poverty, have no access to such resources as credits and the succession are weekly informed about their rights. Migrant wives face significant barriers to employment and typically do not control family resources. As a rule, agricultural land belongs of farm headed by men. Women by virtue of poverty and hopelessness agree to become second, third and forth wives.⁶

Violence against women includes physical, sexual, and psychological abuses. The most widespread kind of domestic violence in Tajikistan is the psychological one. The older the woman, the more likely she was to play a role in family decision-making, as well as a report her husband’s assistance with household chores. Within compound family the young wife, in most instances, expected to defer to decisions made by her mother-in-law, as well as to those of her husband, both in matter of finance and of household management.⁷

The number of suicides among young women, especially in Sugd region (Nothorn Tajikistan) is increasing. The majority of real reasons leading to these tragic events are originating from the existing inequality between men and women throughout their lives, caused by the absence of access to information, education, medical services and poor knowledge of legislation and rights. The problem of self-immolation of women has been repeatedly mentioned in Mass Media. Such agonizing way of suicide committed by unhappy girls is provoked by unfair treatment of girls in a new family after their marriage, still immature and capable of committing the most unpredictable reckless acts. Cases of suicide are extreme signs of protest against the existing inequality of realizing the real depth of the problem.⁸

Contrary to widespread opinion that trafficking is limited in the traditional public environment, in reality, the patriarchal nature of Tajik society makes women

⁶ *Needs Assessment of Rural Women on Land Tenure Rights in Tajikistan*. UNIFEM. October 15, 2008, www.un-tj.org/library/mode+details?id=307

⁷ *Заключительные замечания Комитета по ликвидации дискриминации в отношении женщин: Таджикистан* [Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Tajikistan], (CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3 February 2007) [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/16313018419e3b4ac12572a400337a3e/\\$FILE/N0724356.pdf](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/16313018419e3b4ac12572a400337a3e/$FILE/N0724356.pdf)

⁸ *Альтернативный доклад неправительственных организаций Таджикистана по реализации Конвенции о ликвидации всех форм дискриминации в отношении женщин, Душанбе, 2006 г.* [Shadow Report on the Realization of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by Non-governmental Organizations of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, November 2006]: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/russian/cedaw/Raltngoreport_tajikistan.html; <http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/pdf/Tajikistan%20final%20report%20English.pdf>

more unprotected from trafficking, compared to a less conservative society.⁹ IOM Research in Tajikistan (2001) noted the presence of the following traffic types: trafficking of women with the purpose of prostitution or sexual exploitation; transporting drugs; slave labour abroad; home or sexual slavery extracting organs.¹⁰

A major factor promoting the growth of the industry is the drug traffic crossing the republic. By virtue of special circumstances (neighbouring Afghanistan is the world's leading supplier of raw opium and heroin, civil war), socio-economic situation of the majority of the population increase the financial difficulties of families (from lack of money to even lack of food and ordinary cloth).

In contemporary society, as the result of culture-imposed religious prejudices, a woman is more often confined inside her home. The situation in Tajikistan is aggravated in post-Soviet Tajikistan by religious and social prejudices as well as lack of knowledge of all aspects of this problem or by lack of «gender education». As a result, the general public believes that gender is an exclusively women's problem and they have to face it all alone.

Launched in 2008, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's "UNiTE to End Violence against women" campaign is a multi-year effort aimed to prevent and eliminate violence against women and girls in all parts of the world. Among the measures recommended for the civil society to undertake was to ask local artists to create a film, a piece on violence against women and to organize an exhibit where the film to be displayed and discussed as a panel or question and answer session with the authors.

In 2010, the Tajik artists had got the opportunity to reflect the local gender issues in Tajikistan through the different contemporary art approaches. They presented the results of their work at the exhibition "Modalities" which was initiated and supported by the Swiss Cooperation office in Tajikistan and UNIFEM, Bactria Cultural centre.¹¹ The exhibition was aimed at attracting attention to the global campaign "SAY NO – UNiTE", initiated by UN Secretary General, in order to strengthen efforts to prevent violence against women worldwide. Tajik artists would like to attract attention and express their position in regard of different aspects of daily life, relations and development perspectives of the country itself and Tajik men and women separately. We would like to present some examples of this exhibition as an artist's intention to make a positive influence to equal and fair development within families and the society.

⁹ *Tajikistan: On the Way...*, p. 6.

¹⁰ Саодат Олимова, Нигина Мамаджанова, *Торговля людьми в Таджикистане* [Trafficking in human beings in Tajikistan], Душанбе IOM International Organization for Migration, 2006, <http://www.iom.tj/pubs/Human%20trafficking%20publication%20IOM%202006.pdf>

¹¹ Exhibition *Modalities*, March 30-April 12, 2010, Dushanbe, 2010.



Picture 1, A. MIRHASKAR: *Rural Women in the City*



Picture 2, *S. O. SHARIFI: Lost Mystery*

**СОВЕТСКАЯ ЦЕНЗУРА В БИБЛИОТЕКАХ
ЗАПАДНОЙ УКРАИНЫ
(НА ПРИМЕРЕ НАУЧНОЙ БИБЛИОТЕКИ
ЧЕРНОВИЦКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА 1940 – 1991 ГГ.)**

**SOVIET CENSORSHIP IN THE LIBRARIES
OF WESTERN UKRAINE
(ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY
OF CHERNIVTSI UNIVERSITY IN 1940 – 1991-S)**

Олег Шилюк

Черновицкий национальный университет
имени Юрия Федьковича (Украина)
o.shilyuk@chnu.edu.ua

Rezumat: *Autorul analizează introducerea cenzurii în activitatea bibliotecară din vestul Ucrainei, care s-a manifestat prin intermediul naționalizării, rechiziționării și confiscării încăperilor și fondurilor bibliotecare, prin “curățarea” fondurilor și distrugerea principiilor democratice, care stăteau la baza funcționării bibliotecii.*

Abstract: *The author studies the implementation of censorship in the Library Science of Western Ukraine, which was carried out by means of nationalization, requisition and confiscation of library facilities and funds, “cleaning” of the fund, destruction of democratic principles that had previously existed in the functioning of library.*

Résumé: *Dans son article l’auteur étudie l’instauration de la censure dans les bibliothèques de l’Ukraine de l’Ouest produite par le nationalisation, la réquisition et la confiscation des locaux aussi bien que des fonds des bibliothèques, l’application de l’épuration des fonds, de la liquidation des postes existant dans le système de bibliothèques.*

Keywords: *library, Soviet censorship, “cleaning” of the fund, librarian censorship.*

Изучение истории украинских библиотек эпохи тоталитаризма неразрывно связано с исследованием советской цензуры, которая составляла основу государственной библиотечной политики, направленной на уничтожение значительного количества книг и их авторов, способствовала образованию печально известных специальных хранилищ (“спецхранов”). Процесс

изъятия книг из общего, научного и культурного обращения нескольких поколений украинцев, приводил к формированию заидеологизированных библиотечных фондов, информационно обеспечивал насильственную политику советской власти. На развитие библиотечного дела и, в частности, на состояние фондов библиотек негативно влияли цензурные проверки, изъятие литературы по идеологическим мотивам, в результате чего фонды библиотек были обеднены или уничтожены как идеологически вредные.

Главным идейным руководителем введения цензуры в библиотеках Украины была коммунистическая партия. Многочисленные партийные постановления по идеологической направленности деятельности библиотек побуждали к дальнейшему усилению библиотечной цензуры. История деятельности органов цензуры в Украине начинается с 1922 г. созданием Центрального управления по делам печати при Главполитпросвете Наркомпроса УССР. Репрессивные функции этого управления постоянно расширялись и направлялись на цензурирование фондов библиотек. Функционировала жесткая иерархическая система – республиканский Главлит, в областях – обллиты, в районах – райлиты, в городах – горлиты. Официально учреждения Главлита находились при исполкомах, а фактически подчинялись высшим партийным органам.

В период перестройки, начиная с 1986 г. и заканчивая распадом СССР, цензура постепенно ослаблялась. В сентябре 1986 г. Главлит СССР издал приказ № 29с, в котором цензорам было дано указание сосредоточить внимание на вопросах, связанных с охраной государственных и военных тайн в печати, и информировать партийные органы только о существенных нарушениях в идеологической сфере.¹

Следует уточнить: исследование работы органов цензуры является сегодня осложненным из-за фрагментарности имеющихся документов, что было следствием деятельности самого Главлита, который практиковал уничтожение документов до момента своей ликвидации в 1991 г. В частности, в 1990 г. руководство Главлита СССР разослало на места секретное распоряжение “Об архивах Главлита”, в котором отмечалось, что дела, относящиеся к переписке с партийными и государственными органами республики, области, нужно исключить из описей дел постоянного хранения,

¹ А. Штрале, *Закат цензуры в советской Латвии 1985 – 1990 гг.*, [Decline of censorship in Soviet Latvia in 1985 – 1990 –s], in http://opentextnn.ru/data/files/strale_sovlat.pdf (Accessed 10.11.2013).

установив временный срок хранения не более трех лет, и предоставить право руководителям местных органов уничтожать эти дела по своему усмотрению.²

С первых дней установления советской власти в западных областях Украины цензура стала неотъемлемой составляющей советской библиотечной политики, а библиотеки рассматривались властью как основные учреждения политпросвещения, способствовавшие распространению коммунистической идеологии. Установление советской власти на Западной Украине в 1939 г., оккупация в 1941-1944 гг., послевоенное продолжение политики советизации западноукраинских земель разрушили исторически сложившийся библиотечный фонд и систему библиотечных учреждений региона, в значительной мере негативно отразились на исторических фондах книжного наследия, коллекционных собраниях и библиотеках.

На территории западноукраинских областей был распространен сценарий национализации библиотек и сосредоточения историко-культурных фондов в нескольких центрах. Первыми средствами советской библиотечной цензуры можно считать осуществление национализации, реквизиции и конфискации частных библиотек и библиотек общественных организаций. Поэтому достаточно разветвленная сеть библиотек общества “Просвита” и библиотек других общественных организаций, как “националистические организации”, прекратили свое существование.

Для гибкой системы введения цензуры в деятельность библиотек создавалась единая общедоступная сеть библиотек, главной задачей которой была систематическая пропаганда коммунистической идеологии. Соответственно, одновременно с закрытием библиотек, было объявлено об их перерегистрации. В Черновицкой области все библиотеки, независимо от их подчинения, были обязаны до 15 ноября 1940 г. пройти регистрацию в областном отделе образования.³ Только библиотеки образовательных учреж-

² С. Костилева, *Документи Головліту УРСР як джерело вивчення системи політико-ідеологічного контролю над друкованими ЗМІ* [Documents of “Golovlit of the USSR (Chief Office of Literature and Publishing Outfit Affairs) as a source of the research of the system of the political-ideological control of printed mass media], in <http://histans.com/JournALL/pro/13/4.pdf> (Accessed 10.11.2013).; А.В. Блюм, *Закат Главлита: Как разрушалась система советской цензуры: документальная хроника 1985–1991 гг.* [Decline of “Glavlit”: The way how the system of the Soviet censorship has been destroyed: documental chronicle of 1985 – 1991-s], in <http://www.opentextnn.ru/censorship/russia/sov/libraries/books/blium/?id=3888> (Accessed 10.11.2013).

³ *Реєстрація бібліотек: Оголошення обласного відділу народної освіти* [Registration

дений (школ, университета и т.п.) смогли сохраниться, но только в количественном измерении, а составу их фондов было уделено особое внимание.

Одним из основных методов цензуры в библиотеках было проведение “чисток” фондов от так называемой “идеологически вредной” литературы, осуществляемых в соответствии с инструкциями и разного рода списками. В эти списки, утвержденные государственными органами, вносились издания, подлежащие изъятию и конфискации из публичных библиотек и те, которые не вписывались в прокураторство ложе коммунистической идеологии.

В ежегодные приказы Главлита входил пункт: “Осуществить учет всех библиотек, обязать все библиотеки составлять инвентарные списки книг, привлечь к проверке библиотек партийный актив”. Имелась в виду проверка библиотек с целью изъятия литературы.⁴ Такие проверки и “чистки” фондов библиотек органы Главлита осуществляли целенаправленно и систематически. Так, уже 3 января 1941 г. бюро Черновицкого обкома КП(б)У рассмотрело вопрос “Об изъятии вредной литературы”.⁵ Бюро утвердило представленный обллитом список литературы местных авторов, которую предлагалось изъять как “вредную” и “устаревшую”. Обллит обязал провести изъятие этой литературы из всех библиотек и книготорговой сети. Таким образом, то, что буковинцы хранили веками, обогащали и приумножали, в течение года было разграблено. Изъятые книги или вывозились, в т. ч. и в Москву, или уничтожались. Этим был нанесен огромный непоправимый удар духовным сокровищам края.

В крупных городах создавали центры концентрации литературы (национализированных библиотечных фондов). В Черновцах таким центром концентрации стала библиотека Черновицкого университета. Некоторые вновь созданные организации и учреждения самостоятельно обращались с просьбами, чтобы забрали книги, которые им достались с предыдущих лет. В частности Черновицкая школа № 3 обратилась с просьбой в университет, чтобы отдать свою библиотеку.⁶

of libraries: announcement of the regional department of the national education], in “Радянська Буковина”, 1940, 27 жовтня, с.4.

⁴ *Центральный государственный архив высших органов власти и управления Украины (далее ЦГАВО)* [Central State Archive of the Upper Organs of the authority and administration of Ukraine (hereafter CSAUO)], ф. 4762 Комитет по делам культпросвет учреждений УССР, оп. 1, д. 4, стр. 5-6.

⁵ *Государственный архив Черновицкой области (далее ГАЧО)* [State Archive of Chernivtsi region (hereafter SACHR)], ф. 1 Партархив Черновицкого обкома КПУ, оп. 1, д. 85, стр. 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ф. Р82 Черновицкий государственный университет, оп. 1, д. 10, стр. 14.

В послевоенные годы работа по “очистке” библиотечных фондов была продолжена. Главлит СССР по указанию отдела агитации и пропаганды ЦК ВКП (б) ввел новое положение о спецфондах литературы, которое активизировало процесс проверки и очистки книжных фондов страны. Стали регулярно публиковаться очередные списки на изъятие, включавшие произведения многочисленных авторов, которые стали жертвами репрессий или различных идеологических кампаний - против “буржуазных космополитов”, “критиков антипатриотов”, “перерожденцев” в истории, философии, в литературе и искусстве, ученых-генетиков и др. В целом, в документах Главлита и партийных органов регулярно констатировалось, что “библиотеки Западной Украины засорены вредной литературой”.⁷

В 1946 г. выходит Постановление Совета Министров № 1566 “О проверке книжных фондов в библиотеках СССР”, в котором было проанализировано состояние проверки библиотечных фондов. Констатировалось, что в большинстве западных областей Украины была закончена проверка части книжных фондов на украинском и русском языках, а книги на иностранных языках из всех сельских и районных библиотек изъяты и переданы областным библиотекам. При отсутствии соответствующих специалистов на местах, книжные фонды областных библиотек оставались длительное время неупорядоченными, в частности в библиотеках Черновицкой области таких книг насчитывалось более 60 тыс.⁸

В библиотеке Черновицкого университета, которая исполняла роль местного пункта концентрации национализированных библиотечных фондов, проводилась значительная работа по упорядочению документов. По состоянию на 1946 г. около 800 тыс. экземпляров документов фонда были разобраны, обработаны и расставлены. Оставалось еще более 150 тыс. неразобранных. Постоянно продолжала поступать литература по сценарию концентрации – от бывших профессоров университета, из Резиденции митрополитов и других учреждений и организаций. Так, в 1947 г. в библиотеку поступило около 20 тыс. книг, в основном на польском языке, из костела.⁹ Документы были в довольно плохом гигиеническом состоянии, покрытые плесенью.

⁷ ЦГАВО [CSAUO], ф. 4762 Комитет по делам культпросвет учреждений УССР, оп. 1, д. 5, стр. 46; *Ibid.*, д. 120, стр. 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, д. 119, стр. 4.

⁹ *Отчет о работе научной библиотеки Черновицкого государственного университета за 1947 г.* [Report of the work of the Scientific library of Chernivtsi State University for the year of 1947], с. 9.

По состоянию на 1 января 1951 г. был окончательно подсчитан библиотечный фонд университетской библиотеки – 798615 экз. Сравнивая это количество с данными 1946 г. наблюдается разница – около 150 тыс. единиц документов, которые, скорее всего, были уничтожены или переданы в другие библиотеки СССР.¹⁰

Конечно, в это время университетская библиотека не могла оставаться вне политической жизни общества. Философская дискуссия, дискуссия по вопросам биологии, “разоблачения космополитов в литературе и науке” вызвали соответствующее направление в работе библиотеки. Чистке подлежали не только фонды, но и справочный аппарат библиотеки. После публикаций в газетах “Правда” (28.01.1949) – “Об одной антипатриотической группе театральных критиков”, и “Культура и жизнь” (30.01.1949) – “На чужих позициях”, прошла “чистка” картотек от произведений “космополитов”. Был пересмотрен раздел “Биология” в картотеках и каталогах, из которого изъяли произведения “вейсманистов-морганистов”. Изъятые каталожные карточки изолировали и держали отдельно.¹¹

В марте 1951 г. на Ученом совете университета при обсуждении состояния работы библиотеки, особое внимание было обращено на работу с фондом иностранной литературы. В состав комиссии по “идеологической проверке документов” были включены научные работники, преподаватели. В течение года были проверены более 50 тыс. книг, из которых более 3700 экземпляров, с формулировкой “идеологически невыдержанная” литература, были изъяты из фонда.¹² Проверка фонда проводилась и в последующие годы. Так, в 1954 г. комиссией по идеологической проверке иностранной литературы было проверено около 23 тыс. томов. В результате проверки 937 документов были переданы в спецфонд, который уже тогда насчитывал более 60 тыс. книг, журналов и газет.¹³

В 1961 г. Министерство культуры УССР издает приказ “Об очистке книжных фондов библиотек республики от устаревшей литературы”. В Черновицкой области после проведения “очистки” облитом были изъяты для проверки инвентарные книги всех библиотек. После этого работники

¹⁰ О. Шилюк, *Наукова бібліотека Чернівецького університету в 40-х роках ХХ ст.* [Scientific Library of Chernivtsi University in 1940-s] in «Науковий вісник Чернівецького університету», 2008, Вип. 376/377, с. 50.

¹¹ *Отчет о работе ... за 1947 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1947], с.27.

¹² *Отчет о работе ... за 1951 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1951], с.13.

¹³ *Отчет о работе ... за 1954 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1954], с.12.

управления культуры и обллита выезжали на места для повторной проверки фондов библиотек.¹⁴

Проверки библиотечного фонда и его “очистки” по идеологическим мотивам продолжались до конца 1980-х гг. Так, в 1986 г. специально созданной комиссией проводилась проверка фонда иностранного книгохранилища на “идеологическую чистоту” и очистка от устаревшей и изношенной литературы.¹⁵ В работе библиотеки оставался акцент на идеологическом воздействии на читателей, активной пропаганде литературы и участии в борьбе с “проявлениями чуждой идеологии”.¹⁶

Особое место в библиотеках СССР занимали так называемые специальные хранилища (спецфонд, “спецхран”), подразделения, в которые по распоряжению цензурных органов передавались книги и периодические издания, доступ к которым, по мнению цензора, можно было предоставлять только по специальному разрешению. Масштабы советских спецхранов были просто гигантскими: в некоторых из них до 1987 г. находилось до полумиллиона книг и периодических изданий.¹⁷

Личный состав отделов спецхранов в библиотеках Западной Украины изначально формировался исключительно из прибывших советских кадров – членов коммунистической партии, ВЛКСМ.¹⁸ Состав литературы, подлежащей передаче в спецхран, постоянно детализировался. Со временем не только расхождение содержания книги с политикой коммунистической партии было основанием для помещения книги в спецхран, но и личность автора. Если автор попадал в списки “врагов народа”, его книги немедленно изымались из библиотек. Впоследствии в спецхран начала поступать научная литература по биологии, ядерной физике, психологии, социологии, кибернетике, генетике.

В 1987 г. приступила к работе Межведомственная комиссия, возглавляемая Главлитом СССР, которая начала пересмотр изданий с целью передачи их из спецхранилищ в свободное использование. К 1990 г. этот процесс почти

¹⁴ ЦГАВО [CSAUO], ф. 5116 Министерство культуры УССР, оп. 9, д. 419, с. 40.

¹⁵ *Отчет о работе ... за 1986 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1986], с.14.

¹⁶ *Отчет о работе ... за 1988 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1988], с.15.

¹⁷ А. В. Блюм, *Советская цензура в эпоху тотального террора. 1929-1953*. [Soviet censorship in the period of total terror. 1929 – 1953] in <http://opentextnn.ru/censorship/russia/sov/libraries/books/blium/total/> (Accessed 10.11.2013).

¹⁸ Л. Кусий, *Спецфонд Львівської філії бібліотеки АН УРСР: початки організації (1940 – 1941)* [Special fund of Lviv department of the library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: beginnings of organization (1940 – 1941)], in «Записки ЛНБ ім. В. Стефаника НАН України», 2007, Вип. 15. с.366.

езде был завершен. Такое подразделение как спецхран прекратил свое существование в структуре библиотек.

Отдел спецфондов, который функционировал в библиотеке Черновицкого университета, был порождением советской цензуры, направленной на изъятие и уничтожение идеологически враждебных власти изданий. Несмотря на то, что официально спецхран научной библиотеки Черновицкого университета был создан в марте 1947 г., еще в 1946 г. была начата работа по отбору документов из фонда.¹⁹

Деятельность по отбору книг в спецхраны не была достаточно активной. В январе 1949 г. выходит приказ № 1 Комитета по делам культурно-просветительных учреждений УССР, где отмечалось, что в библиотеках не уделяется должное внимание систематической проверке книжных фондов библиотек и изъятию “идеологически враждебной” литературы, а руководители библиотек и библиотечные работники будут несут персональную ответственность за идеологическое состояние книжных фондов. Библиотекам запрещалось без разрешения Главлита выдавать читателям книги, которые получены не через книготорговую сеть, а от отдельных лиц или взамен утерянных читателем.²⁰

К 1950 г. в спецхран университетской библиотеки было уже отобрано более 21 тыс. документов. Кроме того, при повышении производственной квалификации библиотекарей проводились “библиографические хроники” – сообщалась информация о книгах, которые были подвергнуты резкой критике, и указания как работать с такими изданиями. В 1954 г. спецхран университетской библиотеки уже насчитывал более 60 тыс. экземпляров книг, журналов и газет.²¹ Использование документов в спецхранилище было весьма незначительным, так в течение 1962 г. были обслужены 24 читателя и выполнены 329 книговыдач.²²

Спецхран активно наполнялся до конца 1980-х годов. Начиная с 1988 г., в соответствии с приказами Минвуза УССР, была развернута работа по переводу в открытые фонды изданий, находящихся в фонде спецхранов. Работа по переводу документов из спецхрана в открытые фонды библиотеки Черновицкого университета осуществлялась комиссией утвержденной ректором, которая

¹⁹ *Отчет о работе ... за 1946 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1946], с.42.

²⁰ ГАЧО [SACHR], ф. Р945 Черновицкая государственная обласная библиотека, оп. 1, д. 22, стр. 21.

²¹ *Отчет о работе ... за 1954 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1954], с.12.

²² *Отчет о работе ... за 1962 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1962], с.19.

состояла из ученых различных кафедр и библиотечных работников. По решению комиссии был значительно упрощен доступ к тем изданиям, которые находились в спецфонде.²³ Комиссия пересмотрела около 5 тыс. изданий, более 3 тыс. из которых были возвращены в открытые фонды. Кроме того, в эти же фонды были переданы 400 изданий, ранее отмеченных в приказах Главлита. В фондах сектора спецхрана остались, в основном, документы на немецком и румынском языках, изданные на Буковине в период II-й Мировой войны, не рекомендованные членами Библиотечного совета для передачи в общие фонды. К 1990 г. процесс передачи книг из спецхранов в открытое использование почти во всех библиотеках был завершен. Такое подразделение, как “спецхран”, прекратило свое существование в структуре библиотек.

Советская библиотечная цензура проявлялась также в других направлениях работы библиотек, в частности она имела особенности в организации обслуживания читателей, ограничивая его коммунистическим воспитанием, осуществляя регулирование информационных потребностей читателей и применяя идеологический диктат. Воздействуя на повышение политического образования среди читателей, библиотекари заставляли знакомиться с советской пропагандистской идеологически выдержанной литературой, кроме того организовывали кружки политграмоты и политпросвещения. Анализировались читательские формуляры, а также велись специальные анкеты, которые способствовали детальному изучению информационных потребностей читателей. Эти и другие мероприятия по информационно-библиотечному обслуживанию свидетельствуют о цензурном контроле над читателями библиотек.

В целом, партийные и правительственные директивные документы 40-80-х гг. поставили деятельность всех библиотек, в том числе и научной библиотеки Черновицкого университета, в жесткие идеологические рамки, согласно которым нужно было лишь покорно и точно выполнять указания большевистской партии. Библиотека находилась в условиях перманентных изъятий исторической, художественной литературы и периодических изданий, которые, по оценке цензуры, признавались буржуазно-националистическими и вредными делу социалистического строительства. Книжные “чистки” практически продолжались до начала 80-х годов. Кроме того, с идейных позиций осуществлялись книжное обеспечение, подписка периодических

²³ *Отчет о работе ... за 1988 г.* [Report of the work ... for the year of 1988], с.12.

изданий и вообще все пополнение библиотечного фонда. Централизованно библиотека получала большое количество преимущественно русскоязычной, общественно-политической и научной литературы, лишь незначительную часть поступлений составляли книги на украинском языке. Стало невозможным приобретение иностранной литературы гуманитарного направления. Такой односторонний подход в сочетании с регулярными “чистками” и изъятиями предопределял все большую деформацию библиотечного фонда.

Введение различных видов цензуры в западноукраинских библиотеках во второй половине XX в. привело к почти полной деформации их фондов. Только единичные уникальные библиотечные фонды, сформированные на протяжении веков, смогли сохраниться благодаря статусу библиотек учебных заведений. Остатки фондов передавались в специально созданные “спецхраны”, что привело к изъятию для нескольких поколений из научного и культурного обращения значительного пласта украинской и мировой культуры. Образование информационного вакуума и обеспечение пользователей исключительно идеологически выдержанными изданиями подтверждает применение идеологического насилия, содействие деформации общественного сознания. Чистки фондов библиотек негативно отразились на читательской активности, поскольку подбор литературы в фондах уже не удовлетворял интересы пользователей.

**POWER STRUCTURES IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.
THE GENDARMERIE IN BUKOVINA BETWEEN 1938 AND 1949¹**

Among the important functions of the contemporary state are those related to the assurance of public order, control and prevention of antisocial phenomena, and the safeguard of rights and freedoms of the individuals. The state is the only institution in the international society that has the legitimate right to appeal to force, to hold, control and coordinate instruments / power structures in order to the support its functions. A special role among the democratic institutions meant to help ensure law and order is held by the gendarmerie. With a centuries-old tradition in Western Europe, with an experience of over a century in Romania, the gendarmerie – as contemporary state organism – develops not only nationally, through better regulation and normative laws and experience in exercising duties, but also internationally, through cooperation with similar bodies in other countries of the world and by participating in multinational organizations, such as the European Gendarmerie Force, to which it belongs with full rights since 2009, and the Romanian Gendarmerie.

However, at different times and under different regimes, the gendarmerie has not always been put to serve the interests of society, the nation, but – particularly during authoritarian or totalitarian political systems – to watch and to act in order to impose the will of rulers, including through repression, to protect and maintain social order in the face of the attempts of population to overthrow injustice, to eliminate arbitrariness and establish the rule of law and people's control over the authorities. Thus, we can not separate the evolution of an institution from the history of the society it was, or still is, part of, with all its positive and negative forms.

The elaboration of a study focused on the analysis of a turbulent period of time in the evolution of the Romanian Gendarmerie, with a special focus on the activities carried out in a region located at the north-eastern borders of the country - administrative borders and political system both in a continuous metamorphosis, with all the inherent implications of the fluctuations in domestic policy under the impact of the international context, subject to constant external pressure from the Soviets and undermined by subversive actions of the Bolshevik supporters and of the nationalists of various ethno-political orientations, is, therefore, a complex attempt that must be carried out on a minefield of conflicting information and interpretations not always

¹ Eugen Șalar, *Organizarea și activitățile Jandarmeriei în Bucovina în perioada 1938 – 1949*, Suceava, Editura Lidana, 2013, 668 p.

grounded, but also, simultaneously covered in layers of documents, memoirs and studies that make this an epic time-consuming labor.

Given the role of the Gendarmerie in Romanian contemporary society, its place in the process of strengthening the rule of law and also the need to clarify how the Gendarmerie acted and reacted during a none too favorable decade for national consolidation and creativity, the study prepared by Eugen Șalar is up-to-date and relevant to the historical knowledge. The subject in the center of the author's analysis exhibits particular interest in deciphering attitudes of the decision-makers and performers during troubled situations by highlighting some reactions that place them within or outside the borders of legality, by providing to the interested the experience of earlier generations.

The first chronological limit of his research is 1938, when King Charles II has annulled the democratic constitutional regime and established an authoritarian regime; the second one marks the dissolution of the gendarmerie by the authorities of the new totalitarian state.

The paper is based on the author's doctoral thesis and numerous documentary sources identified in the National Archives of Romania, the Romanian Military Archives, Central Archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Suceava County National Archives Botosani County National Archives, the State Archives in the Chernivtsi region (Ukraine) as well as in various volumes of documents, media, official bulletins, memoirs of contemporaries etc.

Following the logic of academic discourse, Eugen Șalar establishes the chronological limits in *The Introduction*, motivates his choice, presents the sources used, mentions researchers who directly or indirectly covered different issues also analyzed in this review, explains the architecture of his endeavor and highlights the ideas later discussed in the four chapters of his work. Unfortunately, this chapter lacks critical perspective on the achievements of predecessors and the aspects unattended by contemporary historiography, which would have better emphasized the author's contribution to a better understanding of the past.

Chapter I is a picture of Bukovina gendarmerie during the regime of Carol II, preceded by a history of the Romanian gendarmerie in the Romanian principalities, in the Austrian Bukovina and after the Great Union. Relevant to mention are the author's remarks on the threats and risk factors that occurred during the administration of Carol which offer a view of the 1938-1940 background that the gendarmerie had to face. Coherent, logical and detailed, the study presents the law changes, the functions and powers of gendarmerie that occurred after the new undemocratic legislation had been enforced, the administrative-territorial reorganization of the country's provinces and its implications on the national and regional structures of the gendarmerie.

Based on the data collected in various archives and using specialized literature, the author analyzes the legal actions and those that exceeded the legal framework undertaken by bodies of the Bukovina gendarmerie against the far left, the far right, the religious sects, the Jews, and also presenting the routine activities carried out by the gendarmerie troops. An interesting chapter in the history of the gendarmerie in the north part of the country is the one that refers to the organization of the process of

reception, supervision and management of the flow of military and civilian Polish refugees in the fall of 1939, when the collaboration between the local administrations, the military and police authorities and population created favorable conditions that allowed the transit of thousands of Poles who did not wish to remain in the territories occupied by the Germans and the Soviets. The narrow outlook of the political factor caused the dramatic evacuation of Romanian territories annexed by the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1940, when the gendarmerie had to simultaneously ensure order and withdraw to the rapid advance of the Red Army, which resulted in casualties on the part of Bukovina gendarmerie, with numerous attacks against its honor and integrity, both from the Soviet military, as well as from the communists and their partisans among the locals.

The second chapter analyzes the process of adapting to the new political (military and legionary regime) and geopolitical (territorial losses in the summer of 1940) context. Complex relationships between Ion Antonescu and the legionnaires influenced the organization and good functioning of the Romanian Gendarmerie which thus had to manage the controversial issue of the legionary police as the Legion attempted to force the Gendarmerie to give up competent personnel and hire instead people from the supporters of the far right. From September 1940 to January 1941, as indications of the author show, was a confusing time for the gendarmerie, as it had to simultaneously cooperate with the legionnaires and combat their illegalities, accept Legionary ideology and remain outside the political propaganda. Meanwhile, the events arising in Europe made the work of law enforcement increasingly difficult and complex near the USSR borders. Interesting information here refers to the Legionary rebellion in Bukovina and Gendarmerie actions against the legionnaires, and the reinstatement of 'normality' after the removal of the legionnaires from the government.

The third and most extensive chapter approaches the evolution of Bukovina gendarmerie during the war against the Soviet Union (June 1941 - August 1944). In order to outline the context, Eugen Șalar highlights the Ukrainian irredentist activity in Bukovina (the author's statement on page 205 that the Ukrainian nationalist movement in northern Bukovina appeared in 1921 must be corrected. In fact, this movement appeared in the 1870s-1880s). The author underlines the attempts and terrorist acts of Soviet paratroopers, the undisguised horthyst claims to acquire new Romanian territories, and also the complex relationship between the German minority in Bukovina and the Third Reich. From the point of view of logical and chronological organization of information on the destiny of the Romanian gendarmes took prisoners in June 1940 or arrested later by the Soviets, this part should have been included in the second chapter.

The participation of gendarmerie troops in replacing Soviet administration and the restoration of the Romanian gendarmerie and administration in the territories liberated in 1941 are extensively approached. The new regulations on the functions and duties of the gendarmerie in the context of Romania's participation in the anti-Soviet war, the reorganization of the gendarmerie by means of a clearer delimitation of responsibilities, and the involvement in social activities have not been left out of

the pertinent analysis by the PHD student. The study also addressed issues related to the status and disciplinary practice, the training forms, the organization of the gendarmerie formations etc.

Given the status of orthodoxy as state religion, the gendarmerie had the mission to oppose the activities of the numerous religious sects from Bukovina in the decades before the World War II. Yet the most difficult missions were related to supervising and annihilating the activity of extremist political movements (communist and legionary). However, from the point of view of the human drama, mention should be made on the involvement of the gendarmerie in executing the orders to deport the Jews and gypsies from Bukovina. Even though they were assigned orders, it is clear that some responsibilities involved special efforts and, often, huge toils in persuading the inhabitants to comply with the law under the current state of belligerence. Forced, for the second time, to evacuate northern Bukovina, the gendarmerie – with all its unexplainable and justifiable excesses – was a factor of relative order and stability in the territories liberated from the Soviet domination.

The evolution and dissolution of the gendarmerie in the early postwar years, marked by the communist regime brought by Soviet tanks, are the main subjects of the fourth chapter. The author discusses the international and domestic context that led to the overthrow of Antonescu's regime, and approaches, based on documents and testimonies of contemporaries, the seized control of gendarmerie by the communists, who removed people resisting politicization and Sovietization by employing faithful supporters and resorting to ideological perversion etc. The new social and political framework led to reorganizing the gendarmerie by redefining its duties and restricting its powers; it allowed the government to use this weapon to impose a totalitarian system, which all culminated in the dissolution of the gendarmerie and the restructure of law enforcement bodies based on Soviet model. To highlight revitalization of tradition through the reinstatement of gendarmerie after the fall of the communism, the author makes a survey of all security troops that replaced the gendarmerie troops in 1949, and later reinstated in 1990.

The synthetic conclusions, too succinct for such a large amount of information brought together in the study, and the numerous interpretations suggested by the author, are complemented by several dozen annexes, including documents, charts, sketches, drawings, photographs extremely useful for understanding the subject under investigation.

The volume prepared by Eugene Șalar is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the past historical province of Bukovina and an important piece in the architecture of studies dedicated to power structures of modern Romania, providing readers and practitioners a clear, documented and fairly objective view on a controversial historical period.

Ștefan PURICI

Ștefan cel Mare University of Suceava

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Mariam Chkhartishvili is currently Director of the *Institute of Georgian History* at the Faculty of Humanities, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University and **Head** of the *Department of Medieval History of Georgia* at the same university. Fields of scholarly interests: Political and Cultural History of Medieval Georgia; Modern history of Georgia; Georgian hagiography as historical source. Since 1999 has been involved in the research projects supported by grants of Georgian Academy of Sciences and Georgian National Foundation for Georgian Studies, Humanities and Social Sciences (Rustaveli Foundation). Representative books: *Georgian Ethnic in the Epoch of Religious Conversion* (2009); *Coverage of the Process of the Georgian National Consolidation in Print Media. Georgians as Readers of Iveria* (2011, co-author K. Mania).

Mobile phone: +995599714015; E-mail: mary.chkhartishvili@gmail.com

Sergiu Cornea, Associate Professor in Public Administration, is currently Vice-Rector on Scientific Activity & International Relations at Cahul State University “B. P. Hasdeu”. He is member of the Association of Historians of the Republic of Moldova and published dozen of scientific, methodical and didactic studies in the History and Public Administration domains. His main fields of research are related to the Administrative Organization of Bessarabia under the Russian Empire Occupation, the History of Public Administration, and Territorial Organization of Public Power.

Phone: +37329925485; E-mail: s_cornea@yahoo.com

Raluca Dima holds a Master Degree in the Management of International Relations and European Policies, at the “Babes-Bolyai” University of Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of History and Philosophy, obtained in 2010. She prepares a PhD Thesis: “The Romanian Orthodox Church as a transnational actor. The relations between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Orthodox communities in Western Europe after 1990”. Her fields of interest include: religion and politics, sociology of religion and transnational studies.

Mobile phone: +40743938876; E-mail: ralue_dima@yahoo.fr

Larisa Dodkhudoeva is currently Head of Ethnographic Department in the Institute of History, Archaeology, Ethnography at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic

of Tajikistan. Her researches are focused basically on Gender studies and history of women in Tajikistan.

Mobile phone: +992372257776; E-mail: sofikomalik@gmail.com

Alina Felea has a Ph.D from Institute of History of Academy of Science of Moldova in 2001. She is a scientific researcher at Institute of History, State and Law of Academy of Science of Moldova. Her research interests include some topics as „Mentalities and everyday life in the medieval and modern times”, “History of medieval towns in Eastern Europe”, “Testamentary legacy in Eastern Europe and South East”.

Mobile phone: +37379629964, E-mail: afelea44@yahoo.com

Radu Gabriel Ichim is currently a Ph.D. student at Faculty of History and Geography, Ștefan cel Mare University of Suceava, Romania. He is finishing his Ph.D thesis on work and life of the Primate Metropolitan of Romania, Calinic Miclescu (1822-1886). Field of interest: history of the Romanian Orthodox Church in 18th-19th centuries.

Phone: +40742973355; E-mail: ichim_radu_gabriel@yahoo.com

Vazha I. Kiknadze is currently Director of the Iv. Javakhishvili Institute of History and Ethnology at Tbilisi State University. He is the author of over 100 scientific papers and 5 monographs. The last one has been published in New York, by E. Mellen Press, in 2013. His works are notable for innovation, covering a wide chronological spectrum from the middle centuries until the beginning of XXth century. Phone: +99532527187 E-mail: vazhakiknadze@yahoo.com

Marinel Ovidiu Koch – Tufiş is currently a Ph.D. student at the Faculty of History, University „Karl Franzens” in Graz, Austria. His dissertation focuses on the aspects of absolutist policy of the Habsburgs in Transylvania, Banat and Oltenia, in the 18th century. He is author of several articles and studies about mining, metallurgy and population of Banat and Transylvania.

Phone: + 06765744067, E-mail: marinelovidiu.kochtufis@edu.uni-graz.at

Harieta Mareci-Sabol is Lecturer at the Faculty of History and Geography of the “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava. She received her Ph.D. from “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași in 2002 with a thesis on Romanian historiography. In this field of study, she has published one monograph and several articles. Her research interest focuses on Bukovina’s cultural history and its personalities.

Phone: +4740764695, E-mail: harieta@atlas.usv.ro

Ștefan Purici graduated from Chernivtsy University, Ukraine, in 1989, his specialization being World History. He obtained his PhD in 1995, with a thesis on the Romanian national movement in Bukovina (1775-1861). He is currently Professor in the Department of Human, Social and Political Sciences, Faculty of History and Geography, Ștefan cel Mare University of Suceava, where he is also Vice-Rector for International Relations. His research interests include the history of Bukovina, International Relations, European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. He is contributor to various international collections of articles and is the author of a several books, studies and articles.

Phone: +4070869075; E-mail: stefanp@atlas.usv.ro

Natalia Pushkareva is Professor, Leading Research Fellow and Head of Women's and Gender Studies Department at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Editor of the Yearbook „Sotsialnaya istoriya” (Social History). She is also the President of “Russian Association for Research in Women's History” (from 2002) and Member of the Board of the “International Federation for Research in Women's History”. She published a dozen of monographs and collections of essays, among them – *Women in Medieval Rus* (Moscow, Mysl: 1989), *Women in Russia and in Europe at the Dawn of the Modern Age* (Moscow, IEA: 1996), *Women in Russian History from the 10th to the 20th c.* (New York, M.E. Sharp, 1997), *Gender Theory and Historical Sciences* (St.-Petersburg, 2007). She is also one of the contributors of the volume *Shame, Blame, and Culpability. Crime and violence in the modern state*, edited by J. Rowbotham, M. Muravyeva, D. Nash (Routledge: SOLON, 2012).

Phone: +79163249389; E-mail: pushkarev@mail.ru

Lorina P. Repina is Associate Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vice-Director of the Institute of World History of the RAS, and the President of the Russian Society for Intellectual History. Research interests: Theory of History, Methods of Historical Research, Intellectual History, Gender History, Urban History.

Mobile phone: +79037453782; E-mail: lorinarepina@yandex.ru

Oleh Shylyuk is currently Deputy Director of the Scientific Library of the Yuriy Fed'kovych Chernivtsi National University. His research is devoted to the topic *The development of libraries in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR (1939-1991 years)*. He is author of several articles and studies about history of libraries in Western Ukraine, the characteristics of their activities.

Phone: +38 0372584771; E-mail: o.shylyuk@chnu.edu.ua

Dan-Dragos Sichigea graduated from “Ovidius” University of Constanța in 2009. He holds a Master degree in International Relations in the XX-XXI centuries at the same university. His research interests are focused on international relations during the Second World War and the Cold War era and Romanian participation in the former Warsaw Pact.

Phone: +40742272286; E-mail: dragos_sichigea@yahoo.com

Dovile Troskovaite is currently a junior researcher at University of Klaipeda, Department of History and Archeology. She is finishing her Ph.D. thesis on the formation of self-identity of Polish Karaites in the first half of the 20th century. She is also a junior researcher at Vilnius University, Faculty of History, working in an international team of researchers, who investigate the demographical and social structure of Jews and Karaites in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 18th century.

Phone: +37068411853; E-mail: dovile.troskovaite@gmail.com

Katarzyna Wagner is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of History, University of Warsaw, Poland and works in the Historical Museum of Warsaw. Her dissertation focuses on inequality in Polish cities in the 17th and 18th century (during the “Deluge” and the Great Northern War). Her fields of interest include political and economic history, Polish-Swedish relations in 17-18th century, and the history of cities in 17-18th century.

Phone: +48604051914, E-mail: wagner.katarzyna@gmail.com